

UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Zoran D. Kovačević

**Ideas of Darwinism in the Classical-Realist Theory
of International Relations**

Doctoral Dissertation

Belgrade, 2024

UNIVERZITET U BEOGRADU
FAKULTET POLITIČKIH NAUKA

Zoran D. Kovačević

**Ideje darvinizma u klasično-realističkoj teoriji
međunarodnih odnosa**

doktorska disertacija

Beograd, 2024

Supervisor:

Dr Filip Ejđus, Full-Time Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade

Members of the committee:

Dr Dragan Simić, Full-Time Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade

Dr Dejan Jović, Full-Time Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Dr Marko Kovačević, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade

Date of defence: _____

Acknowledgement

This dissertation was largely written at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, while a smaller portion was written at La Sapienza University of Rome. I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Filip Ejodus, who helped me specify the topic of this research and more than once showed me the way out of the scientific mist I was in. I owe my sincere gratitude to the Faculty of Political Sciences administrative staff, from the library to the student services. Finally, I owe thanks to my family and those sincere friends and colleagues who supported me throughout this challenging journey.

Ideas of Darwinism in the Classical-Realist Theory of International Relations

Abstract

Despite the fact that most classical realists have prided themselves on “biological heritage” within their theory, IR scholars have so far rarely explored its roots seriously. Classical realism and biological realism are occasionally used as synonyms, but this “biological” aspect seems to be insufficiently explored without the role and key insights of Darwinism. Even though certain aspects of Darwinism have gained influence in IR in the past three decades, seminal works have not discovered the connection between ideas of Darwinism and classical realism. That being the case, this dissertation tends to answer two main questions: 1) Does classical realism implicitly or explicitly rely on ideas of Darwinism? 2) Does classical realism need ideas of Darwinism to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness and coherence? The main finding of this research is that ideas of Darwinism are present and necessary for classical realism, both in its origin and in substance. The origin is reflected in those theorists and philosophers on whose backing classical realism built its basis of international politics in a theoretical and substantive sense. The substance is demonstrated in key ideas and principles of Darwinism found in the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau, who is considered the genuine founder of classical realism. As a direct consequence, this analysis demonstrates that ideas of Darwinism are part of the classical realist hard core and protective belt in the sense Imre Lakatos is referring to in his philosophy of science.

Keywords: Darwinism, classical realism, Hans J. Morgenthau, biology, hard-core, protective belt, content analysis

Scientific field: Political Sciences

Scientific subfield: International Studies

UDC number: 327:316.75(611/612:32)

Ideje darvinizma u klasično-realističkoj teoriji međunarodnih odnosa

Rezime

Iako se većina klasičnih realista ponosila “biološkim nasleđem” unutar te teorije, istraživači međunarodnih odnosa su sasvim retko i ozbiljno istraživali korene ovog nasleđa. Klasični realizam i biološki realizam se povremeno koriste kao sinonimi, ali ovaj “biološki” aspekt je nepotpun bez uloge i ključnih uvida darvinizma. I pored toga što su određeni aspekti darvinizma u protekle tri decenije dobili na značaju u disciplini o međunarodnim odnosima, radovi nisu posvetili dovoljno pažnje da ispituju suštinsku vezu između ideja darvinizma i klasičnog realizma. Imajući to u vidu, ova disertacija teži da odgovori na dva glavna pitanja: 1) Da li se klasični realizam implicitno ili eksplicitno oslanja na ideje darvinizma? 2) Da li su klasičnom realizmu potrebne ove ideje kako bi zadržao svoj teorijski identitet, svoju posebnost i koherentnost? Glavni nalaz ovog istraživanja je da su ideje darvinizma prisutne, ali i neophodne za klasični realizam. To se potvrđuje u njenom poreklu, ali i u samoj suštini ove teorije. Poreklo se ogleda u onim teoretičarima i filozofima koji su direktno ili indirektno uticali na izgradnju i razvoj ove teorije u konceptualnom i sadržinskom smislu. Sa druge strane, sama suština se demonstrira u ključnim idejama i principima darvinizma koje pronalazimo kod osnivača i glavnog predstavnika klasičnog realizma - Hansa Morgentaua. Ova analiza ukazuje da su ideje darvinizma deo tvrdog jezgra i zaštitnog pojasa teorije klasičnog realizma u smislu o kojem govori Imre Lakatoš u svojoj filozofiji nauke.

Ključne reči: darvinizam, klasični realizam, Hans Morgentau, tvrdo jezgro, zaštitni pojas, biologija, analiza sadržaja

Naučna oblast: Političke nauke

Uža naučna oblast: Međunarodne studije

UDK: 327:316.75(611/612:32)

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: Introduction	10
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review	14
2.1. Review of the literature on classical realism	14
2.2. Review of the literature on the biological interpretations of IR	20
2.2.1. Discussions on the positive contribution of Darwinism in IR and Political Science	20
2.2.2. Critiques of applying Darwinian ideas in IR and Political Science	33
2.3. Gaps and missing pieces.....	37
CHAPTER 3: Theoretical and Methodological Framework.....	40
3.1. Research outline	40
3.2. Theoretical framework	42
3.3. Methodological framework	44
3.4. Final remarks.....	46
CHAPTER 4: Classical realism and Darwinism: Hard Core and Protective Belt	48
4.1. The fundamentals of classical realism.....	48
4.2. Darwinism - ideas and principles	55
4.3. Symbiotic interplay: Where ideas of Darwinism meet classical realism.....	58
4.4. Final remarks.....	67
CHAPTER 5: Classical Realism and the shadow of Darwinism	69
5.1. Classical realist geopolitical history	69
5.1.1. Classical realist thinking in German Geopolitics – Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer	71
5.1.2. Classical realist thinking in Anglo-American geopolitics - Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman.....	80
5.1.3. Conclusion	89
5.2. The actual apostles of classical realism and the legacy of Darwinism: Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt	93
5.2.1. Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism and power-politics.....	94
5.2.2. Max Weber's Darwinism in Disguise.....	98
5.2.3. Carl Schmitt – between Darwinism and Nazism.....	104
5.2.4. Conclusion	111
CHAPTER 6: Ideas of Darwinism in the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau	114
6.1. Introduction	114
6.2. Human nature	117
6.3. The tragedy of struggle.....	121
6.4. Power.....	123
6.5. Survival	127
6.6. Imperialism.....	130
6.7. Morality.....	133
6.8. Fear, adaptation and imitation	138
6.9. Materialism.....	146
6.10. Zero-sum worldview	149
6.11. Conclusion.....	153
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion.....	157
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	168
BIOGRAPHY	200

List of tables and figures

Figure 1. The model of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programmes	43
Table 1. Classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism	50
Figure 2. Classical realism: hard core and protective belt	54
Figure 3. Ideas of Darwinism	56
Table 2. Classical geopolitics and classical realism	91
Table 3. Nietzsche, Weber, Schmitt and their connection with classical realism and Darwinism.....	112
Table 4. Ideas of Darwinism and the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau.....	156

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Classical realism represents one of the earliest paradigms and an important theory for the discipline of International Relations (IR). It is widely known for its emphasis on the role of human nature and the inherently competitive behaviour of states in the international arena. Despite decades of presence and occasional theoretical dominance within IR, it cannot be argued that classical realism provided entirely clear and complete answers to key questions regarding human nature, state behaviour and international politics in general. While classical realism significantly influenced the early development of IR as a discipline, its prominence has waned over time. Namely, classical realism in today's scholarship remains marginalized by the overwhelming influence of Kenneth Waltz's structural realism. Other theoretical frameworks and perspectives have also emerged in IR, offering alternative explanations and approaches to understanding international politics. These include constructivism, liberalism, feminism, poststructuralism, and critical theory. The diversification of theoretical perspectives has expanded the intellectual landscape of IR and reduced the dominance of classical realism as a single explanatory framework. However, classical realism still holds value as a theoretical perspective and continues to contribute to ongoing discussions and debates in the field.

Classical realists have often claimed that their theory is deeply rooted in the practice and history of international politics because, according to them, today's world is the same as the one of yesterday and that of tomorrow. In other words, there are eternal political rules that exist, and we have to accept them as they are, such as the fact that politics among nations takes place in an environment of absolute uncertainty. In such an anarchic environment, there are countless possibilities, from conquest and defeat to utter eradication. These possibilities have been, and remain, features of human relations since time immemorial. Classical realism, as a theory, especially focuses on the quest for power, and there are two main reasons why. The first reason is because classical realists saw that the dynamics of power were a constant feature in the international system. The second reason is that they identified that the negative aspects of human nature that generate power are not likely to change at any point. Therefore, it is not surprising that classical realism was often closely associated with the tradition of *Machtpolitik* and *Realpolitik* from the second half of the 19th century.

However, what has been left out of sight is another strong theoretical wave that arose in the 19th century, and that is Darwinism. Ideas derived from Darwinism, in both scientific and unscientific forms, have much to offer for understanding classical realism as an IR theory. Darwinism represents a theory of the evolutionary mechanism proposed by English naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882) after publishing his book *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 as his way of explaining the organic change in living beings. The central premise of Darwinism lies in the understanding that all living organisms, including humans, have evolved over millions of years through the process of natural selection. The "Father of Evolution", as he was often called, made a genuine revolution in the scientific inquiry from then on and remained one of the most argued figures in the scientific and public discourse. Based on his immense knowledge and observations, many other branches developed in the following decades but have always remained part of Darwinism in one way or another. These areas include evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, social Darwinism, Neo-Darwinism, and many others. While Darwinism has the most to offer to the natural sciences, there is a growing interest regarding its contribution to the social sciences. The discipline of IR, as a field of study within social sciences, is anything but excluded from such considerations. Bearing in mind the biological basis of classical realism, this IR theory, in relation to other IR theories, can best serve to analyze the ideas of Darwinism.

This research thus aims to identify and explore the ideas of Darwinism underpinning classical realism. Or better yet, this research seeks to investigate those ideas of Darwinism that are aligned with and follow the logic of basic principles that classical realism proposes, such as the pessimistic side of human nature, struggle for power, survival, and many others. This means that not all ideas of Darwinism will be favorable for the analysis, but only those ideas and principles that fit into the classical realist narrative with regards to human nature and international politics in general. The ideas of Darwinism in this research will be divided into two strands. The first strand represents Darwinian scientific ideas - evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology and ethology - which stand on biological and scientific foundations. The other strand represents social Darwinism, a non-scientific belief system that centers on sociopolitical and ideological dimensions, yet still falls within the framework of Darwinism. As such, the inquiry revolves around two research questions: whether ideas of Darwinism serve as an implicit or explicit foundation within classical realism, and whether they are essential for maintaining the theory's coherence, distinctiveness, and theoretical identity. The main finding is that classical realism both implicitly and explicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism and that those ideas are indeed necessary for classical realism's coherence, distinctiveness, and theoretical identity. The dissertation argues that ideas of Darwinism constitute the so-called "hard core" and "protective belt" of classical realism and that this theory is not the same theory without those ideas. This type of investigation sheds light on the interconnectedness of these two frameworks and the influence of Darwinian thought on the fundamentals of classical realism. In a nutshell, this research uncovers the implicit connections between ideas of Darwinism and classical realism.

As with any research, there are different ways and approaches to attain new scientific insights and knowledge. The author of this dissertation decided to examine the subject in question as a two-step process. The first step involves a historical-analytical approach, addressing the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist origins of classical realism. Essentially, this step will be divided into two influences that classical realism had: one was recognized, and the other was unrecognized. Both recognized and unrecognized influences interacted with Darwinian scientific ideas, primarily in the realm of evolutionary biology but often enough touching on social Darwinist ideas. The second step in this analysis deals with Hans J. Morgenthau and how Darwinian scientific ideas (conventional and modern) and social Darwinist ideas enhance classical realism as an IR theory. Hans J. Morgenthau was chosen as a pivotal figure of classical realism since he is undoubtedly the modern founder of this theory and its most prolific representative. Overall, this two-step process provides a systematic approach to analyzing ideas of Darwinism in classical realism, starting with a historical examination of the Darwinian origin of classical realism and then narrowing the focus to the ideas of Darwinism in the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau.

This research endeavour is important for many reasons. One obvious reason is that it focuses on a completely neglected topic in current scholarship, i.e., the relationship between classical realism and the ideas of Darwinism. This thesis will help address the current shortage of research in this area and provide real value to the IR discipline. Certain aspects of Darwinism are visible in many academic works as a hidden undertone, especially in the theoretical formulations which conceptualize a specific phenomenon. For example, some authors have noted that the classical realist concept of the "struggle for power" has carried overtones of evolutionists' "struggle for survival", while others associated neorealist devotedness on the competitive side of the international system with selection in order to explain the success of some states and the failure of others. Identifying the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist thread that runs through classical realism highlights the underlying conceptual similarities and shared assumptions between these frameworks. This contributes to interdisciplinary knowledge and fosters a better appreciation of the interconnectedness of different fields of study. It also encourages interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration, fostering new insights and perspectives that transcend traditional disciplinary silos. This ultimately contributes to advancing knowledge and developing more holistic approaches to

studying complex phenomena. In other words, research that explores the intersection of Darwinism and classical realism has the potential to bridge disciplinary boundaries between political science, international relations, and evolutionary biology.

On the other hand, both Darwinism and classical realism have interdisciplinary connections that extend beyond their respective fields. The principles and concepts found in these frameworks can be applied to various other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, economy, anthropology, etc. Researching these theories fosters interdisciplinary collaboration and allows a more comprehensive understanding of complex phenomena. On top of that, there is a historical significance involved. Darwinism and classical realism have profoundly impacted their respective fields and shaped our understanding of human behaviour, politics, and biology. Researching these theories helps us appreciate their historical significance and enduring influence on contemporary thought.

Most importantly, this research enhances our understanding of classical realist theory and shows the academic community that this theory is still alive. By investigating the presence of ideas of Darwinism in classical realism, this research can deepen our understanding of the theoretical foundations of classical realism. It provides insights into the intellectual influences that shaped the development of classical realism and highlights the implicit incorporation of Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas within the theory. This contributes to a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of classical realism as a framework in international relations. Lastly, the insights gained from this research can relate to contemporary issues and challenges. Examining the Darwinian aspects of classical realism provides a lens through which to analyze and understand current dynamics in international politics, such as competition for resources, power struggles, and the impact of evolutionary factors on state behaviour.

In addition to this introductory chapter which aims to briefly present the research problem and the structure of the thesis itself, there will be six more consecutive chapters. The second chapter will present a critical overview of the existing theoretical scholarship. This literature review chapter will be divided into three parts. The first will deal with the current status of classical realism as one of the oldest and most influential theories of international politics. This section of the literature review will offer different interpretations of this theory and will tend to display disputes on several levels regarding this theory. The second part will show the key discoveries and developments regarding evolutionary (Darwinian) interpretations of international relations. This body of literature is mainly defined by the generalization of Darwinian or biological principles and their application in the study of human nature and the behaviour of states. This cluster comprises books and articles about the symbiosis between evolutionary theory, biology, Darwinism, and international relations. Essentially, this section aims to point out the authors who delved deeper into the connection between natural and political science. Finally, the last part of the literature review chapter will briefly clarify certain gaps and missing pieces that this research intends to fill in.

The third chapter deals with the theoretical and methodological framework of this research. At the outset, this chapter will elaborate more thoroughly on the research problem and reveal two central research questions of this theoretical research. After that, this chapter will present a theoretical framework in the form of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programmes. Once the theoretical framework is presented and explained, a method suitable for this theoretical inquiry will be revealed. At the very end, this chapter will expose certain strengths and weaknesses of the proposed research project.

The fourth chapter will explain in detail the most prominent traits of classical realism and, at the same time, explain what Darwinism is and what is meant by the ideas of Darwinism. Following that, this chapter will demonstrate which essential ideas and principles of Darwinism this research aims to emphasize and associate with classical realism.

The fifth chapter will examine classical realism's forbears and their intrinsically Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist roots. It will be shown that one can find an unrecognized and recognized influence of Darwinism in classical realist thought. It will begin by discussing classical geopolitics and its recognizable social Darwinist history. Classical (traditional) geopolitics will be divided into two groups: German geopolitics and Anglo-American geopolitics. Scholars that belong to German geopolitics are Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén and Karl Haushofer. In contrast, scholars that belong to Anglo-American geopolitics are Alfred T. Mahan, Halford J. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman. Except for Spykman, all those figures do not officially belong to the canon of classical realism. However, given the pervasiveness of their ideas during the formation of classical realism, it is crucial to understand and scrutinize classical realism through the lens of classical geopolitics. They wrote and formed the classical realist hard core and protective belt concepts as Darwinists. Subsequently, this study will delve into the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt - three influential figures who significantly shaped classical realist thought, particularly Hans J. Morgenthau. Their Darwinian and social Darwinist insights have also penetrated the hard core and protective belt of this IR theory. Taken together, this chapter posits that classical realism is inherently tied to ideas of Darwinism, as many of its foundational concepts can be linked to Darwinian and social Darwinist thought prevalent among theorists and philosophers from the latter half of the 19th to the mid-20th century.

The sixth chapter deals with the founder of classical realism – Hans J. Morgenthau. This German-American jurist and political scientist sit at the epicentre of modern classical realism. Therefore, this part of the research will conduct a detailed analysis of his academic work and reveal his affiliation with the ideas of Darwinism. Ideas derived from Darwinism give meaning and shape his understanding of human nature, struggle, power/survival, moral relativism, and others. Two things will be of essential importance. Firstly, it will expose that Darwinian scientific ideas and principles mentioned in the fourth chapter of this thesis are found in Morgenthau's writings. Modern Darwinian scientific ideas and findings derived from various authors will be useful and applicable to Morgenthau's theory of international politics. In addition, his thoughts on key concepts will be combined with the social Darwinist ideas of Spencer, Haeckel, Huxley, Gumpłowicz, Sumner and others. Besides this group of "orthodox" social Darwinists, Austrian and German militant social Darwinists, such as Heinrich von Treitschke, Friedrich von Bernhardi and Gustav Ratzenhofer, will also be considered. Secondly, in addition to Morgenthau's direct affiliation with recognized forebears (Nietzsche, Weber and Schmitt), he indirectly adopted many Darwinist premises of those unrecognized theorists of classical geopolitics. Overall, this chapter also contains arguments supporting the notion that ideas of Darwinism are situated at both the "hard core" and "protective belt" of classical realism.

The seventh and final chapter will consist of two parts. The first part will summarize the major theoretical findings in relation to research questions and aims and present the assumed contribution to the discipline of international relations. The second part will provide prospects for future research concerning this topic. Considering certain limitations of the conducted research, this part of the dissertation will be dedicated to the recommendations for future theoretical and empirical extensions of the proposed idea. It will basically suggest different viewpoints from biological and Darwinian ideas that can be relevant to IR discipline.

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

The following chapter aims to provide a review of literature on the current state of classical realism, on the one hand, and the key discoveries and developments regarding evolutionary (Darwinian) interpretations of international relations and political science. I will divide this chapter into three parts to better understand the present condition of scholarship and its shortcomings. The first part of this literature review is an overview of different interpretations of classical realism as one of the oldest and most influential theories of international politics. The second – and essentially the main – cluster comprises books and articles dealing with the symbiosis between evolutionary theory, biology, Darwinism, and international relations/political science. This body of literature is mainly defined by the generalization of Darwinian or biological principles and their application in the study of human nature and the behaviour of states. This section points to the authors who delved deeper into the connection between natural and political science. It will also reveal that the realist school was not the only school thinking in biological terms and that other IR schools (liberalism and constructivism) also contributed. The last part of this chapter will briefly provide remarks on certain gaps and missing pieces that this dissertation intends to fill in.

2.1. Review of the literature on classical realism

Considering the existing research on classical realism, one may say they are numerous and useful for IR students and scholars. However, the first problem that one encounters when researching classical realism is the obvious confusion and disagreement on the actual origins of this theory. Particularly, there is a misunderstanding about the timeframe and divergent thoughts on who may be labelled as the original realist. I will present three main approaches regarding this issue - the ancient, the pre-modern, and the modern.

The first approach argues that classical realism can be traced back to ancient Greece. For this reason, political scientists and historians often point to Thucydides as the embodiment of early realism.¹ They have long identified him with classical realism because of his pessimistic outlook on human nature, international politics, and war.² The Melian Dialogue from Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5th century BC) is probably the most famous text in the realist tradition and the most important reason for pairing Thucydides with political realism. Human beings are seen as driven by their passions and assumed to be interested primarily in self-preservation and enhancing their power.³ Ashley Tellis is one of the authors who claim that Thucydides fits right in this tradition because he regards human nature as egoistic, recognizes that the pursuit of power and

¹ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1997, pp. 18-49; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 8; Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 306; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing, Boston, 1979, p. 186; Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 1988, pp. 235–251; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation", *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1988, pp. 317–349; Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 1.

² Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 1990, pp. 223–237; Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988, pp. 591–613.

³ Laurie M. Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism*, Northern Illinois University Press, Ithaca, 2020, p. 203.

material gain leads to disorder, violence, and decay, and that “the logic of domination cannot be avoided or subdued.”⁴ Certain classical realists who wanted to travel that far back emphasize that human nature has basically not changed since the days of classical antiquity.⁵ Classical realism, from an ancient standpoint, expresses the tragic understanding of politics and life more generally.⁶

The second faction, or the pre-modern, identifies sixteenth-century Florentine philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) as the actual *protorealists* because they were extensively quoted by the realists of the twentieth century as the progenitors of their approach.⁷ For example, E. H. Carr described Machiavelli as “the first important political realist”, and many other scholars widely accepted the notion that Machiavelli was the first authentic realist.⁸ In American academic circles, his gradual process of becoming a realist was closely associated with what political realism had to offer for American science and US foreign policy. Firstly, by accepting Machiavelli, postwar realists in the US became the legitimate heirs to a long and noble tradition of political thought. Second, Machiavelli’s inclusion in a realistic tradition corresponded to the renewal of the interpretation of his works for the defence of republican freedom. This “republican” Machiavelli provided a good intellectual framework to alleviate the adjustment of political realism in postwar America.⁹ American historian Frederick Schuman rightly claimed in one of the earliest American international relations textbooks that “the revival of realism” in the West was associated with the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, who saw first and more clearly than anybody else “the realities of the State System.”¹⁰

Thomas Hobbes also significantly impacted many political scientists interested in international relations and political realism.¹¹ His name and the theory of classical realism have become virtually synonymous in discussions within the theory of IR, and for very good reason.¹² As it has been in various forms for decades, the argument that international politics is best described as an anarchic “Hobbesian state of nature” continues to be one of the most prominent and evocative analytical touchstones in the analysis of world politics. That idea remains the defining feature of realist

⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 5/2, 1995, pp. 3-94.

⁵ Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Meyers, eds., *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, New Republic Book Co, Washington D.C, 1977, p. 17.

⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 63.

⁷ Charles W. Kegley and Shannon L. Blanton, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Wadsworth Publishing, Boston, 2010, p. 34.

⁸ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 62; Janice Leung, “Machiavelli and International Relations Theory,” *Glendon Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, pp. 3–13; Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002; Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 306; Alison McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018; Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

⁹ Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 116.

¹⁰ Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics, 7th edn*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969, pp. 63-64.

¹¹ Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage, New York, 2003, pp. 78–88; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, Vintage, New York, 2004, p. 38; Kurt T. Gaubatz, “The Hobbesian Problem and the Microfoundations of International Relations Theory”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001/2, pp. 164-186; Donald Hanson, “Hobbes’s “Highway to Peace””, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, Issue 2, 1984, pp. 329-354; David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 432–56; Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986, p. 13; Hedley Bull, “Hobbes and the International Anarchy”, *Social Research*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1981, pp. 717–738; Roger D. Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 128.

¹² Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 19.

thought and is shared by virtually everyone calling himself a realist.¹³ Steven Forde is also convinced that Hobbes was the founder and principal contributor to the classical realist tradition.¹⁴

Of course, some do not agree that the spotlight should be aimed only at these two figures. For instance, Reinhold Niebuhr claimed that the first great realist title belonged to Saint Augustine.¹⁵ Nonetheless, what is evident in the majority of literature is that a careful reading from both Machiavelli and Hobbes often echoes Thucydides, i.e. that they were perceived as a bridge, transmitting the intellectual framework characteristic of classical Greece to the writers of the realist school in the twentieth century.¹⁶ This notion can also be seen in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, where one finds that “political realists usually claim to be part of a tradition that extends back to Thucydides through Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli.”¹⁷

The modern viewpoint lies on the premise that the birth of classical realism began with Edward H. Carr and the publishing of his book *The Twenty Years Crisis* in 1939. This was because Carr was the first to begin advocating for the true science of international politics and maintained that in order to have science, the inquiry must take into account the true state of things and not solely how things should be.¹⁸ The realities of two world wars led many others to join Carr as representatives of classical realist theory in one way or another. Notably, those were Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, Friedrich Meinecke, Nicholas Spykman, George Kennan, Arnold Wolfers, John Herz and Henry Kissinger.¹⁹ Books and articles that derived from these authors were the most highly regarded in the UK and USA in the early post-World War II and Cold War periods.²⁰ However, it was Hans J. Morgenthau who is commonly accepted as the “father” of classical realism and the person who most successfully expressed, promulgated, and synthesized this theory.²¹ His book *Politics Among Nations* (1948) was so comprehensive, systematic, and theoretical that it quickly became the essential guidebook for IR students and scholars worldwide.

¹³ Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986, p. 13.

¹⁴ Steven Forde, “Classical Realism”, in Terry Nardin (ed.) and David R. Mapel (ed.), *Traditions of International Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 75.

¹⁵ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953, pp. 120-121.

¹⁶ Thomas J. Johnson, “The Idea of Power Politics: The Sophistic Foundations of Realism” in Benjamin Frankel, *Roots of Realism*, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 196.

¹⁷ William Wohlforth, “Realism” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 132.

¹⁸ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 35.

¹⁹ Joseph M. Parent and Joshua M. Baron, “Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 195–196; Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach”, *World Politics*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 1966, pp. 361–377; Murielle Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 667-679; Duncan Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 1-21; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Realism and Security Studies”, in Craig Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Macmillan Press, London, 1999, p. 57; Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1992, p. 282;

Casper Sylvest, “John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism”, *International Relations*, Volume 22, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 441-455; Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 169.

²⁰ Especially after Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and the development of neorealism, political scientists began referring to all the realist works of the interwar and early Cold War years as classical realism.

²¹ Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva*, Westview Press, Boulder & London, 1987, p. 6; Biao Zhang, “Hans Morgenthau, Realist Theory of International Leadership, and the Future of Global Order”, *Chinese Political Science Review*, Vol. 2, 2017, p. 513; Daniel Maliniak; et al., *The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada*, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg (VA), 2007, p. 4; Barbara Kunz, “Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power”, *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, p. 189; Petar Popović, “Hans Morgenthau and the Lasting Implications of World War I”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2020, p. 121.

Classical realists after him have only taken a step further and enhanced his key hypothesis and insights.

For modern realists, the importance of human nature was apparent and regularly served as a focal point for their chief critics. It was Kenneth Waltz who once argued that the classical realist essential observations on IR were undermined by their inability to differentiate between claims about human nature unambiguously, the internal attributes of states, and the overall system of states. Classical realism has been largely viewed as human nature realism, but the neorealist position regarding this subject was shattered with several very well-argued articles.²² On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that the concept of human nature is only important for classical realists. Many other IR theories highlight human nature in their discussions, although with varying degrees of significance.

The question of “origins” and “representatives” is not the only analytical approach to the literature of classical realist theory. Scholars such as Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams identify three “critical” waves of reading classical realism.²³ The first wave was part of the identifiably “critical” movement in IR theory that started at the beginning of the 1980s through the mid-1990s, represented most prominently by Richard Ashley’s (1981) article on Morgenthau and human interest, RBJ Walker’s discussion of Machiavelli (1989) and Timothy Luke’s arguments on re-reading realism (1993).²⁴ The first wave attempted to locate “classical” thinkers or concepts in contexts beyond the IR mainstream, providing reinterpretations that challenged their canonical position and usages and stressing instead their potential for opening up IR theory, providing space for alternative thinking. Those three scholars and others who followed their path were mostly tangled in the effects of particular thinkers on the discipline of IR. Essentially, their endeavour in reinterpretation was ultimately guided by disciplinary interests and focused on challenging the discipline as such, including its narratives on the state, sovereignty, power and legitimacy.²⁵

The second wave consists of many more authors. Their work goes from the later 1990s through the mid-2000s. In contrast to the first wave, their effort was characterized by explicit attempts to provide more detailed and in-depth understandings of IR’s classical realists, including Thucydides, Hobbes, Rousseau, Clausewitz and Morgenthau, and to elaborate their contribution to the history of the discipline of IR.²⁶ Their quest for disciplinary understanding beyond the neorealist or neoliberal mainstream on the one side and for alternative perspectives on international politics on the other was less explicitly focused on fundamentally challenging the discipline than the first wave did. More exactly, it was argued as a form of historical redescription within the disciplinary parameters and themes looking to reopen and rediscover closed lineages or lost alternatives. Their work undertakes explicit efforts in order to elaborate conceptual understandings and intellectual-

²² Joseph M. Parent and Joshua M. Baron, “Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 193–213; Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984, pp. 225–286.

²³ Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, “Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating ‘Divides’ in International Relations Theory”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, p. 3–17.

²⁴ Richard K. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 204–236; R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 26–50; Timothy W. Luke, “Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order”, *Alternatives*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 229–258.

²⁵ Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, “Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating ‘Divides’ in International Relations Theory”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, p. 6.

²⁶ Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001; Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, Routledge, New York, 1998; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

historiographic accounts of realist thinking and how these accounts can contribute to a more advanced and profound analysis of international politics.²⁷

Two observations characterize this second wave of re-reading classical realism. Firstly, classical realism is perceived in relation to other forms of historical traditions (especially a deeper engagement with liberalism) and as a body of thought that has important implications for contemporary theoretical positions, especially as a form of a constructivist theory which in the same time critically analyses and promotes certain ideas about politics. Secondly, this wave was also directly concerned with fundamental differences in ontological and epistemological terms between classical and neorealism. They openly challenged structural realism's use of classical authors as a legitimation strategy, questioning its methodological and its disciplinary-historical claims.²⁸

The third wave of re-reading classical realism is typically characterized by a greater distance from the discipline of IR, seeking legacies in the discipline beyond the conventional IR's mainstream self-understanding and narrowly delineated traditions.²⁹ These efforts extended the intellectual background and lineages of classical realism in many ways, providing extensive analyses of not only the figures that were mentioned above but also a range of influences and relationships with classical realism. They range from American pragmatists to Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt and further back to the impact of Epicurean philosophy, Aristotle and Thomas Reid.³⁰ Simultaneously, complex academic histories of the IR discipline and the place of classical realism in post-war social science have emerged as vibrant and highly influential areas of study.³¹ Just like the first and the second wave, these more recent works frequently took critical theories as a lens through which they viewed classical realism. Sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, they wanted to test and destabilize established narratives of IR theory, such as its history and its theoretical commitments, by classifying different or additional legacies, relations and influences between theoretical movements and classical realism. The most obvious implication of these interventions was to show that classical realism is a multidisciplinary project. Thus, classical realism cannot be reduced to disciplinary territories or paradigms when the fact is that it emerged out of a multitude of inspirations.³² Therefore, this theory cannot be understood as an ontology of

²⁷ Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, "Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating 'Divides' in International Relations Theory", *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, p. 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath, "Common Sense, Thomas Reid, and Realist Epistemology", *International Politics*, Vol. 50, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 1–15; Anthony Lang (ed.), *Political Theory and International Affairs: Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's the Politics*, Praeger, Westport, 2004; Seán Molloy, "Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil", *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 94–112; Felix Rösch, "Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau", *International Politics*, Vol. 50, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 815–829; William E. Scheuerman, "Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man vs Power Politics", *Constellations*, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 506–530; Robert Schuett, "Freudian Roots of Political Realism: The Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Power Politics", *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 53–78; Vibeke Schou Tjalve, *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008; Stephen Turner and George Mazur, "Morgenthau as Weberian Methodologist", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 477–504.

³¹ Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath, "Misreadings in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and Neorealism", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 327–349; Marco Cesa, "Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz", *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 177–191; Murielle Cozette, "Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of Scholarship", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2008, pp. 5–27; Nicolas Guilhot, "The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory", *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 2, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 281–304; Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010.

³² Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, "Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating 'Divides' in International Relations Theory", *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, pp. 7–8.

international politics but instead as a problematization, a way of looking at epistemology and ontology as knowledge and practice rooted in and seeking to address key issues and dilemmas in international politics (such as national interest, power, morality, peace, history etc.).³³

It is also worth mentioning that few recent books aimed to emphasize and point out that the modern foundations of classical realism should be framed in the European rather than in the American context.³⁴ Reichwein and Rösch examined how realist tradition evolved in Europe, together with its long and intellectually rich and inspiring history. They also wanted to highlight that, due to immigration, realism gradually became more and more American, which consequently led Europe to lose the battle for realism and miss the opportunity to receive the credit it rightfully deserved. Matthew Specter, an intellectual historian, also wanted to deconstruct what realism means and where it originated. *Émigrés* played an important role in his analysis. By applying genealogy, he wanted to expose the realist paradigm in the context of the intellectual interchange between the United States and Germany from 1880 until 1980. According to Specter, realism, as we know it today, was not born after the First or Second World War but in the last decades of the 19th century when the terms “geopolitics” and “Lebensraum” were first coined. Another intention was to elucidate the realist “imperial origins”, i.e. that realism does contain some sort of “imperialistic” spirit within its DNA. In this respect, one decade before Reichwein, Rösch and Specter, John M. Hobson came to a similar conclusion and claimed that a subliminal Eurocentric bias underpins classical realism.³⁵ He also noted that classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and Edward. H. Carr were remarkably Eurocentric.

Lastly, there are some authors, like Jonathan Kirshner, who even went that far as to claim that classical realism is not a theory, but a “point of departure, a philosophical disposition, an approach associated with a constellation of theories that derive from a set of commonly shared assumptions.”³⁶ Likewise, Patrick James places classical realism not as a theory but as a “philosophical position that emphasizes the pervasiveness and durability of conflict.”³⁷ In addition, Richard Ned Lebow sees classical realism primarily as “an approach to international relations.”³⁸ For those reasons, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro point to a need for caution in labelling and specifying classical realism. According to them “What we now call classical realism was never a coherent research program, but rather a vast repository of texts written by different authors for different purposes and in different contexts over the course of 2,500 years. Most classical realists were not social scientists; even the twentieth-century classical realists never adhered to what are now widely accepted standards of social science methodology.”³⁹ Whatever the case may be, as one can clearly see, the literature on classical realism is definitely multilayered, and it cannot be viewed solely from one singular point of view. Rather, there are many different, both competing and complementary, ways of looking at this IR theory.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁴ Alexander Reichwein (ed.) and Felix Rösch (ed.), *Realism: A Distinctively 20th Century European Tradition*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021; Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022.

³⁵ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 187-188.

³⁶ Jonathan Kirshner, *An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2022, p. 13.

³⁷ Patrick James, *Realism and International Relations: A Graphic Turn Toward Scientific Progress*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, p. 285.

³⁸ Richard Ned Lebow, “Classical Realism”, in Tim Dunne (ed.), Milja Kurki (ed.) and Steve Smith (ed.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 59.

³⁹ Steven E. Lobell (ed.), Norrin M. Ripsman (ed.) and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (ed.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 16.

2.2. Review of the literature on the biological interpretations of IR

Even though the life science approach is somewhat a new, innovative and significant development of the study of international relations, this scientific approach nonetheless tends to answer the old questions in new ways, thus improving prevailing theories and providing original knowledge. Despite the belief that there should not be any boundaries for the improvement of science, there have been disagreements on whether life science should make its way into the field of IR. This is the reason why I will divide this chapter into two sections. The first section introduces scholars who were fond of biological/evolutionary/Darwinian ideas as a tool for the study of IR and world politics, while the second presents works which were suspicious and critical of it, arguing that those ideas never belonged in the IR discipline in the first place. In sum, this chapter will review the key arguments in the literature on both sides of this debate.

2.2.1. Discussions on the positive contribution of Darwinism in IR and Political Science

Almost all biological (evolutionary/Darwinian) approaches to IR share the premise that international politics is subject to the same laws and principles found in the natural world. In other words, international politics can, in some respect, be explained with the help of these ideas. This is, of course, a strong statement because it argues that IR, as an area of inquiry, is subject to regularities that make it acceptable for existing theories and procedures prevailing in other branches of knowledge.⁴⁰ As one will see further, there are different vantage points about the use of evolutionary principles in the analysis of international politics. Some scholars focus on the human nature angle; others concentrate on state behaviour, while few draw attention to the international environment (system).

The earliest supporter of the inclusion of evolutionary theory in IR is Jack O'Neill, who provided a framework for teaching Evolutionary International Relations (evIR) in the context of world politics.⁴¹ This American scholar advocated for incorporating life sciences materials into introductory or advanced courses in IR. According to O'Neill, the generalized core question of evIR focuses on the origins, evolution and future world politics of the globally dominant species *Sapiens*.⁴² He tackles questions such as time frame, territoriality, the geopolitics of speciation, ethology, primatology, xenophobia and a few other interesting themes that can benefit the study of IR. In this respect, he presents a multiple structures (MS) format, which provides a variety of ways that learning environments can be designed to enhance learner participation in this process. Jack O'Neill's scientific endeavour on this matter is really noteworthy, considering that he advocated for this approach almost four decades ago.

The second author one needs to single out that made a significant impact in the Western academic community was Bradley A. Thayer and his book *Darwin and International Relations*.⁴³ This pathbreaking but also controversial publication offers the first comprehensive analysis of the international affairs of the state through the lens of evolutionary theory. As with other authors who

⁴⁰ George Modelski, "Evolutionary World Politics: Problems of Scope and Method", in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 16.

⁴¹ Jack O'Neill, "Evolutionary International Relations: A Biopolitical Framework for Teaching World Politics", *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1986, pp. 44-53.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³ Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004.

endorsed the symbiosis of these two branches of science, there is certain unease and the desire for justification regarding such research endeavour. Thayer believes that the findings and knowledge from the life sciences and their implementation in social sciences are not a threat to the social sciences. On the contrary, Thayer posits that the gulf between evolutionary biology and social science has grown too great and that the time has come to bridge this gap.⁴⁴ According to him, his book *Darwin and International Relations* represents the first step in illustrating how evolutionary theory can assist important theoretical and empirical issues in the discipline of IR.⁴⁵

Thayer's standpoint of analysis is the one of *human nature* and *human behaviour* (so-called "first image" analysis) and how these two things play a role in the origins of war and ethnic conflicts. With an introductory explanation of what are the basic concepts of evolution (natural selection, adaptation, fitness, etc.) Thayer moves on and chooses realism and liberalism from the theories of IR in order to develop one part of his argument. By exploring the origins of egoism and domination, this author provides an alternative ultimate cause of classical realism. Specifically, the evolutionary mechanism explains why humans are egoistic, strive to dominate others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions.⁴⁶ He notices that realism, like the Darwinian view of the natural world, highlights that international relations are a competitive and dangerous realm, where statesmen must strive to protect the interests of their state through an almost constant appraisal of their state's power relative to others.⁴⁷ Statesmen must behave egoistically, putting their state's interests before those of others or international society.⁴⁸ He explains that the pessimistic standpoint on human nature, i.e. that humans are generally evil, can better be explained by using Darwin and evolutionary theory.

Thayer's sociobiological approach to the study of international politics is for some controversial since it challenges conventional theories of international relations by proposing that the principles of natural selection and evolution also apply to state behavior and interactions. In any case, this author paved the way by arguing that evolutionary biology contributes significantly to theories used in international relations, especially regarding a greater understanding of human nature. He also contributed to the discussion on the evolutionary origins of war and ethnic conflicts, and, as one can see in the next subchapter, he will be the main target for those wishing to attack the penetration of Charles Darwin and his theory in political science in general.

Just like Bradley Thayer, Albert Somit, and Steven A. Peterson wanted to explain the evolutionary origins of hierarchy, dominance, and submissive behaviours. However, unlike Thayer, they aimed to call attention to the delusion of democratic nation-building.⁴⁹ They agree with Thayer that thousands of years of recorded human history testify to an uncomfortable fact that the vast majority of humankind has lived (and continues to live) under some form of authoritarian rule. Democracies were notably rare, and authoritarian governments have been the "default option". According to them, Neo-Darwinian theory offers the single most powerful and intellectually coherent explanation for this issue. Working over literally millions of years, natural selection has endowed the social primates with a "predisposition" for hierarchical social structures, which remains one of the most pervasive and ubiquitous aspects of human social (as well as political)

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 266.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁹ Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, "An Evolutionary Approach to Political Science and Public Policy: The Folly of Democratic Nation Building", *International Political Science Association Triennial Congress*, 9-13 July, 2006, Fukuoka, Japan, pp. 7-23.

organizations.⁵⁰ They believe that species which is so behaviorally inclined hardly represent promising genetic material for the nurturance of democracy.

Somit and Peterson further elaborated their argument in their book *The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution*.⁵¹ Here they discuss two separate points. The first point is that humans are social primates with an innate tendency for hierarchical and authoritarian social and political structures. Some individuals are dominant, while others are obedient and willing to accept the dominance of those above them in the hierarchy. Among our own species, the most powerful and persistent evolutionary legacy is the readiness to give “obedience to those in authority”.⁵² The second discussion point is that democracy requires very special “enabling conditions” before it can become viable, and the attempts to export democracy to states without these enabling conditions are doomed to failure.⁵³

Another cluster discusses the problem of human nature. An important figure for this topic is Jennifer Sterling-Folker, a professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, who also sought to explore the evolutionary tendencies of realism and liberalism. She thinks there are many advantages to examining these two IR theories from an evolutionary perspective. Such recasting not only highlights the similarities and differences between each of these paradigms but also allows us to recast old debates and questions into new and sometimes startling reconfigurations.⁵⁴ According to Sterling-Folker, realism is often described in evolutionary terms because it relies on “survival of the fittest” imagery. Likewise, realism concurs with Darwinism that human beings are primarily shaped by their environment, so the institutions they create and nurture are affected by a “selection-by-competition” logic.⁵⁵ On the other hand, liberalism has also commonly been defined in evolutionary logic. More specifically, liberalism concurs with Lamarckian perspectives that human beings are primarily shapers of their environments, and the institutions they create are determined by a “selection-by-learning” logic.⁵⁶

What Sterling-Folker finds striking are the parallels between Darwin’s theory of natural selection and realism on the one hand and a Lamarckian-type theory of in-use inheritance and liberalism on the other.⁵⁷ Realism tends to emphasize, just like Darwinism, the extent to which human beings are separate from and shaped by their environment.⁵⁸ Liberalism tends to emphasize, just like Lamarckism, the extent to which human beings are shapers of their environments.⁵⁹ A crucial difference in their emphasis can be traced back to how these two theories define the environment. Even though both realism and liberalism observe international relations as anarchic, each theory interprets anarchy from their key presumptions about the relationship between the anarchic environment and human beings. For realists, humans remain distinct from their environment because anarchy is an essentially primordial realm with a central characteristic that exists independently of what human beings do. From their perspective, death is a primordial or natural feature of the environment in that it ultimately cannot be prevented by human activity. For liberal theorists, although survival is frequently acknowledged as a prerequisite to the pursuit of all other interests, the question of death is quite different because human beings have capacities far beyond

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵¹ Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, *The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.

⁵² Ibid., p. 15.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁴ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 65.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

those of other species and have developed more complex ways of transmitting adaptive variations from one generation to the next that they may transcend an all-encompassing primordial fear of death.⁶⁰ In essence, for Sterling-Folker environment lies at the very centre. In other words, she identifies that anarchy for realists represents a primordial environment beyond human control. At the same time, liberals see it as an environment composed of what human beings do.⁶¹

As a result, each theory's opposing views concerning the human environment relationship produce different assumptions about human nature and its consequences for political behaviour. The realist conception of human nature is accompanied by the notion that the environment in which human beings exist produces a fixed and universal fear of death in the species. Liberal theorists, on the other side, rely upon an entirely different conception of human nature, namely that the environment in which humans exist is primarily one of their makings and is, therefore, subject to human intent that is developing along normatively progressive lines.⁶² She concludes that for realism, "nature" remains paramount, in that sense that it considers human evolution to be subject to the same biological processes that have affected the evolution of all other organisms on the planet, and this then places identifiable boundaries around the act of institution-building itself. Liberalism's attention to "nurture" assumes that human evolution had a different logic which allowed that the behaviour was conditioned by the social environment.⁶³

John R. Hibbing and John R. Alford contributed to the topic of human nature with their "wary cooperation" theory drawn from the works of leading scholars in evolutionary psychology and experimental economics.⁶⁴ Their theory can be summarized as follows: humans are cooperative but not altruistic; they are competitive but not exclusively. Alford and Hibbing argue that in equating natural selection with inherent selfishness, political scientists reflected views held by mainstream biologists from the mid-1900s through about a quarter of a century ago.⁶⁵ The overwhelming emphasis of evolutionary theorists at the time was generally consistent with what became known as the rational choice interpretation for the assumptions on human behaviour. On the one hand, the inclination to cooperate is deeply rooted in human nature, especially within defined group boundaries, but on the other hand, so is the high sensitivity to selfish actions on the part of other group members.⁶⁶ It is not that evolution itself favours selfish or cooperating behaviour but simply that evolution is agnostic about the methods (competition or cooperation) by which overall survival advantages are achieved.

In a more recent article on this topic, Dominic D. P. Johnson and Bradley A. Thayer propose a hypothesis that offensive realism, more than any other theory of IR, correlates significantly with what we know about human nature from the evolutionary sciences.⁶⁷ Three core assumptions about behaviour in offensive realism (self-help, power maximization, and out-group fear) have roots in the scientific knowledge about human behavioural evolution. According to Johnson and Thayer, these particular traits are evolutionarily adaptive and empirically common across the animal kingdom, especially in primate and human societies. Drawing from evolutionary anthropology, they

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 75.

⁶¹ Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff barriers to Trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp. 36-38; Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp. 67-68.

⁶² Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory", in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 77.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 99.

⁶⁴ John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing, "The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior", *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2004, pp. 707-723.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 708.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 709.

⁶⁷ Dominic D. P. Johnson and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Evolution of Offensive Realism", *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 35, Issue 1, 2016, p. 18.

argue that our ancestors not only lived in anarchy for millions of years but also evolved and developed their cognitive and behavioural adaptations specifically to survive and reproduce effectively under anarchy. It (anarchy) has been a constant feature of the entire history of humanity, and this legacy heavily influences our decision-making and behaviour today regarding international politics. For this reason, evolution under conditions of anarchy has predisposed human nature toward the behaviours predicted by offensive realism. Consequently, states behave as offensive realists predict not just because of anarchy in the modern international system but also because of the legacy of our own evolution.

By aligning egoism with self-help, dominance with power maximization, and in-group/out-group bias with fear of others, Johnson and Thayer try to advance offensive realist arguments without seeking an ultimate cause in the anarchic international state system. Evolutionary theory serves to explain why human beings are egoistic, strive to dominate others, and make ingroup/outgroup distinctions, thus providing a foundation for what offensive realism and John Mearsheimer unilaterally branded as self-help, power maximization, and fear.⁶⁸ Humans evolved in circumstances where competition for resources and dangers from other humans and the environment were great. Also, we survived by virtue of evolved behavioural traits, such as egoism, dominance and ingroup/outgroup bias, which were basically adaptations to competitive ecological conditions. In sum, evolutionary theory offers realist scholars a natural-scientific behavioural foundation for offensive realism. Human evolution explains why people seek control over resources, why they seek to dominate others to achieve and maintain a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy, and why we are often mistrustful and suspicious of other groups.⁶⁹ Since the leaders of states are human, they, too, will be influenced by this evolutionary legacy as they react to the actions of other states and decide how to respond.

Johnson and Thayer hold that reading the literature of offensive realism, especially John Mearsheimer's insights on international politics, can be hauntingly analogous to reading ethnographic studies of warfare among preindustrial societies. They conclude that self-help, power maximization and fear are important strategies to survive both nature and contemporary international politics.

Shiping Tang agrees with Johnson and Thayer that offensive realism had been the guiding ideology among leaders and statesmen for much of our history. Tang gives strong historical evidence on that topic and claims that once a system is transformed into an offensive realist system, war becomes a powerful selection force over states within it: you either expand and survive or perish. States within the system needed to innovate, imitate, and compete in order to stay alive within the system. He goes a step further by suggesting that social Darwinism and geopolitics are schools of offensive realism because these disciplines, just like offensive realism, advocated for control through expansion and conquest.⁷⁰

Similarly, Azar Gat seeks to show how the various causes of violence and war can be explained within an integrated human motivational complex that was principally shaped by evolution and natural selection.⁷¹ Gat argues that IR theory is deeply flawed on this matter and can only move forward in this respect once a broader evolutionarily perspective is accepted. As a positive contribution in this direction, he mentions Bradley Thayer, who also took an evolutionary perspective as a starting point for his research on conflicts and war. According to Gat, attempts to

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁰ Shiping Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 174.

⁷¹ Azar Gat, "So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 571-599.

find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced because they need to notice what lies in the background. First of all, Gat reminds us that for 99.5% of the Homo's evolutionary history, humans lived as hunter-gatherers. As a result, in this type of "state of nature", human behavioural patterns have generally been evolutionarily adaptive. For instance, the desire and struggle for scarce resources have always been regarded as a vital aim of politics and an obvious motive for war.⁷² Furthermore, kinship - expanding from family and tribe to peoples and nations - always had a huge influence in determining one's loyalty and willingness to sacrifice life to defend and promote a common good.⁷³ Overall, all of these things partake in the interconnected human motivational system originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction. Interestingly, Gat draws attention to the fact that realist theory only partially recognized this argument. Azar Gat's narrative enhances that part of IR, which mostly concentrates on the causes of conflict and general patterns of war.

This cluster of literature is primarily interested in positioning human nature within the evolutionary framework as these scholars draw certain conclusions from evolutionary theory and implement it in the analysis of international relations. While Thayer highlights that evolutionary theory is sufficient to explain the origins of egoism and domination, Somit and Peterson use Neo-Darwinian theory to clarify better the problem of hierarchical and authoritarian structures for democratic nation-building. Jennifer Sterling-Folker also tackles the question of human nature by focusing on evolutionary tendencies in realist and liberal theories of IR. However, unlike Thayer, who leaves certain blank spots while explaining these two important theories, she proposes "selection-by-competition" and "selection-by-learning" logic as their crucial difference with regard to human beings in the anarchic environment. Alford and Hibbing, on the other hand, criticize the prevalent pessimistic understanding of human nature and add that human nature is not bad or good but simply that long-term survival is what matters. Johnson, Thayer, and Tang essentially came to the same conclusion on how offensive realism corresponds with the conditions of anarchy, which existed for millions of years and greatly impacted how we perceive human nature. Finally, Azar Gat, in his 2009 article, pinpoints the evolutionary reasons for war, which are actually still relevant for consideration.

Certain scholars emphasize the importance of *change* as a fundamental evolutionary force in international politics. Their most important quest is to find the causes of change, namely why certain changes were accepted and others were not. The most common answer is that change occurs through interaction between changing environments and actors. The key units of analysis, whether it be states, regime types, economic innovations, ideologies, strategies, or policies, exist in different formats.⁷⁴ They identify that during history, there were variations in the types of states (empires, city-states, nation-states) and different types of ideologies (communism, fascism, democracy). At a certain moment, some of these state types and ideologies disappeared and were replaced with the variant that was fit for the current situation. Liberal democracy has been selected over communism and fascism, just as nation-states were selected over city-states and empires.⁷⁵ As actors and environments change, so do the probabilities that some approaches will survive and thrive while others will deteriorate or even vanish.⁷⁶ Change comes either gradually or abruptly and is viewed as a rule in international politics because things are always in motion and rarely stagnant. For most of these authors, evolution and change are synonymous terms.

George Modelski proposed so-called "long cycles" of power-shift as an evolutionary theory of IR, insisting that international politics is evolutionary because it goes through long cycles of hegemonic

⁷² Ibid., p. 594.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

rise-and-fall.⁷⁷ Long cycles serve to explain the dynamics of international politics. He later took one step forward and introduced his Evolutionary World Politics (EWP) research program that posed the same central question: What explains the structural change in world politics over the past millennium in a way that also gives us a glimpse of the future? Modelski sees EWP as a subfield of IR, which offers a theoretically viable “big picture” of world politics and provides a way of looking at the future as a timetable of global development. Also, EWP specifies optimal change conditions and success for policies that respect the evolutionary mechanisms and the rhythm of world politics.⁷⁸ Modelski suggests that the central problem of the study of world politics, which is long-term institutional change at the global level, can be best understood as an evolutionary process. Modelski argues that global-level change in political institutions is actuated by a set of four mechanisms - selection, variation (innovation), cooperation and reinforcement - each shaping a distinct phase of the evolutionary process.⁷⁹

While Sterling-Folker uses evolutionary learning to explain a liberal understanding of IR, Modelski points to *evolutionary learning* as an important aspect of world politics in general. He claims that the structure of world politics is shaped by evolutionary learning and gives few reasons for such a premise.⁸⁰ According to him, evolutionary learning is the basic principle of world politics (rather than anarchy), and it shapes the political process, gives it meaning, organizes its past and generates its future. Also, it defines the structure of global politics and its main functional areas: agenda setting, coalition building, macro-decision making, and execution. Around them form the principal institutional orders such as ideology, balance-of-power alliance, global war, world powers etc. He concludes that the traditional conceptions of the study of international relations take a lot of work to harness successfully to the study of change. Modelski reminds us that realists, in particular, tend to see the realm of international relations as static.

More recently, Shiping Tang similarly tried to apply his social evolution paradigm (SEP) in order to examine the systemic transformation of international politics from the beginning of human history (c. 11,000 BC) until today.⁸¹ He thinks that George Modelski needed to grasp the basics of biological or social evolution because evolution, whether biological or social, is not cyclical. There is a necessity for a social evolutionary approach toward the history of IR because non-evolutionary theories cannot account for the entire history of international politics. Only an evolutionary approach can offer a genuinely endogenous account of changes. As part of human society, the international system has been an evolutionary system from the beginning, although some properties of international politics, such as anarchy, remained present until today.

According to Tang, SEP as a tool and its central evolutionary mechanism (variation–selection–inheritance) has enough explanatory power to achieve this task and simultaneously tries to give the evolutionary resolution of the “Great Debates” in IR. He opens his work by asking a fundamental question: how can IR scholars arrive at so vastly different readings into the big picture of international politics when all along they have been looking at roughly the same human history? As he believes, by seeking to explain the entire history of international politics with a single grand theory, IR theorists have been implicitly assuming that the fundamental nature of international politics has remained roughly the same, or more precisely, that human society has experienced a

⁷⁷ George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1978, pp. 214–235; George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1987.

⁷⁸ George Modelski, “Evolutionary World Politics: Problems of Scope and Method”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 27-28.

⁷⁹ George Modelski and Kazimierz Poznanski, “Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1996, p. 317.

⁸⁰ George Modelski, “Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?”, *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-24.

⁸¹ Shiping Tang, *The Social Evolution of International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. vi.

single phase of international politics. Therefore, all major grand IR theories had the same flaw as they were non-evolutionary theories. A social evolutionary approach toward IR can provide genuinely endogenous explanations for the systemic transformations of international politics and neatly resolve some great debates among IR theories.⁸² Initially, Tang offers a social evolutionary account to explain the evolution of international politics from an offensive realism world to a defensive realism world. By deploying the social evolution paradigm (SEP), he gives an endogenous account for the transformation of international politics: from the initial “paradise-like” anarchy to the “nasty, brutish, and short” offensive realism world, then to a defensive realism world, and finally to a more rule-based world.⁸³ Tang concludes that without an evolutionary element, a systemic theory of international politics can only hope to understand a system’s dynamics, but not how a system changes (i.e., evolves) into a different one.⁸⁴

In this group of authors, it is important to include Francis Fukuyama, an American IR scholar who became famous in 1992 as the author of the book *The End of History and the Last Man*. However, in his 2011 book *The Origins of Political Order*, Fukuyama returns to the dawn of politics and reveals where basic political institutions came from and how evolution bolstered human political development.⁸⁵ Firstly, according to Fukuyama, humankind’s earliest conflicts were essentially Darwinian, meaning there were conflicts over scarce resources in which only the fittest survived. Secondly, Fukuyama believes that political systems basically evolved in a manner roughly comparable to biological evolution. He reminds us that Darwin’s theory of evolution is based on the principles of variation and selection. Variation among organisms occurs due to random genetic combinations. Those variants better adapted to their specific environments have greater reproductive success and therefore propagate themselves at the expense of those less well adapted. At this high level of abstraction, Fukuyama believes that from a very long historical perspective, political development has followed the same general pattern. In other words, the forms of political organization employed by different groups of human beings have varied, and those forms that were more successful - meaning those that could generate greater military and economic power - displaced those that were less successful.⁸⁶ Fukuyama also adds that competition was crucial for the process of political development, just as it was in biological evolution. If the competition did not exist, there would be no selection pressure on institutions, and therefore there would not be any incentives for institutional innovation or reform. Violence and war were probably the most significant competitive pressures that led to institutional innovations.⁸⁷

This cluster of literature one finds important because it uses the theory of evolution to explore fundamental changes in international politics. The transformation of one system into the other captivated several IR scholars. However, most did not recognise evolutionary theory’s usefulness and practicality in elucidating this phenomenon. It was Modelski who made a significant breakthrough in the 1970s and 1980s with his influential “long cycles” theory that was four decades later upgraded with Tang’s social evolution paradigm (SEP). Both of them assume that only an evolutionary approach can give us a clear image of changes, even though they are not exactly on the same line when it comes to exact mechanisms of change. On the other hand, Francis Fukuyama provided certain thoughts on this topic in a twofold way. Firstly, he borrowed and later applied two Darwinian mechanisms - variation and selection - in his analysis. Secondly, he made it clear that competition, whether biological or political, is absolutely mandatory for any form of change.

⁸² Ibid., p. 5.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 179.

⁸⁴ Shiping Tang, “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2010, p. 48.

⁸⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011, pp. 26-48.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 446.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 448.

One small body of “evolutionary” scholarship explores the role of *adaptation* and *imitation* in international politics. Jennifer Sterling-Folker contends that both realists and liberals accept the idea of evolutionary adaptation as a central premise, but they disagree over how adaptation comes about. While realists underline competitive survival in an anarchic environment that cannot be altered substantially, liberals indicate the role of technological change and consequent institutional adaptations that transform anarchic context.⁸⁸ She also reveals that the debates between evolutionary biologists and palaeontologists have direct parallels to the debates between realists and liberals regarding the process of political-institutional adaptation.⁸⁹ A realist selection-by-competition logic and its process of institutional adaptation tend to resemble the Darwinian attention on gradualism, continuity, and convergence. Conversely, a liberal emphasis on selection-by-learning logic and its process of institutional adaptation depends instead on conscious and immediate innovation appropriate to the context at hand and gives humans control over their institutional adaptations.⁹⁰

For some authors, imitation (mimicking) is regarded as a strategy or a pattern of a state’s behaviour. The basic concept is that actors (states) make decisions automatically and do not think about other actors much but incorporate some ideas about the population they face in their strategies.⁹¹ Actors pursuing suboptimal strategies cease to exist and are replaced by actors pursuing better ones in a clear battle for survival. Robert Axelrod is considered to have developed the most influential evolutionary argument using a computer tournament to simulate an evolutionary process in which actors who pursued inadequate strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma would gradually be replaced by those pursuing more effective ones.⁹² Tit for Tat, a well-known game theory survival strategy, develops by starting cooperating and then reciprocating whatever the other side does. From Axelrod’s standpoint, states choose the most beneficial strategies based on either their own previous experience or the experience of other actors. States also, like individuals, do not abandon strategies that have served them well. This approach later evolved into the study of “agent-based models”, prominently explored by Lars-Erik Cederman, in which spatially located actors who possess certain resources and an automatic decision rule interact over time.⁹³ By conquering other states, they (states) evolve and grow, making the structure of the international system as certain types of states cease to exist, and others replace them. Undoubtedly, evolutionary models from both Axelrod and Cederman demonstrate the survival value of more cooperative ideas and strategies.⁹⁴

Jennifer Sterling-Folker also gave her contribution regarding this subject by thinking that the competitive anarchic environment would encourage weaker states to imitate the economic practices of the more powerful, even though the replication would never be precisely identical because each state would already have existing institutions on top of which the imitation would be layered.⁹⁵ This explains why, for example, it is hard to find two democracies that have precisely the same electoral institutions and practices. Both the liberal and the realist theories of IR assume that groups become socially similar by imitating the institutions of another, but the concept of imitation is utilized

⁸⁸ William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 90.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁹¹ Andrew H. Kydd, “Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice”, in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.) and Duncan Snidal (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 434.

⁹² Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, New York, 1985.

⁹³ Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997; Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.

⁹⁴ Andrew H. Kydd, “Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice”, in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.) and Duncan Snidal (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 435.

⁹⁵ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 91-92.

differently. Sterling-Folker tries to prove her claim about institutional adaptations using the European Union as an example. For liberals, the EU represents a new institutional variant in response to new sectoral environments, and she thinks it is possible to serve as the institutional model for imitation in the future. For realists, on the other hand, the EU is an institutional adaptation to particular historical and geostrategic circumstances that have now disappeared.⁹⁶ These circumstances have disappeared because, during the post-World War II bipolar era, European nation-states faced a mutual threat from the Soviet Union while simultaneously benefiting from a shared ally in the form of the United States. Following the decline of bipolarity, however, realists anticipate a decrease in such collaborative endeavors and a resurgence of potential competitive hostilities among states that had previously cooperated.⁹⁷

Similar to this topic, Daniel T. Blumstein, et al. produced a paper which deals with signalling in international politics.⁹⁸ According to their findings, signalling systems are pervasive in nature and, as such, can be useful for international politics. Knowing how to send and interpret signals is essential to diplomacy and war. These authors look to evolutionary theory regarding signalling in animal species to draw out some parallels and general rules of thumb that they think might benefit diplomats and politicians in foreign policy matters. They present eight lessons in this respect. On top of that, these authors also highlight that the rules of evolution and natural selection are all around us and are waiting to be revealed and utilized for present-day applications.⁹⁹ With this article, the authors really gave a brave incentive for any passionate researcher who tends to bridge the gap between evolutionary theory and international politics.

Another part of the scholarship deals with the *organic theory* and its role in the IR discourse. The “organism” that has received the most attention in IR was, of course, the nation-state, which became the dominant unit and level of analysis in IR and geopolitics because the state was the political entity with which people most willingly identified themselves. In that sense, Ronen P. Palan and Brook M. Blair are convinced that modern realism could only emerge after the advent of the organic theory of the state, as developed during the course of the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁰ In addition to that, Roland Dannreuther also noticed that realist theory mostly drew from the influential tradition of geopolitics and its seminal proponents such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, and Karl Haushofer.¹⁰¹ Likewise, Sterling-Folker thinks that the realist theory of IR evidently places human beings squarely in the realm of nature, along with all other organisms.¹⁰² In contrast to the realist position, Pheng Cheah reminds us that the idea of the state as an organism was originally part of the liberal Enlightenment project. As such, it does not need to be necessarily tied to irrationalism or authoritarian politics.¹⁰³

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 99.

⁹⁷ See John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 5-56.

⁹⁸ Daniel T. Blumstein, et al., “The Peacock’s Tale: Lessons from Evolution for Effective Signaling in International Politics”, *Cliodynamics: Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 191–214.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁰⁰ Ronen P. Palan and Brook M. Blair, “On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, p. 388.

¹⁰¹ Roland Dannreuther, “Geopolitics and International Relations of Resources”, in Roland Dannreuther and Wojciech Ostrowski (eds.), *Global Resources: Conflict and Cooperation*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013, p. 82; See also Zhengyu Wu, “Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, pp. 786-823.

¹⁰² Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 81.

¹⁰³ Pheng Cheah, “The Rationality of Life: On the Organismic Metaphor of the State”, *Radical Philosophy*, Vol. 112, 2002, pp. 9-24.

Alexander Wendt, the most influential theorist of the social-constructivist approach, also did not hesitate to explore how extensive the narrative of organic theory in IR theory is.¹⁰⁴ Wendt introduces his standpoint by referring to the fact that the philosophical argument against organicism is usually assumed rather than argued in IR. He acknowledged that prior to the twentieth century, many of the greatest political and social theorists of the day regarded the state as an organism, including - in different forms - Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Spencer, and Durkheim. The reality is that the majority of IR scholars treat states as intentional actors; more interestingly, according to Wendt, the idea of the state as an organism played a key part in the consolidation of classical realism.¹⁰⁵ Wendt thinks that as long as we accept physicalist ontology, states can be considered as super-organisms rather than organisms. He defines a super-organism as a “collection of single creatures that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of organism”.¹⁰⁶ According to him, super-organisms differ from organisms in both ways the states do. For instance, they comprise individuals who do not immediately die if the collective is destroyed. Likewise, they do not engage in genetic reproduction. In every other way, however, super-organisms are like organisms, and Wendt presents four such congruencies. Firstly, super-organisms are individuals with their own spatiotemporal specificity. Secondly, super-organisms are organized into mutually constitutive part-whole relationships. Thirdly, super-organisms are homeostatic systems. Finally, super-organisms exhibit some autonomy from the environment.¹⁰⁷

Three main points are made in this portion of the literature. First, one can see that it was implicitly acknowledged that the organic theory had been somehow suppressed and denounced in IR, most probably because of its connection with geopolitics. Second, realism, in particular, was associated with the organic metaphor of state because of its biological foundations and reliance on ontological materialism. Finally, Wendt became the first scholar who clarified the substantial difference between organisms and super-organisms and paved the way for future research on this subject.

As for works related to international security, Raphael Sagarin stands out as the leading scholar.¹⁰⁸ This marine ecologist introduced a new way of thinking about security, the so-called *Darwinian Security*, in the study of international security. More specifically, Sagarin wanted to apply certain lessons that nature has to offer to resolve some of the harshest global security problems that state face today, such as international terrorism, the spread of contagious diseases and natural disasters. According to Sagarin, human beings have much to learn from biological organisms with regard to maintaining security in a hostile environment.¹⁰⁹ In a book he edited titled *Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World*, Sagarin, together with other authors, presented a multidisciplinary approach to solving major national security problems. Some contributors, like Gregory P. Dietl, Dominic D. P. Johnson and Elizabeth M. P. Madin, directly applied insights from evolutionary biology to examine security threats in international politics. Another Sagarin book definitely worth mentioning is *Learning From the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight Terrorist Attacks*. There he pointed out that nature is pragmatic and suggested that policymakers should take a look at how animals adapt to new and diverse security threats in response to threats in nature. Sagarin’s “outside of the box” reasoning on international security issues represents a significant contribution and deserves more attention in future studies.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004, pp. 289-316.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁰⁸ Raphael Sagarin (ed.) and Terrence Taylor (ed.), *Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008; Raphael Sagarin, *Learning From the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Disease*, Basic Books, New York, 2012.

¹⁰⁹ Raphael Sagarin, “The Origins of Natural Security”, in Raphael Sagarin (ed.) and Terrence Taylor (ed.), *Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008, p. 3.

If one wants to learn more about international morality, Mary Maxwell gives us significant insight on this topic by offering a pioneering synthesis of sociobiology and international relations theory.¹¹⁰ In her book *Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View*, Maxwell shows that two different moralities evolved in human pre-history. First morality she labelled as “standard morality” from which abstract ethical principles arose, such as justice and obligation. The second morality was “group morality”, which refers to the group’s right to survive and dominate other groups in the system. According to Maxwell, just as Hans Morgenthau and other IR scholars claimed that power is an instinct that we must deal with, she argues that, with the help of sociobiology, morality is also instinctive and must be considered.¹¹¹ She gives convincing arguments for the relevance of sociobiological thinking on international affairs, with special emphasis on international morality as an important and somewhat neglected subject.

At the very end, many publications point out parallels between the neorealist inference pattern and Darwinian reasoning. Back in the 1990s, George Modelski and Kazimierz Poznanski noticed that “in its emphasis on competition and self-help, neorealism shows a close affinity for social Darwinism (though not Darwinism itself) which marked social thought at the turn of the twentieth century.”¹¹² Ken Booth notices the same in his conclusion to *Realism and World Politics*, where he develops an analogy between the work of Kenneth Waltz and Charles Darwin.¹¹³ Darwin and Waltz, Booth believes, have each contributed to the rethinking of our basic metaphysics, and their theories provided original pictures of how the world works, especially about aspects of human survival.¹¹⁴ According to him, there are a few important areas of comparison between the work of Waltz and Darwin. First, he considers both Waltz and Darwin as big-picture theorists. Darwin worked on the largest canvas imaginable, seeking to explain the origin of species, while Waltz sought to explain one aspect of that panorama, the dynamics of the international system in which certain units of human group survival have interacted. Second, they both pose the question of change. Issues of continuity and change are at the heart of the major theoretical works of both Darwin and Waltz. While Darwin explores instances where the succession of small physical adaptations changes an animal into a new species, Waltz explores instances where one type of international system changes into a different one. Consequently, when Darwin declares that “Natura non facit saltum” (“Nature does not make a leap”), Waltz does the same because he believes in the “perennial forces of politics” while contemplating the continuities of international history.¹¹⁵

Iain Wilson is on the same track regarding this topic.¹¹⁶ While Booth develops an analogy between the work of Kenneth Waltz and Charles Darwin, Wilson thinks that certain fundamental parallels between the two are left unexplored, especially the behavioural plain. He examines Waltz’s underlying argument that significant states will tend to behave prudently and draws some parallels with how Darwinists reason biological evolution. Waltz and his theory argue that the diversity of a state’s behaviour is reduced partly by elimination. Over time, most of the major states will converge around a particular pattern of behaviour. We can then deduce and see which behaviours are likely to be favoured by the system and anticipate that those behaviours will be pervasive and widespread. States that did not take sufficient care of their security or behaved inappropriately in the past were likely to “fall by the wayside” and were either conquered or

¹¹⁰ Mary Maxwell, *Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹¹² George Modelski and Kazimierz Poznanski, “Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1996, p. 319.

¹¹³ Ken Booth, “International Politics: The Inconvenient Truth”, in Ken Booth (ed.), *Realism and World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2011, pp. 325–343.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

¹¹⁶ Iain Wilson, “Darwinian Reasoning and Waltz’s Theory of International Politics: Elimination, Imitation and the Selection of Behaviours”, *International Relations*, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 417–438.

relegated from geopolitical significance.¹¹⁷ The widespread behaviours generate a neorealist international system that punishes states that do not conform to that pattern of behaviour, something Waltz refers to as “structural selection.”¹¹⁸ For a realist, the behaviour which is almost always rewarded by anarchy is, of course, the pursuit and preservation of power. According to Wilson, Kenneth Waltz reasons that two consequences of anarchy will lead to security-enhancing behaviours becoming ubiquitous. The first consequence is the elimination, while the second is socialization, both of which have parallels in Darwinian thought.

In this group, it is very important to add Tarek Oraby and his doctoral dissertation from 2019 titled *A Darwinian Theory of International Conflict*.¹¹⁹ Oraby’s main idea in that research was to advance the current understanding of the general conditions that are affecting the likelihood of military conflicts and wars between states. Oraby has done so by generalizing Darwinian principles as they are used in the study of biological entities and applying those principles to study states and their behaviour in the international realm. Even though he reminds us that states are noticeably different from life forms, he believes that the same Darwinian principles can provide a parsimonious explanation of states’ conflict behaviours. On top of that, Oraby somewhat critiques the neorealist tradition in the study of international relations. He admits that his arguments are most similar to neorealism, especially regarding the question of survival. In addition, his Darwinian approach is similar to neorealism in purporting to explain state behaviour by reference to material factors. However, by constructing a Darwinian image of international politics, Oraby also shows significant differences in relation to Waltz’s and Mearsheimer’s neorealism. For instance, unlike neorealism, he does not only want to explain the behaviours of the system’s largest and most powerful states. Likewise, unlike neorealists who believe that even power distribution among states is more favourable for international peace, Oraby claims that equal power distributions tend to produce more conflict-prone behaviours. Finally, his key findings are strongly based on empirical evidence since he believes that various neorealist answers had one thing in common - they enjoyed very limited empirical support.

While Booth tries to show us the magnitude these two scientists made in their scientific fields, Wilson goes for the behavioural aspect to explain how states try to survive in the anarchic environment. This group of recent articles is relevant because it uses some of the basic Darwinian principles in order to explain Waltz’s neorealism and, what is maybe even more important, these scholars demonstrate that even though Waltz’s theory is grounded in the social sciences, its structure is to some extent fixed in the life sciences. On the other hand, Tarek Oraby strengthened this portion of literature by elaborating important parallels and differences between Darwinism and neorealism.

As a final point, aforementioned scholars Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson edited a *Handbook of Biology and Politics* in 2017.¹²⁰ In this handbook, first-rate authors came together and, in more than 500 pages, tried to illustrate how a more biologically-oriented approach can expand and enrich political science. Somit, Peterson and other authors believe that this biologically-oriented approach can benefit political science both in a conceptual way and in terms of its research capabilities. This volume provides readers with comprehensive insights on general biological approaches to politics but also gives new information on Neo-Darwinism, human political behaviour, public policies and other areas of interest. One article that deserves to be singled out is a paper from John M. Friend

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 418.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 421.

¹¹⁹ See <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1339561&dswid=-2438>

¹²⁰ Albert Somit (ed.) and Steven A. Peterson (ed.), *Handbook of Biology and Politics*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017.

and Bradley A. Thayer titled “Biology and International Relations”.¹²¹ These two scholars provided additional convincing arguments for encompassing evolutionary thinking and behaviour in the study of IR. More specifically, Friend and Thayer tried to frame their key argument within a discussion of deterrence theory and evolutionary psychology. Overall, the editors of this unique handbook have shown the growing importance of combining the science of politics and biology in the broadest sense of the word. On the other hand, contributors are convinced that this is not a one-way process but that biologists can also benefit in their respective fields once they become familiar with the content of this book.

2.2.2. Critiques of applying Darwinian ideas in IR and Political Science

Although the twenty-first century has been proclaimed as the “century of biology”¹²², evolutionary arguments are not well accepted by one group of political scientists, especially in the US. One of the earliest articles on this debate comes from Ahti Laitinen and George Maude.¹²³ These authors see the impact of biologism (especially sociobiology) on the study of man, politics and international relations as dangerously simplistic. Their main warning is that international politics, viewed in this sense, is a dangerous world of inevitable conflict and aggression. In contrast, David P. Rapkin points out some evident obstacles regarding the evolutionary global politics research program.¹²⁴ Rapkin sets forth four linked problems and issues that must be harmonized for this scientific design to work. These include (1) specification of the units or populations of units that are subject to evolutionary process; (2) the relationship of these units and the larger environment within which they operate; (3) the answer to the question of how the environment serves as a selection mechanism, and the relationship of this mechanism with other forms of adaptation, i.e. social learning or “directed” adaptation; (4) the question of directionality, i.e. the answer to the question whether the evolution of global politics is cumulative in the sense of leading to more or less of something.¹²⁵

Richard Ned Lebow criticized the evolutionary aspect of international politics on multiple occasions. First, back in 1994, he criticized Kenneth Waltz’s assumption that the environment, or international structure in the language of neorealism, rewards certain adaptations in structure and behaviour and punishes others.¹²⁶ Adaptation is facilitated by an evolutionary process through a process of natural selection so that well-adapted units prosper and the unfit decline or become extinct. According to Lebow, the twentieth century offers little support for the neorealist notion of evolutionary adaptation. For evolution to bring about a world of better-adapted units, the effects of natural selection must be cumulative, which is not true for states. Clever and adaptive leaders may mobilize their country’s resources and increase its power relative to other states. However, their skills are not hereditary. Accomplished statesmen are just as likely to be followed by hacks or leaders whose foreign policy is severely constrained by domestic circumstances, and their country may lose its competitive advantage.¹²⁷ His second article was more explicit and focused on the

¹²¹ John M. Friend and Bradley A. Thayer, “Biology and International Relations”, in Albert Somit (ed.) and Steven A. Peterson (ed.), *Handbook of Biology and Politics*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017, pp. 165-180.

¹²² Craig Venter and Daniel Cohen, “The Century of Biology”, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 2004, p. 73.

¹²³ Ahti Laitinen and George Maude, “Biologism, Politics and International Politics”, *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1986, pp. 113-128.

¹²⁴ David P. Rapkin, “Obstacles to an Evolutionary Global Politics Research Program”, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 52-60.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹²⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, Vol. 48, Issue 2, 1994, p. 273.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

increasingly mainstream use of evolutionary biology in international relations theory.¹²⁸ Lebow's position on this matter is that evolutionary foundations essentially generate parsimonious theories, and as a consequence, social Darwinism resurfaces in a new guise. He concludes that any possible applications of evolution to history and international politics can be applied only metaphorically. Finally, in one fairly recent article, Lebow offered his critique of adaptation and imitation.¹²⁹ At the outset, Lebow starts with his commentary on evolutionary psychology. He believes evolutionary psychologists make big and unwarranted leaps far too easily from genetic change to political behaviour. Unlike them, Lebow thinks that one needs to be a lot more careful and explicit about identifying the mechanisms under consideration. He also remarks that we need to properly describe how those mechanisms work and in which conditions they work. Likewise, he adds that we must distinguish more effectively between different mechanisms and think thoroughly about how they might interact. Furthermore, Lebow argues that such theoretical and conceptual advances must have adequate empirical support. He again reminds us that today evolutionary theories in IR show very little of biologists' sophistication or caution and that scholars must always specify whether they are using evolution in a biological or metaphorical sense.

Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald were among the first to criticize Bradley Thayer's theory.¹³⁰ Their main argument was that importing sociobiology into international relations does not accomplish any of its proponents' goals, especially the notion that sociobiology provides a scientifically accepted view of human nature. They aimed to dispute both Thayer's specific formulation of sociobiology and the general project of explaining political phenomena through biological theories, and they do so in three ways. First, they argue that sociobiology remains the object of considerable scientific and ethical controversy, and its approaches contain numerous methodological flaws. Second, they contend that even if sociobiology could overcome its inherent limitations, the micro-foundations produced by a sociobiologically informed international politics theory are indeterminate and contradictory. Finally, they think that current micro-foundations in the social sciences, including structural realist and rational actor approaches, can be just as "scientific" from the perspective of the philosophy of science without importing sociobiological hypotheses.¹³¹ Therefore, Bell and Macdonald are convinced that Thayer is mistaken in arguing that sociobiology is superior to current approaches to political realism. In addition, realist scholars should be extremely wary of importing the ethically controversial and methodologically flawed sociobiological approach into the study of international politics.

Larry Arnhart also criticized Bradley Thayer as he downplays the importance of environment and culture as "proximate causes".¹³² According to Arnhart, Thayer tends to reduce human biology to genetics because when he speaks of "ultimate causes", he assumes that these causes are genetic. Thayer extracts this from Richard Dawkins, who claims that all Darwinian explanation is fundamentally about "selfish genes".¹³³ Thayer agrees that the organism evolved largely to satisfy the needs of the gene, and in a similar manner, egoism evolves through a population. Arnhart observes two problems within this premise. First, biology is, of course, much more than just genetics. Second, a purely genetic science cannot explain much about politics, which depends on higher levels of complexity far beyond genes. Thayer's broadly conceived bio-political science needs to study not only the aspect of genetic evolution but also the behavioural and cultural

¹²⁸ Richard Ned Lebow, "You Cannot Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations", *International Politics Reviews*, Vol. 1, 2013, pp. 2–10.

¹²⁹ Richard Ned Lebow, "Evolution, Adaptation, and Imitation", in William R. Thompson (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 1-30.

¹³⁰ Duncan S. A. Bell and Paul K. MacDonald, "Start the Evolution without Us", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001, pp. 187-198.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

¹³² Larry Arnhart, "Darwin, Thucydides, and International Relations", 2 Oct. 2009, *See* darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2009/10/darwin-thucydides-and-international.html.

¹³³ *See* Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

evolution of human beings and other political animals. Arnhart finalizes his argument by claiming that studying genes would not give us much data about politics, whereas studying the genetic interaction with behavioural and cultural evolution would tell us quite a lot.

Annette Freyberg-Inan criticizes a particular aspect of the realist paradigm: realist psychology.¹³⁴ More specifically, she focuses on realist views concerning human motivation and the psychological driving forces for action. The assumptions that characterize the realist paradigm include a particular view of human nature from which realist theorists develop expectations about the likely behaviour of states.¹³⁵ Freyberg-Inan defines motivation as a part of the human organism and human nature. Motivation interacts with environmental factors insofar as the environment can facilitate or restrict the operation of motives and insofar as it provides stimuli for what psychologists refer to as “motive arousal.”¹³⁶ According to her, motives are aroused by internal or external stimuli, such as hunger or provocation, and they determine how humans react to such stimuli. Freyberg-Inan believes that motives are related to needs, incentives and goals and that realists attribute political decisions to a very narrow range of such motives. Motives that realist international relations theory ascribes to the nation–states are identical to those which define the realist view of human nature.¹³⁷ Therefore, the state’s goals are assumed to be analogous to those of individuals. However, she concludes that the motivational assumptions employed by realists not only represent a simplification of reality but are, in fact, biased in favour of the particular view of reality that corresponds to the ideological preferences shared by realist theorists and policymakers. She argues that realism functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy by favouring interpretations of political events that serve to confirm the assumptions that were initially adopted.

Another point on this matter comes from Reed Davis, who contemplates that the case against a Darwinian approach to political science is found in the works of three political realism’s chief intellectual architects - Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Raymond Aron.¹³⁸ According to Davis, all three thinkers believed that the various manifestations of scientific naturalism were a provocation to human liberty and individual freedom. Likewise, he argues that this kind of naturalism restricts the options that statesmen have at their disposal when advancing the cause of peace and reconciliation. Davis also attacked Bradley Thayer’s “abstract” scientific naturalism and his single-minded preoccupation with hegemony, which propelled him far beyond the precepts of classical realism. According to him, Thayer and his Darwinian naturalism focus on a restless, violent quest for dominance that is not endemic to all biologically based theories of international relations.¹³⁹

Finally, the most recent article within this framework is from 2022. Matthew Rendall provides a critique of neorealism and some of its main postulates, especially its emphasis on security.¹⁴⁰ He argues that neorealist implicit reliance on evolutionary economics and the theory of natural selection is somewhat flawed. For this type of analogical reasoning to work, Rendall believes, the right theories must be chosen, and adequate analogies must be drawn.¹⁴¹ His article argues that Kenneth Waltz is misguided for two main reasons. The first one is because Waltz assumed that the counterpart of profit-maximization in the international arena is the pursuit of security. The second reason is that he assumed the dominant selection mechanism was group selection. According to

¹³⁴ Annette Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2004.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹³⁸ Reed Davis, “Beyond Nihilism: Classical Realism and the Perils of Scientific Naturalism”, *Modern Age*, 2014, pp. 32-44.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ Matthew Rendall, “Realism, Reckless States, and Natural Selection”, *International Relations*, 2022, pp. 1–22.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Rendall, this view has been discredited in biology for the last five decades and increasingly getting discredited in economics as well. Furthermore, Waltz's emphasis on group selection totally obscured individual selection that is occurring within states. In other words, neorealists have also committed a fallacy often found among biologists, and that is the assumption that traits enhancing group fitness are adopted even if those traits reduce fitness in intragroup competition.¹⁴² In this sense, Rendall is one of the few scholars who elaborate on the notion of fitness in international relations. Generally speaking, the neorealist affinity with the natural selection line of reasoning encouraged the arguments that international competition selects traits that promote survival. However, at the same time, this line of reasoning does not provide the right answers to explain risk-averse great power behaviour. For that reason, Rendall believes neorealism's equation of fitness with security risks is fundamentally false.

What is noticeable from this group of scholars, besides the fact that they are intrinsically against Darwinian or evolutionary inauguration into the field of IR, is that they evidently advocate for a clear division between the two branches of science. They point to some genuine and serious challenges that would occur if biology were to define international relations. Firstly, one could face certain methodological and conceptual problems when trying to implement the evolutionary theory in IR, especially regarding the level of analysis. Analyzing human nature and the state's behaviour produces different assumptions and conclusions. It remains very difficult to actually demonstrate psychological or biological phenomena at the level of the state. The second major issue is which evolutionary theory we should be advancing since there are different versions of evolutionary theory. At first glance, there is only one Charles Darwin and his theory of natural selection. In reality, certain variants of the evolutionary theory remain debatable within biology that, for example, emphasize cooperation rather than conflict. In addition, even when scholars embark on such a journey, they must always specify whether they use evolution in a biological or metaphorical sense. Likewise, they must have substantial knowledge to interpret and explain the mechanisms in question properly. Thirdly, sociobiological claims do not give a comprehensive and holistic account of human nature, as there are many areas still left unexplored. Political scientists who supported evolutionary inclusion in IR, like Bradley Thayer, put a substantial emphasis on nature, simultaneously marginalizing the role of nurture (culture). This can lead to the so-called "genetic reductionism" that clearly does not stand a chance in the IR academic discourse. Finally, researchers should be particularly cautious not to be entangled with social Darwinism in any form, risking to be accused of justifying or even promoting racial and eugenicist ideologies.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 1.

2.3. Gaps and missing pieces

This literature review reveals that there are two main narratives regarding this subject. One narrative maintains that biology, evolutionary theory, and ideas derived from Darwinism could be more or less useful for IR and political science. Political scientists from this group are convinced that much can be explained if such ideas are included in the analysis of international politics. The other narrative, on the contrary, presumes that this type of reasoning is dangerously controversial, illogical, and based on fragile grounds. Whatever the case may be, what seems even clearer is that in both camps, researchers have only sporadically made a link between classical realism and the ideas of Darwinism.

While there has been some research on deep-rooted biological background in classical, neoclassical, and structural realism, few researchers have taken into consideration the correlation between the Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinist ideas on the one hand, and the key classical realist arguments on the other. Even though there is extensive literature on classical realism, there is hardly any publication on the exact relationship between the ideas of Darwinism and the writings of classical realists. In their discussions, scholars interested in this topic have made certain contributions regarding the symbiotic relationship between IR and central evolutionary ideas but have yet to significantly contribute to developing the conception of classical realism in the context of Darwinism. Numerous articles and studies have offered many new answers to existing problems, but a considerable number of new questions have arisen, and there seems to be enough room for improvement. For those reasons, this subchapter will outline certain gaps and missing pieces. Based on identified gaps in present literature, this thesis will offer what appears to be missing in the current knowledge of classical realist thought.

First of all, based on what has been shown in the literature review, there are three main reasons why Darwinism was neglected in classical realism. The first reason lies in the fact that Charles Darwin's name still carries a great deal of unfair baggage in the social and political sciences, which often conceals the usefulness of modern Darwinian thought. Moreover, if ideas of Darwinism are by any chance present in IR debates, there is an almost inevitable risk that Darwinism fixates on nineteenth-century evolutionary biology, which automatically underestimates the sophistication of modern Darwinian discoveries. In that sense, Dominic D.P. Johnson correctly judges that social scientists see visions of Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism whenever biology starts to advocate for the dark aspects of human nature. In other words, there is an almost automatic link in the brains of social scientists between biology and social Darwinism.¹⁴³ The second reason is that this kind of research only began to emerge significantly around the new millennium, which means that the intellectual exchange between life sciences and international relations is still in its embryonic stages. Today, only a small number of IR scholars maintain close intellectual links with modern biologists. The final reason why the notion of Darwinism was neglected in classical realism is the fact that the current literature recognizes that neorealism shares the most common ground with Darwinian-related ideas. They believe that addressing the Darwinian questions, such as survival and security, holds the most important key for explaining the actual behaviour of states in the international arena.

Overall, there seems to be a need to investigate the abundance of ideas of Darwinism in classical-realist theory by conducting an extensive and in-depth analysis of their main 20th-century figure – Hans J. Morgenthau. Likewise, those thinkers who overtly or subtly served as guiding stars during the development of classical realism will also be analyzed. The vocabulary that classical realists and

¹⁴³ Dominic D.P. Johnson, "Survival of the Disciplines: Is International Relations Fit for the New Millennium?", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue 2, 2015, p. 758.

their forebears regularly used in their books and articles is most reminiscent of Darwinism. For instance, classical realists repeatedly spoke about the biological laws that govern human beings and, consequently, the behaviours of states in international politics. Even though they have acknowledged the impact of biology on man and politics, scholars did not delve into details of what that impact is and whether we can find the basis for such observations in Darwin's theory and in what has been written based on his ideas. Neither the theorists of classical realism nor the researchers who have delved into this important theory have thoroughly analyzed what is meant by the biological basis of classical realism. The previous scholarship fails to appreciate the potential of the ideas and principles of Darwinism that are unquestionably present in classical realism, both in origin and form. Even though classical realism and biological realism are occasionally used as synonyms, this "biological" aspect is insufficiently researched and incomplete without insights into the role of Darwinian scientific ideas and the palpable parallel with regards to social Darwinism. This lack of an answer is what constitutes a major research gap in the study of the realist theory of IR.

The following study differs in many respects from the authors mentioned in this chapter. Although Bradley A. Thayer and his book *Darwin and International Relations* really represent a major contribution to this topic, he did not look deep enough at the evolutionary evidence regarding human nature. For instance, he mentioned only a few scientists to support his claim on the evolutionary origins of egoism and domination, focusing too much on sociobiologists. He also failed to notice that Darwin himself said a great deal about these two human traits. On the other hand, he completely ignored representatives of social Darwinism, both conventional and militant. His main focus was on the origins of war and ethnic conflicts, but even here, Thayer did not mention German militant representatives of social Darwinism and their biological arguments regarding this matter. Likewise, Thayer did not cope much with the evolutionary foundations of power and survival, which is important since he dealt with realist theory more than any other IR theory.

This study differs from Jennifer Sterling-Folker's scientific endeavour as well. She also belongs to the cluster that examined human nature. Her focus was primarily environmental, comparing its impact on the realist and liberal perception of human nature. Even though Folker successfully notices the realist "survival of the fittest" imagery, she does not connect this notion in any way with social Darwinism. Likewise, because of her excessive emphasis on environmental factors, she did not include other evolutionary factors equally important for human behaviour.

Johnson and Thayer, in their 2016 article, presented the idea that John Mearsheimer's offensive realism can be entwined with certain aspects of evolutionary theory. However, this study will show that classical realism is better equipped for such analysis since it has more to offer. As one can notice, classical realism includes more Darwinian principles than self-help, power maximization and fear. Shiping Tang went a step further than Johnson and Thayer and suggested that social Darwinism and Geopolitics belong to offensive realism since these two advocated for control through expansion and conquest. This research stands on a similar side of the argument asserting that classical realism, too, should integrate classical geopolitics primarily due to social Darwinism. Likewise, social Darwinism should be included in classical realist thought because its forerunners bear that mark, and some of its elements exist in Morgenthau's theory. Furthermore, what sets this research apart from the works of Modelski, Poznanski, Wilson, and Oraby is its focus on classical realism. Common to all four is their belief that Darwinism shares most with neorealism. The logic of neorealism does seem to contain the Darwinian logic of survival and its selection mechanism. However, this research will expose that Darwinism definitely has its place and role in the theory of classical realism as well.

This dissertation also, in a different way, examines the notions of adaptation and imitation. While Folker, Axelrod and Cederman investigated these two concepts in more general terms, this research focuses on Hans J. Morgenthau and how he intuitively applied adaptation and imitation when explaining international politics. Regarding international morality, Mary Maxwell introduced a new perspective on this topic when she asserted that with the help of sociobiology, it is possible to overcome Hans Morgenthau's power-politics. However, this research reveals that the question of international morality will be extremely difficult to achieve due to human nature and survival imperative, at least from the point of view of classical realism and Darwinism.

At the end of this chapter, it is important to add that due to its topic, this research is susceptible to various forms of criticism or even rejection in the academic community. As was said before, there is a constant aversion of social scientists to the excessive use of biology in this field of science, especially when one tries to question a certain mainstream narrative. However, the benefits of integrating IR theory with natural sciences, despite the great challenges of communication and cooperation, far outweigh the benefits of disciplinary isolation. Theories and issues can be enriched significantly once the academic community accepts this radical change in approaching IR because this approach does offer new knowledge and parsimony that can help IR to thrive rather than flounder in the Age of Biology.¹⁴⁴ By incorporating and promoting the advancements of the life sciences in the field of IR, Charles Darwin's ideas, along with the ideas of his many followers, could complement the political sciences so that both may benefit from this fusion.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 749.

CHAPTER 3: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

3.1. Research outline

As was presented in the previous chapter, while certain aspects of Darwinism have been gaining influence in IR in the past three decades, the current IR scholarship has not yet discovered and evaluated the association between ideas of Darwinism and classical realism, let alone its theoretical tractability. This is not to argue that the dominant “scientific” reading of classical realism is wrong or incorrect but rather that the prevalent interpretation of classical realism as a paradigm is, to a certain extent, too narrow and categorical.¹⁴⁵ The fundamental cause of this “restraint” can mainly be traced to the rhetorical impact of social Darwinism and the damaging myths that emerged about Charles Darwin and his theory of natural selection. However, the ideological reasons for the continuing rejection of Darwinism from social sciences were largely ungrounded and detrimental precisely because this term began to change so that it was used to describe scientific and ideological doctrines.¹⁴⁶ Social Darwinism was used to block and ostracize biological ideas from the social sphere and, eventually, to discourage any theoretical exchange between natural and social sciences. This rhetorical impact of social Darwinism produced serious consequences in the realm of social sciences (and consequently IR theories) because generations of scholars still need to explore and extract the bountiful pickings of ideas of Darwinism. The critical point to note is that not only has “social Darwinism” been shown to be a highly misunderstood concept, but it also foreshadowed and prevented the developments in other emerging fields, such as Sociobiology. The reluctance of IR scholars to openly acknowledge the ideas of Darwinism reflects a widespread and unnecessary fear of it. In the minds of social scientists, ideas of Darwinism were seen as a negative concept for any serious inquiry.

Even though most classical realists have prided themselves on “biological heritage” in their theory, scholars of IR have rarely explored its roots seriously. What becomes obvious on close reading of classical realism is the prevalent “essence” of Darwinism, which brings us to whether this IR theory needs ideas of Darwinism for it to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness and coherence. Most books and articles about this school of thought indicate an implicit adoption in which Darwinian scientific concepts are manifested. Likewise, certain aspects of social Darwinism are found under the surface of classical realist thought. Meanwhile, there is a discrete lack of reference to Charles Darwin and the ideas that later derived from his theory. Therefore, in classical realist works there seems to be hidden or “covert” Darwinism. Especially in Hans J. Morgenthau’s major works, there is a careful culling of Darwinian references from the text and a genuine distancing from such ideas. Nevertheless, as this dissertation aims to show, the Darwinian essence remains present. Simply put, even if the term Darwinism or the references to such works are missing from the works of classical realists, the Darwinian “spirit” is nonetheless there. Darwinian scientific ideas and principles, along with social Darwinism, have been variously deployed and persistently transpire in classical realist observation of international politics. To put it another way, classical realism relies on Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas more than meets the eye.

Therefore, the main objective of this research is to investigate how much ideas of Darwinism are present in the origin of classical realism and whether these ideas are within the theoretical core and

¹⁴⁵ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 2011, pp. 3-5.

¹⁴⁶ Gregory Claeys, “The “Survival of the Fittest” and the Origins of Social Darwinism”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2000, p. 228; Antonello La Vergata, “Darwinism and the Social Sciences, 1859–1914”, *Rendiconti Lincei*, Vol. 20, 2009, p. 336; Naomi Beck, “Social Darwinism”, in Michael Ruse (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 195.

protective belt of this IR theory. The origin will be reflected in those theorists and philosophers on whose backing classical realism built its basis of international politics in the theoretical and substantive sense. The theoretical core and protective belt will be demonstrated in key ideas and principles of Darwinism (explained in more detail in the next chapter), primarily in the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. In other words, drawing attention to the theoretical principles of Darwinism and classical realism, this dissertation will essentially explore the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist thread that runs through classical realism. As a result, regardless of the layers that classical realism undoubtedly has, this theory implicitly adopts both key Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas and principles that inevitably shape its fundamentals. It is thus crucial to unveil two central research questions that are imposed for this substantially theoretical research:

1. Does classical realism implicitly or explicitly rely on ideas of Darwinism?
2. Does classical realism need ideas of Darwinism to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness and coherence?

Bearing in mind those two questions, the following research will investigate the presence of ideas and principles of Darwinism in classical realist scholarship. What is important is that this influence of Darwinism is more implicit than explicit since its legacy in classical realism is often unrealized, unrecognized, played down, or ignored. The present study embraces this task by comprehensively examining the key texts of classical realism's founder - Hans J. Morgenthau. Before that, this study will embark on a quest to track those scholars who officially and unofficially influenced this IR theory. What binds those scholars is that they were associated with the framework of Darwinism to a greater or lesser extent. In sum, the crucial point is that regardless of the label or composition, there appears to be a "thread of Darwinism" woven into classical realism in one way or another. This is an exceptionally important observation for two reasons. First, this subtle camouflaging effect brings to light the true extent of Darwinism in classical realism. Secondly, this kind of inquiry opens the gate for the affirmative exploitation of such ideas in other branches of realism.

Considering the above-mentioned, the study's first aim will be to establish the presence of ideas and concepts of Darwinism in classical realism. The second aim is to investigate whether the ideas and concepts of Darwinism are fundamentally important for classical realism and whether this theory is the same without those ideas and concepts. It is a forensic and extractive work with a threefold purpose. Firstly and most importantly, it is to examine the range of such ideas in classical realism and reveal the true extent of "hidden" Darwinism within Hans J. Morgenthau's academic work. Secondly, it is to explore the traceability of the ideas of Darwinism beneath that theory. This will be done via recognized and unrecognized forebears of classical realist theory. Finally, it will signal the receptiveness for future research with a similar topic that might benefit and enhance other theories of international relations, not just realism.

This chapter has revealed the research questions this dissertation aims to answer, but it also wants to unveil the basis of this study. Therefore, the next part will present a theoretical framework that will ground and support the fundamental assumptions of this research. What comes after that is the outline of a specific method suitable for this theoretical inquiry. The final part will give some room for the limits and advantages of the following study.

3.2. Theoretical framework

The dissertation will investigate the role of ideas of Darwinism in classical realism by drawing on the ideas of Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) and his philosophy of science.¹⁴⁷ This Hungarian philosopher presented his key arguments in his book *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes – MSRP*, published in 1978. Lakatos developed MSRP as a new tool for evaluating scientific theories. His approach eliminates the shortcomings of the concepts offered by other philosophers of science, namely Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Throughout the book, Lakatos critiques Karl Popper's falsificationism, arguing that the simple criterion of falsifiability is too restrictive and does not adequately capture the complexity of scientific practice. He also challenges Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts, suggesting that scientific change is better understood through the dynamics of research programs. In other words, his contribution in this respect was to bridge the gap between Popper's falsifiability and the problem of demarcation and Kuhn's concept of changing scientific paradigms through scientific revolutions. The methodology of scientific research programmes offers several positive aspects that contribute to our understanding of scientific development and inquiry. For instance, Lakatos provides a dynamic and evolving view of scientific inquiry. Unlike static views that see scientific theories as either confirmed or falsified, Lakatos acknowledges the continuous development and refinement of theories over time. This perspective aligns well with the actual process of scientific research. He also offers a more holistic approach to understanding scientific knowledge, providing insights into how theories develop and interact with data.

In essence, Lakatos' research programme revolves around two parts of a scientific theory. The first part of any scientific theory is its "hard core", which contains its basic assumptions (or axioms). The hard core represents the central, non-negotiable components of a scientific theory or research program. It defines the key concepts, relationships, and assumptions that underlie the theory. These core assumptions or principles are typically resistant to change and serve as the foundation upon which the entire research program is built. One can look at the hard core as the nucleus of a scientific research program. The second part of a scientific theory is its so-called "protective belt" or a surrounding defensive set of "ad hoc" hypotheses. While the hard core provides the foundational principles of a research program, the protective belt serves as a flexible and adaptive layer surrounding the core. The protective belt consists of auxiliary hypotheses, secondary assumptions, or additional theories that surround and protect the hard core. These auxiliary hypotheses act as a buffer zone between the hard core and empirical challenges. Essentially, while the "hard core" of a particular theory contains the essential aspects that define that theory, the "protective belt" is a set of confirmed but disputable auxiliary hypotheses that can be replaced.

¹⁴⁷ Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 48-52; Peter Urbach, "The Bayesian Alternative to the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in Kostas Gavroglu (ed.), Yorgos Goudaroulis (ed.), Pantelis Nicolacopoulos (ed.), *Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 400.




Figure 1. The model of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programmes

Positive heuristics refer to the guidelines or principles that suggest fruitful research directions within a scientific research program. These heuristics guide scientists on how to extend and develop the core ideas of a theory, providing a framework for generating new hypotheses and theories. They are constructive in nature, encouraging scientists to build upon existing knowledge, formulate new theories, and make novel predictions within the framework of a research program. Positive heuristics assist in the progression of scientific knowledge by guiding researchers to explore uncharted territories or aspects within a theory that could lead to new discoveries or advancements. Negative heuristics, on the other hand, set boundaries or restrictions within a scientific research program. They suggest which directions or types of theories are unfruitful or should be avoided within the framework of the given research program. These heuristics help scientists by warning against certain approaches or hypotheses that are likely to lead to dead ends, inconsistencies, or contradictions within the established framework of the theory. Negative heuristics provide guidelines for avoiding research paths that might undermine the core principles of the theory or lead to degeneration of the research program.

Imre Lakatos argued that both positive and negative heuristics are essential for the development and progression of scientific knowledge within a research program. Positive heuristics guide scientists to explore new avenues and make advancements, while negative heuristics serve as a safeguard, preventing the program from drifting too far or deviating in directions that could jeopardize its coherence and empirical success.

To explain bluntly what Lakatos is talking about, we can use the example of psychoanalytic theory. In psychoanalytic theory, the "hard core" could be associated with the fundamental principles and concepts established by Sigmund Freud. This includes key notions such as the unconscious mind, the role of early childhood experiences, the structure of the psyche (id, ego, superego), and defense mechanisms. These core principles form the theoretical nucleus of psychoanalysis, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the complexities of human behavior. The "protective belt" consists of adaptations, extensions, and additional concepts that psychoanalysts have developed over time to address nuanced clinical situations, cultural diversity, and the evolving landscape of psychological understanding. For instance, various

psychoanalytic schools, such as Jungian or Adlerian, while maintaining a connection to the core principles, they introduce auxiliary hypotheses that offer diverse lenses through which to interpret human behavior. If psychoanalytic theory is deprived of the fundamental (i.e., hard-core) principles established by its founder, Sigmund Freud, then the whole theory is jeopardized.

Marxist theory can be another example. The hard core of Marxist theory is the idea that social relations and class struggle are the driving forces of history. This theory assumes that capitalism is a system of exploitation in which the ruling class (the bourgeoisie) extracts surplus value from the working class (the proletariat), leading to class conflict and social revolution. The protective belt of Marxist theory, on the other hand, includes concepts such as the labour theory of value, alienation, historical materialism, and others that help explain how the capitalist system works and how social change can be achieved. In the case of Marxist theory, hard core (class struggle as the driving force of history) is not subject to falsification, while the protective belt (labour theory of value, alienation, historical materialism) is. By distinguishing between the theory's hard core and protective belt, Lakatos helps clarify what parts of the theory are essential and what parts are open to revision in response to new evidence.

While Lakatos's approach offers valuable insights into scientific development, it also raises potential challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between the rigid hard core and the flexible protective belt. A rigid hard core may resist modification, hindering the theory's adaptability to new evidence or challenges. The consequence of such inflexibility is a diminished capacity to incorporate novel information, potentially leading to stagnation or decline in the scientific program. On the other hand, over-reliance on auxiliary hypotheses may create a perception of the theory as constantly changing to accommodate new data, potentially compromising its scientific integrity. Therefore, achieving a harmonious equilibrium between the two is crucial for the sustained success of a research programme. Critics have also noticed that the distinction between the hard core and the protective belt is not always clear-cut. Determining which aspects of a theory belong to the hard core and which belong to the protective belt can be subjective and may depend on the interpretation of individual researchers. Additionally, Lakatos's framework might not be universally applicable to all scientific disciplines or practices. Some areas of science, such as certain branches of theoretical physics or areas dealing with highly speculative and exploratory hypotheses, may not neatly conform to the hard core and protective belt model.

In any case, if one leaves these imperfections aside, Imre Lakatos and his philosophy of science provides the best theoretical course of action for the purpose of this research. The interplay between the classical realist hard core and its protective belt will offer a nuanced perspective and give new generative insight regarding this important IR theory.

3.3. Methodological framework

It is now necessary to take a step further and illustrate which tool (method) will be used in exposing the "thread of Darwinism" that is assumed to exist in classical realist hard core and protective belt. For all intents and purposes, content analysis in its manifest and latent form will be used because it can expose the issue in question. At this point, one will be briefly acquainted with the basic characteristics of this research method and, even more significantly, its function in this study.

Content analysis as a research method represents a form of textual analysis used to identify, enumerate and analyze the presence and occurrences of specific messages (or themes and concepts)

embedded in relevant texts. It rests on the assumption that texts are a rich data source with great potential to reveal valuable information about particular phenomena. Qualitative researchers using a content analytic approach recognize that text is open to subjective interpretation and reflects multiple meanings.¹⁴⁸ Its key advantage is that it enables a thorough and careful interpretation of the meaning of a certain text, which is vital for this kind of theoretical research.¹⁴⁹

Since this research method can be either quantitative or qualitative, the author will choose the latter rather than the former, considering the subject and nature of this thesis. Qualitative content analysis enables the identification of implicit connections, uncovering subtle references, metaphors, or indirect influences that might reveal the incorporation of Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist thought within classical realism. It also enables a holistic examination of entire texts, ensuring that the analysis is not confined to isolated quotes but considers the broader context in which these ideas are discussed. Qualitative content analysis supports the synthesis of theoretical concepts. Furthermore, qualitative content analysis allows us to weave together the ideas of Darwinism and classical realism in a theoretically cohesive manner, providing a rich and nuanced understanding of how these frameworks intersect.

As there are two types of qualitative content analysis, conceptual analysis and relational analysis, this study will focus on conceptual (thematic) analysis, which determines the presence and frequency of (Darwinian and social Darwinist) concepts (or themes) in a text. Those notions (messages or themes) might appear explicitly or implicitly, that is, in a literal, analogical, or metaphorical sense, which are the three basic modalities that appear in the works of theorists that are subject to analysis.¹⁵⁰

In order to uncover the “heritage of Darwinism” that is distinct and unfamiliar to current classical realist thought, it is necessary to take a step back and catch a glimpse of those “forefathers” who had a Darwinian and especially the social Darwinist “vigour”. Their influence will be divided into two categories: an unrecognized influence on classical realism and a recognized one. The *modus operandi* in which this lineage will be presented starts with six theorists of classical geopolitics - Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Karl Haushofer, Alfred T. Mahan, Halford J. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman - whose influence is unrecognized yet exists. After that, the discussion will move on to Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, whose influence is both recognized and acknowledged in classical realist thought. It will be shown that they, too, adopted (in a literal, analogical, or metaphorical sense) various evolutionary and social Darwinist ideas in their works, such as the struggle for survival, the evolutionary background of power, organicism, selfishness, competition for resources, moral relativism, imperialism, etc. Most of those facets however constitute the hard core and protective belt of classical realist theory. Following that, the ideas of Darwinism will be exposed in books and articles of classical realism’s founder - Hans J. Morgenthau. To put it another way, once it has been demonstrated how classical realist “forefathers” utilized evolutionary and social Darwinist ideas, it will be necessary to disclose the Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinist ideas in the writings of classical realists themselves, particularly in the works of Hans J. Morgenthau, who is regarded as the most influential of them all. Henceforth, it will be demonstrated through this research method that Hans J. Morgenthau frequently and quite unwittingly relied on ideas of Darwinism.

¹⁴⁸ Heidi Julien, “Content Analysis”, in Lisa M. Given (ed.), *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Sage Publications, London, 2008, p. 120.

¹⁴⁹ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2004, pp. 22-23.

¹⁵⁰ Michael P. Marks, *Metaphors in International Relations Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, pp. 190-192.

Units of analysis will be seminal works (books and articles) published by the theorists mentioned above that have been repeatedly interpreted and reinterpreted over time and are considered primary or original texts. Primarily, those are going to be the works of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Karl Haushofer, Alfred T. Mahan, Halford J. Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. After that, attention will be directed towards the main books and articles of Hans J. Morgenthau, as he represents a central figure of classical realism. On the other hand, the literature regarding the ideas of Darwinism will be equally significant in order to detect the connection between those ideas and classical realism. Finally, the engagement with secondary literature, whether favourable or critical, will be just as important to this study as paying attention to the original texts.

The final point is that throughout this research, one will notice the pursuit of a latent (hidden) meaning related to ideas of Darwinism. Unlike manifest content analysis, concerned with easily observable or “surface-level” data, latent content analysis is often defined as interpreting what is hidden deep within the text.¹⁵¹ In this way, the role of the researcher is to discover the implied meaning, underscoring the importance of the researcher co-creating meaning with the text.¹⁵² To analyze texts using this research method, the text must be coded, or broken down, into manageable code categories for analysis (i.e. “codes”). In this case, codes will be keywords that will be elaborated on in more detail in the next chapter.

In this study, content analysis will serve two critical purposes: it will expose the origins of established ideas and entrenched practices of classical realism. At the same time, the second shall reveal the apparent “problem” that there is a lack of awareness of the plurality of truths. One such “truth” is that classical realism relies upon and needs ideas of Darwinism because those ideas are in the hard core and protective belt of this IR theory. For this reason, they are essential to classical realism, and as a result, this IR theory would not be the same theory without those ideas. Classical realism, like all theories, is perpetually in the process of becoming, and a scholar’s responsibility is to acknowledge and remind others that theories are always subject to interpretation and reinterpretation.

3.4. Final remarks

This chapter introduces a theoretical framework that will serve as a platform for the following investigation. It has also provided a methodological tool capable of “uncovering” the buried layer of Darwinism in classical realism. As a reminder, there are two directions in the upcoming analysis. The first is the historical-analytical approach, which concerns the origin of classical realism. The second approach in this analysis is substantial and deals with the actual ideas of Darwinism, which one finds in the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau.

There are, however, several limitations to this research as well as potential downsides. First, the lack of previous studies in this subject area is apparent at first glance, indicating that IR researchers hesitated to tackle this topic due to its complexity and uniqueness. Simply said, any social science researcher might quickly become engrossed in biological concepts and assumptions that he or she does not fully understand. The second constraint stems from the fact that the causal relationship

¹⁵¹ Nancy L. Kondracki; Nancy S. Wellman; Daniel R. Amundson, “Content Analysis: Review of Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education”, *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior*, Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 224-230.

¹⁵² A. J. Kleinheksel; Nicole Rockich-Winston; Huda Tawfik; Tasha R. Wyatt; “Demystifying Content Analysis”, *American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education*, Vol. 84, Issue 1, 2020, p. 129.

between ideas of Darwinism and classical realism may not be as strong as one might expect. Classical realists and their forefathers did not openly discuss Darwinian notions, making it hard to extract and conventionally measure these ideas. Like most qualitative studies, this research is based on opinion and judgment rather than actual results. A different, or one might even say “robust” methodology, might address the research problem in the future more effectively. The third limitation involves subjectivity or personal bias. Although scientific or academic research needs to be handled objectively, one often sees what one wishes to see – in this case, the elements of Darwinism in the theory of classical realism. Finally, the research project may be too ambitious because both Darwinism and classical realism are exceptionally vast areas, with many different theorists, each with its own specificity and subcategories. In this respect, one limitation of this study is that it concentrates the most on Hans J. Morgenthau, without any profound attention given to other distinguished classical realists.

Nonetheless, the task ahead has many positive aspects and contributes to the field of IR. It reveals, first and foremost, that classical realism isn’t quite defeated and that it still remains an inspirational theory for research. As mentioned earlier, it is innovative because classical realism is being placed in a different context than has been the case in current scholarship. This study proposes a new point of view on classical realism, i.e., the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist angles that are present but repeatedly ignored in current scholarship. Furthermore, this research contributes to the biological foundations of classical realism by introducing a “scent” of Darwinism, without claiming to be the only correct reading of classical realism, but rather to demonstrate that there are various ways to look at this important theory. Finally, IR scholars will greatly benefit from understanding the concepts found in ideas of Darwinism since they may be applied to other IR theories besides realism. This aspect will be elaborated on in detail at the very end of this thesis.

One essential point to note is that this doctoral dissertation belongs to the history of political ideas because it attempts to criticize and reconstruct one of the prominent theories of IR – classical realism. Given the lack or little progress on this subject in the past, it is now important to look into the fundamentals of both classical realism and Darwinism through the lens of Imre Lakatos research programmes.

CHAPTER 4: Classical realism and Darwinism: Hard Core and Protective Belt

The following chapter will initially explain the most prominent traits of classical realist theory, its hard core and protective belt. It will provide a comprehensive understanding of the foundational principles that anchor classical realism in IR. In the second section of this chapter, the focus will shift to the most essential features of the ideas of Darwinism. This section aims to unravel the fundamental tenets that govern Darwinian thought, together with those figures that are pivotal for the analysis. The third section will demonstrate which Darwinian ideas and principles this research aims to emphasize and associate with classical realism. After all, not all ideas of Darwinism are suitable for examining this IR theory. In summary, this chapter will navigate the intellectual crossroads where these two seemingly disparate domains converge. It endeavors to establish meaningful connections between classical realism and Darwinism, discerning the resonance and compatibility of certain ideas of Darwinism with the tenets of classical realism within the context of international relations.

4.1. The fundamentals of classical realism

This subsection aims to recapitulate the fundamentals of classical realism and its notable figures. Although the literature review chapter offered three waves of classical realist thought, most scholars agree that the years following World War II marked the actual rise of this IR theory.¹⁵³ Classical realists adopted viewpoints that contradicted those of their liberal counterparts. In other words, their main objective was to explain and comprehend how things actually are rather than engage in the futile debate about how they “ought” to be.¹⁵⁴ Because of its ubiquity, classical realism has often been described as the “oldest theory” of international politics and the “dominant” one.¹⁵⁵ Three key ideas that constantly predominate within classical realism are state-centrism, survival, and self-help.¹⁵⁶ This section gives a brief overview of the most important premises of this theory, which are necessary for the further continuation of this research. For classical realists, the state, its behaviour, its interests, and its survival remain central when discussing international politics. In addition, classical realists included many premises to enhance further their theory, such as human nature and its tragic condition in this world, following by power, egoism, domination, anarchy and morality. Taken together, they form the basic structure of classical realist thought from the twentieth century. This dissertation will adopt classical realist theory in its modern form, from Edward H. Carr to Henry Kissinger. However, given the expected limitations of the research, especially the time constraint, the central figure will be Hans J. Morgenthau.

It is noteworthy that, in addition to classical realism, the realist theory of IR has developed in two other directions: neorealism and neoclassical realism. Neorealism, or structural realism, emerged in the 1970s and was developed by Kenneth Waltz as a response to the limitations of classical

¹⁵³ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, p. 63.

¹⁵⁴ Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964.

¹⁵⁵ Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1997.

¹⁵⁶ Steve Lamy et al., *Introduction to Global Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, p. 74; Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2002, p. 250.

realism.¹⁵⁷ According to Waltz, classical realism failed to explain states' behaviour in the international system adequately. The basic tenets of neorealist thought are based on the idea that the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no high authority and no world government that can regulate the behaviour of states. Instead, states are seen as self-interested units that seek to maximize their security and survival in a highly competitive international environment. Neorealists also emphasized the importance of power distribution and the concept of polarity, which refers to the number of great powers in the international system. A unipolar system has one dominant power, a bipolar system has two, and a multipolar system has more than two. According to Waltz, states are primarily concerned with the balance of power, determined by the number of great powers in the system and their distribution of capabilities. Material factors primarily measure this distribution of capabilities. For Waltz, the balance of power tends to be more stable in a bipolar or multipolar system, as there are more actors to check each other's power.

Neoclassical realism emerged in the 1990s, around two decades after structural realism. This branch of realism was a response to the limitations of structural realism, which focused primarily on systemic factors in explaining state behaviour.¹⁵⁸ Neoclassical realism wants to maintain a systemic perspective while seeking to incorporate domestic factors into the analysis of international relations. The origin of neoclassical realism can be traced to the work of Robert Jervis, who argued that the behaviour of states is influenced not only by the distribution of power in the international system but also by the internal domestic politics of individual states. Jervis and other neoclassical realists posited that the perceptions and beliefs of state leaders are greatly shaped by various domestic factors such as interest groups, bureaucratic politics, and public opinion. The basic tenet of neoclassical realism is centred on the idea that a combination of systemic and domestic factors influences the behaviour of states. Even though neoclassical realists agree that power distribution in the international system is an important determinant of state behaviour, it is not the only one. Domestic factors such as regime type, interest groups and bureaucratic politics also influence state behaviour. Furthermore, they also point out the importance of the state leader in shaping foreign policy. State leaders and their beliefs and perceptions are shaped by domestic factors, which have certain effects on state behaviour in the international system. Generally speaking, neoclassical realism posits that a complex interplay of systemic and domestic factors influences the behaviour of states in the international system.

It is important to note that although there are significant differences between these three branches of realism, there is also a significant amount of overlap. For instance, all three have identified states as the main actors in the international arena. Likewise, all three strands have emphasized great powers as they influence the world stage the most. Finally, all three assume that the international system is fundamentally anarchical. The table below concisely shows some of the main arguments and representatives of each of the three branches of realism.

¹⁵⁷ Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

¹⁵⁸ See Gideon Rose, "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1998, pp. 144-172; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991; Randal Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2006; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, pp. 167-214; Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.

School of realism	Main arguments	Notable scholars
Classical realism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ International politics is inherently anarchic and characterized by a struggle for power. ■ States are the primary actors in international relations, and their actions are primarily driven by their own self-interest. ■ Human nature is the ultimate source of conflict, as individuals and states seek to maximize their power and security. 	Carr, Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Aron, Kissinger
Neorealism (Structural realism)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ International politics is characterized by a system of states that operates within an anarchic international system. ■ The distribution of power among states is the most important determinant of international outcomes. ■ States are rational actors seeking to maximise their security and survival within the system. 	Waltz, Mearsheimer, Gilpin, Walt, Van Evera
Neoclassical realism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ International politics is shaped by both the international system and domestic factors, including the nature of the state and its leadership. ■ Domestic factors, such as bureaucratic politics, interest groups, and public opinion, can affect a state's foreign policy decisions. ■ While systemic factors may constrain a state's actions, domestic factors can also provide opportunities for states to pursue their interest. 	Rose, Snyder, Schweller, Jervis, Zakaria

Table 1. Classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism

Human nature represents a starting point for classical realism; more precisely, this theory has a rather pessimistic view of human nature. They argue that humans are inherently selfish, power-seeking, and prone to conflict, with the core of such behavior lying, above all, in egoistic passions.¹⁵⁹ According to Hans J. Morgenthau, who is considered by many to be the archetypal realist, man is characterized by two distinctive attributes: egoism and *animus dominandi*.¹⁶⁰ Human beings are mostly driven by their passions and are interested primarily in self-preservation and enhancement of their power. For him, all men have three basic drives: the drive to live, the drive to reproduce and the drive to dominate.¹⁶¹ Since human egoism is ineradicable, classical realists claim that conflict is always present and inevitable.¹⁶² Following this line of thought, Morgenthau and other classical realists have tended to equate international politics with the pursuit and use of power. As Morgenthau blatantly puts it, “the aspiration for power over man [...] is the essence of politics.”¹⁶³

This negative view of human nature only extends to the behavior of states. Classical realists assert that states, as actors in the international system, are motivated primarily by the pursuit of power and national interest. They are skeptical about the possibility of genuine altruism or cooperation between states without an underlying self-interest. For classical realists, the national interest animates behaviour of states, as they are seen as rational egoists guided by the dictates of *raison d'état*.¹⁶⁴ National interest is “most likely to be pursued in an essentially egoistic way with respect to other states.”¹⁶⁵

Both humans and states are competitors for power, always engaged in a continuous and inescapable struggle for survival. From a classical realist point of view, the struggle for power and the struggle for survival are essentially the same. Because of survival, classical realism places a strong emphasis on power as the central currency of international politics. The pursuit of power is not solely viewed as a means of aggression but as a necessary and rational response to the uncertain and competitive nature of the international environment. According to Morgenthau “The first dimension of the national interest is survival. Like an individual, a nation-state also always considers it as its primary duty to secure its survival and the survival of its citizens.”¹⁶⁶ Martin Wight also sums this up by saying that “international theory is the theory of survival [...] (it) involves the ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and national extinction.”¹⁶⁷ Morgenthau and other classical realists basically “reapplied” the “struggle for power”, which is founded in human nature, to the level of the state, which they perceived as the main actor of international politics.¹⁶⁸ Classical realists also claim that states cannot be separated from human beings simply because they are the ones who make decisions that determine how the state should

¹⁵⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 165; Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932, p. 23.

¹⁶⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, pp. 191–196.

¹⁶¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 38.

¹⁶² Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Harper and Row, New York, 1946, p. 231; Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932, p. xv.

¹⁶³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946, p. 45.

¹⁶⁴ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, p. 30.

¹⁶⁵ Jack Donnelly, “Twentieth-Century Realism”, in Terry Nardin (ed.) and David R. Mapel (ed.), *Traditions of International Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 93.

¹⁶⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, 1950, p. 841.

¹⁶⁷ Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory”, *International Relations*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 1960, p. 48.

¹⁶⁸ Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London & New York, 1998, p. 26; Arnold Wolfers, “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1951, p. 42.

be.¹⁶⁹ They evidently endorsed naturalism, in which they found certain (largely) incorrigible and generally unattractive facts about human beings and human nature.¹⁷⁰

Insecurity and conflict are, however, rooted in the anarchic structure of international relations. In the absence of an international (supreme) government, “the law of the jungle still prevails”.¹⁷¹ For that reason, classical realism underpins the fact that international law and international institutions are inherently weak since these two cannot enforce rules or prevent conflicts. Consequently, war represents a normal facet of international politics and will continue to occur as long as states exist in an anarchic environment. Therefore, states will continue to fight each other in order to expand their bases of power. In international politics, power is usually viewed in terms of the material resources required to harm or coerce other states. Furthermore, the need to control resources is based on the assumption that resources are limited and that there is no overarching authority to regulate their allocation in anarchy. As a result, the competition for resources is presumed to be omnipresent.

In a world of scarce resources, their aggregation inevitably leads to a struggle for power, and in such an environment, moral argumentation is no match for raw power. Most realists allow some space for morality in the international sphere, but, as Nicholas Spykman explains, “justice, fairness, and tolerance [...] can be used instrumentally as moral justification for the power quest, but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness.”¹⁷² Alternatively, in E. H. Carr’s words, “Power goes far to create the morality convenient to itself.”¹⁷³ In sum, ethical considerations have very little influence on the behaviour of states. For classical realists, morality in the international realm is relative and situational, and it depends on the balance of power between states and the context of the specific situation. In other words, what is considered moral or just in one situation may not be applicable or relevant in another. Since states are primarily motivated by their own interests, moral considerations are often sacrificed in favour of pragmatic calculations of power.

Classical realists perceive states as operating in an anarchic realm reflecting Hobbes’s state of nature, in which human life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”¹⁷⁴ The nature of international interaction is essentially conflictual and this constant fear to acquire, maintain, demonstrate and exercise power forces states in international anarchy to face a profound “security dilemma.”¹⁷⁵ Their central aim is not simply to increase their (absolute) wealth, power, or utility but to increase the (relative) gap between their holdings (of wealth, power, and utility) and those of other states.¹⁷⁶ Power politics is the popular name of that game which always results in a zero-sum situation. To put it simply, one state’s gain is another state’s loss. For two reasons, classical realists’ understanding of the world is utterly materialistic. The first is that they emphasize material (primarily economic and military) assets as sources of power. Second, they continually claim that material and biological factors determine human nature.¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁹ W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by Reading Thucydides”, *The Monist*, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2006, p. 240.

¹⁷⁰ Brian Leiter, “Classical Realism”, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2001, p. 245.

¹⁷¹ Frederick Lewis Schuman, *International Politics: The Western State System in Transition*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1941, p. 9.

¹⁷² Nicholas J. Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, p. 18.

¹⁷³ Edward. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939*, Macmillan, London, 1966, p. 236.

¹⁷⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Broadview Press, Peterborough, 2002, p. xiii.

¹⁷⁵ John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.

¹⁷⁶ Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, 1998, p. 35.

¹⁷⁷ Samuel Barkin, *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 32.

Essentially, the so-called theoretical “hard core” of classical realism consists of the following: a pessimistic depiction of human nature, the primacy of power and survival, state-centrism, anarchy, moral relativism, a competitive zero-sum outlook, and materialism.

Although one has been introduced to some of the fundamental premises of classical realism, other variables with significant implications should also be mentioned. In other words, if one wants to look at the classical realist protective belt, the concepts of restraint, alliance formation, diplomacy, balance of power, history, geography, leadership, rejection of international law and imperialism serve as good illustrations. Within the context of classical realism, the concept of restraint refers to the idea that states, despite their pursuit of power and survival, may exercise self-restraint in their actions to maintain stability and avoid excessive conflict. States might exercise restraint by judiciously employing their power and avoiding actions that could lead to excessive destabilization or the escalation of conflicts. Restraint serves as an auxiliary hypothesis within classical realism by acknowledging that while states pursue power and security, they might not always engage in maximalist actions, understanding the potential risks and costs associated with unchecked aggression.

Similarly, alliance formation represents a strategy employed by states to protect themselves and enhance their security by forming alliances or coalitions with other states. Alliance formation acts as part of the protective belt in classical realism by supporting the core notion that states strive for survival and security in an anarchic international environment. The balance of power is thus important since it is linked to the idea that nations have frequently endeavoured to maintain their security and promote their interests by joining forces with other states.¹⁷⁸ Diplomacy, as a component of statecraft, involves the use of negotiations, treaties, and dialogue to manage international relations. Classical realists recognize the importance of diplomacy in advancing national interests and avoiding unnecessary conflict. Likewise, they have often looked to history in order to understand and predict patterns of state behavior. They believe that historical insights can provide valuable lessons about the enduring nature of power politics and the recurrent patterns of conflict and cooperation. Classical realist theorists have often pointed out the importance of geographical location since geography shapes the options available to states.¹⁷⁹

Classical realists often emphasize the importance of leadership qualities such as strategic vision, decisiveness, and the ability to navigate through power politics.¹⁸⁰ These qualities play a crucial role in the success of a state in the international arena. On the other hand, classical realists tend to be skeptical of the efficacy of international law and institutions in restraining state behavior. They argue that states ultimately act in their own self-interest, and international law may be disregarded when it conflicts with national interests. Finally, imperialism can be considered part of the classical realist protective belt since power maximization leads to some form of imperialism. Classical realists emphasize the pursuit of power as a central motive for state behavior, which sometimes leads to territorial control and influence over other regions. This approach is imperialistic in essence, especially when states try to enhance their geopolitical standing and gain access to valuable resources.

In summary, restraint, alliance formation, diplomacy, balance of power, history, geography, leadership, rejection of international law, and imperialism serve as auxiliary hypotheses within classical realism and support the core principles of the theory, providing mechanisms through which

¹⁷⁸ Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 4.

¹⁷⁹ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, p. 71; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., “The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1952, pp. 382-401.

¹⁸⁰ See Henry Kissinger, *Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy*, Penguin, New York, 2022.

states navigate the pursuit of power and survival in the international arena. Although important, these facets are not essential for classical realism as IR theory; hence, they belong to this theory's protective belt.




Figure 2. Classical realism: hard core and protective belt

One also needs to remember that there are some big differences among classical realists themselves. For instance, Morgenthau and Kissinger diverge on many issues. Morgenthau repeatedly insisted on the pessimistic side of human nature, while Kissinger hardly even mentions this facet in his works. Similarly, they stood on completely different ground on the Vietnam War. While Morgenthau saw it as an unnecessary crusading adventure, Kissinger openly advocated (and did much more than that) for the American military presence in that region.

4.2. Darwinism - ideas and principles

Even though Darwinism represents a spectrum of different and sometimes conflicting approaches, only a small fraction is considered suitable for IR theories. It is convenient at this stage to consider precisely what Darwinism is and what ideas of Darwinism and principles stand for, thus shedding light on how classical realist scholars and their forebears used them in their works. In this dissertation, Darwinism refers to Charles Darwin's ideas as well as the ideas of his many followers from the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. The ideas of Darwinism therefore encompass the entire spectrum of ideas, principles, and theories that have originated from or are inspired by Charles Darwin's work on evolution. In this research, ideas of Darwinism will be depicted in their broadest scope, encompassing evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology, ethology, but also social Darwinism. In order to avoid conceptual confusion and enhance precision in the analysis, the two strands of Darwinism will be examined; one focusing on the biological and scientific aspects, and the other on the sociopolitical and ideological dimensions:

1. Darwinian scientific ideas – evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology and ethology

2. Social Darwinism

By distinguishing between the biological and social currents within Darwinism, the analysis aims to provide clarity and prevent potential misunderstandings that may arise from conflating these aspects. These fields undeniably all trace their origins back to the fundamental concepts established by Charles Darwin, and collectively, they form a tapestry of disciplines interconnected by their roots in the foundational ideas of Darwin's evolutionary theory.¹⁸¹ In other words, these fields, while differing in their approaches and applications, share a common heritage that can be traced back to Darwinism. They all share fundamental principles like adaptation, natural selection, and common descent, which are inherent in Darwinism. They all acknowledge the central role of evolutionary processes in shaping biological diversity and social phenomena. In essence, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology, ethology, and social Darwinism emerge from the river of Darwinism, drawing inspiration and theoretical underpinnings from Charles Darwin's revolutionary insights.

¹⁸¹ Timothy Shanahan, *The Evolution of Darwinism: Selection, Adaptation and Progress in Evolutionary Biology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004; Charles Crawford (ed.) and Dennis Krebs (ed.), *Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology*, Taylor & Francis, New York, 2008; Daniel R. Wilson (ed.), David Smillie (ed.) and Johan M. van der Dennen (ed.), *The Darwinian Heritage and Sociobiology*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 1999; Agustin Fuentes (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Primatology*, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, 2017; Jacques Gervet and Muriel Soleilhavoup, "Darwinism and Ethology: The Role of Natural Selection in Animals and Humans", *Acta Biotheoretica*, Vol. 45, 1997, pp. 195-220; Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael Ruse, *Social Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.




Figure 3. Ideas of Darwinism

Here are some arguments supporting the claim that these fields are connected and share roots in the ideas initially proposed by Charles Darwin. Evolutionary biology as a field directly stems from Darwin’s work and focuses on studying the processes, patterns, and mechanisms of evolution. It encompasses various sub-disciplines all of which aim to understand the evolutionary history and processes that have shaped life. Evolutionary psychology also derives from Darwinism, as it applies Charles Darwin’s principles of natural selection to human behavior. It asserts that our psychological traits evolved to solve ancestral problems, aiding survival and reproduction. Sociobiology seeks to explain social behaviors, particularly in animals, including humans, through an evolutionary lens. It draws heavily from evolutionary principles, positing that social behaviors have evolved and persisted due to their adaptive advantages in terms of survival and reproduction. Primatology and ethology are disciplines firmly rooted in evolutionary principles as well. Primatology, the study of primates, and ethology, the study of animal behavior, both draw heavily from Darwin’s evolutionary theories. Darwin’s work on evolution provided the foundational framework for understanding the behavior, social structures, and adaptations of primates and other animals.

While distinct from scientific theories, social Darwinism attempted to apply Darwin’s ideas to human societies and international politics, albeit in a misinterpreted and often ethically questionable manner. It purported that societal progress and success mirrored the principles of natural selection, leading to notions of inherent superiority or fitness of certain groups over others. In other words, social Darwinists attempted to apply evolutionary principles, particularly the idea of “struggle for survival” and the “survival of the fittest,” in order to justify various social, economic, and political ideologies, including the idea that certain nations, races, or social classes were more “fit” and should dominate over others. Whether we like it or not social Darwinist were, in their own way, followers of Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution.

Despite their differences in application and interpretation, all these fields share fundamental concepts rooted in the principles of Darwinism and, as such, essentially belong to the ideas of

Darwinism. Over time, these fields have evolved and diversified but continue to be influenced primarily by Darwinian thought. They remain interconnected through their exploration of evolutionary mechanisms, whether applied to biological evolution, social behavior, or broader societal implications. As such, these ideas can reinforce classical realism because they substantially support and fortify key classical realist arguments.

Now we will again use Imre Lakatos and his idea of a hard core and protective belt. The hard core of Darwinian scientific ideas is generally associated with common descent, natural selection, the struggle for survival, and adaptation.¹⁸² In other words, those facets lie at the very center of scientific Darwinism as a broader set of ideas. However, there are also other aspects that are important but not strictly speaking essential. For example, in evolutionary biology, there are various mechanisms of natural selection: sexual selection, genetic drift, variation, inheritance, imitation, etc. If one looks into evolutionary psychology, human nature and evolved evolutionary mechanisms (fear, adaptation, and imitation), along with natural selection and adaptation, are part of the hard core. Part of the protective belt in evolutionary psychology consists of, among other things, sexual selection and gene-culture coevolution. For sociobiology, the topic of human nature is also part of the hard core, while some other features, such as reciprocal altruism and learning, belong more to the protective belt. In the context of primatology and ethology, the hard core represents evolutionary perspective and common ancestry, while individual variation, for instance, is within the protective belt.

Social Darwinism, as a non-scientific belief system, although not rooted in rigorous scientific evidence or principles, has its own hard core and protective belt. Its hard core, among other facets, includes biological determinism, struggle for survival, competition, materialism, self-interest and laissez-faire capitalism. Imperialism, power politics, human nature, moral relativism and eugenics are within its protective belt. Despite lacking a scientific foundation, social Darwinism exhibits a structured belief system with interconnected elements in its hard core and protective belt.

As mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter, vis-à-vis ideas of Darwinism, only a small fraction of hard core and protective belt can be suitable for this dissertation topic. Of course, sexual selection and genetic drift are not in any way applicable for the analysis, but struggle for survival, adaptation, evolved evolutionary mechanisms such as fear and imitation, environmental pressure, competition for resources and territory, evolutionary roots of power as part of natural selection, human nature, and other facets can definitely be valuable for the analysis.

It is now deemed necessary to uncover all relevant scholars that are considered crucial for this analysis. Their views, ideas, and findings, however big or small, will serve to confirm the hypothesis that ideas of Darwinism are indeed an intrinsic part of classical realism since those ideas are found in its hard core and protective belt. One can divide them into three main categories:

The first group comprises social Darwinists from the 19th and early 20th centuries. Social Darwinism is generally defined as the extension of Charles Darwin's theories of natural selection into the realm of social relations.¹⁸³ Some of the most influential social Darwinists are: Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1909), Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895), Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), Walter Bagehot (1826-1877), Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916), Bartholomäus von Carneri (1821-1909), Friedrich Jodl (1849-1914), Albert E. F. Schäffle (1831-1903) and Oscar Peschel (1826-1875).

¹⁸² Rosaura Ruiz and Francisco J. Ayala, "Darwinism: Its Hard Core", in Thomas F. Glick, Miguel Angel Puig-Samper, Rosaura Ruiz, *The Reception of Darwinism in the Iberian World*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2001, pp. 239-261.

¹⁸³ Alexander B. McKillop, "Social Darwinism", in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2013, See www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/social-darwinism.

The second group includes German and Austrian militant representatives of social Darwinism who are at the same time advocates of the so-called *Machtpolitik*. Three figures stand out: Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849-1930), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) and Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842-1904).

The third group is dedicated to modern scientific researchers and representatives. Their areas of expertise range from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology and ethology. This group includes the following scholars: Richard Dawkins (1941-), Richard D. Alexander (1929-2018), Edward O. Wilson (1929-2021), Joseph Lopreato (1928-2015), Richard W. Wrangham (1948-), Dale Peterson (1944-), Frans de Waal (1948-), Dario Maestriperi (1964-), Robert Ardrey (1908-1980), Lee Alan Dugatkin (1962-), Liane J. Leedom (1961-), Andrew Bard Schmookler (1946-) and Jan Sapp (1954-).

In addition to the aforementioned, Charles Darwin himself and Thomas Malthus will also be considered sporadically. The best way to expose Darwinian and social Darwinist ideas and principles in classical realism is to place those ideas and principles alongside the main ideas and principles that arose from classical realism. The next section of this chapter serves that very purpose.

4.3. Symbiotic interplay: Where ideas of Darwinism meet classical realism

To gain access and investigate the scope of ideas of Darwinism in classical realism, this section aims to point out and analyze its essential features. The first two things that connect ideas of Darwinism with classical realism are the *struggle for power* and *the struggle for survival*.¹⁸⁴ In both Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas the primacy of survival is self-evident. According to evolutionary biology, organisms in nature make every effort to ensure their survival.¹⁸⁵ Social Darwinism also extended this logic in the realm of society and international politics. Herbert Spencer advocated the idea of survival as the highest good. He claimed that those who survive that struggle are, by definition, not only the fittest but also morally the best.¹⁸⁶ In other words, according to Spencer, whatever survives is, by definition, good. Social Darwinists vigorously supported the idea that strong nations, by definition, were successful at expanding industry and empire and, in that way, would survive. In contrast, others who did not abide by such laws would vanish.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, classical realism is grounded on the “ethos of survival”, and its ontology of danger reflects an “ethical” scheme that prioritizes survival and self-preservation.¹⁸⁸ States desire power to ensure self-preservation, which is perceived as the ultimate goal of any domestic and international policy.

¹⁸⁴ Classical realism often sees the struggle for power and the struggle for survival as synonymous, while neorealists identify these two as separate things. See: Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism”, July 2009, (<https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/> Accessed on 26/11/2021); Jonathan Joseph, “Realism and Neorealism in International Relations Theory”, *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, Wiley Online Library, 2014, pp. 3142-3151.

¹⁸⁵ Timothy Shanahan, *The Evolution of Darwinism: Selection, Adaptation and Progress in Evolutionary Biology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 14.

¹⁸⁶ David Weinstein, *Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer's Liberal Utilitarianism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 83-114.

¹⁸⁷ Gregory Claeys, “The “Survival of the Fittest” and the Origins of Social Darwinism”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2000, p. 226; Boris Barth, “Imperialism”, *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, 2015, p. 2; Marvin Perry, Margaret Jacob, James Jacob, Myrna Chase, Theodore H. Von Laue, *Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society, Volume II: From 1600*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, Boston, 2008, p. 581.

¹⁸⁸ Louiza Odysseos, “Dangerous Ontologies: the Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 403-418.

As will be seen in the chapter that deals with classical realist predecessors, the struggle for power was profoundly identified as the struggle for life. This endless quest for power, both for individuals and states, is largely the result of the so-called state of nature (anarchy) in which a lack of security and resources serves as a motivational force to ensure the state's survival. Competition within human society and between states is seen as ruthless but also natural, inevitable, and scientifically defensible.

On the other hand, power was equally important for social Darwinists and classical realist predecessors since most identified that maximization of power must lead to some form of imperialism.¹⁸⁹ This aspect of power is also unconsciously present in Hans J. Morgenthau's theory of international politics. Equally important, the notion of power has its roots in evolution, which also needs to be explored and brought to light.

The second fundamental assumptions of classical realism (and realism in general) is *state-centrism* and *anthropomorphic personification of states*.¹⁹⁰ States are seen as central and unitary actors in international politics.¹⁹¹ As Palan and Blair have noticed, (classical) realism could only emerge after the advent of the organic theory of the state, which developed during the nineteenth century.¹⁹² The reason these two scholars defended such views is social Darwinism on the one hand, and many authors that belonged to the school of classical geopolitics on the other, who were all enthusiastic about organic theory (organicism), arguing that the state is an integrated organism with the primary purpose to ensure its own survival.¹⁹³ What is also apparent is that both classical realism and classical geopolitics perceived the international political system as anarchic, in which states, just like organisms in nature, are in a never-ending competition and antagonism. Another common point in this respect will reveal that both sides regarded law and cooperation as almost irrelevant and ineffective on their own. Alfred T. Mahan, one of the most influential theorists of classical geopolitics, argued that the use of power and force was primary, whereas the law was only ever secondary.¹⁹⁴ A few studies have superficially demonstrated that realism had a traditional geopolitical mindset and that classical geopolitical theories were part of the wellspring, out of

¹⁸⁹ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 203; Max Weber and Ben Fowkes, "The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1980, p. 438; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 36-69; Gary L. Ulmen, "American Imperialism and International Law: Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs", *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, p. 59; Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 29; Alfred T. Mahan, "The Monroe Doctrine," in *Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles, With Other Essays*, Little Brown, New York, 1908, p. 377.

¹⁹⁰ Samuel Barkin, *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 23.

¹⁹¹ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 7.

¹⁹² Ronen P. Palan and Brook M. Blair, "On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, p. 388.

¹⁹³ Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, R. Oldenbourg, München/Leipzig, 1897; Friedrich Ratzel, *Sein und Werden der organischen Welt*, Gebhardt und Reisland, Leipzig, 1869; Friedrich Ratzel, *Die Erde und das Leben: Eine vergleichende Erdkunde*, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig, 1901-1902; Alexandros Stogiannos, *The Genesis of Geopolitics and Friedrich Ratzel*, Springer, Cham, 2017; Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Wentworth Press, Sydney, 2019; Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and Hess*, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2016; Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2003; Stefano Guzzini, *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012; Mark Bassin, "Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel's Political Geography", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1987, pp. 473-495.

¹⁹⁴ Charles D. Tarlton, "The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann", *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, pp. 584-614.

which realist approaches to IR arose.¹⁹⁵ This research will delve deeper and further expand this perspective since most theorists that belong to classical geopolitics were social Darwinists at the same time.

Another characteristic of Darwinism is the question of *human nature*, especially its negative aspects. Human nature is not something that has only been much debated in the realm of social sciences but is one of the most controversial topics within evolutionary biology and sociobiology.¹⁹⁶ Evolutionary biology, for instance, explores why egoism and dominance are so prevalent in the animal kingdom, including humans, by investigating how these behaviors might confer evolutionary advantages related to resource acquisition, mating opportunities, and overall survival success.

Charles Darwin himself noted that man was “the rival of other men; he delights in competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into selfishness.”¹⁹⁷ He argued that in the struggle for life, selfish behaviour ensures that an organism meets its physiological needs if the resources are scarce. In other words, organisms were naturally shaped to pursue basic selfishness.¹⁹⁸ As Darwin believed, our species is a product of a long history of such selfish struggles. The British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins elaborates Darwin’s position and gives us a more modern argument for the origin of egoism.¹⁹⁹ His gene’s-eye view of Darwinian evolution is opposed to the classical view, which emphasizes that evolution is organism-centred. He explained this theory in his most famous book, *The Selfish Gene*, from 1976. According to Dawkins: “a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness [...] This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour.”²⁰⁰ In other words, since heritable information is passed along almost exclusively by genetic material, Dawkins came to the conclusion that evolution occurs through the survival of competing selfish genes. His main argument is that:

The logic of Darwinism concludes that the unit in the hierarchy of life which survives and passes through the filter of natural selection will tend to be selfish. The units that survive in the world will be the ones that succeeded in surviving at the expense of their rivals at their own level in the hierarchy. That, precisely, is what selfish means in this context.²⁰¹

Dawkins was not isolated in this type of thinking. At pretty much the same time as him, Richard Alexander (1929-2018) also confirmed that human actions are ultimately selfish, even if individuals are unaware of their motivations.²⁰² This renowned American zoologist inferred selfishness as the basis for “maximal reproduction in the long run.”²⁰³ In any case, Darwin, Dawkins and Alexander

¹⁹⁵ See Semra Ranâ Gökmen, *Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations*, PhD Thesis, METU - Middle East Technical University, 2010; John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2003, pp. 76-77; Zhengyu Wu, “Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, pp. 786-823.

¹⁹⁶ Janet Radcliffe Richards, *Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction*, Routledge, New York, 2001; Whitley R.P. Kaufman, *Human Nature and the Limits of Darwinism*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016; Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.

¹⁹⁷ Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, p. 326.

¹⁹⁸ John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 15.

¹⁹⁹ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, p. 70.

²⁰⁰ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 3.

²⁰¹ Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, Bantam Press, London, 2006, p. 215.

²⁰² Richard D. Alexander, “The Evolution of Social Behavior”, *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 5, 1974, p. 377.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

tended to show that human nature's selfish (egoistic) side directly results from our evolutionary (genetic) past.

Like in the case of egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait rooted in human evolution. For dominance to appear, other organisms are required over whom an individual organism can dominate. In his most famous book, *The Origin of Species*, Charles Darwin recognized that “[e]ach species tries to take advantage of the instincts of others, as each takes advantage of the weaker bodily structure of others.”²⁰⁴ He also identified that creatures are “overmastering” one another.²⁰⁵ In the case of human beings, Darwin recognized that: “the varieties of man seem to act on each other in the same way as different species of animals - the stronger always extirpating the weak.”²⁰⁶ He also added that since man is a social animal “it is almost certain that he would *inherit* a tendency to be [...] obedient to the leader of the tribe; for these qualities are common to most social animals.”²⁰⁷ Darwin is convinced that our evolution causes this negative aspect of our nature: “Our descent [...] is the origin of our evil passions!! – The Devil under form of Baboon is our grandfather!”²⁰⁸

American biologist and the founder of sociobiology Edward O. Wilson provides more modern clues on the evolutionary background of dominance.²⁰⁹ The field of sociobiology is generally defined as the study of the evolution of social behaviour in animals.²¹⁰ Sociobiologists have an unequivocally Darwinian perspective, and Wilson's entire view on human nature revolves around Darwinism.²¹¹ For Wilson, one of the main reasons for the emergence of dominance is related to power itself. In the language of sociobiology, Wilson placed the will to dominate side by side with power. According to him, dominance as a human feature needs to be understood in the context of evolutionary theory because correlates of power in animal groups are essentially the correlates of dominance.²¹² For example, he observed that the dominant animals of some primate societies utilized power in order to terminate fighting among subordinates.²¹³ Furthermore, Wilson noticed that the will to dominate is intertwined with the possession and priority of access to the necessities of life and reproduction.²¹⁴

The founder of sociobiology was not lonely in this type of thinking. Many other evolutionary biologists, sociobiologists, primatologists and ethologists have only strengthened this position. Another sociobiologist named Joseph Lopreato advanced Wilson's argument and claimed that there is little doubt about the biological and evolutionary origin of a drive to dominance.²¹⁵ A few decades after Wilson, evolutionary biologist Richard W. Wrangham and ethologist Dale Peterson

²⁰⁴ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 208.

²⁰⁵ As cited in David Paul Crook, *Darwin's Coat-tails: Essays on Social Darwinism*, Peter Lang, New York, 2007, p. 3.

²⁰⁶ Charles Darwin, *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited by the H.M.S. Beagle*, Henry Colburn, London, 1839, p. 520.

²⁰⁷ As cited in Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 28.

²⁰⁸ As cited in David Paul Crook, *Darwin's Coat-tails: Essays on Social Darwinism*, Peter Lang, New York, 2007, p. 105.

²⁰⁹ Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, The Belknap Press, London, 1975; Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, pp. 70-71.

²¹⁰ Joshua S. Goldstein, “The Emperor's New Genes: Sociobiology and War”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1987, p. 34.

²¹¹ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 298.

²¹² Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011, p. 25.

²¹³ Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, The Belknap Press, London, 1975, p. 287.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 277.

delivered the same results in their book *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*. These two scientists also gave valid arguments that the roots of dominance are found in power. In the example of chimpanzees, they noticed that the reason for power competition between males was twofold. The first reason was access to mating and food, while the second was because those chimpanzees simply craved power and wanted to dominate their peers.²¹⁶ Likewise, Frans de Waal, a Dutch primatologist, in his acclaimed books *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes* and *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved*, also found out and gave substantial evidence that the dominance and the desire for power are almost certainly inborn for both humans and primates as our closest relatives.²¹⁷ In the case of the Rhesus macaque, an Italian behavioural biologist Dario Maestriperi discovered that these primates, too, have the innate drive for dominance as they use power mercilessly against their subordinates.²¹⁸ In addition, Maestriperi noticed that “if the monkeys are not busy traveling around and looking for food, that means they have more time to fight for power.”²¹⁹ American anthropologist Robert Ardrey (1908-1980), who became famous with his book *The Territorial Imperative*, also highlighted that dominance and subordination are characteristic of all animal societies.²²⁰

Many representatives of social Darwinism looked at human nature with great wariness and suspicion. They also saw that biological laws govern the whole of organic nature, including humans.²²¹ Ludwig Gumplowicz, the most radical representative of social Darwinism, believed that the struggle between social groups and the state’s components is as inexorable as the struggle between hordes or states and that the only motive is self-interest.²²² Such an observation of human nature essentially represents the Hobbesian war of all against all, with lust and selfishness as major motivational forces within life itself.²²³ On the other hand, modern sociobiological ideas have also been concerned with the impact of “human nature” on politics. For example, sociobiology has identified certain behavioural patterns (aggression, coalition building, peacemaking) that humans share with higher animals, especially primates.²²⁴ Animal aggression is explicable in terms of competition “for a common resource or requirement that is actually or potentially limiting”.²²⁵ Like most social Darwinists, Edward O. Wilson, the founder of Sociobiology, saw war as a natural thing, i.e., part of our biological nature.²²⁶ We, humans, in his view, are by nature aggressive beings, and there are biological virtues in aggression, particularly in the context of fighting for territory.²²⁷ In all important aspects, the sociobiological picture of human nature is almost identical to that of social Darwinism and Hobbesian behaviourism.

²¹⁶ Richard W. Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 1996, p. 199.

²¹⁷ Frans de Waal, *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007, p. 184; Frans de Waal, *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, p. 76.

²¹⁸ Dario Maestriperi, *Macchiavellian Intelligence*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p. 4.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²²⁰ Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Investigation into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations*, A Delta Book, New York, 1966, p. 223.

²²¹ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 31.

²²² Ludwig Gumplowicz, “The Outlines of Sociology”, *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Issue 253, 1899, p. 145.

²²³ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 46; Ernst Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes (Vol. 1)*, Henry S. King, London, 1876, pp. 19-20.

²²⁴ Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978; Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975; Glendon Schubert (ed.) and Roger D. Masters (ed.), *Primate Politics*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1991.

²²⁵ Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 243.

²²⁶ Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 82.

²²⁷ Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*, Knopf, New York, 1998, p. 171.

One can clearly recognize certain parallels concerning human nature, which are found in classical realism. Classical realists also saw that politics is governed by objective (naturalistic) laws that are rooted in human nature.²²⁸ They have viewed human beings as utterly selfish (or self-interested, as Gumpłowicz would say) and their actions as essentially immoral or amoral.²²⁹ Their perception of human nature is largely materialistic and pessimistic, with an egoistic/selfish side as a central feature. States, just like individual human beings, act in their rational self-interest within the international system, and personal and national selfishness is recognised as the prescribed law of domestic and international politics. It thus seems that the social Darwinist – “red in tooth and claw” - *Weltanschauung* from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century has its place in the realist perception of international warfare.²³⁰ Furthermore, the topic of dominance is also something that is mutually shared. Hans J. Morgenthau introduced his famous concept of *animus dominandi* - a “desire for power” that manifests within a human as the desire to dominate others.²³¹ Not only social Darwinists but also modern evolutionary scholars could not neglect the fact that there is a universal human drive for dominance.²³²

The next facet that logically follows is the *moral autonomy* of the political sphere. This side of Darwinism creates the greatest tension because it was thought that such ideas justified and/or promoted imperialistic, racial, and eugenicist policies.²³³ However, a closer look tells a story similar to a realist one. Almost all social Darwinists shared a common belief that ethics and politics must primarily abide by the laws of life. Herbert Spencer believed that there could only exist a theatre of natural laws and that these are only the laws of life itself or the universe in general.²³⁴ Actions are thus “good” or “bad”, whether they are relatively more or less adapted to the laws of life.²³⁵ Ludwig Gumpłowicz also noticed that the state’s laws had nothing to do with ethics or moral ideals because they were completely subject to natural laws. The state is a product of nature and is ruled and guided by the laws of nature and, thus, is not amenable to ethical judgment.²³⁶ Ernst Haeckel understood that politics, morals, and the principles of justice must always be aligned with natural laws.²³⁷ According to Haeckel, might goes before right as long as organic life exists.²³⁸ Classical realist thinking from the 20th century does not differ much from this paradigm. Hans J. Morgenthau’s sixth principle of political realism also speaks of the autonomy of the political sphere

²²⁸ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 7; Brian Leiter, “Classical Realism”, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2001, p. 245; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 4; Hartmut Behr (ed.) and Felix Rösch (ed.), “Morgenthau’s Twofold Concept of Power”, in Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, p. 49.

²²⁹ Brian Leiter, “Classical Realism”, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2001, p. 249.

²³⁰ John Keiger, “Thinking The Causes of World War I”, *Horizons*, Issue No. 1, 2014, pp. 52-63.

²³¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 165.

²³² Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975; Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals and Aggression*, Viking, New York, 1979; Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Human Ethology*, De Gruyter, New York, 1989.

²³³ Jerry Bergman, *How Darwinism Corrodes Morality*, Joshua Press Incorporated, Peterborough (ON), 2017; Jerry Bergman, *The Darwin Effect: Its Influence on Nazism, Eugenics, Racism, Communism, Capitalism and Sexism*, Master Books, Green Forest (AR), 2014; Orville Skye, *Darwinism And Morality: The Implications And Effects Of Darwinism On Society*, Independently Published, 2021; Jeffrey O’Connell and Michael Ruse, *Social Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.

²³⁴ Lester F. Ward, “The Political Ethics of Herbert Spencer”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 4, 1894, pp. 109-110.

²³⁵ Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche, Spencer, and the Ethics of Evolution”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, No. 23, 2002, p. 5.

²³⁶ Ludwig Gumpłowicz, “The Outlines of Sociology”, *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Issue 253, 1899, pp. 146-152.

²³⁷ Ernst Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes (Vol. 2)*, Henry S. King, London, 1876, p. 368.

²³⁸ Ernst Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man (Volume I)*, Watts & Co, London, 1910, p. 72.

in which morality and ethics completely lose their significance.²³⁹ In other words, classical realists understood that any means required for the state's self-preservation is justified.²⁴⁰ Observing all the above considerations, this research will demonstrate that the classical realist reflection on ethics was not entirely their invention and did not occur unexpectedly.

The next common trait represents a *zero-sum worldview* and, with it, the notion of relative gains. Wealth distribution as a zero-sum game has been one of the fundamental characteristics of social Darwinism since its beginning.²⁴¹ Moreover, social Darwinists perceived the world as a zero-sum game in which one side gains power, wealth or influence only if the other loses. Gumpowicz speaks of this when he says that “the social struggle consists in establishing appropriate institutions for increasing the power of one social group at the expense of others.”²⁴² The zero-sum game is closely associated with *materialism*, which one finds in Darwinism and classical realism.²⁴³ The “nature” of man is grounded in materialist competition in which the pressure for resources and status generates a struggle for existence amongst them.²⁴⁴ There also appears to be an evolutionary background to the zero-sum concept that is definitely worth exploring, and evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology can be of service in this regard. The importance of relative gains in a zero-sum world for classical realism is immense since states in international relations are forced to strive to attain as many material resources as possible. Classical realists hold that states see their relations with one another in a zero-sum framework since they believe that anything one state may gain endangers or weakens the other. The term “power” thus appears to function in the way “wealth” and “population” does in the social Darwinist notion. Classical realism is also fundamentally based on materialism, emphasizing the tangible aspects of power such as military capabilities, economic resources, and geographic advantages, rather than abstract principles or moral considerations.²⁴⁵

The principles of *fear*, *adaptation*, and *imitation*, rooted in Darwinism, were inadvertently integrated into the theory of classical realism. According to evolutionary psychology findings, fear is a spontaneous reaction to a perceived threat or danger that creates an intense urge to defend oneself from that threat or danger.²⁴⁶ It is fear that stops human beings from undertaking various hazardous actions and has therefore helped to ensure the survival of the human species.²⁴⁷ Fear, therefore, represents a product of our evolutionary past, both biologically and socially.²⁴⁸ More

²³⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 13.

²⁴⁰ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 8.

²⁴¹ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 110; Robert H. Frank, *The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p. 21.

²⁴² Ludwig Gumpowicz, “The Outlines of Sociology”, *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Issue 253, 1899, p. 145.

²⁴³ On Darwinism and materialism: See <https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy/History-of-materialism#ref68540>.

²⁴⁴ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 31.

²⁴⁵ Gregory J. Moore, *Niebuhr International Relations: The Ethics of Foreign Policymaking*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, p. 182.

²⁴⁶ Eran Halperin; Daniel Bar-Tal; Rafi Nets-Zehngut; Drori Erga, “Emotions in Conflict: Correlates of Fear and Hope in the Israeli-Jewish Society”, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 233–258; Neta Crawford, “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’”, *International Relations*, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 271–288.

²⁴⁷ Marks Isaac Meyer, *Fears and Phobias*, Heinemann Medical Books, London, 1969; Martin Seligman, “Phobias and Preparedness”, *Behavior Therapy*, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1971, pp. 307–320; Arne Öhman and Susan Mineka, “Fears, Phobias, and Preparedness: Toward an Evolved Module of Fear and Fear Learning”, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 108, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 483–522.

²⁴⁸ Charles Darwin himself identified fear as one of the six basic emotions. See: Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.

important for this study is that this emotion has been widely regarded as the most important emotion in realist analysis of international politics.²⁴⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, makes it clear that he considers fear an emotion in international politics.²⁵⁰ According to him, fear can be transferred from the individual to the state level. This is particularly apparent when personal fears are transformed into anxiety for the nation and when identification with the nation alleviates individual fears by projecting them onto the international scene.²⁵¹

The importance of adapting to the ever-changing circumstances in international politics is another Darwinian characteristic that is present in Morgenthau's thought. Adaptation is one of the fundamental evolutionary principles and is defined as the adjustment of organisms to their environment to improve their chances of survival.²⁵² In this case, the level of organisms is transferred to the level of states in international relations. In an article titled "Man and Society", Morgenthau insists that it is vital that the traditional diplomatic modes of thought and action be adapted quickly and, if necessary, radically to new circumstances.²⁵³ While analyzing US foreign policy, he emphasizes the necessity to change in response to a changing world. He concludes openly that if the US does so, it will be the master of the new age, but if it fails, it will become its victim.²⁵⁴ This Darwinian (adapt or perish) way of thinking places Morgenthau alongside scholars of classical geopolitics like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, and Halford J. Mackinder, who proposed such ideas in the first place.

Adaptation leads to another important concept often "flowing" on both sides: *the balance of power*. For classical and structural realism, the balance of power theory suggests that states must ensure survival by maintaining or increasing their (relative) power in a self-help world.²⁵⁵ In many ways, the balance of power theory resembles Herbert Spencer's general theory, which he referred to as the theory of "dynamic equilibrium". Dynamic equilibrium refers to a state of balance or stability within a system that is constantly changing or evolving. In a dynamic equilibrium, various forces, processes, or elements within a system interact and counterbalance each other, resulting in a stable overall state despite ongoing fluctuations and changes. Systems are in stasis but, now and then, such systems get disturbed and have to fight their way back to stasis.²⁵⁶ Spencer's work often touched upon the idea of equilibrium in natural and social systems. He believed that societies and organisms adapt and change to maintain a state of equilibrium or balance with their environment. The connection between dynamic equilibrium and Darwin's ideas lies in the recognition that ecosystems are not static but rather dynamic systems in a state of constant change. This perspective aligns with Darwin's understanding of how organisms and their environments interact and evolve over time through processes like natural selection, leading to the dynamic balance observed within ecosystems. Spencer's "rudimentary" idea of balance of power was later expanded by a more militant social Darwinists fraction who synthesized all the older notions about the functions of

²⁴⁹ Eric Van Rythoven (ed.) and Mira Sucharov (ed.), *Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions*, Routledge, New York, 2020; Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, p. 45.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁵² Andreas C. Göransson, *Crossing the Threshold: Visualization Design and Conceptual Understanding of Evolution*, Linköping University Electronic Press, Linköping, 2021, p. 34.

²⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Man and Society", *Morgenthau Papers*, Box 172, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 3, January 1965, p. 14.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Anil Kumar Singh, *International Regimes and World Order*, K. K. Publications, New Delhi, 2014, p. 67; John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 348.

²⁵⁶ Michael Taylor, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2007, p. 70.

war.²⁵⁷ Most believed that warfare served two functions: external - as the maintenance of the balance of power, and internal - promotion of social cohesion.²⁵⁸ This is in accordance with the classical realist conception that anarchy motivates states through internal means of increasing their relative power, such as arms buildups or economic mobilization.²⁵⁹ More importantly, Spencer's idea of dynamic equilibrium has many common characteristics with Morgenthau's perception of balance of power.

Although it is not quite prominent at first glance, imitation represents a consistent phenomenon of international politics.²⁶⁰ According to the simplest definition, imitation represents the act of copying the behaviour of someone observed and is the most common learning behaviour among animals and humans.²⁶¹ As such, imitation is not only found in social interactions but also in the power dynamics within international relations. George Kennan illustrated this phenomenon with Russian elites after the Crimean War, where losers quickly copied the methods of the winners.²⁶² Hans J. Morgenthau and other classical realists also placed supreme emphasis on "environmental compulsion and incentive structure", which perceived that the behaviour of a state is, just like the behaviour of an individual, predominantly a product of circumstances.²⁶³ Imitation in international politics hence represents a competitive urge which forces states to copy innovations and be on a par with their rivals to feel protected and survive in the international arena. Classical realists placed particular importance on this notion while analyzing the arms race and similar survival strategies during the Cold War.

Finally, *imperialism* is part of the social Darwinist paradigm.²⁶⁴ Imperialism, the practice of extending a country's power and influence through colonization, annexation, or domination of foreign territories, was equally justified and bolstered by the tenets of social Darwinism.²⁶⁵ It was portrayed as a natural extension of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest in the international arena. Nations viewed expansion and domination as a means to showcase their superiority and secure resources. The exploitation of weaker nations was justified as a way to advance civilization and spread the influence of the 'superior' culture or nation. Weber's, Schmitt's and Morgenthau's comprehension of economic imperialism and power politics aligns with the overarching concept of imperialism.

²⁵⁷ Doyne Dawson, "The Origins of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories", *History and Theory*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1996, p. 11.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11; Likewise, classical realist spiritual father Thomas Hobbes also understood that war serves both the internal function of solidarity and the external function of maintaining the balance of power.

²⁵⁹ Michael J. Meese; Suzanne C. Nielsen; Rachel M. Sondheimer, *American National Security*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2018, p. 25.

²⁶⁰ Jodok Troy, *Desire and Imitation in International Politics*, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2021; Richard Ned Lebow, "Evolution, Adaptation, and Imitation in International Relations" in William P. Thompson (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.

²⁶¹ Karl H. Schlag, "Imitation and Social Learning", in Norbert M. Seel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning*, Springer, New York, 2012, p. 1490.

²⁶² George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979, p. 224.

²⁶³ Joseph M. Parent and Joshua M. Baron, "Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, June 2011, p. 201.

²⁶⁴ Rutledge M. Dennis, "Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race", *The Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 1995, pp. 243-252; Anne Aschenbrenner, *Social Darwinism and Its Consequences for 19th Century Society*, GRIN Verlag, Munich, 2015; Jessie Hill, *Social Darwinism and Its Influence on the Imperialism of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, The Author, Raleigh, N.C., 1999.

²⁶⁵ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 203; Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, p. 480; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Quest for Knowledge in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022, p. 192.

4.4. Final remarks

As will be seen throughout this study, there is frequent adoption, in varying guises, of both Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinism, which, taken together, form an integral part of classical realism. These bits and pieces constitute a new image of classical realism, which demonstrate the reliance and necessity of ideas of Darwinism for this IR theory. This approach will also indicate the background of this theory's emergence as its (futile) endeavour for a separate theory from related traditions, such as classical geopolitics. The widespread adoption of ideas of Darwinism in classical realism was predominantly implicit, precisely because it avoided identifying itself with Darwinism in any sense.

The purpose of this chapter was to present a pathway for uncovering such endorsement, and this has been done in three steps. Firstly, it was necessary to highlight the main postulates on which the theory of classical realism is based. Secondly, there was a genuine need to explain and clarify key ideas and principles of Darwinism. Finally, there was a necessity to elucidate the likely position of ideas of Darwinism within the theory of classical realism. In essence, the main hypothesis of the following study is not only that classical realism draws on ideas of Darwinism much more than is usually acknowledged, but also that those ideas and principles are in the hard core and protective belt of classical realism in the sense Lakatos is referring to. That is to say, the ideas of Darwinism are essentially fundamental, immutable, and indisputable in classical realist theory. For such various reasons, they represent one substantial fragment in the classical realist landscape and serve to further strengthen this IR theory.

In the case of this study, for instance, assumptions from evolutionary biology and sociobiology about certain negative aspects of human nature, such as egoism and dominance, align closely with the core tenets of classical realism, making Darwinian scientific ideas a significant component of the hard core within this theoretical setting. In addition, social Darwinism also had a rather dark standpoint on the subject of human nature and can also enhance classical realist position. Darwinian principles found in evolutionary biology and sociobiology also suggest that humans have innate traits driven by self-interest, survival, and competition. Classical realists, following this line of thought, assert that these characteristics are fundamental to human behavior in the political realm. They argue that states, composed of individuals driven by self-interest, act similarly in their pursuit of power and dominance within the international system. Likewise, social Darwinist ideas of the survival of the fittest resonate with classical realist notions of the struggle for power among states. Classical realists view the international anarchical system as an arena where states compete for survival and dominance, echoing the survival instincts observed in Darwin's theory. In both international politics and the natural world, the concept of anarchy prevails, shaping interactions and outcomes. Anarchy and natural world share striking similarities in their underlying dynamics of competition and self-help mechanisms.

One also finds that fear, adaptation, and imitation ultimately serve the goal of survival, both for organisms in nature and for states in the international arena. Darwinian scientific ideas give evidence to support the argument that power itself originated in evolution, which is of extreme importance for the essence of classical realist theory. Additionally, numerous social Darwinists who sporadically analyzed politics were quite consistent with many central classical realist theoretical postulates that followed over half a century later, such as the tragedy of the human condition and the marginal role of morality when it comes to politics.

It is important to underline that beyond the scope of this research are going to be the 'positive' aspects of the ideas of Darwinism. More precisely, those ideas that are not closely aligned with or supportive of key classical realist principles. Namely, while Darwinism has often been associated

with competitive aspects of nature, one mustn't ignore the fact that such ideas also offer valuable insights into many positive traits, behaviors, and societal developments observed in human societies and across various species. For instance, the ideas of Darwinism also highlight the evolutionary roots of morality, cooperation, and altruism. These ideas suggest that, in various species, including humans, cooperative behavior can enhance survival chances. It is well known for instance that in the symbiotic relationship among different species, cooperation enhances and fosters mutual benefit. Robert Trivers (1943-), William D. Hamilton (1936-2000) and Marc Hauser (1959-) are just some of the names worth mentioning that dealt with this aspect of Darwinian thought.²⁶⁶ Besides the origin of selfishness, Richard Dawkins also dealt with the topic of altruism within and among species.²⁶⁷ Altruism, where organisms, animals and individuals may act selflessly for the benefit of others, also promotes social bonds and community cohesion, contributing to the success of groups and societies. Altruistic behavior, according to Dawkins, can still be explained as a way to ensure the survival and reproduction of genes that are shared among kin. Following his hypothesis, organisms may exhibit altruistic behavior toward relatives because helping relatives can indirectly benefit the shared genes passed on to future generations. Even among social Darwinists, one can find authors who support such arguments, and the best known is Russian social Darwinist Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921). This author mostly dealt with the positive aspects of Darwinism and its application to society. In his book *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (1902), Kropotkin argued that, contrary to the Darwinian idea of the survival of the fittest, cooperation rather than conflict is the primary driver for the development of species.²⁶⁸ For Kropotkin, ample evidence indicates that sociability is highly prevalent in the animal kingdom, and in human interactions too, mutual aid is not an exception but the rule. In any case, the explanation that is given will set the boundary of the intended research and serve as a clear delineation with regards to research direction.

The next chapter examines classical realism's forbears and their intrinsically Darwinian roots. By scrutinizing the foundational ideas of classical realism's progenitors, the following chapter aims to elucidate how these early thinkers, influenced by Darwinism, laid the groundwork for a perspective that places a profound emphasis on power dynamics, human nature, and the struggle for survival in the realm of international politics.

²⁶⁶ Robert L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism", *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1971, pp. 35-57; William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior", *The American Naturalist*, Vol. 97, No. 896, 1963, pp. 354-356; Marc Hauser, *Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong*, Ecco, New York, 2007; Frans de Waal, *The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2009; Dennis Krebs, *The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.

²⁶⁷ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

²⁶⁸ Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, New York University Press, New York, 1972.

CHAPTER 5: Classical Realism and the shadow of Darwinism

This chapter aims to conduct an analysis of the realist paradigm. As mentioned earlier, Darwinism had an unrecognized and recognized influence on classical realist thought. The purpose here is to seek certain patterns from classical realist predecessors, to go deeper and trace the roots and parallel ways of thinking that were later established and well-known in classical realism. Specifically, the perceptions of those predecessors on struggle for survival, power, morality, a zero-sum outlook, and other discussed facets are in one way or another entwined with Darwinism. I will begin by discussing traditional geopolitics and their recognizable social Darwinist history. Those figures do not officially belong to the canon of classical realism. However, considering that they were inescapable during the period of classical realism's formation in the mid-20th century, classical realism, as one of the basic theories of IR, cannot be effectively understood or examined without addressing the notion of classical geopolitics. Geopolitics and political geography were vital to political thought long before classical realism became a popular theory in the aftermath of World War II. Although they were social Darwinists, what theorists of classical geopolitics wrote about is largely in accordance with the basic principles of classical realism and they viewed international politics through Darwinist lenses. Accordingly, classical realism, as an IR theory, implicitly leans on ideas of Darwinism. Following that, this research will examine Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. These three figures had an undisputed impact on the development of classical realist thought, especially for Hans J. Morgenthau. Through them, it will again be shown that classical realism as an IR theory implicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism since they also had Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist standpoints on topics such as power, survival, egoism, etc. that are within the hard core and protective belt of classical realism. This chapter altogether argues that classical realism needs Darwinism if it wants to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence because its roots can be traced to the abundant Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas found in various theorists and philosophers from the second half of the 19th to the mid-20th century. In order to reach such an assumption, the right way is to analyze the content of their texts and uncover that thread.

5.1. Classical realist geopolitical history

The period between the end of the 19th century and World War II is defined as the golden era of classical geopolitics, both in terms of theory and practice. Under the strong influence of the scientific wave that came from Great Britain, primarily due to the theory of evolution of Charles Darwin, following Herbert Spencer and Thomas Malthus, classical geopolitical thought was born in continental Europe.²⁶⁹ The pioneers of classical geopolitics were, at the same time, the pioneers of geopolitics as a discipline within political science. The term “geopolitics” was coined in 1899 by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén and quickly gained much attention in European academic circles.²⁷⁰ Two sets of ideas underline the dominant components of classical geopolitics – one is social Darwinism and its environmental determinism, and the other is great power projection and imperial rivalries.²⁷¹ While it is often thought that social Darwinism was exclusively a vital

²⁶⁹ Only a few months after the original book's release in the UK, Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) was translated into German and published in 1860.

²⁷⁰ Ola Tunander, “Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century Rudolf Kjellén's ‘The State as a Living Organism’”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, p. 452.

²⁷¹ Klaus Dodds (ed.), Merje Kuus (ed.) and Joanne Sharp (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 3; Daniel Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change”, in Michael W. Doyle (ed.)

component of German geopolitics, this was simply not the case since this idea also “sailed” across the seas, in the UK and the US. In other words, even though classical geopolitics was branded as a kind of “intellectual poison” after World War II, it nonetheless remained a “travelling theory” because it has silently entered various IR disciplines, primarily realism.²⁷²

Interestingly enough, immediately after World War II, geopolitics as a term disappeared almost completely from the jargon of international relations and went “underground”.²⁷³ It is surprising and ironic that World War II marked the rise of realism and the fall of geopolitics. Geopolitics abruptly vanished from academic writing and political discourse in Europe and the US, much like the term “race”. For example, the name “geopolitics” had a distinctly negative connotation in the US, while its central concepts were regarded as an “intellectual disease.” Moreover, both the term and its principal (European) theorists were buried in the rubble of World War II. As a result, the science of international politics needed a new theory and terminology. Nevertheless, despite such aspirations, geopolitical rhetoric spiralled beyond its European and imperial origins. German discourses, such as *Weltpolitik*, *Realpolitik* and *Lebensraum*, were still “in use” by American academics, but in a different form.²⁷⁴ This was the period in which the US came out victorious from World War II and became a superpower with ambitions to attain even greater status through power expansion. Because of this, those words have either been replaced or have acquired new meanings in the US. The influx of influential European scholars, like Morgenthau, Wolfers, Kissinger and Spykman, who understood very well the true (Darwinian) origins of those terms, brought unease into this new academic environment. These scholars nonetheless played a vital role in the development of realism in the US and helped to constitute the invisible bridge between traditional geopolitics and the classical realist paradigm.²⁷⁵

There are two particular reasons why, following the end of World War II, classical geopolitics was rejected from mainstream realist theories. The link of traditional geopolitics with Nazi *Realpolitik* during World War II is the first and most evident explanation. *Geopolitik*, or the German science of geopolitics, was believed to take the geopolitical study to a deviant extreme by claiming that geographic features of the earth justified racialist German expansion. Unsurprisingly, this association pushed the postwar realists to deliberately distance themselves from geopolitical analysis and theorizing.²⁷⁶ The scientific turn in IR in the 1950s is a second factor that significantly influenced the break between realist and geopolitical theories.²⁷⁷ Those years marked the increasing impact of the scientific rigour in IR, brought about by the behavioural revolution with its new

and John G. Ikenberry (ed.), *New Thinking In International Relations Theory*, Westview, Boulder, 1997, p. 95; Stefano Guzzini, *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 19; Klaus Dodds (ed.), Merje Kuus (ed.) and Joanne Sharp (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, New York, 2016, pp. 1-2.

²⁷² On “travelling theory”, see Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 226–247; Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan, “Traveling in Paradox: Edward Said and Critical International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2007, pp. 83-99;

²⁷³ Henry Kissinger, an immigrant and a classical realist, brought the term, in theory, and practice, back into usage in the 1970s in the US. His re-use of this term erased the Nazi stigma that was usually associated with it; See David Criekemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Criekemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill–Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 119.

²⁷⁴ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 19.

²⁷⁵ Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No. 3, 1977, pp. 46-47.

²⁷⁶ Lucian M. Ashworth, “Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2010, p. 294.

²⁷⁷ Zhengyu Wu, “Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, pp. 787-788.

methods and techniques.²⁷⁸ The obsolete ways of introducing new knowledge without solid scientific criteria were dismissed or marginalized. Therefore, realist scholars sought to produce new and separate theory within the field of IR, which at its core included, among other things, power politics as the primary feature of international affairs. Despite this fact, the separation of classical geopolitics from realism did not initiate its demise; on the contrary, it remained a silent analytical framework for many realists in the years following World War II. In other words, although many proclaimed that German *Geopolitik* and its Darwinian essence were dead, those ideas prevailed and played an important role in developing classical realist thought in the United States.

As this chapter will show, classical geopolitics is one of the reasons why classical realism needs Darwinism. It is crucial to demonstrate considerable realist thought within classical geopolitics to ascertain the necessity of Darwinism in classical realism. It will be shown that, in many ways, classical geopolitics and political realism were two sides of the same coin. In other words, this subchapter will thoroughly demonstrate how both traditions shared many assumptions, which, in turn, illustrate their similar worldviews. What one must always bear in mind is the fact that the theorists of classical geopolitics were, above all, rigid Darwinists. Their understanding of power, survival, human nature, morality, and other concepts later found within the classical realist hard core and protective belt is frequently interpreted through a social Darwinist framework. Through classical geopolitics, classical realism thus implicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism, and because of that, the following section of this research examines the most influential classical geopolitical theorists, first in Germany and then in Anglo-America. Those geopolitical figures will provide concrete evidence for the proposition mentioned above.

5.1.1. Classical realist thinking in German Geopolitics – Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer

This section introduces German geopolitics and examines how it relates to classical realism. When it comes to reading and remembering the German theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, realists are initially regarded to have shown a remarkable lack of interest.²⁷⁹ Even so, the geopolitical lexicon realists utilized in their books and articles indicate that geopolitics had an unacknowledged influence on classical realism. Classical realists have, for example, borrowed many concepts from the German language in order to define and explain international politics. These words include *Realpolitik*, *Machtpolitik*, *Weltpolitik*, *Großraum* and *Lebensraum*.²⁸⁰

Although there is a common assumption that German geopolitics is grounded on social Darwinism along with its positive and negative aspects, it is worth saying that German geopolitical thinking has much older roots.²⁸¹ Specifically, famous German philosophers, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), perceived the state as a being or entity with a life of its own.²⁸² Whatever the case may be, the three most prominent

²⁷⁸ Constantinos Koliopoulos, “International Relations and the Study of History”, in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2019, p. 10.

²⁷⁹ Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, p. 7.

²⁸⁰ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 13.

²⁸¹ Richard Weikart, “The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, pp. 469-488.

²⁸² John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, p. 59; John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2003, p. 97; Michael Heffernan, “Fin de Siecle, Fin du Monde?: On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890-1920”, in Klaus Dodds (ed.) and David Atkinson (ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p. 46; Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State And The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, p. 310.

scholars will be the main focus of this subchapter. At the very beginning, one will be acquainted with the main ideas of Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellén, moving on to Karl Haushofer, who is considered to be the main apostle of Nazi geopolitics. Even though many scholars contributed to the development of German geopolitics, the names of Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer usually stand out as the founders. By exploring these three important figures, one will recognize a strong realist thinking pattern among them.

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) is considered the one who laid the groundwork of German geopolitics of the 19th and 20th centuries, both in the academic and political sense. As a zoology student, he was intrigued by the ideas of Charles Darwin. In 1869 he even published a book titled *Being and Becoming of the Organic World (Sein und Werden der organischen Welt)* as his contribution to the theory of evolution. Darwin's ideas became a starting point for his thinking on geopolitics which he continuously developed while teaching at the Technical University of Munich (1875–1886) and the University of Leipzig (1886–1904).

Ratzel's theoretical conception is based on biological (i.e. organic) and evolutionary (i.e. Darwinian) foundations, while his political beliefs lie on nationalism and pan-Germanism.²⁸³ W. J. Cahnman suggests that Friedrich Ratzel drew heavily on the ideas of both Malthus and Darwin to create his own anthropo-geographical theory.²⁸⁴ More importantly, Ratzel tried to channel his interest in biology and evolution into his work on political science and international relations in the context of power politics. Ratzel recognized, as Darwin did that an inevitable struggle for life occurs even in the case of nation-states. Such a struggle requires a state to grow or die, losing or gaining influence in direct proportion to its capacity to defeat or overcome its rivals. Furthermore, he believed that "true realistic politics has always had a strong geographical essence [...] The essence provides the supply of political egoism which has to act according to the rule of its soil."²⁸⁵ In reality, his views promoted "survival of the fittest" on the level of the state, which is in line with the social Darwinist ethos of the late nineteenth century.²⁸⁶ It would be inaccurate to claim that Ratzel only believed that a state's power was the direct outcome of its territory. In his analytical approach, this scholar introduces other pillars of geopolitical influence, such as political, economic and ethnographic phenomena.²⁸⁷

Three notions that prevail in his writings can be associated with the classical realist hard core: state-centrism, survival and the pursuit of power. Meanwhile, one aligns with the classical realist protective belt: imperialism in the form of *Lebensraum*. Firstly, Friedrich Ratzel recognized, through his organic theory of the state, that the state is the solitary and the most important actor in international relations.²⁸⁸ According to him, the state should be conceptualized as a super-organism in a world of constant struggle and uncertainty.²⁸⁹ States were "living organisms", and like all "organisms", a state must struggle against the environment, i.e. other legitimate states and empty spaces, in order to survive. For Ratzel, states fiercely compete for scarce resources, particularly

²⁸³ Milomir Stepić, *Geopolitika: ideje, teorije, koncepcije*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, str. 143; Michael Heffernan, "Fin de Siecle, Fin du Monde?: On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890-1920", in Klaus Dodds (ed.) and David Atkinson (ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p. 45.

²⁸⁴ W. J. Cahnman, "The Concept of Raum and the Theory of Regionalism", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1944, p. 456.

²⁸⁵ Friedrich Ratzel, *Antropogeographie. 1. Teil: Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte*. J. Engelhorn, Stuttgart, 1899, pp. 76-77.

²⁸⁶ Keiger John, "Thinking The Causes of World War I", *Horizons*, Issue No. 1, 2014, pp. 52-63.

²⁸⁷ Alexandros Stogiannos, *The Genesis of Geopolitics and Friedrich Ratzel*, Springer, Cham, 2017, p. 26.

²⁸⁸ Charles B. Hagan, "Geopolitics", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1942, p. 479.

²⁸⁹ Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 28.

land.²⁹⁰ The ultimate expression of such struggle was the imperialist competition from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In other words, the European territorial state was like a sentient organism with its own “needs” and “demands.”²⁹¹ Countries that have a large territory, such as the United States, Russia and China, are destined to become great powers (*Weltmacht*), and in order for Germany to secure its place among those powers, it too must join the race for greater territory (*Lebensraum*).

The second point is his ethos of survival, i.e. his understanding that international politics entails a continuous struggle for survival, in which each state must adapt to the environment.²⁹² According to Crikemans, for Ratzel “success in this existentialist struggle between national states was deemed more important than any other consideration.”²⁹³ Survival is considered the main criterion based on which a state should evaluate the effectiveness and morality of its international behaviour.²⁹⁴ Since nation-states are in a hostile environment of constant uncertainty, anarchy represents a fact of international politics, and the state system is seen as intrinsically competitive. Survival is intertwined with the pursuit of power (*Macht*), and state success in that endeavour leads to becoming a great power (*Grossmacht*) and, finally, a world power (*Weltmacht*).²⁹⁵ For that reason, a war for Ratzel has been seen as a natural phenomenon in the political competition for maximum power gain. Germany was especially viewed as being afflicted by an obligation to power politics.²⁹⁶ His preoccupation with the logic of survival reflects his fear of the opposite of survival – national extinction. As one will see in the continuation of this research, Ratzel and other geopolitical theorists marked a thin line between power and survival.

Finally, Ratzel’s theory of *Lebensraum* is equally important as the previous two subjects. Since space for Ratzel “is the very first condition for life”²⁹⁷, he defined his *Lebensraum* as “the geographical surface area required to support a living species at its current population size and mode of existence.”²⁹⁸ In other words: “The struggle for life (*Kampf um Dasein*) [...] primarily means nothing more than a struggle for space (*Kampf um Raum*).”²⁹⁹ Like classical realists after him, Ratzel understood humans as part of the natural world.³⁰⁰ Even though the use of this concept was reserved for German academic and political audiences, Ratzel’s *Lebensraum* idea is actually associated with US foreign policy. He was greatly influenced by his experiences in North America, which he studied thoroughly and published two books - *Maps of the Cities and Civilizations of the American South* (1874) and *The Southern United States of America* (1878/1880). Already in 1878, early signs of Ratzel’s *Lebensraum* concept appeared, where he suggests that the United States

²⁹⁰ Daniel H. Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era”, in Daniel H. Deudney (ed.) and Richard A. Matthew (ed.), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, p. 41.

²⁹¹ John Agnew and Luca Muscarà, *Making Political Geography*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2012, p. 68.

²⁹² David Crikemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Crikemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill–Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 105.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Mark Bassin, “Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel’s Political Geography”, *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 1987, p. 477.

²⁹⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future*, Pinter, London, 1998, p. 17.

²⁹⁶ Klaus Kost, “The Conception of Politics In Political Geography and Geopolitics in Germany until 1945”, *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 1989, p. 371.

²⁹⁷ Friedrich Ratzel, *Lebensraum: Eine biogeographische Studie*, H. Laupp, Tübingen, 1901, p. 168.

²⁹⁸ Friedrich Ratzel, *die Erde und das Leben: Eine vergleichende Erdkunde*, 2 vols, Leipzig, Bibliographisches Institut, 1902, pp. 590–606.

²⁹⁹ Friedrich Ratzel, “Lebensraum: A Biogeographical Study [1901]”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 61, 2018, p. 14.

³⁰⁰ Ian Klimke and Mark Bassin, “Lebensraum and Its Discontents”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 61, 2018, p. 54.

illustrate a “general truth of political geography - that states are living essences that are never fixed, always growing or in retreat.”³⁰¹

Ratzel understood that (territorial) expansion has more than one form - there may be spheres of interest, spheres of influence, or even colonies.³⁰² He noted that Americans first had the task of mastering their “empty” expanses and admired them by saying that “even in foreign policy, they work with greater ideas of space (*Raumvorstellungen*) than the Europeans.”³⁰³ Ratzel further formulated this idea in 1900 after extensively studying the US and its “sphere of influence.”³⁰⁴ The synonym for “sphere of influence” at that time was Monroe Doctrine which was very much represented in academic and political circles in the US. That is the reason why some claim that Ratzel and his *Lebensraum* concept can be seen as a product of the evolutionary character of the Monroe Doctrine.³⁰⁵ According to Jean Gottmann, it is not surprising that this Doctrine was equated with “geopolitics” precisely because it was based on the fact that America is a continent separated from the others by vast oceans.³⁰⁶ As one will see in the rest of this chapter, the Monroe Doctrine also gained much attention in the writing of other theorists of classical geopolitics and in the works of Carl Schmitt. This Doctrine is significant because theorists of classical geopolitics openly spoke about it as a form of imperialism, while political realists spoke of it as a requisite for power maximization.

Friedrich Ratzel, as described above, played a crucial role in the early stages of German geopolitics and paved the way for other like-minded scholars. The second key figure that shaped geopolitical ideas in Germany was Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), who, in addition to inventing the word geopolitics, is considered responsible for the creation of the term biopolitics.³⁰⁷ His academic career started at Uppsala University, where he studied (1880) and later became a professor of political science (1890-1893). What distinguishes Kjellén from Ratzel is that he was not just a renowned scholar but also a conservative politician since he served as a member of the Swedish Parliament on several occasions. Even though he was a Swede, his Germanophile *Weltanschauung* was well accepted and recognized in Germany.³⁰⁸ He almost completely supported Ratzel’s social Darwinist insights of a state as an organism.³⁰⁹ However, unlike Ratzel, Kjellén believed that the future belongs to those land powers that have the capacity to achieve autarky within their own territory.³¹⁰ This means that states are struggling to emancipate themselves from other geopolitical entities by striving for autarky and self-sufficiency, which helps them preserve their uniqueness and independence.³¹¹ One of his scientific goals was to build a realistic state theory based on impartiality and cold hard facts.³¹² He also wanted to depict the world as it is by examining the relentless struggle between nation-states. His commitment to the objective observation of international politics is especially reflected in his book *The Contemporary Great Powers* (1914), where he says that it is “written without love for anything but reality and without hatred for

³⁰¹ Friedrich Ratzel, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika, Vol. II*, Munich, R. Oldenbourg, 1893, p. 85.

³⁰² Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1942, p. 479.

³⁰³ Friedrich Ratzel, “Die Nordatlantischen Mächte”, *Marine Rundschau*, Vol. 14, 1903, p. 1058.

³⁰⁴ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 11.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁰⁶ Jean Gottmann, “The Background of Geopolitics”, *Military Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1942, p. 197.

³⁰⁷ Thomas Lemke, *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction*, New York University, New York, 2011, p. 9.

³⁰⁸ Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State and The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, p. 316; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 34.

³⁰⁹ David Crikemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Crikemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 112.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1917, p. 76.

³¹² Peter Davidsen, *The Emancipation of Political Science: Contextualizing the State Theory of Rudolf Kjellén (1899-1922)*, PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2021, p. 312.

anything but false impressions.”³¹³ In addition to portraying the “reality” of world politics, there are four things that occur in his writings that are closely tied to classical realist hard core: state-centrism, power, survival and egoism. There is one, however, that coincides with the classical realist protective belt: balance of power.

First, just like Ratzel before him, Kjellén acknowledged that the state is the primary actor in international politics. For him, the very word *Politik* simply meant the theory of the state.³¹⁴ In his geopolitical framework, the state acts as a rational individual and “it (state) stands in front of us as an organically emerged phenomenon [...] like a single human being.”³¹⁵ According to Sven Holdar, Kjellén adopted the state-centric organic analogy because he regarded the international system as utterly anarchic.³¹⁶ Consequently, much like Ratzel, Kjellén recognized that states are actively engaged in intense competition for limited resources.³¹⁷ Kjellén’s state-centric perspective is also reflected in his emphasis on the nation-state and groups of states while downplaying other categories, such as provinces and municipalities.³¹⁸ On top of that, in his analysis, Kjellén gives little attention to the statesmen and their influence on politics.³¹⁹ Kjellén’s metaphor of state-organism is comparable to that of Thomas Hobbes and applicable to a realist point of view.³²⁰

Second, just like classical realists, Kjellén was the opponent of legalistic/liberal principles that were gradually taking shape during his era.³²¹ In particular, the early political science at the end of the 19th century was dominated by lawyers and legalists, but Kjellén, in contrast, made a plea for the notion that the most important characteristic of the state is power. Furthermore, he underlined that states, seen as “living organisms” in relation to one another, spoke an entirely different language, i.e. the language of “power”.³²² His understanding of state politics is based on the assumption that “the nature of the state is ultimately power [...] and the law is its servant.”³²³ In other words: “The state as a power is the wider concept that covers the state as law – not the other way around.”³²⁴ For Kjellén, too, state power comes first, while law and moral principles come as second. In this respect, he insisted that in the international arena “the state is primarily a sphere of interest and power and not a sphere of law.”³²⁵

³¹³ Rudolf Kjellén, *Samtidens stormakter*, Politiska handböcker 1, Stockholm, 1914, p. iv.

³¹⁴ Rudolf Kjellén, “Undersökningar till politikens system 1: Öfverindelning och terminologi”, *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, Vol. 21, 1918, p. 122.

³¹⁵ Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1917, p. 203.

³¹⁶ Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State and The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, p. 319.

³¹⁷ Daniel H. Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era”, in Daniel H. Deudney (ed.) and Richard A. Matthew (ed.), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, p. 41.

³¹⁸ Ragnar Björk (ed.) and Thomas Lundén (ed.), *Territory, State and Nation: The Geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2021, p. 3.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2004, pp. 16-17.

³²¹ Ladis K. D. Kristof, “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1960, p. 23; Peter Davidsen, *The Emancipation of Political Science: Contextualizing the State Theory of Rudolf Kjellén (1899-1922)*, PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2021, p. 339.

³²² David Crikemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Crikemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 111.

³²³ Rudolf Kjellén, *Grundriß Zu Einem System Der Politik*, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1920, pp. 24-27.

³²⁴ Rudolf Kjellén, *Staten som Lifsförm*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1916, p. 28.

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 175.

Kjellén's state-organism was a power in its relations with other states, and "powers" and their "vital interests" are key terms of his political theory.³²⁶ On the other hand, his state-science (*Staatswissenschaft*) is viewed as a "doctrine of power" which derives from an organic being: the "state".³²⁷ Accordingly, "the very origin of states is reduced to the sphere of pure power and will."³²⁸ For him, the maximum gain of power becomes the "central motive" of state action and politics in general. No rules directed the state in its relations with other states other than the influence of its power.³²⁹ Power "is the political expediency, the advantage and the necessity. Here the state has its moral principle."³³⁰ The "state" and the "power" were synonymous. States rose because they were powerful and maintained their status only if they remained powerful.³³¹ Therefore, the essence of the great power was its will to have more power in the rivalry with other great powers. Any increase in physical size was just the logical outcome of an inevitable competition for power between states.³³² As a result, the great powers had a natural right to expand in an anarchic world, especially if they, like Germany, could show a population surplus.³³³

Kjellén also underscored that the state as a political organism is kept in a perpetual struggle for existence and space and that only organisms with such endurance could survive and prosper.³³⁴ In the first edition of his book *The Great Powers* (1905), one may notice biological and Darwinian elements of his state theory and his understanding of states as forms of life locked in an eternal struggle for survival and power.³³⁵ Later, in *The State as a Life-Form* (1916), he reminds that: "States cherish the law, but they value their survival even more."³³⁶ States are not just characterized by a raw appetite for territorial expansion but also for the "categorical imperative of self-preservation."³³⁷ This imperative of self-preservation (survival) is tied to the necessity of acquiring new living space, forces states onto the battlefields and nurtures their egoistic will to power.³³⁸ Kjellén declared that: "When the battle for space and existence becomes stronger, we perceive the natural aspect of the States, whereas their legal aspect seems to disappear".³³⁹ His highly deterministic view of the state's condition and his ontology of survival were later established as the crux of classical realism.

Finally, one must not ignore Rudolf Kjellén's attentiveness to egoism since this feature is one of the key features of human nature in classical realist imagery. Likewise, his devaluation of morality and international law is no less striking than in classical realism. In the following lines, Kjellén reveals that: "We shall not deny altruistic tendencies, and they may sometimes even get into power,

³²⁶ Rudolf Kjellén, *Festskrift Till Hugo Geber*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1913, p. 141; Klaus Kost, "The Conception of Politics In Political Geography and Geopolitics in Germany until 1945", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 1989, p. 371.

³²⁷ Klaus Kost, "The Conception of Politics In Political Geography and Geopolitics in Germany until 1945", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 1989, p. 371.

³²⁸ Rudolf Kjellén, *Staten som Lifsform*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1916, p. 164.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³³⁰ Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Kurt Vowinckel, Berlin, 1924, pp. 20-30.

³³¹ Holger H. Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum", in Colin S. Gray (ed.) and Geoffrey Sloan (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 220.

³³² Rudolf Kjellén, *Stormakterna: konturer kring samtidens storpolitik IV*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1914, p. 244; John Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, Arnold, London, 2002, p. 77.

³³³ Sven Holdar, "The Ideal State and The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén", *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, p. 317.

³³⁴ Silviu Costachie, "German School of Geopolitics: Evolution, Ideas, Prospects", *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, Year XIII, No. 2, 2011, p. 274.

³³⁵ Rudolf Kjellén, *Stormakterna: konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, Vol. 1*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1905, p. 22.

³³⁶ Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1917, p. 28.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

³³⁹ As cited in Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, "The State as a "form of life" and the space as *Leistungsraum*: the reception of Ratzel in the First and Second World Wars", *Geographica Helvetica*, Vol. 78, 2023, p. 31.

but they will develop only when not directly conflicting with the egoistic tendencies.”³⁴⁰ His “political immorality”, i.e. his emphasis on the power struggle and his devaluation of the role of morals and law, results from his belief that men and their passions, or our human nature, is what really drives politics.³⁴¹ This view of human nature as a quest for dominance (*animus dominandi*) was later made axiomatic by Hans Morgenthau. Kjellén’s self-centeredness is also exposed in the case of civil wars, where he notices that “[...] between social groups one recognizes all too clearly the ruthlessness of the life struggle for existence and growth, while at the same time one can detect within the groups a powerful cooperation for the purposes of existence.”³⁴² His thoughts on egoism as part of human nature are profoundly Darwinian.

It is also worth mentioning that Rudolf Kjellén, in several of his articles and books from the end of the 19th century and onward, fiddled with the concept of balance of power. He divided the world into three so-called large continental power areas or state systems - an American, an Oriental and the Mediterranean – and based these ideas on a world that consists of large autarkic state areas and a balance of power on the oceans between these powers.³⁴³ Kjellén’s conceptualization of the balance of power goes beyond a mere static distribution of strength among nations. It incorporates a dynamic interplay of adaptation, where states navigate the challenges posed by their continental and maritime environments, striving to maintain equilibrium while adjusting their strategies in response to shifts in the global geopolitical landscape. As will be demonstrated in the following section, this idea was further developed before World War II by other prominent geopolitical theorists.

Rudolf Kjellén is important because his ideas were taken further by the next generation of Germany’s geopolitical scholars, primarily by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) and his *Journal of Geopolitics* (*Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*), in which he was editor-in-chief.³⁴⁴ What sets Haushofer apart from others is that this German scholar had a military education, and after World War I, he even retired with the rank of major general. On the other hand, he gave lectures at the Bavarian War Academy and later became a professor at the University of Munich. In 1908 he was appointed as a military attaché in Imperial Japan, where he carefully studied expansionist policies in the Asian continent. During the reign of Nazi Germany, this knowledge and expertise helped him become a great authority in military circles regarding the region of the Far East. His geopolitical *Weltanschauung* and his association with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime marked him as one of the darkest intellectual figures of that time. This scholar has elevated German geopolitics to its peak but also paved the way for its downfall in the 20th century.

By the 1920s, Karl Haushofer upgraded the German science of geopolitics on the foundations laid by Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellén. He adopted their views on geopolitics and incorporated these two figures into his own comprehensive approach to studying geography and world politics.³⁴⁵ From Ratzel, Haushofer extracted and gave supreme value to two things: state as organism and *Lebensraum*.³⁴⁶ From Kjellén, Haushofer borrowed the term autarky - or national self-

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 96.

³⁴¹ Ladis K. D. Kristof, “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1960, p. 25.

³⁴² Rudolf Kjellén, *Grundriß Zu Einem System Der Politik*, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1920, pp. 93–94.

³⁴³ Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State and The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, pp. 320-321.

³⁴⁴ Karl Haushofer, “Amerika in Kampf der Kontinente”, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Vol. 19, 1942, pp. 530-534.

³⁴⁵ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 35.

³⁴⁶ Silviu Costachie, “German School of Geopolitics: Evolution, Ideas, Prospects”, *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, Year XIII, No. 2, 2011, p. 272; Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, Kennikat Press, New York, 1942, p. 90.

sufficiency.³⁴⁷ Before delving into his association with classical realism, it is important to note how this controversial scholar defined geopolitics. In his words:

Geopolitik will serve our statesmen in setting and attaining their political objectives. It will present them with the scientific equipment of concrete facts and proven laws to help them see political situations as they really are.³⁴⁸

As one can notice, he clearly thought of geopolitics as a realistic instrument designed to educate the politician and the statesman about power-political thinking.³⁴⁹ In his books and articles, one comes across two substantial hard-core elements of classical realism: state-centrism and power politics. In addition, Haushofer dealt with one element belonging to the classical realist protective belt: the balance of power.

Like Ratzel and Kjellén before him, Haushofer found his place in the tradition of Darwinistic organic thinking. The state for Karl Haushofer was also a real “organism” and a “biological” phenomenon.³⁵⁰ Haushofer was captivated by the notion that states were dynamic organisms that were always competing on the world stage rather than merely some fixed juridical entities. His anthropomorphic conception of the state essentially comes from Ratzel’s *Kampf ums Dasein* (struggle for existence) vision of politics.³⁵¹ For Haushofer, “power in this world means struggle.”³⁵² Also, moral restrictions do not exist for him in the struggle for power and space. He justified this position by saying that: “it was Spinoza, not an imperialist, who said that only he who has power has right.”³⁵³ Geopolitics itself served as the scientific foundation of the art of political action in the struggle of state organisms for existence and *Lebensraum*.³⁵⁴ Accordingly, geopolitics is a story of a vicious struggle for power and space, a contest between state-organism of haves and have-nots in a zero-sum game.³⁵⁵ Haushofer recognized the state as the sole actor in international politics and war, in this regard, represented the “ultimate arbiter” in international relations and served as a benchmark of national power.³⁵⁶ In sum, Haushofer perceived international politics in terms of power relationships among nations and observed how geographic factors, such as location, resources, and territory, influenced these power dynamics.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Haushofer advocated for some form of balance of power in international relations, but not because he was promoting international peace and stability; he did so because that approach was essential for Germany’s survival in a fiercely competitive international arena. His school of thinking was adamant that there must be areas of separation between the major powers within the continental divisions and that this would eventually lead to the creation of the desired international balance of power. He argued that Germany needed to think beyond the nation-state in order to build a continental “Indo-European block” which would “counterbalance” first and

³⁴⁷ Holger H. Herwig, “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum”, in Colin S. Gray (ed.) and Geoffrey Sloan (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 220.

³⁴⁸ Karl Haushofer, “Politische Erdkunde und Geopolitik”, in *Freie Wege vergleichender Erdkunde*, Erich von Drygalski zum 60. Geburtstag, Oldenbourg, München, 1925, p. 57.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁵⁰ Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, Vol. 2*, Boldt, Boppard am Rhein, 1979, p. 205.

³⁵¹ Stefano Guzzini, *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 23.

³⁵² Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer “Educated” Hitler and Hess*, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2016, p. 143.

³⁵³ Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, Kennikat Press, New York, 1942, p. 43.

³⁵⁴ Hans W. Weigert, “Haushofer and the Pacific”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1942, p. 332-342.

³⁵⁵ Harold James, *The War of Words: A Glossary of Globalization*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2021, p. 124.

³⁵⁶ Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon: Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft*, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1913, p. 8; Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer “Educated” Hitler and Hess*, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2016, p. 100.

foremost the sea power of Great Britain.³⁵⁷ According to him, a gradual polarization was taking place between the “oceanic” powers - or the “space-owning imperialists” of the western hemisphere (England, France and the United States) - and the oppressed “continental” powers of “Eastern Eurasia” (China, Japan, India and Russia).³⁵⁸ Haushofer felt that those Western powers were looked upon as having disturbed the balance of powers and tried to keep it that way since it benefitted them both economically and politically.³⁵⁹ Therefore, the creation of the Euro-Asian continental block is necessary because of objective geopolitical factors and, most importantly, because it is in Germany’s interest. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union likely resulted in building a powerful block in which Germany could enjoy an economic and military advantage.³⁶⁰ Taken together, the alliance of the three states (Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan) had two goals. Firstly, it was to restore the balance of power that was upset after World War I. Secondly, its creation was vital in order to reduce the influence and shake the very foundations of the British Empire.

For those reasons, Haushofer and his school of geopolitics assumed that the international system should evolve into several regional subsystems. His idea of pan-regions was viewed as an essential part of German geopolitical strategy and is closely intertwined with his other concept – *Pan-Ideen* or panideas. He offered several examples of his panideas - Panislamism, Panamericanism, Pangermanism and Panasianism.³⁶¹ Haushofer’s pan-regions were, in fact, the geographical expression of panideas and were associated with the superpowers’ global division of spheres of influence. The main goal of his pan-regional concept was to reduce the number of potential conflict zones between the major powers by determining the spheres of influence on the globe. What is even more interesting is that he admired the United States’ sphere of influence over Middle America and American ambition to create a large informal empire in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific.³⁶² Its Manifest Destiny, Haushofer believed, had most successfully employed geopolitics within its region. Furthermore, just like Ratzel, he extolled the Monroe Doctrine as the greatest practical implementation of geopolitics and advocated for a parallel German Monroe Doctrine.³⁶³ Haushofer firmly believed that Monroe Doctrine could serve as an example of Germany’s need for expansion.³⁶⁴

Although there are some differences among the theorists mentioned above, there are seven main elements characteristic of German *Geopolitik* and classical realism. First, the primary political entities in international politics are states. Second, the acquisition of power is a precondition for gaining territory, not vice versa. Third, the ethos of state survival is central to both traditions. Fourth, the interaction between states (organisms) in the international arena is deeply competitive, thus making war a common phenomenon of international politics. Fifth, both classical realism and classical geopolitics emphasized the concept of balance of power, although not to the same extent and not in the same form. Sixth, states’ actions are beyond what is right or wrong and are judged by their success, not by the standards of some abstract law or morality. Finally, some form of ideology

³⁵⁷ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 60.

³⁵⁸ Karl Haushofer, “Die geopolitische Betrachtung grenzdeutscher Probleme” in: Karl Christian von Loesch (ed.) and Arnold Hillen Ziegfeld (ed.), *Volk unter Völkern*, F. Hirt, Breslau, 1925, pp. 191-192.

³⁵⁹ On status quo powers see Edward. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 1946, p. 53.

³⁶⁰ Wolfgang Natter, “Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-1945: Karl Haushofer, and *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*”, in John Agnew (ed.), Katharyne Mitchell (ed.) and Gerard Toal (ed.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, p. 195.

³⁶¹ John O’Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten, “Political Geography of Panregions”, *Geographical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 1, 1990, p. 4.

³⁶² Karl Haushofer, “Die weltpolitische Machtverlagerung seit 1914 und die internationalen Fronten der Panideen”, in Karl Haushofer (ed.) and Kurt Trampler (ed.), *Deutschlands Weg an der Zeitenwende*, Eher Verlag, Munich, pp. 208-223; Phil Kelly, *Classical Geopolitics: A New Analytical Model*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016, p. 48.

³⁶³ Jörg Brechtfeld, *Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 55.

³⁶⁴ Phil Kelly, *Classical Geopolitics: A New Analytical Model*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016, p. 51.

must lie in need of expansion - be it Monroe Doctrine or *Lebensraum*. As one can observe, some elements on which German theorists of classical geopolitics focused their attention are found in the hard core of classical realism and some in the protective belt. More importantly, they observed that as social Darwinist and with Darwinian vantage point. The next subchapter will discuss three theorists that dominated geopolitical thought in the 20th century US and Great Britain. One will notice that what they wrote is an extension of what theorists of the German school of geopolitics wrote about.

5.1.2. Classical realist thinking in Anglo-American geopolitics - Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman

This subchapter will explore three key Anglo-American exponents of classical geopolitics and their theoretical connection with classical realism. One will notice that their affiliation with Darwinism is present but more subtle than in the case of German geopolitics.³⁶⁵ On the other hand, their realist concepts are more apparent and straightforward than those found in the German branch of classical geopolitics. It is, therefore, necessary at this stage to introduce Alfred T. Mahan, Halford J. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman as the three most influential pioneers of this school of geopolitics.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) is probably the most famous American theorist of geopolitics. Mahan graduated from the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis (MD) in 1859 and served for four decades in the United States Navy. His education and his active military service are the reasons why he became the progenitor of naval geostrategy and the promoter of naval power in international politics. His reflections on geopolitics are more focused on practical issues and are at the service of American national interests. For this theorist of classical geopolitics, one can say that he implicitly acknowledged many Darwinian scientific ideas, and what's more, he was labelled by various historians as a social Darwinist.³⁶⁶ Just like the German geopolitical theorists, Mahan shared the social Darwinist impression that ““all around us now is strife: ‘the struggle of life’, ‘the race of life.’”³⁶⁷ Moreover, in 1895, he wrote:

More and more civilized man is needing and seeking ground to expand and in which to live. Like all natural forces, the impulse takes the direction of least resistance, but when in its course it comes upon some region rich in possibilities, but unfruitful through the incapacity or negligence of those who dwell therein, the incompetent race or system will go down, as the inferior race ever has fallen back and disappeared before the persistent impact of the superior.³⁶⁸

This line unmistakably depicts his social Darwinist bias that the weaker (inferior) must always yield to the stronger (superior). Consequently, just like Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer, Mahan also thought that a nation needs to expand territorially or else it will vanish.³⁶⁹ Following Ratzel, Mahan likewise perceived international relations as a dynamic condition of a continuing struggle between

³⁶⁵ Stefano Guzzini, *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 22.

³⁶⁶ Gearoid O Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 30; Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 111.

³⁶⁷ Alfred Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1917, p. 18.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.

³⁶⁹ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1939, p. 214.

nation-states in which the primacy of “sea power” is decisive.³⁷⁰ In his works one finds three hard-core elements which essentially belong to classical realism: survival, human nature and moral relativism.

Although his capital work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783*, gives a comprehensive account of the importance of sea power in international politics, the first chapters of this book outline his political philosophy. Specifically, in Mahan’s political doctrine, one implicitly finds the well-known social Darwinist idea of how all states, peoples and races are in a constant struggle for survival where only the fittest and most aggressive survive.³⁷¹ Mahan repeats this position in his book *The Problem of Asia*, where he notes that the first law of states (as well as of man) is survival, i.e. self-preservation.³⁷² Nation-states are, therefore, primarily concerned with their own survival.³⁷³ States, above all, fight for their survival because they are, to the greatest extent, selfish and self-serving.³⁷⁴ The pursuit of interest stems from self-preservation - or survival in realist vocabulary. As each country tries to extract as much as possible from the planet’s limited resources, this inevitably leads to them being “locked” in a struggle with other countries for the basic necessities of life. Specifically, nation-states were eternally locked in a vicious (zero-sum) survival competition for resources and markets.³⁷⁵ The world itself is based on struggle and unpredictability; hence everywhere exists a struggle and race for life.³⁷⁶ Those natural laws of selection in international politics result in inequalities in population, wealth, and opportunity, leading to economic discontent and conflict. As a result, states are eternally conflicted and are always opposite to each other, while a deep and ominous state of unrest characterizes the relationship between world powers. Since survival is the number one priority, the stakes in this fight are extremely high, and the state’s ability to compete successfully, according to Mahan, is essential.³⁷⁷

The second realist point is that Mahan, like classical realists after him, saw human nature as egoistic, volatile and avaricious.³⁷⁸ In his words: “it must be remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man remains the same.”³⁷⁹ According to him, human nature always follows one universal principle: the pursuit of interest. Consequently, the state does not differ from the individual, but on the contrary, the pursuit of interests is even more intensified, especially in the domain of international relations. Therefore, nation-states had to be selfish or, in his own words, self-interested.³⁸⁰ He regarded self-interest as a legitimate and adequate motive in foreign policy.³⁸¹

³⁷⁰ Geoffrey R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, Brighton, 1988, p. 90; Claude Raffestin, Dario Lopreno and Yvan Pasteur, *Géopolitique et Histoire*, Editions Payot, Lausanne, 1995, pp. 104-107.

³⁷¹ Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge [ur], *Uvod u geopolitiku*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007, str. 36.

³⁷² Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon International Politics*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2003, p. 70.

³⁷³ Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 109.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, p. 209.

³⁷⁶ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1897, p. 18.

³⁷⁷ Charles D. Tarlton, “The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann”, *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, p. 587.

³⁷⁸ Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 114.

³⁷⁹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 1894, p. 89.

³⁸⁰ Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 108.

³⁸¹ John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, p. 109.

Following this line of thought, Mahan sees that conflict is a natural part of human nature.³⁸² War quite manifestly represents only a natural phenomenon.³⁸³ In the style of Ratzel and Kjellén, Mahan continues by saying that “conflict is the condition of all life, material and spiritual.”³⁸⁴ Attempts to eliminate violence from international relations have never been fruitful because human selfishness leads to permanent conflict. What awaits people in the future is not the illusion of universal harmony or peace but the reality of constant competition and conflict between states. Only strong states can successfully maintain themselves in this constant struggle, and strength is always measured in relation to military strength.

Finally, Mahan noticed that since there is no universal and independent arbiter of justice in the international arena, every nation-state has the right to construct its subjective understanding of moral responsibility.³⁸⁵ One of the reasons why Mahan came to this conclusion is because anarchy represents a distinctive characteristic among sovereign nation-states.³⁸⁶ The use of force in international politics was primary, whereas the law was only ever secondary. He deemed futile all (liberal) efforts to substitute force with the law since all law depends on the force for its efficacy.³⁸⁷ This standpoint is best reflected in Mahan’s understanding of the Monroe Doctrine. From the beginning of his career, he stressed the importance of the Monroe Doctrine for US foreign policy. He argued that this doctrine is a declaration of America’s moral conscience and has to be expanded and advanced in order to address America’s current national interests.³⁸⁸

Knowingly or not, Mahan entangled the Monroe Doctrine with realism and the organic thinking that was characteristic at the crossroads of the centuries:

The virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, without which it would die deservedly, is that, through its correspondence with the national necessities of the US, it possesses an inherent principle of life, which adapts itself with the flexibility of a growing plant to the successive conditions it encounters. One of these conditions, of course, is the growing strength of the nation itself.³⁸⁹

Mahan used organic metaphors to justify and rationalize the “growth” of the American empire in the Western Hemisphere.³⁹⁰ In 1911 he wrote that “the Monroe Doctrine is [...] the reflex, as against distant outsiders, of the instinctive impulse toward self-preservation, and as such represents natural right - which is moral right - as opposed to legal.”³⁹¹ The next section of this subchapter explores the work of the British most famous and influential geopolitical thinker - Halford J. Mackinder - whose ideas are deeply interrelated with Mahan as his American counterpart.

³⁸² Charles D. Tarlton, “The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann”, *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, p. 587.

³⁸³ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions*, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, London, 1910, p. 89.

³⁸⁴ Alfred Mahan, “A Twentieth-Century Outlook”, *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, Vol. 95, 1897, p. 532-533.

³⁸⁵ Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 111.

³⁸⁶ Greg Russell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2006, p. 130.

³⁸⁷ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, p. 199; Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 39.

³⁸⁸ Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, p. 122.

³⁸⁹ Alfred T. Mahan, “The Monroe Doctrine,” in *Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles, With Other Essays*, Little Brown, New York, 1908, p. 377.

³⁹⁰ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 43.

³⁹¹ Alfred T. Mahan, “The Deficiencies of Law as an Instrument of International Adjustments”, *The North American Review*, Vol. 194, No. 672, 1911, p. 677.

Before one gets acquainted with the realist thinking in the works of Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), it is worthy to briefly point out two things for which this English theorist of geopolitics is best known. Firstly, Mackinder highlights the eternal conflict between sea and land powers.³⁹² His comprehensive research into world history, from the earliest civilizations until the start of the 20th century, led to the discovery of this pattern of state behaviour. Mackinder's renowned concept regarding the timeless significance of Eurasia (Heartland) for global dominance is another factor in the importance of Mackinder for geopolitics. He summarized this into a few well-known sentences: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world."³⁹³ More importantly, for this research topic, it is essential to reveal the context in which this geopolitics scholar wrote and developed as an academic.

What is both interesting and important is that before becoming a Geography professor at the London School of Economics (LSE), Mackinder received two degrees at the University of Oxford – one in biology in 1883 and another in modern history in 1884. Mackinder himself acknowledged that he drew upon the ideas of Charles Darwin in order to develop his own understanding of Geography.³⁹⁴ The status of the theory of evolution in the social sciences at that time in England, notably at Oxford, was quintessentially social-Darwinist and relied on the presumption of racial inequality on which the British Empire was established.³⁹⁵ For this research, Mackinder clearly fits into the classical realist mode of thought for four reasons: state-centrism, struggle for power, dismissal of international law, and balance of power. The first two are part of the classical realist hard-core, while the last two belong to the protective belt.

Like other theorists of classical geopolitics, Mackinder was a passionate reader of Friedrich Ratzel and shared his organic conception of the state.³⁹⁶ He referred to the state as an organism as early as 1905.³⁹⁷ According to him, all "the communities of men [states] should be looked on as units in the struggle for existence."³⁹⁸ Consequently, Mackinder identified British Empire as an "organism" that has grown out from its original "natural area" and dwelled in a state of "permanent struggle" with other organisms.³⁹⁹ His divided world of state-organisms is best exemplified in the following lines:

The most important facts of contemporary political geography are the extent of the red patches of British dominion upon the map of the world, and the position of the hostile customs frontiers. They are the categorical expression of the eternal struggle for existence as it stands at the opening of the twentieth century.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹² In geopolitical terminology, the so-called tellurocratic vs thalassocratic power rivalry. See: Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study of the Politics of Reconstruction*, Constable and Company LTD, London, 1919, pp. 40-76.

³⁹³ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1919, p. 186.

³⁹⁴ Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 13; Daniela Russ and Thomas Turnbull, "Competing Powers Engineers, Energetic Productivism, and the End of Empires", in Daniela Russ (ed.) and James Stafford (ed.), *Competition in World Politics: Knowledge, Strategies and Institutions*, Verlag, Bielefeld, 2021, p. 195.

³⁹⁵ Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 42.

³⁹⁶ Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 4; Lucian M. Ashworth, "Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57, 2013, p. 141.

³⁹⁷ Halford J. Mackinder, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength", *National and English Review*, Vol. 15, 1905, p. 140.

³⁹⁸ Halford J. Mackinder, "On the Scope and Methods of Geography", *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1887, p. 143.

³⁹⁹ Halford J. Mackinder, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength", *National and English Review*, Vol. 15, 1905, pp. 140-141.

⁴⁰⁰ Halford J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1907, p. 343.

On the other hand, his organic definition of national interest served as a driving force behind economic growth. In other words, the empire was a tool for maintaining the economic basis of the military power that was crucial for national survival.⁴⁰¹ Mackinder argued that since people in power who governed democracies were not skilled enough with the requisite geographical vision, they were thus not able to understand that the states they represented were in a permanent struggle with other organisms. In the case of Great Britain, such a struggle was so crucial that a Heartland-based empire could permanently supplant Great Britain. Taking this into account, it is evident that Mackinder saw states as primary actors in international politics.

With regards to the question of power, it seems both interesting and surprising that a few decades before Edward H. Carr's popularized the distinction between realist and utopian ideas, Mackinder wrote about the opposing concepts on foreign policy between "organizer" (realist) and "idealist".⁴⁰² For Mackinder, "organizers" are the ones who understand the constraints of resources and the realities of power. He believed that one "must regard the exercise of Power in foreign affairs as a normal and peaceful function of the national life, to be steadily provided for."⁴⁰³ From Mackinder's imperialist point of view, international politics is a struggle to gain more relative power in relation to other states.⁴⁰⁴ He confirms this position by saying: "Nature is ruthless, and we must build a Power able to contend on equal terms with other Powers, or step into the rank of States which exist on sufferance."⁴⁰⁵ Gaining more relative power in a zero-sum world must be one of the foreign policy priorities of the British Empire.

In a realist manner, Mackinder also dismissed international legalism and considered it pure idealism, primarily due to his insistence on the realities of war and trade competition.⁴⁰⁶ He warned that "No mere scraps of paper, even though they be the written as the constitution of a League of Nations, are, under the conditions of today, a sufficient guarantee that the Heartland will not again become the center of a world war."⁴⁰⁷ Michael Heffernan highlights this aspect, asserting that Mackinder's analysis was designed to impart a lesson in geopolitical realism. This was in contrast to the "naïve idealism" he identified in the proclamations of American President Woodrow Wilson and others who advocated for a new League of Nations, aimed at facilitating the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.⁴⁰⁸ In other words, for Mackinder "there is in nature no such thing as equality of opportunity for the nations."⁴⁰⁹ As in the case of classical realists, ideals, for Mackinder, must be coated by the "realities of power".⁴¹⁰ Even though Mackinder constantly emphasized the importance of geography for the state's survival, it is without a doubt that power politics represents one of the core principles of his thought.

Finally, Mackinder devoted a lot of time to the topic of the balance of power. First of all, he believed there has always been an underlying "balance of power" between the sea and land

⁴⁰¹ John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2003, p. 99.

⁴⁰² Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 11.

⁴⁰³ Halford J. Mackinder, *Money-Power and Man-Power*, Simpkin Marshall, London, 1906, p. 5.

⁴⁰⁴ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p. 27.

⁴⁰⁵ Halford J. Mackinder, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength", *National and English Review*, Vol. 15, 1905, p. 143.

⁴⁰⁶ Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 10.

⁴⁰⁷ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 80.

⁴⁰⁸ Michael Heffernan, "Fin de Siècle, Fin du Monde? On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890-1920", in Klaus Dodds (ed.) and David Atkinson (ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 38.

⁴⁰⁹ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1919, p. 4.

⁴¹⁰ Knutsen L. Torbjørn, "Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis", *The International History Review*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2014, p. 840.

powers.⁴¹¹ Secondly, he pleaded that “the actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples.”⁴¹² Like his contemporary general Karl Haushofer, Mackinder advocated that the British Empire must undertake a continental commitment if her goal was to retain a *favourable* European balance of power.⁴¹³ At the same time, under the influence of the imperial mindset of that era, his [Heartland] ideas served to preserve and enhance Britain’s position as a global power. As he noted: “The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state [...] would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.”⁴¹⁴ In the case of Central Europe, for example, he proposed creating a zone of minor independent states between these two major powers to keep them from dominating the European continent.⁴¹⁵ He continues by saying that

[...] the function of Britain and of Japan is to act upon the marginal region [around the Heartland], maintaining the balance of power there as against the expansive internal forces [of the Heartland]. I believe that the future of the world depends on the maintenance of this balance of power.⁴¹⁶

One can notice that Mackinder’s notion of peace was fundamentally influenced by a precarious balance of power between the competing empires.⁴¹⁷ The next theorist of geopolitics also believed in the concept of balance of power and was under the strong influence of Halford J. Mackinder. The Dutch-American political scientist Nicholas J. Spykman and his writings can best detect the amalgam of realism and geopolitics.⁴¹⁸

Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943) is considered one of the key figures of Anglo-American geopolitics and a theorist that played a crucial role in “transporting” a number of core principles from classical geopolitics into the field of IR.⁴¹⁹ Even though he was born and raised in Amsterdam, his higher education started at Delft University in the western Netherlands. As an émigré to the United States, he enrolled on a doctoral program at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1920. After completing his PhD studies, he became a full-time professor at the prestigious Yale University in 1928. Spykman was regarded as another “father of American Geopolitics” next to Alfred T. Mahan.⁴²⁰ In the early years of his career, in addition to Mahan and Mackinder, he was influenced by German geopolitics, primarily by Karl Haushofer, to such an extent that some press

⁴¹¹ Geoffrey Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future*, Pinter, London, 1998, p. 21.

⁴¹² Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History”, *The Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, p. 437.

⁴¹³ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1962, pp. 149-150.

⁴¹⁴ Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History”, *The Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, p. 436.

⁴¹⁵ Ola Tunander, “Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century Rudolf Kjellén’s ‘The State as a Living Organism’”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, p. 460.

⁴¹⁶ Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History”, *The Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, p. 443.

⁴¹⁷ Nick Megoran, “Violence and Peace”, in Klaus Dodds (ed.), Merje Kuus (ed.) and Joanne Sharp (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 194.

⁴¹⁸ Phil Kelly, “Rescuing Classical Geopolitics: Separating Geopolitics from Realism”, *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2019, p. 52.

⁴¹⁹ Olivier Zajec, “Nicholas Spykman’s Interactional Realism: Irony, Social Theory, Political Geography”, in Alexander Reichwein (ed.), Felix Rösch (ed.), *Realism: A Distinctively 20th Century European Tradition*, Palgrave Pivot, Cham, 2021, p. 79; Olivier Zajec, *Nicholas John Spykman, l’invention de la géopolitique américaine: Un itinéraire intellectuel aux origines paradoxales de la théorie realiste des relations internationales*, Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 2016, pp. 497-530.

⁴²⁰ David Crikemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Crikemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 118.

even labelled him the “American Haushofer.”⁴²¹ He drew ideas from social Darwinism and German literature and used this kind of reasoning in his research of international politics. Hans W. Weigert, Spykman’s contemporary, was one of those scholars who were convinced that he [Spykman] shaped his thoughts via German geopolitics and advocated for German-style *Realpolitik*.⁴²² At the very beginning of the sixth chapter of his most famous book *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, Spykman even cites Friedrich Ratzel and his statement on the geographical bases of political power.⁴²³

As previously mentioned, this scholar wrote in both geopolitical and realist trajectories. In his geopolitical analysis, one can extract three hard-core principles of classical realism: the struggle for power, the struggle for survival and moral relativism. Imperialism in the form of power maximization and the balance of power, on the other hand, are within the protective belt of classical realist theory. For the purpose of this research, these principles are important because, in essence, they hide the elements of Darwinism that also existed in the previously analyzed theorists of classical geopolitics.

Firstly, Spykman’s interpretation of “power” was substantially imported from classical geopolitical theorists.⁴²⁴ However, more than any other geopolitical theorist, he created a more vivid picture of the struggle for power on the international scene. He considered a struggle to be a basic aspect of life, defining power as survival as well as the ability to impose one’s will on others. More importantly, Spykman has engraved a Darwinian understanding of the notion of struggle. This is most evident when he states that “strife is one of the basic aspects of life and, as such, an element of all relations between individuals, groups, and states. A world without struggle would be a world in which life had ceased to exist.”⁴²⁵ On the other hand, in a pure realist fashion, Spykman acknowledged that power was and always will be the basic controlling factor in relations among states.

His book *America’s Strategy in World Politics* contains what may be the clearest explanation on this subject. This book’s “Power Politics and War” chapter opens with a quotation from Thucydides: “We both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant them what they must.”⁴²⁶ He further asserts that

The struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the relative power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and external policy of states. All else is secondary, because in the last instance only power can achieve the objectives of foreign policy.⁴²⁷

For him, struggle for power equals struggle for survival and “power means survival.”⁴²⁸ Accordingly, in an anarchic world, the struggle for survival is a priority number one, and individual

⁴²¹ Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022, p. 123; Nebojša Vuković, *Logika imperije: Nikolas Spajkman i savremena američka geopolitika*, Konras, Beograd, 2007, pp. 41-72.

⁴²² Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: Twilight of Geopolitics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, p. 245; Leslie W. Hepple, “The Revival of Geopolitics”, *Political Geography Quarterly*, Supplement to Vol. 5, No. 4, 1986, p. S22.

⁴²³ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, p. 165.

⁴²⁴ David Crikemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Crikemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill–Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 119.

⁴²⁵ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, p. 12.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

states must think that preserving and improving their power position represents a primary objective of foreign policy. The survival part is also defined as control over territory and political independence. It is clear that Spykman's ontology of power translates into the ontology of (Darwinian) survival.

Secondly, when Spykman talks about the role of morality in international relations, he does not differ much from his geopolitical predecessors. For him, morality is inferior to power politics as "the search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power."⁴²⁹ He criticized statesmen who have

always been eager to accept from the theologian and the philosopher the correct formulation of the ethical precepts that should guide foreign policy, and since the seventeenth century all power politics has, therefore, been presented not as a crude attempt to survive in a tough world but as a noble endeavor aimed at the establishment of political equilibrium and the preservation of order. Formulated in those terms the success has not been overwhelming.⁴³⁰

In this respect, Spykman goes even further by saying that "the nation which suffers from a feeling of guilt about its use of force in the past is at a great disadvantage compared to the nation which not only accepts the reality of force but affirms its creative value with no sense of shame or sin."⁴³¹ The very structure of international relations (anarchy and the absence of firm regulations and sanctions) forces states to behave in the amoral way that Spykman described.

Following this type of argument, wars between states are inevitable, and peace represents a "brief interlude between wars."⁴³² Spykman even believed that in international society "all forms of coercion are permissible, including wars of destruction."⁴³³ This social Darwinist standpoint is also seen on the subject of expansion. Spykman believed in the expansionist character of a state in the sense that borders were not a static phenomenon and that "other things being equal, all states have a tendency to expand."⁴³⁴ Even small states wish to expand but are often restricted in doing so by various obstacles. A state expands until it is stopped because every state wishes for superiority. Like Ratzel, Haushofer and Mahan, Spykman further elaborates on this topic via Monroe Doctrine and its importance for US foreign policy. He devotes an entire chapter to this topic in *America's Strategy in World Politics*.⁴³⁵ For Spykman, this Doctrine was primarily utilized as an extension of US power: "The Monroe Doctrine was not a measure of our actual strength; it was an expression of the power position to which we aspired."⁴³⁶ Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine outlined a policy which states that

the American continents were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization; that we should consider any attempt to extend the political systems of Continental Europe to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety, and any attempt to control the destiny of American states as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.⁴³⁷

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴³² Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1944, p. 45.

⁴³³ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, p. 18.

⁴³⁴ Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1939, p. 394.

⁴³⁵ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, pp. 65-90.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

Spykman, too gives the impression that Monroe Doctrine represents a subtle platform for the US expansion. It is also interesting to see that in this regard, Spykman somewhat justifies the *Lebensraum* concept by using the case of Latin America. His main claim is that the struggle for power in South America was yet to be fought with the same intensity as it had been in Europe. However, it will definitely happen because, with further development, an increase in population and outward pressure, more *Lebensraum* will be needed.⁴³⁸

Finally, it is relevant to briefly add that Spykman wrote extensively about the balance of power. He is showing us the aspect of the balance of power in the case of the fates of small states in the international arena. He argues that “small states, unless they can successfully combine together, can only be weights in a balance used by others. [...] When the balance [of power] disappears, the small states usually disappear with it.”⁴³⁹ The next chapter will reveal an almost identical line in Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*. In essence, Spykman perceived the balance of power as a dynamic and ever-changing relationship between states. He thus believed that geopolitics could serve as an instrument for the US to actively create a new balance of power in international affairs.⁴⁴⁰ Like Haushofer before him, Spykman saw the forces at play in world politics as magnetic fields, and he shared Haushofer’s belief that the balance of power should be used to strengthen one’s own state.⁴⁴¹ Therefore, the balance of power is just a temporary stalemate in a ceaseless struggle between the most powerful states.⁴⁴²

In summary, the Anglo-American geopolitical faction might be characterized by the following statements. Like their German colleagues, the three analyzed scholars share many Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist impressions. They frequently use phrases like “struggle of life”, “the race of life”, and “strife for life” in their writings. They particularly followed Ratzel’s Darwinist insights regarding international politics. They share the belief that states are the main actors in international affairs and discretely accepted the organic theory of the state. Additionally, like their German counterparts, they view the reality of war as a common and natural part of international politics. Following that logic, they reject international law in any shape and especially its reliance on some abstract moral standards and principles. On top of that, Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman had expansionist intentions, which they justified by any means and proclaimed as normal. Finally, they were also aware of the balance of power, but only in a scenario where their nation-state loses its power and influence on the world stage. As evident, certain concepts that drew the focus of Anglo-American theorists of classical geopolitics can be identified within the fundamental tenets of classical realism, some residing in its hard core and others in its protective periphery. Moreover, they recognized these concepts from a social Darwinist perspective, adopting a viewpoint influenced by Darwinian principles.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 349.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁴⁰ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942, pp. 20-26; David Criekemans, “Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A Concise Overview from 1890 till 2020, and beyond” in David Criekemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021, p. 119.

⁴⁴¹ Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, “Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1939, p. 395.

⁴⁴² Madhavan K. Palat, “Geopolitics as the Theory of World Dominion”, in Madhavan K. Palat (ed.), *India and the World in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, New York, 2018, p. 28.

5.1.3. Conclusion

There are many overlapping clusters of ideas and parallel ways of thinking that are found and advanced in classical realist and geopolitical thought. The reason classical realism and classical geopolitics are so comparable, as well as the circumstances surrounding the birth of classical realism in the middle of the twentieth century, can be understood through an analysis of the classical geopolitical social Darwinist mindset. What theorists of classical geopolitics wrote about mirrors the basic principles from the hard core and protective belt of classical realism, such as the state as the main actor in international relations, egoism, zero-sum, power, survival, imperialism, and many other. In contrast to classical realists, they were explicitly social Darwinists and proud of it. That is the key difference; whereas classical realism, born out of classical geopolitics, only implicitly inherited ideas of Darwinism. While loosely inspired by Darwinian scientific ideas, classical geopolitics was undeniably entrenched in social Darwinist ideas and principles. Thereon, it gradually and unknowingly established some of the hard-core and protective belt tenets of classical realism. As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, it is no coincidence that there is much congruity between these two traditions and that there is undoubtedly a common stock that justifies the inclusion of geopolitics within the large realist tradition. Therefore, classical realism, through classical geopolitics, implicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism and also shows the necessity of these ideas for this theory's complete theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence.

First and foremost, both traditions were obsessed with power and perceived it as an important element in their conceptualization of international politics. Classical geopolitics had a considerably more comprehensive view of the concept of power, particularly in the theories of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén and Karl Haushofer. Power represents the essence of international politics, and power expansion is the default dynamic of world politics, both in classical geopolitics and classical realism.⁴⁴³ Classical geopolitics and classical realism fundamentally saw international politics as a “zero-sum” game and advocated for the primacy of survival as the number one goal of national interest. In addition, both cultivated the idea of a “closed world” in which states must organize themselves to increase their productivity relative to their rivals.

Furthermore, classical geopolitics and classical realism identified states as the basic unit of analysis in international affairs. States were seen as egoistic and self-help actors by assumption and by nature. Both traditions had a substantial naturalistic mindset together with organic analogies and metaphors. They also agree that anarchy is ever present in relations among states, and both assume that the fundamental nature of international relations does not change. On top of that, both traditions had a rather pessimistic than optimistic view of human nature.

In addition, they were highly critical of utopian (Wilsonian) ideals that were popular in academic literature before and after the Great War.⁴⁴⁴ Consequently, both traditions assumed that by promoting morality and following some international legal principles, states would lose more than what they gained. They generally gave supreme value to “hard” and “objective” material factors of foreign policy and supported some form of power/territorial expansion. While geopolitics openly insists on imperialism, classical realism speaks the same using terms such as power

⁴⁴³ Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1999, p. 60; Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 42; Karl Hwang, “Power in Alexander Supan's Guidelines to General Political Geography (1918/1920)”, *Przegląd Geopolityczny*, Issue 3, 2011, p. 24.

⁴⁴⁴ Barbara Kunz, “Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power”, *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, pp. 191-192.

maximization.⁴⁴⁵ Finally, both classical geopolitics and classical realism were, to a great degree, prescriptive and had somewhat nationalistic and ideological traces. This position is aptly summarized by Peter J. Taylor, who wrote that: “In the case of geopolitics, it has always been very easy to identify the nationality of an author from the content of his or her writings.”⁴⁴⁶ One can only agree that this was also the case for most classical realists.

⁴⁴⁵ Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1999, p. 62; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, p. 17.

⁴⁴⁶ Peter J. Taylor, *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality*, Longman, London, 1993, p. 53.

School of geopolitics	Theorist	Affiliation with classical realism	Affiliation with Darwinian scientific ideas	Affiliation with social Darwinism
German geopolitics	Friedrich Ratzel	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Monroe Doctrine	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Survival of the fittest <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias
German geopolitics	Rudolf Kjellén	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Power-politics <input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism <input type="checkbox"/> Balance of power <input type="checkbox"/> Morality and law are subordinate to power	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival
German geopolitics	Karl Haushofer	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Power politics <input type="checkbox"/> Balance of power <input type="checkbox"/> Monroe Doctrine	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias
Anglo-American geopolitics	Alfred T. Mahan	<input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Human nature <input type="checkbox"/> Morality and law are subordinate to power <input type="checkbox"/> Monroe Doctrine	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation	<input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias
Anglo-American geopolitics	Halford J. Mackinder	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Power politics <input type="checkbox"/> Balance of power <input type="checkbox"/> Relative power and a zero-sum outlook <input type="checkbox"/> International law is subordinate to power	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism
Anglo-American geopolitics	Nicholas J. Spykman	<input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Power politics <input type="checkbox"/> Morality and law are subordinate to power <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism in the form of power maximization <input type="checkbox"/> Balance of power <input type="checkbox"/> Monroe Doctrine	<input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation	<input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias

Table 2. Classical geopolitics and classical realism

However, one should also bear in mind that these two traditions should not be viewed as utterly identical but rather a well-matched pair since they share basic theoretical assumptions.⁴⁴⁷ One of the differences between the two is, for example, that classical geopolitics pays more attention to state location/position in the international arena. Classical realists often highlighted the role of history and the individual's lust for power. In contrast, classical geopolitics theorists were less reliant on historical cases and focused more on state power than individual power.⁴⁴⁸ Finally, unlike classical realists, theorists of classical geopolitics did not refer much to writers they undoubtedly heard of, such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes. Instead, Charles Darwin and his followers were prioritized, precisely those that classical realists wanted to ignore. The reason for this is probably because they were more influenced by contemporary developments in geography, biology, and social sciences rather than classical political philosophy.

Before the dissertation moves to the central figure of classical realism, Hans Morgenthau and his prolific contributions to the field of international relations, one needs to be acquainted with Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. This is important as those thinkers were the genuine forefathers that directly influenced the formation of classical realism, particularly on the evolution of Hans Morgenthau's political reasoning. Their Darwinian heritage represents the underlying philosophy of classical realism, which eventually carved this theory into its original form. In this way, the reliance and necessity of Darwinism in classical realism will again be shown.

⁴⁴⁷ Zhengyu Wu, "Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, p. 786; Christopher J. Fettweis, "On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now", *Orbis*, Vol. 59, Issue 2, 2015, p. 238.

⁴⁴⁸ Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations", in Felix Berenskoetter (ed.) and Michael J. Williams (ed.), *Power in World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 51.

5.2. The actual apostles of classical realism and the legacy of Darwinism: Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt

The second part of this chapter deals with three figures that had a direct or recognized influence on classical realist thought. Classical realists have constantly (re)turned to Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt in order to build and fortify the underlying structure of their theories of international politics. This is especially the case for Hans J. Morgenthau, who was committed to all three of them.⁴⁴⁹ It is evident from Nietzsche's, Weber's, and Schmitt's books and articles that they have extracted and applied a series of proto classical realist arguments, such as the question of power, the state, morality, human nature etc. These facets were later established as the hard core and protective belt of classical realist theory. Here too, one can identify that these three figures applied many Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas. Consequently, classical realism as an IR theory implicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism since Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt all dealt with such ideas at some points in their academic careers. If classical realism wants to keep Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt for its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence, then it also needs to encompass the ideas derived from Darwinism that come along.

Before one gets acquainted with the philosophical and theoretical foundations of these three significant thinkers, it is important to remind the reader of the popular reception of Darwinism in Germany. Even though Darwinism began its journey in Britain, it was a common belief that it found its "spiritual home" in Germany. German *Naturphilosophie* unsurprisingly endorsed Darwinian ideas from Great Britain and quickly became mainstream in many spheres of the academic community. This reception was not just the case for theorists of classical geopolitics but also for philosophers, sociologists, jurists and many others.⁴⁵⁰ This is an important point because all three scholars analyzed in this subchapter were Germans. It would be very strange if Darwinism did not infiltrate into their areas of academic interest. As a consequence, classical realists and Hans Morgenthau indirectly extracted and employed their Darwinian and social Darwinist insights to better understand international relations. This aspect is absent from current scholarship and will provide sufficient grounds for answering the research question of whether Darwinism is necessary for classical realism. The aforementioned figures and their main ideas will be presented successively in three individual sections.

⁴⁴⁹ William E. Scheuerman, "A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as Critical Realist", in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 42; Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001, p. 113.

⁴⁵⁰ See Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981; Hans-Günter Zmarzlik, "Social Darwinism in Germany, Seen as a Historical Problem", in Hajo Holborn (ed.), *Republic to Reich: The Making of the Nazi Revolution*, Vintage, New York, 1973, pp. 435-474; William Montgomery, "Germany", in Thomas Glick (ed.), *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1974, pp. 81-116; Richard Ned Lebow, "Max Weber and International Relations", in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 24.

5.2.1. Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical naturalism and power-politics

This section will unveil the multiple linkages between the fundamental Darwinian and social Darwinist concepts and Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical and political *Weltanschauung*. Even though Nietzsche can be associated with many traditions and schools in IR, he is, without a doubt, most commonly linked with the leading exponents of realism.⁴⁵¹ As a consequence, Nietzsche's philosophical naturalism particularly resonated with the development of Hans J. Morgenthau's IR theory. According to Christoph Frei, Friedrich Nietzsche was the philosopher who influenced Morgenthau the most as an intellectual authority.⁴⁵² In one private letter from January 1962, Morgenthau himself remarked: "As concerns the predominant intellectual influences on me, a most powerful and probably decisive influence has certainly been Nietzsche."⁴⁵³ He even said that he saw in Nietzsche a man of "startling closeness of thought and feeling" and was fascinated by Nietzsche's strong and persistent realistic viewing of the world.⁴⁵⁴ Morgenthau's work, and consequently classical realism as a theory, has been erected upon an unacknowledged Darwinian reading of Friedrich Nietzsche. For instance, Nietzsche's conception of man, i.e. his anthropology, is strongly influenced by Darwinism. Given this strong connection, this section will delve deeper and investigate Nietzsche's philosophical bedrocks, especially his ontological analysis of nature and power.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is considered one of the greatest and most important thinkers of the 19th century. This philosopher was born and grew up in the small German village of Röcken near Leipzig. Before turning to philosophy, Nietzsche studied theology and classical philology at the University of Bonn. In 1869, at the age of 24, he was offered a professorship to teach philology at the University of Basel in Switzerland. Due to his serious health problems, but also because of his philosophical temper, he did not stay long in the academic domain. In any case, his philosophical writings span from religion, poetry, morality, language, aesthetics and culture to nationalism, anti-Semitism and power-politics. Certain features of his writings, such as the will to power and *Übermensch*, were used by the Nazi Party as validation for their political views and activities. Despite that, Friedrich Nietzsche's influence was immense as he paved the way for many notable figures in the 20th century.

Even though Nietzsche criticized the scientific content of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution on more than one occasion, he was often recognized as a Darwinist because of his naturalistic observation of the world, but also because of his severe social-Darwinist attitudes.⁴⁵⁵ In 1889 Nietzsche proclaimed himself to be "anti-Darwin",⁴⁵⁶ but in one note from 1872, he, on the other hand, explicitly declared that he takes Darwinism "to be correct."⁴⁵⁷ In early 1867 he asked "What

⁴⁵¹ Daniel Conway, "The Birth of the State", in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 37.

⁴⁵² Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001, p. 94.

⁴⁵³ Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: Eine Intellektuelle Biographie*, Haupt, Bern, 1993, p. 117.

⁴⁵⁴ Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001, pp. 99-102.

⁴⁵⁵ Werner Stegmaier, "Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution", *Nietzsche-Studien*, Vol. 16, 1987, pp. 264-287; Dirk R. Johnson, "One Hundred Twenty-Two Years Later: Reassessing the Nietzsche-Darwin Relationship", *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013, pp. 341- 352; Catherine Wilson, "Darwin and Nietzsche: Selection, Evolution, and Morality", *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013, pp. 353-369; Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Daniel C. Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, Penguin Books, New York, 1995, p. 182; Dirk Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

⁴⁵⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, p. 59.

⁴⁵⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unpublished Writings: from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, p. 44.

is there in history except the endless war of conflicting interests, and the struggle for self-preservation?”⁴⁵⁸ There seems to be a period from the mid-to-late 1870s where Nietzsche’s views on Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer were quite positive because of the influence and friendship with Paul Rée (1849-1901), who was considered a Darwinist.⁴⁵⁹ Another influence came from Friedrich A. Lange (1828-1875), who was also an advocate of social Darwinism in Germany at that time.⁴⁶⁰

Nietzsche was likewise undoubtedly familiar with the writings of other social Darwinists such as Walter Bagehot, Francis Galton, William Henry Rolph and Ernst Haeckel.⁴⁶¹ Like them, he joined the wave of applying certain principles of evolutionary biology to answer various political, social and ethical questions.⁴⁶² Charles Pence points out that “we can say with some confidence that Nietzsche was exposed to Darwin via what was roughly the mainstream tradition of Darwinian critique and commentary in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s.”⁴⁶³ That is why it is necessary to be watchful, and, as one will see in the following subchapter, Nietzsche’s political philosophy is not one-sided and is far more complex than assumed. What is absolutely certain is that he was at the same time inspired and provoked by Darwinism.⁴⁶⁴ “Darwinism” for him was, after all, a return to the Hobbesian state of nature where individuals struggle among themselves for power and supremacy.⁴⁶⁵ Whatever the case may be, there are four hard core classical realist elements Friedrich Nietzsche mentions, which are all wrapped around the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist cloth. These elements are: struggle for power, struggle for survival, egoism/domination and morality.

Firstly, one of the most famous concepts of Nietzsche’s philosophy and later of classical realism as a theory of IR is the concept of power. He defined will to power as “the strongest, most life-affirming impulse” and believed that life itself is the will to power.⁴⁶⁶ By using mainly Darwinian scientific analogies throughout his work, he points out the argument that power, as a natural condition, drives the behaviour between individuals. For example, in his 1873 book *Unfashionable Observations*, he indicates that there is a “lack of any cardinal difference between man and animal.”⁴⁶⁷ Following that, Nietzsche centres a thesis about human nature in which: “Every animal [...] instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions in which fully to release his power and achieve his maximum of power-sensation”.⁴⁶⁸ Nietzsche finds the origins of power in natural forces; that is, all organic functions can be traced back to will to power.⁴⁶⁹ For Nietzsche, power, as control over others, is a goal all organisms must pursue. Moreover, since power is enclosed within nature, he identifies it as an intrinsic and vital force that propels all kinds of actions, including political ones.

Will to power is set in dynamic terms, i.e., in any condition, one must overcome some “Other”, some obstacle or some form of counterforce. It is a struggle “between two or more forces” of

⁴⁵⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Aufzeichnungen über Geschichte und historische Wissenschaften*, Musarion Gesamtausgabe, München, 1922, p. 286.

⁴⁵⁹ See Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005.

⁴⁶⁰ See George J. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1983.

⁴⁶¹ James S. Pearson, *Nietzsche on Conflict, Struggle and War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022, p. 24; John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 139.

⁴⁶² Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 5.

⁴⁶³ Charles H. Pence, “Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Critique of Darwin”, *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, Vol. 33, 2011, p. 169.

⁴⁶⁴ Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 8.

⁴⁶⁵ Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche, Spencer, and the Ethics of Evolution”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, No. 23, 2002, p. 9.

⁴⁶⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 100.

⁴⁶⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unfashionable Observations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 153.

⁴⁶⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 76.

⁴⁶⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage, New York, 1966, p. 48.

“unequal power.”⁴⁷⁰ Power embodies self-preservation as one of its indirect and most frequent results.⁴⁷¹ This shows us that, from the very beginning, Nietzsche intended to use a Darwinian scientific agency in order to better illuminate this concept to a wider audience: “In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source.”⁴⁷² Nietzsche clearly tries to show us that there is an evolutionary root of power. In addition, Nietzsche explains that will to power is “an eruptive, brutal and destructive struggle for assimilation, growth and expansion.”⁴⁷³ This kind of understanding of the question of power is, on the other hand, in the spirit of social Darwinism.

Secondly, the fundamental idea of competition and the struggle for survival between individuals is something that is common to Darwin, Spencer and Nietzsche.⁴⁷⁴ There is, for example, one almost identical parallel between him and Spencer with regard to the notion of struggle. Spencer believed there is rivalry over resources within each organism: “All other organs therefore, jointly and individually, compete for blood with each organ.”⁴⁷⁵ Echoing Spencer, Nietzsche, too, recognized that the social organism evolves in an exactly analogous way to the physical organism through a “struggle of the parts”: “The individual itself as a struggle between parts (for food, space, etc.): its evolution [is] tied to the victory or predominance of individual parts.”⁴⁷⁶

Taking into account these assumptions, one can quickly notice that at the very centre of Nietzsche’s political philosophy lies an attempt to explain the harsh and deep relation between politics and life as the unending form of competition and struggle. After all, competition and struggle are something that Nietzsche always insisted on. According to him, there is not only a struggle for existence, but existence itself represents a relentless struggle. In *Gay Science*, he highlights that “to do what benefits the preservation of the human race [...] this instinct is the essence of our kind and herd.”⁴⁷⁷ For Nietzsche, the reality is constituted by a primordial principle of struggle and the interaction between competing wills to power in that reality is characterized by a constant struggle.⁴⁷⁸ Often enough, Nietzsche employed “survival” in the same way Darwin and his followers did, but his idea of struggle for survival is best exposed in what he referred to as “agonism.”⁴⁷⁹ The fundamental idea behind agonism is that conflict and struggle are the natural foundations of life and that this is always mirrored, in one way or the other, in political, social and cultural life. As a form of struggle for survival, agonism involves aggression, resistance and evasion tied to both animal and human settings. Competition, struggle and destruction are all prevalent in nature and eternally present in the human condition as well. They are a necessary condition for the existence of every form of unity, including states as a type of social unity. His principle of the will to power says that societies and states can only successfully preserve themselves by an organized struggle with contesting/opposing forces that threaten their very existence.⁴⁸⁰ This German

⁴⁷⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vintage, New York, 1968, pp. 367-368.

⁴⁷¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage, New York, 1966, p. 21.

⁴⁷² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vintage, New York, 1968, p. 333.

⁴⁷³ James S. Pearson, *Nietzsche on Conflict, Struggle and War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022, p. 61.

⁴⁷⁴ Barry Stocker, “A Comparison of Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm von Humboldt as Products of Classical Liberalism”, in Manuel Knoll (ed.) and Barry Stocker (ed.), *Nietzsche as Political Philosopher*, De Gruyter, Boston, 2014, p. 139; Herman Siemens and James Pearson, “Introduction”, in Herman Siemens (ed.) and James Pearson (ed.), *Conflict and Contest in Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2019, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁷⁵ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology: Volume 1*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1888, p. 503.

⁴⁷⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vintage, New York, 1968, p. 344.

⁴⁷⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 27.

⁴⁷⁸ Ciano Aydin, “The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort on the Politics of the Future”, in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 802.

⁴⁷⁹ See Yunus Tuncel, *Agon in Nietzsche*, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 2013.

⁴⁸⁰ For those reasons, Nietzsche stresses the importance of having enemies on more than one occasion. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, p. 26.

philosopher clearly adopts a social Darwinist framework regarding competition and struggle, but it is less clear whether he does it deliberately or not.

Another major characteristic of social Darwinism found in Nietzsche's work is the dichotomous division between the weak and the strong. This feature was also exposed in the previous subchapter, which dealt with classical geopolitics. Nietzsche pictures the internal struggle for existence that leads to the creation of what he calls a hierarchy (*Rangordnung*). In this hierarchy, there are always higher and lower structures in which the first ones are "commanding", and the others are "obeying": "The hierarchy has established itself through the victory of the stronger and the indispensability of the weaker for the stronger and of the stronger for the weaker."⁴⁸¹ His politics of domination in the form of hierarchy-inequality and his ethics of selfishness are best seen in the case of ejecting those who are weak and sick. Nietzsche also links this feature in his writings with egoism and domination. Egoism, for Nietzsche, belongs to the essence of a noble soul.⁴⁸² One of his most important claims is that instead of altruism, natural selection breeds selfishness and argues that procreation (i.e. reproduction) as such is the result of drives that are ultimately selfish.⁴⁸³ In place of pity, Nietzsche suggests, we need to put hardness, and in place of altruism, we must prioritise selfishness. On the other hand, like Darwin (and Morgenthau), Nietzsche also believed that men tend to dominate others, and he frames this in the Darwinian context.⁴⁸⁴ Life itself, according to Nietzsche, "is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and, at least, at its mildest, exploitation [...]"⁴⁸⁵ Exploitation, as a form of domination "belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life."⁴⁸⁶ Referring to Darwin, Nietzsche claims that "the human being is wholly a creature of nature and has evolved to the heights of humanity by adhering to a completely different set of laws [...] by feeling himself to be the stronger and gradually bringing about the demise of other specimens displaying a weaker constitution."⁴⁸⁷ He continues in the same manner by saying that "[...] harm comes to the strong not from the strongest but from the weakest."⁴⁸⁸ Precisely because of such attitudes and beliefs, Nietzsche is easily identified with social Darwinism.

Morality is something that also connects this German philosopher with social Darwinism. In his book *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche devotes an entire chapter titled "Morality as Anti-Nature" to this question.⁴⁸⁹ Nietzsche's ethical forces and legal conceptions are indeed in harmony with the social Darwinist zeitgeist in which he lived and wrote. First of all, just like in the case of selfishness and domination, he recognizes that morality is very much a product of the evolutionary process.⁴⁹⁰ Later on, like social Darwinists, Nietzsche also situated the idea of law and morality in the natural forces of power relations rather than relying on universal principles of justice or abstract "natural law". He starts with the fact that it is necessary to be "daring to be immoral like nature."⁴⁹¹ This is because no principles of justice or morality can ever govern the relationship between those who are strong and those who are weak. Moreover, he says that any concept of justice as such is

⁴⁸¹ As cited in Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 44.

⁴⁸² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage, New York, 1966, p. 215.

⁴⁸³ John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 149.

⁴⁸⁴ Catherine Wilson, "Darwin and Nietzsche: Selection, Evolution, and Morality", *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013, p. 366.

⁴⁸⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage, New York, 1966, p. 259.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unfashionable Observations - Vol. 2*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 40.

⁴⁸⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 89.

⁴⁸⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997, pp. 25-30.

⁴⁹⁰ Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 21.

⁴⁹¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vintage, New York, 1968, p. 73.

meaningless because natural life “functions essentially in an injurious, violent, exploitative, and destructive manner.”⁴⁹² In Nietzsche’s own words

states of legality can never be anything but exceptional states, as partial restrictions of the true will to life, which seeks power and to whose overall purpose they subordinate themselves as individual measures, that is to say, as a means of creating greater units of power.⁴⁹³

Consequently, the law of nature is completely indifferent about what is moral or immoral. As one can notice, these sets of Nietzsche’s ethical values and principles substantially coincide with those of social Darwinism.⁴⁹⁴ In a social Darwinist manner, Nietzsche grounds his philosophy of ethics on a particular image of nature.⁴⁹⁵

In this part of the research, one could detect a surprising amount of overlapping ideas between Friedrich Nietzsche and ideas of Darwinism, particularly social Darwinism.⁴⁹⁶ In his philosophy of biology, one can, at first glance, notice that it is almost impossible to ignore the prevalence of Darwinian metaphors and analogies in his writings.⁴⁹⁷ He gives arguments that support the claim about the evolutionary background of man and, more importantly, about the evolutionary roots of power. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s ideas on morality, the concept of struggle, and the dichotomy between strong and weak bear striking resemblances to social Darwinism.

What is remarkable is that even though much of what Nietzsche proclaims as part of his critique of Darwinism is at the same time extremely consistent with those ideas. There thus seems to be some hypocrisy in Nietzsche’s (political) philosophy because, while he attacks Darwin’s theory and that of Darwin’s successors, he simultaneously accepts many postulates that represent the essence of Darwinism. The next section will disclose Max Weber as another important figure for classical realism. It will also reveal yet another case of the influence of the ideas of Darwinism.

5.2.2. Max Weber's Darwinism in Disguise

In order to additionally recognize the line of ideas of Darwinism in the theory of classical realism, one needs to familiarize with Max Weber (1864-1920) and his influence on this IR theory.⁴⁹⁸ He was one of the figures who instigated the realist discourse and the realist approach to international relations. Classical realists borrowed or adopted many of his assumptions, such as his definition of the state, politics as an eternal struggle for power and survival, the necessity to use unethical or violent means to accomplish valued ends etc.⁴⁹⁹ For Hans J. Morgenthau, Max Weber was quite influential and became another role model for the founder of classical realism.⁵⁰⁰ His ideas were

⁴⁹² Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 50.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 134.

⁴⁹⁵ Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: 1890-1990*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1994, p. 124.

⁴⁹⁶ Jean Gayon, “Nietzsche and Darwin”, in Jane Maienschein (ed.) and Michael Ruse (ed.), *Biology and the Foundation of Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 155.

⁴⁹⁷ John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 3.

⁴⁹⁸ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, pp. 70-71.

⁴⁹⁹ Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986, p. 53.

⁵⁰⁰ Barbara Kunz, “Hans J. Morgenthau’s Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power”, *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, pp. 189-208; Kenneth W. Thompson, *Masters of International Thought*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1980, p. 83; Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana

even considered to be the “backbone” of Morgenthau’s work.⁵⁰¹ What Max Weber shared with Friedrich Nietzsche is that he was also quite provoked by social Darwinism and that he ultimately applied many of its core ideas.⁵⁰² On top of that, both Weber and Nietzsche commonly shared the anthropological idea of the eternal struggle of man against man, which leads to struggles between nations.

Max Weber was born in 1864 in the city of Erfurt but grew up in Berlin, which was then the capital of the Kingdom of Prussia. He attended three German universities: the University of Heidelberg, Friedrich Wilhelm University and the University of Göttingen. After finishing his studies, he started teaching at the University of Freiburg and the University of Heidelberg. However, he was deprived of any long-term academic position due to his health issues. As a result, he mostly lived and worked as a private scholar. His academic fields of interest were primarily sociology, history, law, religion and political economy. Max Weber had an enormous impact on the social sciences and greatly influenced many theories of international relations. However, his analysis of the concepts of power and power-politics labelled him part of political realism within IR.

This German scholar was often seen as a nationalist, but how closely can he be associated with social Darwinist ideas? Also, did Weber use some of the original Darwinian scientific ideas in his writings? Finally, how does all of this translate into classical realism? To begin with, in Weber’s books and articles, one constantly comes across the issue of nature, as it represents one of the subjects of his political thought. He concentrates on the topic of nature because, according to him, all political actions are subordinated to a natural order of things.⁵⁰³ His thoughts closely resemble Darwin’s, particularly the emphasis on the inevitability and the necessity of conflict between states, peoples (races) and classes. On the other hand, what Herbert Spencer and Max Weber had in common is that they both emphasized the existence of two major forces: competition and external threat.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, just like Darwin, Weber implemented many Malthusian principles into his political sociology and economy.⁵⁰⁵ One of the reasons why Weber’s naturalism is strong is because this scholar also lived and wrote in times of an unmatched revival of natural sciences that emerged in the mid-19th century’s American and European cultural and scientific milieu.⁵⁰⁶

Two social Darwinist themes form his connection to the classical realist hard core: his definition of the power struggle and his view of the international economy as an unending zero-sum game

State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001, pp. 109-113; Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, pp. 185-200; Tarak Barkawi, “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, pp. 159-184; Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 168-179; Stephen P. Turner, “Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber”, in Duncan Bell, *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 63-82.

⁵⁰¹ Raymond Aron, another prominent realist, was also heavily influenced by Max Weber. See Peter Breiner, “Raymond Aron’s Engagement With Weber: Recovery or Retreat?”, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 99-122; Raymond Aron, “Max Weber and Power-Politics”, in Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 83–100.

⁵⁰² An interesting fact is that Max Weber's younger brother, Alfred Weber, was a strong advocate of social Darwinism and a proponent of naturalism in the social sciences. See Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 266.

⁵⁰³ Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 132.

⁵⁰⁴ Jonathan H. Turner and Norman A. Dolch, “Classical Statements on Geopolitics and the Aftermath of War”, *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1994, p. 96.

⁵⁰⁵ Zenonas Norkus, “Max Weber on Nations and Nationalism: Political Economy before Political Sociology”, *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004, p. 403.

⁵⁰⁶ Steven Shapin, “Weber’s Science as a Vocation: A Moment in the History of “is” and “ought””, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2019, p. 7; Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 13.

between nations. His subtle commitment to imperialism, however, is a social Darwinist theme that is within the classical realist protective belt.

Firstly, Weber clearly follows the Darwinian (and Nietzschean) idea of life as a “struggle.”⁵⁰⁷ The term “struggle” [*Kampf*] appears at least 785 times in Weber’s books and articles.⁵⁰⁸ Man’s relationship to nature occurs in many of his works, together with the social Darwinist notion that struggle and violence represent only a natural part of human life.⁵⁰⁹ For instance, in a 1908 letter to his colleague Robert Michels, Weber underlines the importance of struggle and competition in life.⁵¹⁰ Life as a continuous struggle translates into domestic and international politics, as well as into the economy and society.⁵¹¹ He considers that the “inevitable eternal struggle of man with man” is a “fundamental fact.”⁵¹² Since the struggle is part of human nature, man’s egoism always undermines any likelihood of some collective effort.⁵¹³ Weber describes struggle [*Kampf*] in various (social Darwinist) forms - as the “struggle for power“, “the struggle for existence“, the “struggle of men against men“, the “economic struggle to the death“, “cultural struggle“, etc.⁵¹⁴

The struggle for survival (*Kampf ums Dasein*) and the process of selection (*Ausleseprozeß*) are two major distinctive Darwinian scientific phrases that Weber utilized more than once. He used both to explain the inevitable competition for resources in any given environment. Regarding the first one, people and states are engaged in the endless struggle for survival.⁵¹⁵ In Weber’s words

We wish, so far as it is in our power, to constitute external relations in a manner not directed to the immediate happiness of men and women, but rather so that, exposed to the necessities of an unavoidable struggle for existence, the best in them is preserved, the qualities both physical and spiritual which we would like to preserve for the nation.⁵¹⁶

Nowhere is this more apparent than in international politics, and his position is very straightforward: states are locked in a struggle for survival.⁵¹⁷ Regarding the second one, i.e. that he derived the concept of selection from the Darwinian theory, it becomes clear in a section entitled “Conflict, Competition, Selection” of his book *Economy and Society* (1922). There he draws several sharp distinctions between biological and social selection but ends up revealing the analogous nature of the processes. Weber notices, for example, that a “process of selection or conflict between... [social relationships] means only that one type of action has in the course of time been

⁵⁰⁷ Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1988, p. 159.

⁵⁰⁸ Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 132.

⁵⁰⁹ Max Weber, “Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland”, in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1988, p. 329; Raymond Aron, “Max Weber and Power-Politics”, in Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 92-93; Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 131.

⁵¹⁰ Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.), Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.), Birgit Rudhard (ed.) and Manfred Schön (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung II: Briefe*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1990, p. 651.

⁵¹¹ Edith Hanke (ed.) and Thomas Kroll (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005, p. 126; Andreas Anter, *Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 145; Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016, pp. 70-71.

⁵¹² As cited in Andreas Anter, *Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 124.

⁵¹³ Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 386, p. 509.

⁵¹⁴ As cited in Christopher Adair-Totef, “Imperialism: Necessary and Beneficial?—Review of the Works of Hobson, Weber, and Schumpeter”, *International Critical Thought*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014, p. 90.

⁵¹⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, “Max Weber and International Relations”, in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 10.

⁵¹⁶ Max Weber, “Die deutschen Landarbeiter”, *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, Berlin, 1894, p. 80.

⁵¹⁷ Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986, p. 25.

displaced by another, whether it is action by the same person or by others.”⁵¹⁸ One also finds another Darwinian notion of adaptation and selection in the following lines: “one group yields to the other... [and] the victorious nationality is the one possessing the greater ability to adapt itself to the given economic and social conditions of life.”⁵¹⁹

Following this reasoning, Weber has identified that the principal characteristic of politics ought to be the struggle for power. Moreover, the struggle is closely related to power and survival since “the essence of all politics is struggle.”⁵²⁰ Additionally, Weber’s struggle for power is universal and pervades every aspect of international affairs.⁵²¹ His understanding of power-politics is deeply rooted in Darwinian and Nietzschean metaphysics of the endless existential struggle.⁵²² With regard to struggle, Weber concludes that “you can change the means, the circumstances, even the basic course of those who are responsible for it, but you cannot put the struggle itself aside.”⁵²³ Weber’s ontology of power-politics is intrinsically the existential Darwinian struggle for survival.

Weber also shows the social Darwinist aspect of power-struggle in the form of economic competition: “Even under the guise of 'peace' the economic struggle of nationalities makes its way [...] There is no peace in the economic struggle for existence.”⁵²⁴ From his point of view, the economy stands in a subordinate relationship to politics, but it also revolves around the existence of a “bitter competitive struggle.”⁵²⁵ Likewise, the contest for scarce resources for survival is another social Darwinist moment found in Weber’s writings.⁵²⁶ In some notes, he advocates that units of economic maintenance share an objective material interest to take over the control of markets and (re)sources of raw materials overseas. He declares that “it is a vital matter for us that the broad masses of our people should become aware that the expansion of Germany’s power is the only thing which can ensure for them a permanent livelihood at home and the possibility of progressive improvement.”⁵²⁷ He continues in the same way by saying that “[...] it is also true that the fierce struggle for power replaces the alleged peaceful progress. And in this fierce struggle the strongest will be victorious.”⁵²⁸ In this manner, Weber clearly demonstrates the social Darwinist side of his socio-economic and political thought.

To further exacerbate Weber’s thesis, one needs to get a glimpse at what is perhaps the most explicitly social Darwinist passage in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905): “[...]”

⁵¹⁸ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 39.

⁵¹⁹ Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 10.

⁵²⁰ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 1414; Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 173.

⁵²¹ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 58; Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, p. 10.

⁵²² Raymond Aron, “Max Weber and Power-Politics”, in Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 92-93; David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974, p. 216.

⁵²³ As cited in Richard Ned Lebow, “Max Weber and International Relations”, in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 24.

⁵²⁴ As cited in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, p. 40; See also Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Scribner’s, New York, 1958, pp. 54-55, 72-73.

⁵²⁵ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Scribner’s, New York, 1958, pp. 67-68.

⁵²⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, “Max Weber and International Relations”, in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 26.

⁵²⁷ Max Weber, “Diskussionsbeitrag zum Vortrag von Hans Delbrück 'Die Arbeitslosigkeit und das Recht auf Arbeit'”, in *Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden. Bd. 4, Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Schriften und Reden 1892-1899*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1896, p. 610.

⁵²⁸ Max Weber, “Der Gang der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.” in *Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden. Bd. 4, Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Schriften und Reden 1892-1899*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1897, p. 851.

the capitalism of to-day, which has come to dominate economic life, educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest.”⁵²⁹ According to Weber, economics should look past the “day-to-day politics of the persons and classes who happen to be ruling at any given time” to the “enduring power-political interests of the nation.”⁵³⁰ From Weber’s point of view, the economy is thus always inferior to power-politics, but since the economic struggle is within the zone of political struggle, the social Darwinist spirit remains the same.

This brings us to Weber’s reflections on the topic of Germany and its imperialistic aspirations. Weber thought profoundly of Germany’s role in international politics and expressed deep anxiety with regard to its position with other great powers. In his writings on German foreign policy, it is apparent, among other things, that he regarded international power-politics as a brutal battle for self-assertion among opposing political and cultural units. It is a struggle among great powers to determine whose national culture would dominate over the rest. Of course, nation-states can choose to withdraw from this kind of struggle, but by doing so, they are giving themselves to the supremacy of a dominant power’s culture and interest. If a nation-state, however, wishes to preserve its own culture from outside influence and control, it needs to accumulate enough military might and prepare itself to wage any large war.⁵³¹ Just like German geopolitical representatives from the previous subchapter, Weber believed that nation-states who fail to exert real power on the international scene were risking annihilation or, in the best-case scenario - utter irrelevance: “We do not have peace and human happiness to hand down to our descendants, but rather the eternal struggle to preserve and raise the quality of our national species.”⁵³² Therefore, for Weber, the decline of Germany’s power and, with it, the German national breed must not be an option in any way possible.

One notices that there is a thin line between Weber’s conception of nationalism and imperialism. His concept of nationalism went through different stages. Even though he was unwilling to identify himself as a “nationalist”, in his writings, one will see that he supported a somewhat special form of “nationalism” - i.e. expansionist, annexationist or imperialistic nationalism.⁵³³ Like many Europeans of his time, Max Weber also strongly believed in the superiority of his nation’s culture. He assumed that Germans, as possessors of noble culture, had a duty to ensure their own survival. In his words:

Future generations, and above all our descendants, will not hold the Danes, the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Norwegians responsible if the *mastery of the world* [...] is divided up between the regulations of Russian officials and the conventions of Anglo-Saxon society. [...] They will hold *us* responsible, and rightly so: for we are a great power [*Machstaat*], and unlike the smaller nations we are able to cast our weight in the scale.⁵³⁴

This passage points to his (imperialist) understanding of nationalism and basically means that power-politics serves as an instrument that Germany must use to define the European civilization. In the previous quotation, Weber referred to Germany’s weaknesses, primarily its disunity, which other powers felt and took advantage of. This led those powers to expand and impose their cultures throughout Europe. Therefore, if Germany and its culture want to survive this competitive (Darwinian) environment, it needs to prevent and put an end to the progress of those opposing

⁵²⁹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Scribner's, New York, 1958, p. 55.

⁵³⁰ Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 16.

⁵³¹ Hans Gerth (ed.) and Wright Mills (ed.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 35-36.

⁵³² Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 16.

⁵³³ Zenonas Norkus, “Max Weber on Nations and Nationalism: Political Economy before Political Sociology”, *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004, p. 393.

⁵³⁴ Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1958, p. 140.

nation-states, particularly Russia and Britain.⁵³⁵ It can do that successfully by cultivating and enlarging its national power, especially if it concentrates on colonialism like other major powers.⁵³⁶

In the same way, Weber's imperialist thoughts and intentions are formulated in, as he calls it, the "struggle for elbow-room" between the "units of economic maintenance". Nation-states are primarily characterized by that contest for "elbow-room." Accordingly, states have always tried to expand themselves at the expense of others: "Our successors will not hold us responsible before history for the kind of economic organization we hand over to them, but rather for the amount of elbow-room we conquer for them in the world and leave behind us."⁵³⁷ For Weber, international politics is generally characterized by a fight for territory.⁵³⁸ He sees territory as extremely important because it serves as the geographical medium on which human interactions are positioned. On the other hand, it is also important because it represents a protected safe haven where political structures can survive in relative security.

Overall, Weber was convinced that imperialism was necessary and indispensable to Germany's foreign policy.⁵³⁹ Germany's main duty before history and the future is to fight and survive the Darwinian clash in the international arena. Pacifism, as such, offers little since it is ineffective and outside of this world.⁵⁴⁰ Considering that international affairs are seen in this light, he expressed the unequivocal demand for a powerful and aggressive German *Weltpolitik*. Moreover, as early as 1895, he articulated the idea that *Weltpolitik* needed to be the main future task for the German Reich.⁵⁴¹ In his famous Inaugural Address at the University of Freiburg, Weber advocated for a strong leadership capable of grasping the requirements of that era, such as overseas imperialism.⁵⁴² He believed overseas expansion is a "positive political task", ignored only by naive "philistines."⁵⁴³ In the same speech, Weber openly drew many terms and concepts from evolutionary biology, such as the struggle for existence, selection (*Auslese*) and adaptation (*Anpassung*).⁵⁴⁴ Somewhat later, during World War I, Weber desired that Germany, after its decisive victory, would dominate continental Europe.⁵⁴⁵ One clearly sees his intention to put his writings in the service of Germany's future. Since a dose of social Darwinism undoubtedly stimulated his imperialistic nationalism, Weber publicly defended Germany's right to expand its influence by any means, including military force.⁵⁴⁶ Likewise, his thinking on imperialism is closely intertwined with his thinking on

⁵³⁵ Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 6-7.

⁵³⁶ Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, p. 6; Raymond Aron, "Max Weber and Power-Politics", in Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 84-90.

⁵³⁷ Max Weber and Ben Fowkes, "The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1980, p. 438.

⁵³⁸ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 36-69.

⁵³⁹ Christopher Adair-Toteff, "Imperialism: Necessary and Beneficial?—Review of the Works of Hobson, Weber, and Schumpeter", *International Critical Thought*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014, p. 96; Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016, p. 162.

⁵⁴⁰ Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.) and Gangolf Hübinger (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe: Abteilung I Schriften und Reden*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1984, p. 97.

⁵⁴¹ Andreas Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 124.

⁵⁴² Max Weber and Ben Fowkes, "The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1980, p. 445.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ Max Weber and Ben Fowkes, "The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)", *Economy and Society*, Volume 9, Issue 4, 1980, pp. 428-449; Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, p. 478.

⁵⁴⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, "Max Weber and International Relations", in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 25.

⁵⁴⁶ William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 96.

capitalism, which he regarded as the most powerful force of his time. Capitalism serves the very purpose of expansion and territorial acquisition.⁵⁴⁷

Even though Weber cannot fully be accounted as the prominent theorist or advocate of social Darwinism, he definitely applied the same mode of thought throughout his academic career. On the other hand, Weber is one of the few who didn't hesitate to explicitly use Darwinian scientific terms. Talcott Parsons confirmed that "Weber's perspective [...] was basically evolutionary."⁵⁴⁸ Both Darwinism and Nietzscheism are an integral part of his *Weltanschauung*.⁵⁴⁹ His ontology of power is deeply tied to his understanding of the struggle for existence.⁵⁵⁰ Like many social Darwinists, like German theorists of geopolitics, like Nietzsche and classical realists, Weber also recognized that there is no universal understanding of what constitutes moral or immoral policy.⁵⁵¹ Consequently, he insisted that the struggle between nation-states and their cultures is fundamentally agonistic and never-ending. For those reasons, Max Weber rightfully enters the classical realist big picture. The concluding part of this chapter will expose Carl Schmitt, a controversial jurist and political theorist whose (social Darwinist) views largely influenced and coincided with the basic tenets of classical realism.

5.2.3. Carl Schmitt – between Darwinism and Nazism

The final part of this chapter concludes with Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), a German theorist who is equally noteworthy and intriguing for jurisprudence and the discipline of IR. Born in Plettenberg (Germany), Schmitt dedicated his life to studying law, first in Berlin and later in Munich and Hamburg. In 1915 he gained a doctorate in the same discipline and, in 1921, began teaching at various universities in Germany. His academic work had a profound impact since it spans more than fifty years. In 1933, soon after Adolf Hitler came to power, he joined the Nazi Party, eventually earning him the title of the Crown Jurist of the Third Reich (*Kronjurist des Dritten Reiches*).⁵⁵² Because of his association with Hitler and Nazi Germany, he was arrested and interrogated at Nuremberg in 1947. However, he was released and continued writing on various political and legal topics until his death.

As in the case of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, Carl Schmitt is also considered to be the forerunner of classical realism.⁵⁵³ This controversial German scholar offered the outlines of a power-oriented image of international politics. As one would expect, he was quite influential on the founder of classical realism - Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau knew Schmitt personally and referred to him many times, especially in his early academic career.⁵⁵⁴ As we now know from

⁵⁴⁷ Richard Ned Lebow, "Max Weber and International Relations", in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 26; Andreas Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 125.

⁵⁴⁸ Talcott Parsons, "Introduction", in Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964, p. xxvii.

⁵⁴⁹ Zenonas Norkus, "Max Weber on Nations and Nationalism: Political Economy before Political Sociology", *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004, p. 391.

⁵⁵⁰ Stefano Guzzini, "Max Weber's Power", in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 99-100.

⁵⁵¹ Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, p. 7.

⁵⁵² Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003, p. 40.

⁵⁵³ Jan-Willem Honig, "Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau's German Years", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1995, p. 306.

⁵⁵⁴ David Chandler, "The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2008, p. 45; Jan-Willem Honig, "Totalitarianism and

Morgenthau's diaries and articles, he tried to further develop and expand Schmitt's ideas regarding international politics.⁵⁵⁵ This German scholar did not influence just Hans Morgenthau but also Edward H. Carr as another important classical realist figure.⁵⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, Schmitt himself was influenced by the political and philosophical ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber.⁵⁵⁷ Unlike these two figures, Carl Schmitt did not explicitly mention Charles Darwin or Darwinism as a theoretical framework. Despite that, Schmitt did believe that naturalism is important and that it represents a metaphysical theory since it rests on the assumption that nature defines reality.⁵⁵⁸

There are many levels of understanding between Carl Schmitt and classical realists. Firstly, Schmitt situated the state at the very centre of international politics.⁵⁵⁹ Secondly, he shared classical realist and Hobbesian anthropological assumptions about human nature. Schmitt firmly believed that all real, that is to say, respectable political theories presume that humans are dangerous and dynamic beings.⁵⁶⁰ Following this argument, Schmitt also believed that the state of nature was the primal human condition that is characterized by chaos.⁵⁶¹ Finally, Schmitt advocated that law and morality must be seen as mere products of a battle for political supremacy between rival groups.⁵⁶² For that reason, like pretty much every theorist in this chapter, he attacked liberalism because it denied the essence of the state and the true nature of politics.⁵⁶³

Before one immerses into the Schmitt-social Darwinism-realism relationship, it is worth mentioning Schmitt's connection with theorists of classical geopolitics. Interestingly enough,

Realism: Hans Morgenthau's German Years", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1995, pp. 283–313; Alfons Söllner, "German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau's Political Realism", *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, pp. 161-172; Hartmut Behr (ed.) and Felix Rösch (ed.), "Introduction", in Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 7; William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 32; Michael C. Williams, "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2004, p. 637; David Chandler, "The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2008, p. 45; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Fragments of an Intellectual Biography", in Kenneth Thompson (ed.) and Robert J. Myers (ed.), *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau*, The New Republic Book Company, Washington, DC, 1977.

⁵⁵⁵ Hans-Karl Pichler, "The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, p. 192; Martti Koskeniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 436-437.

⁵⁵⁶ Mika Luoma-Aho, "Geopolitics and grosspolitics: From Carl Schmitt to E. H. Carr and James Burnham", in Louiza Odysseos (ed.) and Fabio Petito (ed.), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 36-56.

⁵⁵⁷ Ciano Aydin, "The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort", in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 806; Some parts of Schmitt's *Political Theology* (1923) have been dedicated to the memory of Max Weber. See Bryan S. Turner, "Max Weber and the Tragedy of Politics: Reflections on Unintended Consequences of Action", *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 19, Issue 4, 2019, p. 388; Paul Bookbinder, "Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt", *Social Science*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1981, p. 137.

⁵⁵⁸ Gavin Rae, *The Problem of Political Foundations in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 35.

⁵⁵⁹ Alessandro Colombo, "The 'Realist Institutionalism' of Carl Schmitt", in Louiza Odysseos (ed.) and Fabio Petito (ed.), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 22.

⁵⁶⁰ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020, p. 48.

⁵⁶¹ Jacob Als Thomsen, "Carl Schmitt: the Hobbesian of the 20th Century?", *Social Thought & Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1/2, 1997, p. 11.

⁵⁶² Richard Wolin, "Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror", *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1992, p. 443.

⁵⁶³ Hans-Karl Pichler, "The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, p. 193.

Schmitt says much more about territory and geopolitics than most classical realists.⁵⁶⁴ He cited many theorists of classical geopolitics, namely Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Karl Haushofer and Halford Mackinder, and acknowledged that they played a great role in his thoughts. For instance, in his 1939 essay, Schmitt regarded Friedrich Ratzel as “the founder of a new science of space” and shared his idea that “space [is] the defining trait of all life.”⁵⁶⁵ Likewise, he referred that his contemporary Karl Haushofer was “the master of geopolitical scholarship.”⁵⁶⁶ However, Rudolf Kjellén’s influence is especially worth mentioning since it is manifested in many ways. This influence begins with Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and parliamentary democracy, moving on to his understanding of the political and the state and finally with regard to his understanding of international law. First, Kjellén’s views are extremely important for Schmitt since they are “directed against the liberal reduction and belittlement of the state.”⁵⁶⁷ As a jurist, Schmitt wanted to convey Kjellén’s thoughts regarding geopolitics into international law.⁵⁶⁸ In addition to that, Schmitt believed that Kjellén’s book *The State as a Life-Form* (1916) provides “the politically educated German reader” with the “abundance and diversity of his [Kjellén’s] striking observations on the geography, foreign policy, and sociology of state.”⁵⁶⁹ Finally and perhaps most importantly, he praised Kjellén because he outlined “the geopolitical, international-political, national-political, economic-political, and social-political unity of the state with great clarity, and the comparison with a living being serves to illustrate this unity.”⁵⁷⁰ As one can see from this line, Schmitt does not reject Kjellén’s organic state theory; on the contrary, he accepts it as a positive characteristic of Germany’s cohesion. His vision of a state-organism is similar to that of Kjellén’s since it is grounded on two fundamental elements: a homogenized people and the identification of an (external) enemy.⁵⁷¹

In Schmitt’s reflections on international politics, one finds two classical realist elements. The first is the struggle for survival, which belongs to classical realist hard-core. The second is imperialism as a form of power maximization that belongs to the protective belt. As in the previous cases, these two principles serve to reveal the social Darwinist thread, which is, up to this point, unexplored in Schmitt’s works.

According to Schmitt, state survival is firmly intertwined with struggle [*Kampf*], while struggle is intertwined with his concept of the enemy [*Feind*]. Enemy, struggle and survival represent the essence of Schmitt’s social Darwinist understanding of international politics. Firstly, Schmitt’s famous line that “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” is substantially social Darwinist.⁵⁷² An enemy is any person or entity (such as the state) that symbolizes a serious potential threat that may lead to a situation in which people (or states) must fight for their existence.⁵⁷³ In other words, the friend-

⁵⁶⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Telos Press Publishing, New York, 2003, p. 88, p. 283; Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventions verbot für raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1941, pp. 76-78.

⁵⁶⁵ Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan, “The Question of Space in Carl Schmitt,” *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2015, p. 277.

⁵⁶⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 87.

⁵⁶⁷ Carl Schmitt, “Der Staat als Lebensform. Von Rudolf Kjellén”, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Vol. 10, 1925, p. 1010.

⁵⁶⁸ Anne Orford, “Regional Orders, Geopolitics, and the Future of International Law”, *Current Legal Problems*, Vol. 74, 2021, p. 162.

⁵⁶⁹ Carl Schmitt, “Der Staat als Lebensform. Von Rudolf Kjellén”, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Vol. 10, 1925, p. 1010.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷¹ Jacob Als Thomsen, “Carl Schmitt: the Hobbesian of the 20th Century?”, *Social Thought & Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1/2, 1997, p. 21.

⁵⁷² Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020, p. 20.

⁵⁷³ Ciano Aydin, “The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort”, in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 804.

enemy distinction is the major facet of politics that includes “struggle” as an existential fact.⁵⁷⁴ On the other hand, the struggle is a prerequisite for every form of unity, including every type of social unity (state).⁵⁷⁵ Struggle for Schmitt is vital since it prioritizes one crucial commitment – survival. In Schmitt’s own words: “the word struggle [*Kampf*], like the word enemy [*Feind*], is to be understood in its existential primordially [*seinsmassige Ursprünglichkeit*].”⁵⁷⁶ As a result, the struggle to the death with the enemy in international politics is something that is in the realm of normality.⁵⁷⁷ In this regard, Schmitt adds “after all, the entirety of human life is struggle and every man is a fighter.”⁵⁷⁸ The friend-enemy distinction is, in essence, a simple fact of life and all politics revolves around an existential struggle between friends and enemies.⁵⁷⁹ Since the concept of the enemy includes “the real contingency of struggle” (*die reale Eventualität des Kampfes*), the friend must always be prepared for defence.⁵⁸⁰ The “existence” in its Darwinian sense is postulated as the highest value of political life, especially in the domain of foreign policy.⁵⁸¹ As a result, international politics is primarily the struggle for national survival. If one ever forgets that struggle is the essence of the “Political”, the consequences end up being lethal. Only in the struggle, Schmitt emphasized, can the new *nomos* arise.⁵⁸²

As one can notice, Schmitt presents a rather grim social Darwinist outlook on international relations. This is also seen in the following lines:

It would furthermore be a mistake to think that a single people could avoid the friend-enemy distinction by a declaration of friendship to all the world or by voluntarily disarming itself. [...] If a people fear the toils and risks of political existence, another people will relieve it of these toils by taking over its “protection against external enemies” and thus its political rule.⁵⁸³

Schmitt aimed to (re)affirm thinking of the international arena as a Darwinian state of nature in which “war, the readiness for death of fighting men, the physical killing of other men on the enemy side, all this has no normative sense, but only an existential sense.”⁵⁸⁴ The concepts of friend-enemy, struggle and survival receive their real value only with regard to the possibility of physical annihilation. The fundamental political fact thus can only be mere self-preservation of the state.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁷⁴ Suavi Aydin, “The Misuse and Abuse of Darwinian Concepts in Social Theory (or was Darwin a Social Darwinist?)”, *Hacettepe Journal of Biology and Chemistry*, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 190-191; Carl Schmitt, “Der Begriff des Politischen”, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 58, 1927, pp. 1-33.

⁵⁷⁵ Ciano Aydin, “The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort”, in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 807.

⁵⁷⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Duncker Humblot, Berlin, 1963, p. 33.

⁵⁷⁷ Martti Koskeniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 432.

⁵⁷⁸ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020, p. 25.

⁵⁷⁹ David Chandler, “The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2008, p. 41; Ciano Aydin, “The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort”, in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, p. 804.

⁵⁸⁰ Jan-Willem Honig, “Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau’s German Years”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1995, p. 298.

⁵⁸¹ Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1990, p. 405.

⁵⁸² Schmitt describes his *nomos of the earth* as a new age and epoch founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures and new spatial orders of the earth. See: Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Telos Press Publishing, New York, 2003, p. 79; Carl Schmitt, *Land und Meer : Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung*, Reclam, Leipzig, 1942, p. 76 .

⁵⁸³ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020, p. 39.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵⁸⁵ Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1990, p. 407.

Accordingly, a world which relies on liberal principles is full of illusions since “there might be in it many perhaps very interesting oppositions and antitheses, rivalries and intrigues of all kinds, but no conceivable opposition on the basis of which men might be required to sacrifice their lives and empowered to shed blood and kill other men.”⁵⁸⁶ He continues this type of argument in the same manner by saying that “just because a people no longer has the strength or the will to remain in the sphere of the political, does not make the political disappear from the world. Only a weak people disappears.”⁵⁸⁷ Schmitt here unmistakably presents the struggle for survival in a clear social Darwinist “red in tooth and claw” connotation.

These principles of Darwinism sound familiar since they are found both in classical geopolitics and in the works of Nietzsche and Weber. Schmitt accepts Nietzsche’s (Darwinian) notion that a society can only preserve itself via the will to power and an organized struggle with contesting forces which threaten its existence.⁵⁸⁸ In a Nietzschean sense, Schmitt also highlights that a nation must always remind itself of its enemies to ensure its own survival.⁵⁸⁹ On the other side of the argument, Schmitt clearly follows the logic of Max Weber that the essence of politics is violence and that man’s highest potentials are, above all, found in the struggle.⁵⁹⁰

The next aspect that needs to be further enhanced for this research is Schmitt’s imperialist thought. As one will see, Schmitt found the justification for imperialism in the Monroe Doctrine and elaborated this concept in more detail than his compatriots Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer.⁵⁹¹ What he inherited from these two theorists of geopolitics is the *Lebensraum* concept and its function in Germany’s expansion. His interest in those two concepts came gradually and grew more in accordance with the increase of power of Nazi Germany. It began in 1926 when Schmitt praised the “world-historical significance” of the Monroe Doctrine and its “astonishing political achievement.”⁵⁹² A few years before World War II, Schmitt started to develop an analysis of international law which served to justify the German Monroe Doctrine. In 1939 he published a booklet on the question of “greater space” in international law as an attempt to incorporate the *Lebensraum* idea into international law.⁵⁹³

Schmitt suggested that since a new world order was rising, the old concepts of space were inadequate and that there was a need for those concepts to be rewritten. What Schmitt introduces as a proxy between Monroe Doctrine and *Lebensraum* is his new concept: *Grossraum*. *Grossraum* encompasses the most important principles of the American Monroe Doctrine and Germany’s *Lebensraum* Doctrine.⁵⁹⁴ *Grossraum* literally means “great-space”, but it also contains a sense of a realist “sphere of influence” in its meaning. By using this term, Schmitt tried to grasp a geopolitical area or a region that goes beyond a single state and its exact territory. His goal was also to establish, promote and justify the concept of ‘*Großraum* order’ within the international jurisprudence.⁵⁹⁵ It is

⁵⁸⁶ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020, p. 26.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵⁸⁸ Ciano Aydin, “The Struggle Between Ideals: Nietzsche, Schmitt and Lefort”, in Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, pp. 806-807.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 810.

⁵⁹⁰ David Bohmer Lebow and Richard Ned Lebow, “Weber’s Tragic Legacy”, in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 181.

⁵⁹¹ Ola Tunander, “Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century Rudolf Kjellén’s ‘The State as a Living Organism’”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, p. 462.

⁵⁹² Carl Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage des Voelkerbundes*, Duemmlers, Berlin, 1926, pp. 169-178.

⁵⁹³ Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung: Mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1941.

⁵⁹⁴ Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 15-16.

⁵⁹⁵ Anne Orford, “Regional Orders, Geopolitics, and the Future of International Law”, *Current Legal Problems*, Vol. 74, 2021, p. 162.

important to note that these three terms are often seen as inseparable from each other in Schmitt's thought.

First, Schmitt defined Monroe Doctrine as a political and legal instrument.⁵⁹⁶ As a political instrument, it was based on a life-or-death existential threat posed by European monarchies in the nineteenth century towards the United States. Just as the US in the nineteenth century had monopolized the task of restraining the intervention of any "alien" European powers, now is the time for Nazi Germany to accept the same task and "protect" Europe from its "alien" powers. In Schmitt's conceptual worldview, the intervention is an act of power and a feature of the territorial order. He suggested that Germany should resist any intervention in its *Grossraum* in the same way the US did - by preventing any interference in its sphere of interests.⁵⁹⁷ British Empire did the same thing in relation to its colonies. Schmitt sought to apply the same principle in Central Europe, where Germany would serve as a military guarantor to a league of independent states. Those states would, however, have to be under German leadership and belong exclusively to the German sphere of interest.⁵⁹⁸ Schmitt believed that such political threats could come from two major powers - the United States with its liberal ideology and the Soviet Union with its communist ideology.⁵⁹⁹ He thus promoted the idea that Europe should be Germany's sphere of interest since the US, Britain, Soviet Union and Japan already had their *Raum*. Consequently, the *Lebensraum* idea was now backed by the Monroe Doctrine and took on a new form (*Grossraum*) which would represent a kind of informal empire.⁶⁰⁰

As a legal instrument, Schmitt claimed that the Monroe Doctrine was "the first and, until now, most successful example of a *Grossraum* principle in the modern history of international law."⁶⁰¹ He reinforces the argument that this Doctrine lies "at the core of all arguments brought forth defensively or offensively in justification by the United States in international law or foreign policy" as the "first great stage of development of American imperialism."⁶⁰² For that reason, Schmitt wanted to build his imperialistic *Grossraumtheorie* on the legal precedent of the Monroe Doctrine.⁶⁰³ He believed that US President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) deserved the credit for the transformation of the original meaning of the Monroe Doctrine into a universal principle.⁶⁰⁴ What Schmitt also meant is that depending on the situation, the United States alone "determines what the Monroe Doctrine really means in any concrete case."⁶⁰⁵ For Schmitt, this "remarkable elasticity and extensibility, this holding open of all possibilities, this holding open above all of the alternative law or politics is in my opinion typical of every true and great imperialism."⁶⁰⁶

⁵⁹⁶ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 35.

⁵⁹⁷ Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1983, p. 255.

⁵⁹⁸ Ola Tunander, "Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century Rudolf Kjellén's 'The State as a Living Organism'", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, pp. 462-463.

⁵⁹⁹ Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte*, Deutscher Rechtsverlag, Berlin, 1939.

⁶⁰⁰ David Bohmer Lebow and Richard Ned Lebow, "Weber's Tragic Legacy", in Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 180.

⁶⁰¹ Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 83-84.

⁶⁰² Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 31.

⁶⁰³ Mika Luoma-Aho, "Geopolitics and grosspolitics: From Carl Schmitt to E. H. Carr and James Burnham", in Louiza Odysseos (ed.) and Fabio Petito (ed.), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 44.

⁶⁰⁴ Gary L. Ulmen, "American Imperialism and International Law: Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs", *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, p. 59.

⁶⁰⁵ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 33.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Another important facet of Schmitt's imperialist thought is economic imperialism, which largely coincides with Max Weber's standpoint. Even though Schmitt discerns various forms of imperialism, he underlines that the US mostly used economic imperialism as an instrument for its dominance on the international scene. He first noticed that "the imperialism of the United States has, over more than a generation, developed an entire world of concepts, institutions, formulae and methods."⁶⁰⁷ That is why Schmitt believed that the concepts of trade and economy "appear again here as the *eo ipso* non-political."⁶⁰⁸ He highlights that what the Anglo-Saxons did, in contrast to Prussians and other militarists, was not imperialism *per se*, but something essentially different, because it signified only economic and, therefore, peaceful expansion.⁶⁰⁹ American imperialism is, in essence, economic imperialism, but not for that reason any less imperialistic.⁶¹⁰ In other words:

The imperialism of the United States of America, above all, counts in current thought and usage [*in der heute üblichen Vorstellungs- und Redeweise*] as the most modern imperialism, because it is principally an economic imperialism, and thus appears to distinguish itself from other forms, especially from every military imperialism. The economic stands in the foreground to such a degree that it is sometimes even used to deny the fact of imperialism at all.⁶¹¹

According to Schmitt, the clearest expression of appropriation for distribution and production is found in imperialism.⁶¹² In conclusion, what Schmitt wanted to express with regard to imperialism is that the accumulation of power eventually leads to some form of imperialism. In this regard, Schmitt emphasizes the words of US Secretary General Philander C. Knox (1853-1921), in which he claimed that the Monroe Doctrine has nothing to do with law but rests only upon politics and power.⁶¹³ It served as nothing more than a fig leaf for affirming US imperialistic policies, first economically and then militarily.⁶¹⁴ This behaviour generates dominance of a particular state within its sphere of influence or even on the world stage as a whole. In this regard, Schmitt points out that "in truth intervention into the affairs of dependent states belongs to every imperialism, because imperialism always also means hegemony."⁶¹⁵ Monroe Doctrine was, for that reason, central to his justification of Germany's imperialism (*Grossraum*) because Nazi Germany, just like the US in the previous century, gained enough (military and economic) power to pursue such foreign policy. One crucial line here remarkably explains this correlation between realist maximization of power and the justification of expansion: "Yet it is furthermore characteristic of every extension of power – whether or not it represents itself primarily as economic – that it produces a specific justification."⁶¹⁶

As one can tell, Carl Schmitt greatly contributed to the discipline of geopolitics, as well as the discipline of IR. His distinction between "friend" and "enemy" must be understood in the existential

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

⁶¹⁰ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 29; Carl Schmitt, "Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus" in *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar — Genf — Versailles 1923-1939*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1940, p. 162.

⁶¹¹ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 29.

⁶¹² Gary L. Ulmen, "American Imperialism and International Law: Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs", *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, p. 46.

⁶¹³ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 34.

⁶¹⁴ Gerry Kearns, "Echoes of Schmitt among the Ideologists of the New American Empire", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 78.

⁶¹⁵ Carl Schmitt, "Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law", in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 36.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

social Darwinist sense.⁶¹⁷ One of the reasons why his friend-enemy dichotomy was social Darwinist in essence is because it did not automatically include a feeling of hatred but rather that the enemy was perceived “in a particularly intensive sense as an existential other and stranger.”⁶¹⁸ Just as significantly, his understanding of struggle [*Kampf*] in international politics echoes the “survival of the fittest” mindset. On the other side of the argument lies his concept of *Grossraum*, which must be understood within the Monroe Doctrine and Ratzel’s and Haushofer’s *Lebensraum*. At first glance, one can recognize that Schmitt’s version of the German Monroe Doctrine leans on Haushofer’s idea of regional subsystems.⁶¹⁹ Schmitt was hardly critical of Nazi Germany’s expansionist policies into the East and later even bolstered the idea that the German Monroe Doctrine should encompass all of continental Europe, including Soviet Russia.⁶²⁰ World War II was, for him, after all, a war for spatial ordering (*Raumordnungskrieg*), and the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact (1939) and its division of Poland was a clear example of such regional ordering.⁶²¹ The reason why the charges were put against him after World War II was precisely the accusation that his *Grossraum* doctrine served as the theoretical foundation for the Nazi doctrine of *Lebensraum*.⁶²² His embrace of Nazism did not come without a dose of subtle social Darwinism.

5.2.4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to reveal that classical realism needs ideas of Darwinism because its actual predecessors relied on such ideas in one way or another. It is a generally accepted fact that all three played a big role in Hans J. Morgenthau's political and philosophical reasoning. However, what has not been accepted or analyzed in IR is that all three, at different stages of their work, integrated some of the Darwinian scientific ideas, but more often social Darwinist ideas and principles. They wrote about certain elements later established in the classical realist hard core and protective belt, such as power, survival, egoism/domination, morality, the zero-sum perspective, and imperialism, either from ideas derived from Charles Darwin and his followers or from a genuine social Darwinist standpoint. For some reason, this side of the argument was sidelined and deemed unnecessary for classical realist analysis.

Friedrich Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers who, with the help of Darwinism, generated the link between classical realism and philosophical naturalism. He was part of an era deeply challenged by the impact of the Darwinian worldview, and he could not help but assimilate some of those ideas. He was also influenced by the German tradition of biological research, which gained a powerful incentive after the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species*. Nietzsche is perceived as a tough realist primarily because he strongly asserts his *der Wille zur Macht* philosophical concept. His ontology of power is generally confined within the strongest principles of nature. Some scholars even claimed that Morgenthau’s conception of power and its distribution is utterly identical to

⁶¹⁷ Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1990, p. 406.

⁶¹⁸ Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Duncker Humblot, Berlin, 1963, p. 27.

⁶¹⁹ Jörg Brechtefeld, *Mitteleuropa and German Politics*, Macmillan Press, London, 1996, pp. 55-56.

⁶²⁰ Stuart Elden, “Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and Großraum”, in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 94.

⁶²¹ Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1941, p. 47; Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Großraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1995, p. 433.

⁶²² Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1990, p. 392; Charles Kruszewski, “International Affairs: Germany's Lebensraum”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 1940, p. 975.

Nietzsche's will to power.⁶²³ On the other hand, Nietzsche often speaks of selfishness, domination and superiority in ways that clearly resemble the same core tenets of social Darwinism.⁶²⁴

Likewise, Max Weber failed to notice how his own approach to international affairs was deeply rooted in the social Darwinist competition between states and empires. As a matter of fact, on several occasions, he showed a clear expansionist attitude with regard to Germany's future. His social Darwinist stance was especially exposed when he wrote about capitalism and economic imperialism. Furthermore, he did not hesitate to use certain social Darwinist terms, such as "elbow-room" and domination (*Herrschaft*), but also some genuine Darwinian scientific terms, such as process of selection (*Ausleseprozeß*) and adaptation (*Anpassung*).

Finally, Carl Schmitt reinforced the notion of the international arena as a Darwinian state of nature. A key theme in both Schmitt's thought and social Darwinism is the existential nature of politics. The image of international politics he presents includes enemies, struggle, power and survival that are all, according to him, imposed by life itself and which are not subject to change in any conceivable future. In sum, Schmitt basically depicts a social Darwinist "red in tooth and claw" world. On top of that, Carl Schmitt was not reluctant in referring to and pointing out theorists of classical geopolitics, who were, by the way, hard-line Darwinists.

Theorist	Affiliation with classical realism	Affiliation with Darwinian scientific ideas	Affiliation with social Darwinism
Friedrich Nietzsche	<input type="checkbox"/> Power <input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism/domination <input type="checkbox"/> Morality	<input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary background of man <input type="checkbox"/> Egoism <input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary background of power <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival	<input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias
Max Weber	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Power <input type="checkbox"/> Zero-sum perspective <input type="checkbox"/> Survival	<input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Process of selection <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation	<input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian survival of the fittest economy <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias
Carl Schmitt	<input type="checkbox"/> State-centrism <input type="checkbox"/> Human nature <input type="checkbox"/> Power <input type="checkbox"/> Survival <input type="checkbox"/> Monroe Doctrine <input type="checkbox"/> Morality and law are subordinate to power	<input type="checkbox"/> Naturalism	<input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Organicism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs. weak bias

Table 3. Nietzsche, Weber, Schmitt and their connection with classical realism and Darwinism

⁶²³ Ulrik Enemark Petersen, "Breathing Nietzsche's Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau's Concepts of Power and Human Nature", *Alternatives*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, p. 100.

⁶²⁴ John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 142-143.

Fundamentally, this chapter taken as a whole has shown that if classical realism wants to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence, it has to take into account two very important things. Firstly, classical geopolitics and classical realism bear much congruence. The classical geopolitics vantage point about power, survival, anarchical environment, morality, and human nature is remarkably compatible with the classical realist perspective on the same topics. Far more significantly, both the German and Anglo-American branches of classical geopolitics either seldom relied on social Darwinism or even based their entire theoretical agenda about international politics on those ideas. This is perhaps an unfortunate discovery for classical realism, but this IR theory nonetheless mustn't neglect such an important facet. As a result, classical geopolitics and, with it, the ideas of Darwinism are indirectly and involuntarily at the core and protective belt of classical realist thought.

Secondly, the three beacons of classical realism—Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt—implicitly or explicitly incorporated certain ideas of Darwinism. What strikes the most is their covert social Darwinism. These thinkers are extremely important for classical realism, as they moulded concepts later found in the classical realist hard-core and protective belt from a Darwinian and social Darwinist angle. Therefore, if classical realism as IR theory wants to keep Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt by its side, then it must acknowledge that side of the story. For Hans J. Morgenthau in particular, this is crucial for two reasons. The first is because he is the one who openly acknowledged the direct influence of all three thinkers on his theoretical work. The second reason is because Morgenthau, as the founder of classical realism, built this theory in the way we know it today. Consequently, for classical realism to maintain its theoretical identity, uniqueness, and coherence, it should not marginalize the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist aspects evident in the philosophies of Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt, as they are authentic vanguards of this theory.

In order to detect ideas of Darwinism in classical realism, the first step was to look at the aforementioned recognized and unrecognized forbears of this theory. The next step, however, needs to provide a detailed account of Hans J. Morgenthau and reveal his affiliation with ideas of Darwinism. After all, his thoughts on international politics represent the nucleus of classical realism. By unearthing the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist content within his theory, one can better illuminate the foundations that shape Morgenthau's perspective on international politics, thereby gaining a deeper understanding of the hard core and protective belt tenets of classical realism. Therefore, the next chapter turns to this German-American jurist and political scientist in order to see how he fits and contributes to this analysis.

CHAPTER 6: Ideas of Darwinism in the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau

6.1. Introduction

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) is considered by many to be the most iconic classical realist of the twentieth century. Disciplinary historians unanimously regard him as the leading classical realist and a scholar who greatly influenced the whole realist landscape. His *Politics Among Nations* (1948) quickly gained world-renowned attention and, until now, remains one of the most used textbooks in the field of International Relations.⁶²⁵ This book and other writings he produced have influenced not only students and professors but also many political leaders, commentators and diplomats in various countries around the globe. After his death in 1980, major public figures and intellectuals, such as Henry Kissinger, described him as a teacher and mentor.⁶²⁶ Manfred H. Lachs, a Polish diplomat and a Judge of the International Court of Justice, even proclaimed that “Professor Morgenthau is to politics among states what Einstein is to mathematical physics.”⁶²⁷ Morgenthau’s biography is very important since it is very much intertwined with his power-political thinking and his general theory of international politics. In addition to his biographical details, this introductory part will also clarify why he was chosen as the key classical realist figure for the analysis.

Hans J. Morgenthau was born in the small northern Bavarian town of Coburg in central Germany. His middle-class family belonged to the Ashkenazi Jewish community, and early in life, Morgenthau faced the spirit of anti-Semitism within German society.⁶²⁸ The city of Coburg gradually became a Nazi Party stronghold and, in 1929, became the first German town in which this party won the municipal elections by an absolute majority of the popular vote. Coburg is also famous because this German city was the first to make Adolf Hitler an honorary citizen. In 1922 young Morgenthau, at the age of 18, had a chance to watch a German dictator speak in his hometown. On this occasion, he later recalled: “I will never forget the paralysis of will that took hold of me while I was listening to this man.”⁶²⁹ The following year, Morgenthau enrolled at the University of Frankfurt to study philosophy but later transferred to the University of Munich to study law. Besides law, Morgenthau was quite interested in the history of European diplomacy and Otto von Bismarck’s *Realpolitik*.⁶³⁰ In 1929 he went back to the University of Frankfurt, where he successfully defended his doctoral thesis entitled *International Jurisdiction: Its Nature and Limits*, which was later published as his first book - *The International Administration of Justice, Its Essence and Its Limits (Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen)*. A few years after Hitler seized power, at the age of 33, Morgenthau became, like many other Jews, a refugee from Nazi Germany. Before finally immigrating to the United States in 1937, he taught and practised law in Geneva and Madrid.

⁶²⁵ Felix Rösch, “Hans J. Morgenthau”, in Robert Schuett (ed.) and Miles Hollingworth (ed.), *The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018, p. 342.

⁶²⁶ Henry Kissinger, “Hans Morgenthau: A Gentle Analyst of Power”, *New Republic*, No. 83, 1980, pp. 12–14.

⁶²⁷ Manfred Lachs, “Some Reflections on the Settlement of International Disputes”, *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, Vol. 68, 1974, p. 331.

⁶²⁸ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 39.

⁶²⁹ Christopher Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State Press, Baton Rouge, 2001, p. 21.

⁶³⁰ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 43; William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 3.

Upon arrival in the United States, besides financial hardship, Morgenthau frequently encountered an unpleasant academic environment and a harsh experience of exile. Regardless of such circumstances, Morgenthau firmly believed that the United States was the country where he could prove his full academic potential. His new academic life in America began at Brooklyn College (1937-1939) in New York. After that, he started teaching at various universities, including the University of Kansas City (1939-1943), the University of Chicago (1943-1971), City College of New York (1968-1975) and finally at New School for Social Research (1975-1980). Throughout his academic career, Hans Morgenthau was a prolific writer who published at least 15 books and numerous articles in scientific journals on topics ranging from international law to nuclear strategy. Besides that, Morgenthau was also a frequent contributor to many newspapers and magazines. He personally knew and communicated with many distinguished intellectuals and writers from his era, including Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Kissinger, George F. Kennan, Carl Schmitt, Talcott Parsons, Hans Kelsen and Hannah Arendt. However, as his former student and now prominent political scientist Richard Ned Lebow noted “[...] questions about his German past were taboo.”⁶³¹ In spite of the suppression of his German heritage in academia, Morgenthau remained strongly attached to the German culture, and many of his closest friends were also émigré scholars.

During these 43 years, Morgenthau was not just a university professor but also an active public commentator on American foreign policy. He participated in and organized many public policy debates during the Cold War period. He also frequently travelled around the globe as a guest lecturer, where he spread his ideas about political realism and international politics. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Morgenthau became a prominent critic of the Vietnam War and the American military involvement in that region. For him, the Vietnam War contained what he called a “crusading spirit” and was not in any way crucial to the national interest of the United States. Kenneth W. Thompson, another Morgenthau’s student and his intellectual follower, even noted that “by the mid-1960s, [Morgenthau] had become America’s main critic of the Vietnam War.”⁶³² On the other hand, he was an outspoken advocate for the existence of the State of Israel and its cause in the Middle East. Even though he often criticized American internal and external policies, Morgenthau did play a small part in the American administration on several occasions. Namely, he was appointed two times as a consultant for the US government. The first period was between 1949 and 1951, when he, with the help and support of George F. Kennan, served as a regular consultant to the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. The second period was between 1962 and 1965, under the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, when he served as a consultant to the Department of Defense but resigned due to his opposition regarding the war in Vietnam.

Hans Morgenthau was a member of several prestigious organizations, such as the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAA&S) and the American Philosophical Society (APS). Likewise, he served as a long-time trustee Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs⁶³³ For one decade, Morgenthau also served as a Chairman of the Academic Committee for Soviet Jewry. Hans Morgenthau received the Grand Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1981, one year after his death, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) established The Hans J. Morgenthau Award in order to commemorate the seminal contributions made by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau to the theory and practice of American foreign policy. Among others, some of the beneficiaries were Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, David Rockefeller, James A. Baker III, Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein, Colin Powell, Richard N. Haass, Martti Ahtisaari, Joseph R. Biden and Dr Robert M. Gates. Today, the University of Bonn (Germany) and the University of Notre Dame (US) offer fellowships in his honour.

⁶³¹ Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 219.

⁶³² Kenneth W. Thompson, *Masters of International Thought*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1980, p. 86.

⁶³³ An interesting fact is that Andrew Carnegie, the founder of this Council, was one of the leading social Darwinists in 19th-century America.

It is worth mentioning that if one wants to fully comprehend Hans Morgenthau's thoughts on power and human nature, one must pay attention to the fact that this German-American scholar spent his intellectually formative years in pre-World War II Germany.⁶³⁴ His intellectual roots were, after all, grounded in the Weimar Republic, where he wrote three books before arriving in the United States. With this in mind, Morgenthau inadvertently imported the continental tradition into the Anglo-American intellectual and political discourse, even though he aimed to distil the IR discipline from the German theoretical debates and discourses. As one will see in this chapter, the vantage point of German social Darwinists especially parallels his theory of international politics.

Although Hans Morgenthau was labelled as “the best-known and most influential biological realist”, explicit references to Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinism are curiously absent from his works.⁶³⁵ In spite of its intellectual repulsion, Morgenthau has implicitly and intuitively imbibed the logic of Darwinism. The attention of this dissertation will be directed towards this German-American scholar in relation to other classical realists for three main reasons. The first reason is that he is considered the genuine modern founder of classical realism and the most influential classical realist of the previous century. The second reason is that his key principles of political realism, to the greatest extent, match the writings of other classical realists, such as Carr, Niebuhr, Aron, Kissinger etc. The third and final reason Hans Morgenthau deserves the spotlight is that the themes and topics he dealt with most favourably relate to the general subject of this research. After all, he introduced and insisted the most on the biological basis of his theory.

The following chapter intends to investigate the “hidden” Darwinism in Hans Morgenthau's theory of international politics and show how he confirmed key ontological similarities between the biological and political spheres through ideas of Darwinism. In other words, a detailed analysis of Hans Morgenthau's theoretical framework will try to demonstrate that basic Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas and principles are decidedly encapsulated in his books and articles. While demonstrating the necessity of ideas of Darwinism in Morgenthau's theory, one can expect two things. First, Darwinian scientific ideas can definitely illuminate some of the hard-core principles in Morgenthau's classical realist theory, such as power, survival, human nature, and a zero-sum worldview. The second is to trace and identify the similarities between his thinking and that of social Darwinism. In this case both hard core and protective belt classical realist principles will be brought to light when it comes to power politics, survival, materialism, human nature, balance of power, morality, imperialism, etc. In addition to conventional social Darwinists and modern followers of scientific Darwinian ideas, German military social Darwinists will also prove useful for this examination. This will all be displayed via content analysis. Together, these arguments will elucidate that Hans Morgenthau implicitly and explicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism and, consequently, that those ideas are in fact crucial for classical realist theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence.

⁶³⁴ Michael Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism, and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War”, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 172.

⁶³⁵ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 44.

6.2. Human nature

Generally, one of the foundations of Hans Morgenthau's theory and classical realism is the question of human nature. Moreover, the most significant difference between classical realism and other forms of realism is precisely the subject of human nature. Classical realism and Morgenthau, in particular, emphasize that imperfect human nature is accountable for the struggle for power that takes place in (international) politics. On the other hand, structural realists (neorealists) such as Kenneth Waltz emphasise how anarchy and the structure of the international system (unipolar, bipolar or multipolar) determine state behaviour in the struggle for power. Neoclassical realism, however, tries to create a middle ground between these two positions.

Be that as it may, according to the famous Morgenthau line "political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature."⁶³⁶ In other words, his theory offers us a bottom-up understanding of international politics because "we have [...] no other access to the knowledge of [...] social facts or social structures than through Man [...] Only through the knowledge of its nature can we come to the knowledge of the nature of the political."⁶³⁷ In this part of the research, human nature will be a stepping stone in the quest to investigate the necessity of ideas of Darwinism in Hans J. Morgenthau's theory of international politics.

At the very beginning of *Politics Among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau cites a long paragraph from American social scientist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910).⁶³⁸ This would not be something strange if Sumner was not at the same time considered as the most prominent American social Darwinist.⁶³⁹ More importantly, his affiliation with Sumner starts with his inquiry on the topic of human nature and the nature of politics:

Concerning attempts to reform international politics before making an effort to understand what international politics is about, we share William Graham Sumner's view: "The worst vice in political discussions is that dogmatism which takes its stand on great principles or assumptions, instead of standing on an exact examination of things as they are and human nature as it is."⁶⁴⁰

As one can clearly notice, Morgenthau aligns his general thought regarding human nature with social Darwinist William Graham Sumner. Elaborating further on the nature of political activity, Hans Morgenthau argued that human nature is rooted in two main human drives. The first human drive is egoism (selfishness) which arises from the competition for those scarce material goods that enable human beings to survive. According to Morgenthau, these goods "have an objective relation to the vital needs of the individual."⁶⁴¹ The second human drive is domination - *animus dominandi* - which is in contrast to the requirements of physical survival. Morgenthau described domination as "the desire to maintain the range of one's own person with regards to others, to increase it, or to

⁶³⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 4.

⁶³⁷ As cited in Robert Schuett, *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realist Man*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 136.

⁶³⁸ In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau cites Sumner more than five times. He also cited this author repeatedly in all three volumes of *Politics in the Twentieth Century*.

⁶³⁹ John Lachs (ed.) and Robert B. Talisse (ed.), *American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 156.

⁶⁴⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, pp. 19-20.

⁶⁴¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 165.

demonstrate it”.⁶⁴² The idea behind the following part of the research is to delve into the evolutionary character of egoism and domination. Modern Darwinian scientific ideas are pertinent to explain these two important traits that Morgenthau believes are at the core of human nature. Following that, the discourse of the social Darwinists on this subject will also be presented. These two traits will provide the first argument on why ideas of Darwinism are necessary for Morgenthau and classical realism in general.

The notion of egoism will be dealt with first. As previously mentioned, Hans Morgenthau and almost all classical realists unanimously point out that one finds an ineradicable core of egoistic passions in human nature.⁶⁴³ Egoism, however, carries a distinct Darwinian undertone that IR scholars, Morgenthau included, tended to neglect and dismiss. First and foremost, egoism is embedded in human evolution because, as Charles Darwin has shown, it was essential in the struggle or competition in which all organisms – including humans – were constantly engaged.⁶⁴⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau’s understanding of egoism aligns with ideas of Darwinism because the works of Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, and Richard Alexander are attuned to his arguments on this subject. Morgenthau identified that human beings encompass a trait (egoism) which helps them survive a highly competitive environment. His own words parallel those of Darwin and Dawkins: “There are two reasons why the egotism of one must come into conflict with the egotism of the other. What the one wants for himself, other already possesses or wants, too. Struggle and competition ensue.”⁶⁴⁵

As one can see, for Morgenthau, an egoist is an individual who cares only for himself and not another in a condition where natural resources are relatively scarce. If scarcity is the prevailing condition, each egoist seeks to develop strategies to enhance his prospects for survival because life is always better than death.⁶⁴⁶ In other words, man is selfish precisely because he wants to live.⁶⁴⁷ Morgenthau also translated the notion of egoism on the international level because states in the international arena have to be selfish if they want to survive the highly competitive international environment. By using the same arguments, the policy of national “egotism or selfishness” is essential for national survival and represents the highest moral duty.⁶⁴⁸ Therefore, egoism is not just an assumption or phrase on which Morgenthau built his theory of international politics. It is a feature which is deeply rooted in the evolution of species as such.

The second drive Morgenthau emphasizes in human nature stems from the egoistic trait in animals and humans. This drive is the drive for dominance or *animus dominandi*. Like in the case of egoism, Morgenthau’s classical realist theory relies on the Darwinian scientific assumption that evolution plays an important role for dominance as a feature of human nature. Firstly, Morgenthau starts with the statement that “the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men.”⁶⁴⁹ Even though he admits that political domination appears as a product of nature itself, he does not relate it specifically with the theory of evolution or any Darwinian idea.⁶⁵⁰ He does,

⁶⁴² Ashley Tellis, “Morgenthau: Politics as the Struggle for Power”, in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (7th edition)*, McGraw-Hill Education, New York, 2006, pp. 608-609.

⁶⁴³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 172.

⁶⁴⁴ Kyle O’Shea, “Survival Of The Selfish: Natural Selection And The Myth Of Altruism”, *The Intellectual Standard*, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2012, p. 26.

⁶⁴⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, pp. 164-165.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁶⁴⁷ Robert Schuett, *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realist Man*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 26.

⁶⁴⁸ Michael Joseph Smith, “Hans Morgenthau and the American National Interest in the Early Cold War”, *Social Research*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1981, p. 779.

⁶⁴⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 39.

⁶⁵⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil”, *Ethics*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 1945, p. 5.

however, mention that “zoologists have tried to show that the drive to dominate is found even in animals, such as chickens and monkeys, who create social hierarchies on the basis of will and the ability to dominate.”⁶⁵¹ Secondly, Morgenthau’s understanding of the will to dominate greatly matches Wilson’s and de Waal’s arguments. For Morgenthau as well, individuals in social groups exert this behaviour to gain control over others and have regular priority of access to resources in a competitive environment. In Morgenthau’s own words:

The other root of conflict and concomitant evil stems from the *animus dominandi*, the desire for power [...] the desire for power is closely related to the selfishness [...] For the typical goals of selfishness, such as food, shelter, security, and the means by which they are obtained, such as money, jobs, marriage, and the like, have an objective relation to the vital needs of the individual; their attainment offers the best chances for survival under the particular natural and social conditions under which the individual lives.⁶⁵²

One can undoubtedly detect here echoes of natural selection, i.e. that dominance hierarchies are an important part of the social groups of primates, including humans, because having a position of power gives key advantages in terms of access to resources, such as food and sex. An environmental incentive to compete for scarce resources drives Morgenthau’s “man” to acquire power. In such a situation, Morgenthau believed: “man cannot hope to be good but must be content with being not too evil.”⁶⁵³ In any case, the will to dominate and the urge to accumulate power are nonetheless presented as the ultimate rationale in human affairs.⁶⁵⁴ His understanding of dominance simply matches that of Darwinism, especially in the sense of power and resources. For those reasons, the notion of dominance in Hans Morgenthau’s theory is definitely grounded in Darwinian scientific ideas.

This brings us to how egoism and dominance relate to social Darwinism and its proponents. First of all, many social Darwinists shared Morgenthau’s dark and pessimistic vision of human nature. Herbert Spencer, for example, held a rather negative point of view concerning human nature. He noticed that there are what he called certain “defects of existing human nature.”⁶⁵⁵ By these defects, he identified love (lust) for power, selfishness, injustice and untruthfulness.⁶⁵⁶ All these traits are notably at the heart of Hans Morgenthau’s classical realist theory. Furthermore, this British philosopher and sociologist also claimed that “it is a tolerably well-ascertained fact that men are still selfish. Granting the proposition that men are selfish, we cannot avoid the corollary that those who possess authority will, if permitted, use it for selfish purposes.”⁶⁵⁷ Spencer even underscored that we as humans need to recognize the truth “that egoism comes before altruism.”⁶⁵⁸ With regard to dominance, Spencer thinks that: “the abject submission of the weak to the strong, however, unscrupulously enforced, has in some times and places been necessary.”⁶⁵⁹ In accordance with Spencer, Ernst Haeckel also noticed that mankind’s rational judgments were obscured “by the selfish interest of the human personality, who is determined to guarantee of his existence beyond the grave at any price.”⁶⁶⁰ Moreover, he held that “Passion and selfishness, conscious or unconscious, is everywhere the motive force of life. [...] Man in this respect is no exception to the

⁶⁵¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 39.

⁶⁵² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 165.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁴ Kenneth Payne, *The Psychology of Modern Conflict: Evolutionary Theory, Human Nature and a Liberal Approach to War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015, p. 46.

⁶⁵⁵ Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics: Abridged and Revised Together with the Man Versus the State*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1892, p. 324.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶⁵⁸ Herbert Spencer, *The Data of Ethics*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1879, p. 187.

⁶⁵⁹ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology (Volume 2)*, D. Appleton, New York, 1914, p. 232.

⁶⁶⁰ As cited in David H. DeGroot, *Haeckel's Theory of the Unity of Nature*, B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam, 1982, p. 48.

rest of the animal world.”⁶⁶¹ Likewise, German militant social Darwinist General Friedrich von Bernhardi firmly believed that “If men and States acted absolutely unselfishly war would be avoidable.”⁶⁶² Bernhardi also asserted that “It is neither probable nor desirable that egotism which is necessary for the preservation of one's existence should be weakened by the desire for a higher civilization.”⁶⁶³ As one can notice, Bernhardi also identified and confirmed the classical realist position that men and states primarily act in the most selfish way.

Heinrich von Treitschke also had a rather grim perspective on human nature. According to Treitschke “[...] it is above all important not to make greater demands on human nature than its frailty can satisfy. The idealist who loses sight of this principle may all too easily become a disappointed enthusiast.”⁶⁶⁴ Furthermore, William Graham Sumner equally shared Morgenthau's pessimism about human nature: “The truth is that cupidity, selfishness, envy, malice, lust, vindictiveness, are constant vices of human nature.”⁶⁶⁵ Sumner presented a similar vision of dominance: “Men have struggled for power over their fellow-men in order that they might win the joys of earth at the expense of others and might shift the burdens of life from their own shoulders upon those of others.”⁶⁶⁶ For Ludwig Gumplowicz, domination is universal in time and space, in the same way Morgenthau described it: “The struggle of races for domination and power, this struggle in all its forms, whether avowed and violent or latent and peaceful, is thus the real propulsive principle, the motive force of history.”⁶⁶⁷ Gumplowicz further adds that self-preservation “finds expression in attachment for one's own and desire to subdue others.”⁶⁶⁸ Overall, many social Darwinists did not just justify selfishness and dominance; they also saw these two traits as something intrinsically human.

Finally, what is even more interesting and equally important to add are the most recent findings, which show that people who display a social Darwinist mindset (“survival of the fittest”, natural hierarchies, individualism, competition, etc.) are deeply associated with characteristics such as admiration for power and the desire to dominate.⁶⁶⁹ Findings show that those individuals share a rather pessimistic view of human nature and interpersonal relations, especially the fact that other people are “by nature” selfish.⁶⁷⁰ Among the big five personality traits, three represent traits that are at the very core of Morgenthau's theory - the need for power, the need for domination and egoism.⁶⁷¹ On top of that, they also had in common a classical realist belief of a dangerous and threatening world characterized by a zero-sum game and general distrust.⁶⁷² Equally important to note are the findings in evolutionary psychology, which mostly gravitate towards the selfish and aggressive side of human nature.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶¹ Ernst Haeckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, Reimer, Berlin, 1868, p. 16.

⁶⁶² Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 109.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁶⁶⁴ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 2)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, p. 590.

⁶⁶⁵ William Graham Sumner, *Social Darwinism: Selected Essays*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 114.

⁶⁶⁶ William Graham Sumner, *The Forgotten Man*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1933, p. 6.

⁶⁶⁷ As cited in André Pichot, *Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitler*, Verso, London, 2009, p. 260.

⁶⁶⁸ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 182.

⁶⁶⁹ Piotr Radkiewicz and Krystyna Skarżyńska, “Who Are the ‘Social Darwinists’? On Dispositional Determinants of Perceiving the Social World as Competitive Jungle”, *PLoS ONE*, Vol. 16, No. 8, 2021, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2, p. 15.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶⁷² Piotr Radkiewicz and Krystyna Skarżyńska, “Who Are the ‘Social Darwinists’? On Dispositional Determinants of Perceiving the Social World as Competitive Jungle”, *PLoS ONE*, Vol. 16, No. 8, 2021, p. 15; Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory”, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), *Roots of Realism*, Routledge, London & New York, 2013, p. 3.

⁶⁷³ Richard Ned Lebow and Feng Zhang, *Justice and International Order: East and West*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2022, p. 132.

All things considered, it is apparent that Hans Morgenthau inadvertently asserted that the evil of politics derived from two drives rooted in Darwinian scientific ideas. The first is selfishness (egoism) which originates in the necessity provoked by the demands of survival. The second one is domination which originates as an urge for power and mastery. If human nature is driven by egoism and domination, as Morgenthau and classical realists claim, one cannot help but accept the fact that Darwinian scientific ideas serve to confirm and consolidate those claims. On the other hand, his arguments with regards to human nature are in harmony with many representatives of social Darwinism. Taken together, ideas of Darwinism enhance and support one of the hard core pillars of Hans Morgenthau's theory, i.e., the pessimistic understanding of human nature. Therefore, Morgenthau's theory needs ideas of Darwinism when it comes to human nature in order for it to keep its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence.

6.3. The tragedy of struggle

The next feature in Hans Morgenthau's theory is the concept of struggle, defined as the reality and tragedy of life. This is important because if one wants to understand the struggle for power as one of the foundations of his theory, then one needs to comprehend his meaning of struggle in general. As will be shown in the continuation of this subchapter, there is a strong similarity between Morgenthau's understanding and that of social Darwinists regarding this subject. First of all, according to Morgenthau, this world is fundamentally a "world of opposing interests and of conflict among them."⁶⁷⁴ In other words, Morgenthau reminds us that: "This world is one of unceasing struggle between good and evil, reason and passion, life and death, health and sickness, peace and war - a struggle which so often ends with the victory of the forces hostile to man."⁶⁷⁵ Furthermore, Morgenthau asserts that "out of this everlasting and ever undecided struggle there arises one of the roots of what might be called the tragic sense of life, the awareness of unresolvable discord, contradictions, and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of things and which human reason is powerless to solve."⁶⁷⁶ He continues in the same manner by saying that "the most basic fact of existence which cannot be subdivided further is the fact of life itself. [...] Before and in all combinations of human motivation, there is one basic force: the impulse for life which strives for survival and recognition."⁶⁷⁷ Simply put, Morgenthau places the fact of life and, with it, the human condition in the realm of eternal struggles that are populated by powerful antagonistic forces.⁶⁷⁸ The tragedy of life struggle is reflected in the fact that there is no way out of these antagonistic forces and that this refuge into struggle is common to both man and beast.⁶⁷⁹

This kind of tragic vision of life is paramount to Darwinism. Charles Darwin himself assumed that struggle is, above all, associated with the tragedy of life: "Nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult--at least I have found it so--than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind."⁶⁸⁰ The relentless struggles for existence, struggle for life, battle for life, and war of nature were all phrases he used to describe the harsh competition

⁶⁷⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 3.

⁶⁷⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946, p. 206.

⁶⁷⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 175.

⁶⁷⁷ As cited in Hans-Karl Pichler, "The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, p. 195.

⁶⁷⁸ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 84.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁶⁸⁰ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 49.

between organisms.⁶⁸¹ His understanding of struggle consists of tragic and “vigorous effort to maintain life and vital activities.”⁶⁸² Darwin’s followers have only elaborated further on his views on this matter. Ernst Haeckel, the leading Darwinist in Germany, affirmed the same tragic viewpoint: ““The cruel and unsparing "struggle for existence" which rages-and naturally must rage-everywhere in the biosphere, this unceasing and inexorable competition of all living creatures, is an undeniable fact. [...] One can deeply lament this tragic fact, but one can neither deny it nor alter it.””⁶⁸³ Haeckel also adds that man who knows the real features of the world is confronted with the tragic struggle for life that rules throughout living nature.⁶⁸⁴ Thomas H. Huxley also points out the tragedy of the human condition. For him: “the motive of the drama of human life is the necessity, laid upon every man who comes into the world, of discovering the mean between self-assertion and self-restraint suited to his character and his circumstances.”⁶⁸⁵ Huxley recognized that life was nothing more than a ruthless and relentless struggle in which man’s best efforts to sue for peace were essentially futile.⁶⁸⁶ This pessimistic standpoint about human fate is also identifiable in the work of Ludwig Gumplowicz. This Polish social Darwinist reminds us that “it is quite proper to picture human life as a perpetual struggle against nature though it is false to believe that man could ever at any point be victorious.”⁶⁸⁷ Likewise, Friedrich von Bernhardt posits that “All existing things show themselves to be the result of contesting forces. This struggle is regulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws and by the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animal world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy.”⁶⁸⁸ From a social Darwinist perspective, the tragedy of life is an inevitable outcome of the struggle for survival. This view of life is seen as tragic because it portrays a world where suffering, death and struggle are constant realities.

In essence, Morgenthau only looks through Darwin’s and social Darwinist lenses at the tragic and cyclical conception of life-struggle. He implicitly adopts the standpoint of Charles Darwin and his followers, who identified that there are antagonistic forces of nature that humans cannot escape from, let alone resolve. In his early unpublished manuscript, Morgenthau says that “the nature of politics is linked to the nature of man in its origin, in its substance, and in its immediate goal. We envisage the political [*das Politische*] as a force inherent in each individual and directed toward other individuals.”⁶⁸⁹ What Morgenthau thinks here when he says “the nature of man in its origin and substance” and “each individual directed toward other individuals” is nothing else than what Darwin and his subsequent followers referred to as the “opposing” and “hostile” forces of nature in which struggle, as a major driving force in the evolutionary process of natural selection, lies at the very centre.⁶⁹⁰ In other words, since human beings are caught between the opposing forces which constitute their very nature, Morgenthau is in harmony with the Darwinian notion of both life and politics as endless and tragic struggles.⁶⁹¹ This is another case where ideas of Charles Darwin himself and social Darwinism are valuable for Morgenthau’s theory to keep its theoretical identity,

⁶⁸¹ Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 166.

⁶⁸² Edward Manier, *The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1978, p. 179.

⁶⁸³ Ernst Haeckel, *Freie Wissenschaft und freie Lehre*, Schweizerbart'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Stuttgart, 1878, pp. 73-74.

⁶⁸⁴ Ernst Haeckel, *The Wonders of Life*, Watts and Co., London, 1904, p. 114.

⁶⁸⁵ Thomas H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics: And Other Essays*, Barnes & Noble, New York, 2006, p. 17.

⁶⁸⁶ Piers J. Hale, *Political Descent: Malthus, Mutualism, and the Politics of Evolution in Victorian England*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014, p. 214.

⁶⁸⁷ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 179.

⁶⁸⁸ Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 18.

⁶⁸⁹ As cited in Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 122.

⁶⁹⁰ Richard D. Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, Pitman, London, 1980, p. 16.

⁶⁹¹ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 54.

distinctiveness, and coherence because they bolster and reinforce his claim about the tragic vision of the human condition.

6.4. Power

Power represents the key concept in classical realist terminology. For them, politics, especially international politics, is predominantly a power phenomenon. Simply put, from a classical realist standpoint, if there is no power, there is no politics. Hans J. Morgenthau's second principle of political realism is defined in terms of power. In his own words: "The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in the international spheres."⁶⁹² On the other hand, power for classical realists represents a fact of life, and Morgenthau especially gave great significance to adapting to the facts of life. If power is a fact of life, is it somewhat linked to evolutionary biology? In other words, is there a Darwinian scientific foundation of power? Likewise, how do social Darwinists interpret power? This part of the research will examine that aspect of the power phenomenon in Hans J. Morgenthau's thought.

To begin with, one needs to look at the evolutionary character of power. As mentioned earlier, power is not something that belongs exclusively to the human species and human nature. Power dynamics in the animal world are strikingly similar to those in human groups. Evolutionary biologist and animal behaviourist Lee Alan Dugatkin finds that the quest to attain and maintain power lies at the heart of almost all animal societies.⁶⁹³ He identified explicit power dynamics in various species of animals, including hyenas, meerkats, mongooses, caribou, chimpanzees, bonobos, macaques, baboons, dolphins, deer, horses, field mice, ravens, skylarks, white-fronted bee-eaters, common loons, Florida scrub jays, copperhead snakes, wasps, ants, and cuttlefish.⁶⁹⁴ On the other hand, this scholar also recognizes that open aggression, complex assessments of potential opponents, spying, deception, manipulation, formation of alliances and building social networks all serve as strategic paths to attain, maintain and increase power.⁶⁹⁵ All these traits are intrinsically peculiar to realism and represent what differentiates this IR theory from other theories.

Furthermore, according to American ethologist Liane J. Leedom from the University of Bridgeport, power is, in both animal and human contexts, an individual's relative capacity to modify others' states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments.⁶⁹⁶ The first main function of power is the ability to control resources. In the animal kingdom, those resources are key substrates of survival for both the individual and the species. Those include territory, food, water and shelter.⁶⁹⁷ Finite resources essential for life led to the appearance of power as biological and social certainty. In other words, the necessities of power originally emerged from

⁶⁹² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 39.

⁶⁹³ Lee Alan Dugatkin, *Power in the Wild: The Subtle and Not-So-Subtle Ways Animals Strive for Control over Others*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2022, p. xiii.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁶⁹⁶ Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011, p. 22.

⁶⁹⁷ Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011, p. 23; Lee Alan Dugatkin, *Power in the Wild: The Subtle and Not-So-Subtle Ways Animals Strive for Control over Others*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2022, p. 51.

Malthusian necessities.⁶⁹⁸ Essentially, Thomas Malthus recognized that competition between individuals of the same species for limited environmental resources plays a crucial role in nature. The second main function of power is relational, meaning an unequal relation exists between the powerful (strong) and the subordinate (weak). Power bolsters those that possess it because powerful ones can act without punishment from other group members.⁶⁹⁹ Taken together, power is crucial for the ability to gain material resources on the one hand and for social recognition on the other.⁷⁰⁰

Following the arguments of Liane J. Leedom, Morgenthau's "man" also exists and acts in the context of scarce resources. In other words, Morgenthau implicitly recognizes the Malthusian imperative and its relation to power. In *Politics Among Nations* and *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Morgenthau refers to the biological sources of political conflict rooted in the Malthusian framework. First of all, Morgenthau believes that only through power, as our natural and innate urge, the scarcity of resources and the existence of conflicting aims can be overwhelmed.⁷⁰¹ According to him: "All human beings want to live and, hence, want the things necessary for life [...] All human beings seek power and, hence, seek social distinctions, again varying with the particular pattern of their culture, that put them ahead of and above their fellow men."⁷⁰² He confirmed this in a passage where he noted that "so long as men seek to dominate each other, to take away each other's possessions, fear and hate each other, they will try to satisfy their desires and to put their emotions to rest."⁷⁰³ The main desire is, of course, the desire for power.

Moreover, Morgenthau mentions two main resources (or possessions) crucial as the elements of power. Firstly, food is one of the essential elements of power which must be protected at all costs or else both man and state cease to exist.⁷⁰⁴ For Morgenthau "A nation that is self-sufficient in food has a great advantage over a nation that must import foodstuffs or starve."⁷⁰⁵ In addition to food, the notion of territory is another element of power that has an important place in Morgenthau's thought. He speaks of it as a vital utility for power struggles and sees it as the "most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends."⁷⁰⁶ For him, territory contains all the necessary physical resources which individuals, communities and states depend on for survival. Moreover, the territory is crucial because it provides a solid benchmark for measuring the extent of real and potential power.

The second aspect of Morgenthau's inquiry on power relates to the social Darwinist stronger (superior) vs weaker (inferior) dyad.⁷⁰⁷ One of the core beliefs of social Darwinism is that life is a

⁶⁹⁸ Andrew Bard Schmookler, *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, p. 67; Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

⁶⁹⁹ Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011, p. 25.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷⁰¹ Anthony F. Lang, Jr., "Morgenthau, Agency, and Aristotle", in Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 32.

⁷⁰² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 281.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

⁷⁰⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, pp. 130-131; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd, London, 1947, p. 165.

⁷⁰⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics (Vol. 3)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 248.

⁷⁰⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 127.

⁷⁰⁷ Way before social Darwinists, ancient political realist Thucydides claimed that "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." This famous sentence was often used to describe and defend the principles of political realism and power-politics in general. See Polly Low (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Thucydides*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2023, p. 322.

struggle in which the strong prevail and the weak succumb.⁷⁰⁸ Social Darwinists believed the same logic must apply since politics is a part of life. One French social Darwinist named Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) summed this up nicely by saying that “International relations are today what they have been since the beginning of the world [...] Right and justice have never played any part in the relations of nations of unequal strength.”⁷⁰⁹ Likewise, regarding this matter, Herbert Spencer claimed that “The superior shall have the good of his superiority; and the inferior the evil of his inferiority.”⁷¹⁰ Alternatively, in the words of Walter Bagehot “The strongest nation has always been conquering the weaker; sometimes even subduing it, but always prevailing over it.”⁷¹¹

As mentioned above, Morgenthau held that the struggle for power is an innate urge in man that constitutes a fundamental essence of life. As such, power, therefore, represents an important dynamic of interaction between states. However scarcely, stronger vs weaker reasoning appears in some of his lines. For instance, Morgenthau asserts that the right of a weak state threatened by a strong one only exists if there is some form of balance of power.⁷¹² If not, the weak will, in one way or the other, be subjugated to the strong. As an example, Morgenthau gives a historical account of how the powerful states make their own authority supreme within the territory of the weak one, destroying its sovereignty.⁷¹³ Furthermore, in a social Darwinist manner, Morgenthau reminds his audience that in any ensuing conflict, the ultimate result between the strong state and the weak one is that the weaker will be subjugated by the stronger.⁷¹⁴ Likewise, in the case of the so-called “international law”, Morgenthau shares the same position: “In the relations between a very powerful and a very weak nation, international law cannot be enforced, obviously, against the powerful nation.”⁷¹⁵ In *Politics Among Nations*, the stronger (superior) vs weaker (inferior) way of thinking is especially explained in the case of both World Wars:

It is significant in this context that the phrase Fénelon used in the early eighteenth century to characterize the battles of the religious wars - “Either you are vanquisher or vanquished” - reappears in Foch’s characterization of the new world wars of the twentieth century. [...] A decision by arms, that is, the only judgment that counts because it is the only one that makes a victor or a vanquished; it alone can alter the respective situations of the opponents, the one becoming master of his actions while the other continues subject to the will of his adversary.⁷¹⁶

Now the question arises about how certain social Darwinists identify power and how much importance they attach to this phenomenon. For instance, British sociologist and social Darwinist Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916) devoted an entire book that explores the concept of power.⁷¹⁷ However, Friedrich von Bernhardi, Heinrich von Treitschke and Ludwig Gumplowicz have the most in common with classical realism when it comes to the role of power. Gumplowicz, for example, sees that reason for the state’s existence and its interests permit it to use any means of power to achieve its objectives. In a clear classical realist manner, Gumplowicz reminds us that “At present politics is strife after power. Each state, party and faction, every man even, is striving after

⁷⁰⁸ Sanford Lakoff, *Ten Political Ideas that Have Shaped the Modern World*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2011, p. 157.

⁷⁰⁹ Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Socialism*, Fisher Unwin, London, 1899, p. 329.

⁷¹⁰ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, Macmillan, London, 1969, p. 541.

⁷¹¹ Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001, p. 31.

⁷¹² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 312.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

⁷¹⁴ Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, p. 191.

⁷¹⁵ Hans Morgenthau, “Principles of International Politics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1956, p. 8.

⁷¹⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 394.

⁷¹⁷ Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, Methuen & Co, London, 1919.

power with all the means at command.”⁷¹⁸ Essentially, for Gumplowicz, both state and human beings possess a natural lust for power. In addition, Gumplowicz also identifies that “state possesses power and not the right, although it creates, develops, and fosters the latter.”⁷¹⁹

Furthermore, both Bernhardt and Treitschke place the struggle for power at the centre of (international) politics. Bernhardt underscores that “It is a persistent struggle for possessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs the relations of one nation to another.”⁷²⁰ For Bernhardt, the increase of power is the first and foremost duty of the state and the only regulator of foreign policy.⁷²¹ He also reminds us that the gain of more power represents the highest moral duty as well.⁷²² Accordingly, the statesman has only one guiding star, and that is power: “[...] the advancement of the power of the State must be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman’s policy.”⁷²³ Heinrich von Treitschke also believes that all questions among states are, in the last instance, decided exclusively by the realities of power.⁷²⁴ For him, the state equals power, and if it neglects its power in favour of some vague ideal of humanity, it will only bring about its own demise.⁷²⁵ To put it briefly, the increase, the conservation and the reduction of power is all that matters in the international arena. In this respect, Treitschke adds “If we apply the standards of a deeper Christian morality to the State, and if we bear in mind that the essence of this great collective individuality is power, we realise that the highest moral duty of a State is to maintain its power.”⁷²⁶ In essence “Power is the principle of the State, as Faith is the principle of the Church, and Love of the family.”⁷²⁷ By and large, the understanding of power among these three social Darwinists does sound remarkably similar to Hans J. Morgenthau’s understanding of power as the ultimate and immediate aim of (international) politics.⁷²⁸

Overall, ideas of Darwinism do enhance the explanation of the power phenomenon. Firstly, findings from evolutionary biology reveal that power is equally important in the animal kingdom. In order to achieve either aim - resources which are necessary for life or status recognition - one needs to encompass power. In other words, power represents an evolutionary necessity of life. Secondly, social Darwinism is notoriously stigmatized for its emphasis on a stronger (superior) vs weaker (inferior) pecking order, which exists on both social and international levels. However marginal it may seem, this is something that is present in Morgenthau’s writings as well. Last but not least, the three social Darwinists mentioned above valued power in the political realm just as much and in the same way as Morgenthau did. German militant representatives of social Darwinism were all in favour of power politics. For those reasons, Morgenthau’s position on power is not only aligned with Max Weber’s understanding of power as a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.⁷²⁹ His espousal of the notion of power is linked with the ideas of Darwinism since it is rooted in evolutionary biology and shares many similarities with social Darwinism. Morgenthau even implicitly acknowledged the evolutionary background of power when he said that “man’s aspiration for power is not an accident of history, but a universal

⁷¹⁸ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 85.

⁷¹⁹ As cited in Heinrich Pesch and Rupert Ederer, *Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics: Excerpts from the Lehrbuch Der Nationalökonomie*, University Press of America, Lanham, 1998, p. 27.

⁷²⁰ Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 19.

⁷²¹ Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 47; Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Britain as Germany’s Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 177.

⁷²² Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 46.

⁷²³ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁷²⁴ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 2)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, p. 601.

⁷²⁵ Henry William Carless Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich Von Treitschke*, Constable, London, 1914, p. 142.

⁷²⁶ As cited in Henry William Carless Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich Von Treitschke*, Constable, London, 1914, pp. 166-167.

⁷²⁷ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Selections from Treitschke’s Lectures on Politics*, Gowans & Gray, London, 1914, p. 12.

⁷²⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 31.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

experience of humanity.”⁷³⁰ Moreover, in *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics*, he even declares that in the end “Man is an *animal* longing for power [...]”⁷³¹ Morgenthau here explicitly relies on the evolutionary background of power, even though he probably was not aware of that fact. In essence, Hans Morgenthau’s notion of power certainly contains Darwinian scientific roots. Therefore, power, as the hard core principle of Morgenthau’s theory of international politics, must comprise a Darwinian scientific foundation in order to maintain its theoretical identity, uniqueness, and coherence. Also, the social Darwinist perception of power shouldn’t be neglected or dismissed either, but should be included in the classical realist framework.

6.5. Survival

The attention will now be diverted to another topic of political realism, and that is the question of survival or self-preservation. The notion of survival represents one of the key subjects in classical realism and is almost exclusively intertwined with the notion of power. Unlike neorealism, classical realism does not strictly separate power and survival. In other words, no clear demarcation line exists between power and survival. Social Darwinist insights on this matter will be examined primarily, after which it will be contrasted with Hans J. Morgenthau’s perspective.

First off, it is well known that Hans Morgenthau, like other classical realists, shared and accepted a Hobbesian vision of survival in an anarchic environment. However, it is much more honest and precise to say that he shared both Hobbesian and Darwinian notions of survival because, from that standpoint, organisms in nature, human beings in the state of nature and states in the anarchic environment share the same “survive or perish” logic. There are several reasons to equate the portrayal of nature in Darwinism and Hobbesian “state of nature”.⁷³² For starters, the importance of competition lies at the core of both Darwinism and Hobbesian reasoning. Because of survival, competition is intense, and the stakes are extremely high. In the Darwinian world, competition is inevitable since material capabilities are not infinite in the biosphere. Organisms must always be on guard against rapacious predation. For Hobbes as well, there is that constant need to secure available resources. He asserts that human beings are inherently egocentric and, given the scarcity of resources, inevitably engage in competition for resources and power. Furthermore, he identifies the strong relationship between zero-sum bias and egoism because human inherent egoism leads them into a state of primal entanglement characterized by zero-sum competition. In other words, in order to fulfill one’s egoistic desires, it is inherently necessary to impede the desires of other individuals.⁷³³ All things considered, both in the Darwinian and Hobbesian world, survival is dominated by constant fear and constant scarcity.

Many orthodox Darwinists followed this Hobbesian line of thought. For instance, distinguished English physician and Charles Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802) declared: “One great slaughter-house the warring world!”⁷³⁴ His grandson Charles Darwin bolstered this idea in his famous passages on the violent reality that lies beneath “the contented face of a bright landscape or

⁷³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 38.

⁷³¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 130.

⁷³² Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 45.

⁷³³ Thomas A. Spragens Jr, *The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2014, p. 164.

⁷³⁴ Erasmus Darwin, *The Temple of Nature; or, The Origin of Society*, J. Johnson, London, 1803, p. 134.

a tropical forest glowing with life [...] the doctrine that all nature is at war is most true.”⁷³⁵ Ernst Haeckel also aligns with this Hobbesian vision when he declares that:

We know that the whole of organic nature on our planet exists only by a relentless war of all against all. [...] The raging war of interests in human society is only a feeble picture of an unceasing and terrible war of existence which reigns throughout the whole of the living world.⁷³⁶

Haeckel further adds that “Nowhere in nature, no matter where we turn our eyes, does that idyllic peace, celebrated by the poets, exist; we find everywhere a struggle and a striving to annihilate neighbors and competitors.”⁷³⁷ More importantly, according to Haeckel, the laws of eternal competition and survival are especially apparent and universal in international politics.⁷³⁸ The reason Haeckel makes such a claim is because he sees politics as nothing else than applied biology.⁷³⁹ Thomas Huxley also saw that man’s early history was nothing less than a Hobbesian war of each against all.⁷⁴⁰ According to Huxley, prior to the first formation of society, humans had set themselves against one another: “Life was a continual free fight, and beyond the limited and temporary relations of the family, the Hobbesian war of each against all was the normal state of existence.”⁷⁴¹ In an article titled “The Struggle for Existence”, Huxley recognized that in the animal world as well, Hobbesian war of all against all was commonplace.⁷⁴² William Graham Sumner also thought that the struggle for survival was the main characteristic of international politics in the past and will stay that way in the future.⁷⁴³ In Sumner’s own words: “It is the competition of life which makes war, and that is why war always has existed and always will. It is in the conditions of human existence.”⁷⁴⁴ Ludwig Gumplowicz gives the same account on this matter. According to him “All of man’s “free acts” may be reduced to a universal concept and a common denominator: preservation.”⁷⁴⁵ Consequently, state survival is no different: “The aspirations of statesmen are directed toward political and national preservation and expansion.”⁷⁴⁶

Furthermore, General Friedrich von Bernhardi also firmly believed that the essence of international politics is the struggle for power and survival. First and foremost, this German representative of *Machtpolitik* and social Darwinism asserts that “Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a natural condition of existence.”⁷⁴⁷ Bernhardi further argues that

Every nation possesses an individuality of its own, and all progress among nations is based on their competition among themselves. As the competition among nations leads occasionally and

⁷³⁵ As cited in David Paul Crook, *Darwin's Coat-tails: Essays on Social Darwinism*, Peter Lang, New York, 2007, p. 3.

⁷³⁶ As cited in John Bellamy Foster, *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 2000, p. 196.

⁷³⁷ As cited in Jan Sapp, *Genesis: The Evolution of Biology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 56.

⁷³⁸ Torbjörn L. Knutsen, *The History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 180.

⁷³⁹ Stanley A. Rice, *Encyclopedia of Evolution*, Infobase Publishing, New York, 2007, p. 185.

⁷⁴⁰ Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 60.

⁷⁴¹ As cited in Piers J. Hale, *Political Descent: Malthus, Mutualism, and the Politics of Evolution in Victorian England*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014, p. 217.

⁷⁴² Hanna Kokko, “Conflict and Restraint in Animal Species: Implications for War and Peace”, in Douglas P. Fry (ed.), *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 38.

⁷⁴³ Torbjörn L. Knutsen, *The History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 183.

⁷⁴⁴ William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1911, p. 10.

⁷⁴⁵ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 178.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁷⁴⁷ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 21.

unavoidably to differences among them, all real progress is founded upon the struggle for existence and struggle for power prevailing among them.⁷⁴⁸

As a result, the relations among nations are primarily dominated by an unceasing struggle for survival, power and predominance.⁷⁴⁹ Heinrich von Treitschke likewise saw world politics as a battlefield in which only the relentless struggle for power ensures the state's survival.⁷⁵⁰ In his own words: "The highest duty of the State is self-preservation. Self-preservation is for the State an absolute moral obligation."⁷⁵¹ As one could clearly identify, social Darwinists prized highly survival for both the individual and the state.

Hans Morgenthau has, of course, the same perspective regarding this subject. Firstly, he acknowledges that the observance of the "laws of nature is vouchsafed by man's instinct for self-preservation."⁷⁵² Laws of nature are the laws of the struggle for survival in a relentless war of all against all. Furthermore, Morgenthau adds that for the individual "the most basic fact of existence which cannot be subdivided further is the fact of life itself [...] Before and in all combinations of human motivation there is one basic force: the impulse for life."⁷⁵³ These sentences show that Morgenthau explicitly relies on the Darwinian scientific notion of survival. He further indicates that our reason will always support those impulses that are most favourable to survival and growth.⁷⁵⁴ In other words, Morgenthau was quite aware that humans evolved to think in terms of survival and growth. Here again Morgenthau explicitly relies on the Darwinian scientific notion of survival. Accordingly, survival in the anarchic environment is nothing else than a supreme imperative for the individual and the state. He expresses the biological depiction of the state in the context of survival: "The very simile of life and death has an objective, empirically verifiable meaning for biological units and is still susceptible of a high degree of empirical precision in the political sphere: a state or a party can be said to live and die."⁷⁵⁵ National self-preservation through the maximization of power is thus the highest universal value which lies at the very core of international politics. Regarding this, Morgenthau writes: "In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirement."⁷⁵⁶

Taking into account the indivisible connection between power and survival, Morgenthau also adds: "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."⁷⁵⁷ All actions in the international system are in the service of power maximization since only this strategy can guarantee national survival. Therefore, states must behave, regardless of their regime types, in accordance with the reality of anarchy or face extinction.⁷⁵⁸ He confirms this when he writes that: "in the life of

⁷⁴⁸ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 27; Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael Ruse, *Social Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, p. 17.

⁷⁴⁹ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 109.

⁷⁵⁰ Hans Kohn, "Treitschke: National Prophet", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1945, p. 437.

⁷⁵¹ As cited in Henry William Carless Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich Von Treitschke*, Constable, London, 1914, p. 167.

⁷⁵² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 310.

⁷⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen", Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1930, p. 10.

⁷⁵⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 137.

⁷⁵⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics (Vol. 3)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 58.

⁷⁵⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 66.

⁷⁵⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 5.

⁷⁵⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 67.

nations peace is only respite from trouble - or the permanent peace of extinction.”⁷⁵⁹ In other words, the state, like an organism in nature, either survives or perishes - there is no other option on the table.⁷⁶⁰ For those reasons, self-preservation (survival) in an anarchic environment is, for Morgenthau the highest moral duty as well.⁷⁶¹ Again, the role of the statesman is to think in terms of survival as the highest national interest, conceived as a power among other powers.⁷⁶²

Just like power, survival represents another core principle of Hans Morgenthau’s theory of international politics. It has a Hobbesian but also a Darwinian background. Furthermore, both Morgenthau and other classical realists talked excessively about the priority of state survival, but social Darwinists did that before them and in basically the same way. For those reasons, survival in its Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist sense must be included as part of the classical realist theoretical hard core, especially if this theory wants to maintain its coherence, distinctiveness, and theoretical identity.

6.6. Imperialism

The next subject worth examining in Hans Morgenthau’s theory is the question of imperialism. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, imperialism is within the protective belt of social Darwinism. Social Darwinists perceived imperialism as a natural and inevitable outcome of the struggle for existence and competition between nations.⁷⁶³ They believed that strong nations had a natural right and duty to dominate weaker nations and that imperialism was a way for the stronger nations to spread their superior culture, values, and institutions to the weaker nations. Social Darwinists also saw imperialism as a way to expand markets and access to resources, which would help fuel economic growth and provide opportunities for accumulating wealth and power. Imperialism from the 19th and early 20th centuries was usually described as an extension of power and influence beyond the state’s boundaries. This section will examine Hans Morgenthau’s relationship with imperialism and explore how he somewhat “obscured” United States imperialism through power maximization. He has done so in two ways: economic imperialism and Monroe Doctrine. Imperialism therefore rightfully deserves to be placed within the protective belt of classical realist theory.

As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau’s theory of international politics highlights national self-preservation through the maximization of power as the number one priority. In order to preserve the state, leaders simply must do everything they can in order to maximize the power of their state. One way to maximize power, according to Morgenthau, is through the economy, or more precisely, through economic imperialism. In this respect, Hans Morgenthau is completely in harmony with the economic imperialism of classical geopolitics, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. To start with, Morgenthau openly uses the word economic imperialism and admits that it must be viewed as a

⁷⁵⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, Knopf, New York, 1951, p. 92.

⁷⁶⁰ Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, p. 198.

⁷⁶¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, 1950, p. 854.

⁷⁶² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 165.

⁷⁶³ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 203; Richard Weikart, “The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, p. 480; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Quest for Knowledge in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022, p. 192.

“rational method of gaining power.”⁷⁶⁴ He defines this type of imperialism “as an unobtrusive, indirect, but fairly effective method of gaining and maintaining domination over other nations.”⁷⁶⁵ From his point of view, power is not projected through conquest or control of territory but through economic control.⁷⁶⁶ As one can notice, Morgenthau does not object to this type of imperialism because, unlike territorial conquest, this form of imperialism contains both subtleness and effectiveness. Furthermore, Morgenthau identified that Central American states were chosen for that type of power exploitation, i.e. as the objects of the United States’ economic imperialism.⁷⁶⁷

The second aspect of Hans Morgenthau’s implicit imperialism is the Monroe Doctrine. As is widely known, the essence of the Monroe Doctrine is the strong US opposition to any attempt by European powers to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, particularly any kind of colonialism. Monroe Doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers could be considered a potentially hostile act against the United States.⁷⁶⁸ This Doctrine served as a central US foreign policy platform for much of the 19th and early 20th century. Hans Morgenthau seemed no less captivated by the importance of the Monroe Doctrine than Carl Schmitt and the theorists of classical geopolitics. Early in his 1929 doctoral dissertation, Morgenthau offered a detailed discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Likewise, in *Politics Among Nations*, he positively mentioned it numerous times. Later on, in his 1951 book *In Defense of the National Interest*, Morgenthau again glorifies this Doctrine. In his words “Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent national interest of the US in the Western Hemisphere”⁷⁶⁹ Furthermore, he highlighted that this Doctrine symbolised what once was right about American foreign policy and praised the wisdom and farsightedness of early American political leaders. Morgenthau especially accepted Carl Schmitt’s view of the centrality of this Doctrine to United States foreign policy.⁷⁷⁰ However, unlike the geopolitical thinking of Ratzel, Haushofer, Mahan, Schmitt and Spykman, who saw its imperialistic spirit, Morgenthau marked its usefulness in terms of spheres of influence. His writing on this topic is in accordance with both Schmitt and theorists of classical geopolitics, namely that the Monroe Doctrine represents a fundamentally positive political achievement for the United States and a paradigmatic example of genuine power politics.

What also seems obvious in close reading is that imperialism for Morgenthau represents a relatively ambiguous concept. Unlike social Darwinists who have rather straightforward position on this subject, Morgenthau simply dilutes the concept of imperialism as such. Primarily, the very definition of imperialism Morgenthau gives us is vague, to say at least. He defines it as a foreign policy that aims at “acquiring more power than [a great power] actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations.”⁷⁷¹ This is exactly the point Morgenthau fails to grasp, i.e. that imperialism is a simple consequence of power politics and the pursuit of more power he continually advocated for.⁷⁷² On the other hand, Morgenthau only identifies imperialism in a scenario where a certain state wants to change the balance of power (status quo) among the great powers, as Nazi

⁷⁶⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 72.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁸ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2006, pp. 5-16.

⁷⁶⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1950, p. 834.

⁷⁷⁰ William E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond”, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 74-75.

⁷⁷¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 53.

⁷⁷² Engin Sune, “Imperialism as a Critical Theory of IR”, in M. Kürşad Özekin (ed.) and Engin Sune (ed.), *Critical Approaches to International Relations: Philosophical Foundations and Current Debates*, Brill, Leiden, 2022, p. 48.

Germany tried to do prior to World War II. However, according to him “not every foreign policy aiming at the preservation of an empire that already exists is imperialism.”⁷⁷³ What this means is that British Empire and its Commonwealth, with all those subordinate nations and cultures, is not an “imperialist” country, but Nazi Germany was because it wanted to alter the basic settings of international order. He shares the same position in the case of the United States and the Virgin Islands: “An objective analysis of the acquisition of the Virgin Islands by the United States might show that it was a part of a policy of the status quo in that region.”⁷⁷⁴ In other words, he believed that the acquisition of the Virgin Islands by the US from Denmark was not an imperialistic act. In the same way, it is also hard to imagine that such an astute intellectual did not notice the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934.

Morgenthau also justified lightly the US territorial expansion in the early stages of its development as a great power. He noted that both the United States and Russia were “absorbed by the task of pushing their frontiers forward into the politically empty spaces of their continent.”⁷⁷⁵ Furthermore, he remarks on Arnold Toynbee’s viewpoint that the US did expand its territorial base “unobtrusively.”⁷⁷⁶ Morgenthau failed to indicate that during the United States’ expansion into what he called “empty spaces”, so many indigenous populations were decimated by military conquest and diseases. Furthermore, it is noticeable that in *Politics Among Nations*, imperialism was defined not as a policy that the West had extensively utilized in relation to the East. Instead, it was represented as a normal and universal strategy of aspiring great powers in relation to each other. By doing this, Morgenthau simply minimized the role that Western imperialism had within the international system in the last five hundred years.⁷⁷⁷

Essentially, while Morgenthau’s understanding of imperialism mirrors certain aspects of social Darwinism, particularly regarding power dynamics, economic expansion, and the justification of dominance, his perspective remains somewhat ambiguous and less overtly imperialistic compared to the forthright views propagated by social Darwinists. Regardless, he emphasizes the prioritization of a state’s power maximization for self-preservation and aligns with social Darwinists by acknowledging that the pursuit of power is a fundamental aspect of international relations. This pursuit, according to Morgenthau, involves economic imperialism—a method of gaining and maintaining domination over other nations through economic control rather than outright territorial conquest. This notion resonates with the social Darwinist perspective that strong nations have a natural right to dominate weaker ones for the expansion of markets and access to resources, alluding to superior cultural values and institutions. On the other hand, Morgenthau’s appreciation and justification of the Monroe Doctrine resonate closely with Carl Schmitt and those theorists of classical geopolitics who were followers of social Darwinism. He portrays the Monroe Doctrine as a platform for protecting US interests in the Western Hemisphere but also as a means of justifying and rationalizing the “growth” of the American empire in the Western Hemisphere, echoing the sentiment of powerful nations securing their dominance over weaker ones for self-preservation and economic gain. Imperialism is thus within the protective belt of Morgenthau’s classical realist theory because it is seen as a natural extension of power politics.

⁷⁷³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 89.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁷ John M. Hobson, “Re-embedding the Global Colour Line within Post-1945 International Theory”, in Alexander Anievas (ed.), Nivi Manchanda (ed.) and Robbie Shilliam (ed.), *Race and Racism in International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 2015, p. 85.

6.7. Morality

Moral relativism and the autonomy of the political sphere represent another cornerstone of Hans Morgenthau's theory and classical realism in general. According to the general definition, the universal moral principles do not apply to the actions of states and states are not expected to follow the same standards of morality as those observed by men. Since the pursuit of power in the international anarchic environment is not a matter of free choice, states are, therefore, not subject to any type of moral assessment. Essentially, the very structure of power politics excludes morality and prioritises national survival and interests. In other words, the essence of classical realism and Morgenthau's theory of international politics is a firm belief in the primacy of self-interest over any type of moral principle. Moreover, classical realism not only identifies that the states' actions are not subject to moral judgments, but they also view human beings and their actions as essentially immoral or amoral.⁷⁷⁸ On the other side of the argument lies the fact that many social Darwinists shared exactly the same belief, i.e. that ethics and politics must be separated and that morality can only abide by the laws of life. For those reasons, this section examines Hans J. Morgenthau's perspective on ethics and compares it with the social Darwinist position.

At the very beginning of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau asserts that "realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."⁷⁷⁹ In plain language, Morgenthau tells us that if time and place allow moral actions to benefit the state's survival, it should pursue such policy. If not, the state has no other option but to pursue immoral policies to gain power and improve its chances of survival. To put it another way, for Morgenthau "Politics and morality are reconciled by the latter being bent to the requirements of the former."⁷⁸⁰ Morgenthau further consolidated his position on this subject by saying that

the individual may say for himself: "*Fiat Justitia, pereat mundus* (*Let justice be done, even if the world perish*)", but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. [...] Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.⁷⁸¹

For him, the survival of a political unit (state) in its identity is "the irreducible minimum and the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units."⁷⁸² Therefore, the state for Morgenthau is not allowed to pursue any other end than its own self-preservation, even if this can only be achieved by immoral means. Relying on universal moral principles for Morgenthau eventually leads to a policy of national suicide.⁷⁸³ On the individual level, Morgenthau shares the same point. He argues that one "basic" moral principle applies to all human beings – the preservation of life. For that reason "the sacredness of human life is a general moral principle, subject to certain qualifications."⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁸ Brian Leiter, "Classical Realism", *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2001, p. 249.

⁷⁷⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 12.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷⁸² Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1952, p. 973.

⁷⁸³ Patricia Stein Wrightson, "Morality, Realism, and Foreign Affairs: A Normative Realist Approach", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), *Roots of Realism*, Routledge, London & New York, 2013, p. 358.

⁷⁸⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Human Rights & Foreign Policy*, Council on Religion & International Affairs, New York, 1979, p. 25.

With these passages, Hans Morgenthau outlined that there is only one path true statesmen must follow. The role of the statesman is reduced to state survival and the enhancement of its power: “When the statesman is confronted with a choice between two actions, the one ethical, the other not, of which the latter has a better chance of bringing about the desired result, he must choose the latter.”⁷⁸⁵ He confirmed that leaders pay little attention to moral sentiments on the example of the 3rd US President Thomas Jefferson: “Why should we deny Jefferson’s cunning, say, in the Puget Sound affair, the cruelty with which the Indians were treated, and the faithlessness with which the treaties with the Indians were cast aside? We know that this is the way all nations are when their interests are at stake – so cruel, so faithless, so cunning.”⁷⁸⁶ In other words, statesmen’s moral principles must not hinder the state’s survival and power.

Morgenthau’s notion of morality is also related to his understanding of war as a phenomenon that is omnipresent in international politics. Classical realism, as an IR theory, generally agrees that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. On the level of the individual, Morgenthau clearly demonstrates his social Darwinist stance on this issue “Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. Take away their arms, and they will either fight with their bare fists or get themselves new arms with which to fight.”⁷⁸⁷ On the international level, Morgenthau posits that: “All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war.”⁷⁸⁸ Morgenthau further asserts that

The elimination of certain types of weapons altogether would have a bearing upon the technology of warfare and, through it, upon the conduct of hostilities. It is hard to see how it could influence the frequency of war or do away with war altogether. [...] The nations adhering to the prohibition would employ their human and material resources for the development and discovery of weapons other than nuclear ones, which might be more or less destructive. The technology of warfare would change, but not the incidence of war.⁷⁸⁹

Because the state’s survival is at stake “victory is the paramount concern of warring nations.”⁷⁹⁰ As one can see, Morgenthau clearly recognizes that war is nothing less than a universal feature of humanity. War is a natural result and byproduct of both state-based aggression and human nature under the conditions of anarchy.

Morgenthau leads us to the point that moral sentiments are especially insignificant when it comes to war and a state’s defence: “[...] from the sphere of power, most societies condemn killing as a means of attaining power within society, but all societies encourage the killing of enemies in that struggle for power which is called war.”⁷⁹¹ The next long paragraph also confirms his strong belief that in the case of war, ethical considerations must be suppressed:

It is indeed true that, even before that ascendancy of the ethics of nationalism, national ethics, as formulated, for instance, in the philosophy of reason of state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has in most conflict situations proved itself to be superior to universal moral rules of conduct. This is obvious from a consideration of the most elemental and also the most important conflict situation of this kind, the one between the universal ethical precept, “Thou shalt not kill,” and the command of a particular national ethics, “Thou shalt kill under certain conditions the

⁷⁸⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 151.

⁷⁸⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 64.

⁷⁸⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 436.

⁷⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

enemies of thy country.” The individual to whom these two moral rules of conduct are addressed is confronted with a conflict between his allegiance to humanity as a whole, manifesting itself in the respect for human life as such, irrespective of nationality or any other particular characteristic, and his loyalty to a particular nation whose interests he is called upon to promote at the price of the lives of the members of another nation. [...] Most Individuals today and during all of modern history have resolved this conflict between supranational and national ethics in favor of loyalty to the nation.⁷⁹²

In other words, killing in the name of the state is considered normal, and morality of any kind must not interfere in such matters.

Social Darwinists share the same standpoint concerning moral relativism and the autonomy of the political sphere. One of the definitions of social Darwinism stems from the notion of morality. It comes from Professor Daniel Becquemont from Lille III University in France. According to him, social Darwinism is “the branch of evolutionism which poses a minimal distance, or no distance at all, between natural laws and social laws [and which] considers that these laws of Nature directly provide a code of morality and politics.”⁷⁹³ Like classical realists, most social Darwinists admitted that no fixed moral principles guide human behaviour. As one will notice further, some also acknowledged that war manifests the state’s struggles for survival in which morality can only play a marginal role.

To begin with, Herbert Spencer, the most notorious social Darwinist, believed that “No human laws are of any validity if contrary to the law of nature.”⁷⁹⁴ In a clear realist manner, Spencer considers morality as the adjustment of acts to particular ends. This basically means that for Spencer, actions are good or bad according to whether they are relatively more or less adapted to certain ends.⁷⁹⁵ These ends can be religious, economic, social and, of course, political in the broadest sense of the word. Ernst Haeckel shares a similar position to Spencer. He also considered that politics, morals and the principles of justice can only be formed in accordance with natural laws.⁷⁹⁶ However, Haeckel is more specific than Spencer regarding this issue because he extends the Darwinian logic onto international politics. Just like classical realists, for Haeckel, states also relate to each other in a lawless and ruthless (anarchic) environment where competition is absolute and where only the fittest of states would survive. As a result, the actions of states must not be judged according to some legal or moral standards since each state acts solely according to its own interest.⁷⁹⁷ Likewise, Ludwig Gumplowicz, one of the most radical representatives of social Darwinism, also confirmed that the state’s laws have nothing to do with ethics or moral ideals because they are completely subject to natural laws.⁷⁹⁸ Gumplowicz mirrors Morgenthau when he says that “the scruples of individual feeling and sentiment are unknown in [international] politics.”⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹² Ibid., pp. 269-270.

⁷⁹³ Daniel Becquemont, “Darwinisme social”, in Patrick Tort (ed.), *Dictionnaire du darwinisme et de l'évolution*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1996.

⁷⁹⁴ Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1872, pp. 229-230.

⁷⁹⁵ Gregory Moore, “Darwinism and Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century: The 'Whole of Metaphysics'?”, in Alison Stone (ed.), *Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2011, p. 120.

⁷⁹⁶ Ernst Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes (Vol. 2)*, Henry S. King, London, 1876, p. 368.

⁷⁹⁷ Torbjörn L. Knutsen, *The History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 179.

⁷⁹⁸ Harry E. Barnes, “The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions: An Exposition and Critique of the Sociological System of Ludwig Gumplowicz”, *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1919, p. 416; Rudi Supek, *Herbert Spenser i biologizam u sociologiji*, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1965, str. 80.

⁷⁹⁹ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 142.

Elaborating further, many Austrian and German representatives of social Darwinism give us arguments on the subject of morality, both on the individual level and in the realm of international politics. First is Austrian philosopher Bartholomäus von Carneri (1821-1909), who, like Hans Morgenthau, saw that the “absolute good” was not a fixed principle but varied according to time or place.⁸⁰⁰ His ethics relies on a social Darwinist basis, as the writings of Ernst Haeckel strongly influenced him. The same position on moral relativism shares another Austrian - Friedrich Jodl (1849–1914) - a professor of ethical philosophy at the University of Vienna and editor of the prestigious *International Journal of Ethics*. According to Jodl, moral laws and principles are not fixed or objective since they can be adaptive for one place and time but unsuitable in different circumstances.⁸⁰¹ One of the most influential social Darwinists in late nineteenth-century Germany was Albert E. F. Schäffle (1831-1903). This German sociologist and political scientist point out that the only criterion for moral judgment is the value of survival. According to Schäffle “there is no unconditional right, except the right to self-preservation.”⁸⁰² A German geographer and an early proponent of social Darwinism, Oscar Peschel (1826-1875) also declared that moral concepts have no place in the natural struggle among nations.⁸⁰³ Likewise, Austrian military officer and sociologist Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842–1904) equally discharged any attempts to apply moral standards in the realm of international politics.⁸⁰⁴ Ratzenhofer made such a “realist” claim because he also strongly believed that the relations between sovereign states in the international arena were fundamentally relations of antagonism and hostility.⁸⁰⁵

Lastly, of great importance for this subject are two German militant representatives of social Darwinism because their understanding is completely identical to that of Hans J. Morgenthau. These two authors are Heinrich von Treitschke and Friedrich von Bernhardi, and they provide the most solid arguments on the autonomy of political and moral relativism in international affairs.⁸⁰⁶ In addition, their arguments most resemble and correspond to what classical realists wrote on power politics and war.

Heinrich von Treitschke is in absolute accordance with Morgenthau’s conception of power politics and the role of morality in international relations. This German historian and a great supporter of social Darwinism believed that when it comes to state power, one must not mingle it with morality in any respect. Just like Morgenthau described it, Treitschke also held that individual and state morality are two separate things. In Treitschke’s own words “it is necessary then to choose between public and private morality, and since the State is power its duties must rank differently from those of the individual.”⁸⁰⁷ Treitschke again highlights that “moralists must first recognize that the State is not to be judged by the standards which apply to individuals, but by those which are set for it by its own nature and ultimate aims”⁸⁰⁸ In other words, for Treitschke, morality and power politics must be separated and “he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle in politics.”⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁰ Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 27.

⁸⁰¹ Friedrich Jodl, *Allgemeine Ethik*, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Stuttgart, 1918, pp. 134-135.

⁸⁰² As cited in Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 170.

⁸⁰³ Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 167.

⁸⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁸⁰⁵ Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Bockhaus, Leipzig, 1893.

⁸⁰⁶ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 206-209.

⁸⁰⁷ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 1)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, p. 94.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸⁰⁹ As cited in Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 45.

Friedrich von Bernhardi shares pretty much the same viewpoint as Treitschke and Morgenthau. According to him “the acts of the State cannot be judged by the standard of individual morality. [...] The morality of the State must be judged by the nature and *raison d’être* of the State, and not of the individual citizen.”⁸¹⁰ He adds that “one cannot apply the conception of individual morality to that of the State. The morality of the State is a thing by itself. [...] The essence of the State is power.”⁸¹¹ Bernhardi further asserts that “The state is the sole judge of the morality of its own action. It is in fact above morality or, in other words whatever is necessary is moral.”⁸¹² Just like classical realists, Bernhardi also points out that international anarchy is the main reason for such behaviour: “While within a State relations between man and man are regulated by law, no similar force exists in the society of States.”⁸¹³ Furthermore, Bernhardi noted that

above the individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the State; it is sovereign, and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another State menace its own existence or interests.⁸¹⁴

He concludes that “No power exists which can judge between States, and makes its judgments prevail.”⁸¹⁵ In other words, Bernhardi underscores that no fixed principles for international politics can be laid down.⁸¹⁶ In addition to that, Bernhardi is also sceptical, as were classical realists, about the validity and sustainability of any form of international law: “Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims. [...] Here and there particular relations can be brought under definite international laws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification.”⁸¹⁷

Finally, these two theoreticians’ general attitude towards war parallels Hans Morgenthau’s standpoint. Both authors recognized that war is a perennial phenomenon and a part of human nature. For instance, Treitschke believes, just like Morgenthau, that “it would be false to conclude that wars can ever cease.”⁸¹⁸ In a realist fashion, he identified war as a regular feature of international politics: “War, therefore, will endure to the end of history, as long as there is multiplicity of States.”⁸¹⁹ On the other hand, Treitschke remarked that war is an indispensable part of us as human beings: “He who knows history knows also that to banish war from the world would be to mutilate human nature.”⁸²⁰ Likewise, Bernhardi, in the same way, discusses the issue of war: “So long as there are men who have human feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests come into being and occasions for making war arise.”⁸²¹

As one can see, a number of social Darwinists from the 19th and early 20th centuries simply rejected any fixed moral code.⁸²² Just like Hans Morgenthau, they rejected any fixed moral principles in human beings and brushed aside any moral considerations in international politics. They understood that if survival and increased power are top priorities in the international arena,

⁸¹⁰ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 45.

⁸¹¹ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 129.

⁸¹² As cited in James M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*, Outlook Verlag, Frankfurt, 2020, p. 11.

⁸¹³ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914, p. 109.

⁸¹⁴ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 111.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸¹⁸ Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 1)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, p. 70.

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

⁸²¹ Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914, p. 19.

⁸²² Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 22.

morality must not stand in the way. The international environment simply dictates that moral suasions are no match for raw power. In the absence of supreme international authority and overarching moral obligations, self-preservation is a moral and biological imperative. Furthermore, due to conflicting interests, war is something that is prevalent in international politics and a condition where moral principles are discarded the most. Overall, the social Darwinist understanding of morality is outright aligned with Morgenthau's fifth principle of political realism and therefore definitely deserves to be placed within the hard core of classical realist theory. In other words, Morgenthau's standpoint on morality implicitly relies on a social Darwinist understanding of this subject. This observation is crucial if classical realism intends to maintain its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence.

6.8. Fear, adaptation and imitation

The following section aims to investigate three concepts rooted in Darwinian scientific ideas that Hans J. Morgenthau indirectly implemented in his theory of international politics. Fear as emotion and adaptation and imitation as two evolutionary strategies have their place in Morgenthau's writings. Fear, adaptation and imitation have a distinct Darwinian scientific background, and all three are intertwined with the notion of survival. The findings from evolutionary theory can inform us why Morgenthau occasionally used these three important concepts to grasp and hindsight the dynamics of international politics. In addition, few social Darwinists dealt with these themes in a remarkably similar way as Hans Morgenthau. One will first get acquainted with the notion of fear, after which adaptation and imitation will follow.

Fear as an emotion still holds a prominent place in the entire realist paradigm.⁸²³ However, unlike John Mearsheimer's offensive realism and Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, fear did not receive the greatest attention within the theory of classical realism. Both Mearsheimer and Waltz have paid much more attention to the effects of this emotion on international politics.⁸²⁴ In any case, there is a need to investigate how much Hans Morgenthau emphasized fear as an emotion at both the individual level and at the level of the behaviour of states.

First and foremost, the very definition of fear must be placed within the evolutionary framework. Fear is a universal innate emotion that we as humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors and, as such, represents a product of our evolutionary past, both in biological and social senses.⁸²⁵ Charles Darwin himself regarded fear as one of the six basic emotions.⁸²⁶ Darwin was also one of the first scientists who systematically studied fear and many other human emotions.⁸²⁷ According to the findings in evolutionary psychology, the purpose of fear is that it has stopped us from undertaking various hazardous actions and helped us to ensure the survival of our species.⁸²⁸ This

⁸²³ Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, p. 2.

⁸²⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, London, 1979.

⁸²⁵ Daniel T. Blumstein, *The Nature of Fear*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 3.

⁸²⁶ Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp. 62–63.

⁸²⁷ Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships", *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, p. 123.

⁸²⁸ Marks Isaac Meyer, *Fears and Phobias*, Heinemann Medical Books, London, 1969; Martin Seligman, "Phobias and Preparedness", *Behavior Therapy*, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1971, pp. 307–320; Arne Öhman and Susan Mineka, "Fears, Phobias, and Preparedness: Toward an Evolved Module of Fear and Fear Learning", *Psychological Review*, Vol. 108, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 483–522.

emotion strongly affected the senses of our environment and the way we perceived and reacted to it. Shiping Tang sums this up by saying that: “Fear for one’s survival or fear of death (hereafter, fear) is the most fundamental psychological trait that biological evolution has endowed most high vertebrate species, including the Homo sapiens.”⁸²⁹

Hans Morgenthau considered fear to be one of the main driving forces in human relations. More importantly, he mentioned its role and importance in our evolutionary past. In *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Morgenthau alluded to the biological and evolutionary roots of fear when he stated that the “history of mankind is the story of inner insecurity, of the anticipation of impending doom, of metaphysical anxieties.”⁸³⁰ In the same book, besides hunger, propagation and self-preservation, he placed fear as something that is primordial to physical nature as a whole.⁸³¹ In addition, Morgenthau regarded fear as an emotion that can be transferred from the individual to the state level.⁸³² He believed that can be done when personal fears are transformed into anxiety for the nation. As a consequence, the identification with the nation alleviates individual fears by projecting them onto the international scene.⁸³³ In other words, Morgenthau identified that there is no ontological difference between the emotions of individuals and that of the state.⁸³⁴ Fear is, therefore, equally ubiquitous and pervasive in international politics.⁸³⁵ In *Politics Among Nations*, he emphasized that “all nations live in constant fear lest their rivals deprive them, at the first opportune moment, of their power position.”⁸³⁶ Since the desire to attain maximum power is universal, all nations must always be afraid.⁸³⁷ Likewise, one of the causes of the unfeasibility of disarmament between great powers is that they constantly live in a state of fear. Morgenthau notes that “As long as the mutual fear persists, neither side can afford to disarm.”⁸³⁸

Morgenthau explicitly treated fear as an emotion that operates at both the individual and collective (state) levels. Fear represents, for him, a primordial emotion necessary for both individual and state survival. In the international realm, states are afraid for two reasons. The first reason is the international anarchic atmosphere, where fear always lurks in the background and drives state behaviour. The second reason is that states are composed and managed by people who possess the emotion of fear in their evolutionary code. That is why Morgenthau, like many other realists, rightly assumed that there is an irrefutable connection between fear and war/conflict. He firmly placed fear, insecurity and aggressiveness among the psychological roots of any conflict.⁸³⁹

The next subject for analysis represents the concept of adaptation. The most general definition of adaptation is that it represents an adjustment of organisms to their environment in order to improve

⁸²⁹ Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, p. 451.

⁸³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 9.

⁸³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁸³² Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, p. 46.

⁸³³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 125.

⁸³⁴ Andrew A. G. Ross, “Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics”, *International Theory*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2013, p. 286.

⁸³⁵ Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, p. 45.

⁸³⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 228.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics (Vol. 3)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 319.

⁸³⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 185.

their chances of survival in that environment.⁸⁴⁰ Simply put, adaptation represents the ability to master the environment by minimizing local threats and adapting simultaneously to novel threats in changing ecologies.⁸⁴¹ Darwin himself identified that those organisms which were unable (or unfit) to adapt to the demands of their environment eventually fall as casualties in the “war of nature.”⁸⁴² In the social Darwinist worldview, on the other hand, the concept of adaptation is closely related to the notion of “survival of the fittest” because those who are best adapted are also the fittest and have the best chances of surviving the highly competitive environment.⁸⁴³ This is particularly interesting because, as one can see, Hans J. Morgenthau’s notion of balance of power is strikingly similar to what Herbert Spencer talked about on this subject.

Hans Morgenthau has, in many ways, implemented the evolutionary logic of adaptation and the inevitability of changes that result from the dynamics of international politics. Firstly, Morgenthau believed that humans must change their traditional habits of thoughts and actions to respond to an already changed world.⁸⁴⁴ Considering the time period in which he wrote this, Morgenthau had in mind the threats and dangers imposed by the nuclear age. Accordingly, he declared that statesmen must especially sense the ever-present fluctuating international political environment and accordingly adapt his/her modes of thought and actions to the demands of the day.⁸⁴⁵ Statesman is simply challenged and confronted with the always-evolving variable of national interest, which he must address according to current circumstances.⁸⁴⁶ Consequently, state survival and potency depend on its ability to adapt to the present conditions. Morgenthau even directly employed one evolutionary analogy to highlight adaptation’s importance. In the first of his three volumes book *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Morgenthau highlights in detail that

The continuing greatness of a nation depends in good measure upon its ability to readjust its institutions, to revise its policies, to reformulate its ideas in the light of new tasks, new conditions, new challenges. The pages of history are full of great empires which became ossified, which because they had solved the problems of the past with institutions, ideas, and policies of the past, thought that they could apply the same institutions, the same ideas, the same policies to the new tasks of the present and of the future. And when those tasks became too great to be dealt with successfully by those institutions, ideas, and policies, those nations declined and disappeared. There is, I think, an analogy between those ossified empires who were unable to move, as it were, with the times and the dinosaur whose biological structure was perfectly adapted to one kind of environment, and, since he could not adapt it to another kind of environment, he had to perish.⁸⁴⁷

Just like in nature, Morgenthau reminds us that the international anarchical environment plays a central role in shaping the interests that determine political action.

⁸⁴⁰ Andreas C. Göransson, *Crossing the Threshold: Visualization Design and Conceptual Understanding of Evolution*, Linköping University Electronic Press, Linköping, 2021, p. 34.

⁸⁴¹ Dean Mobbs, Cindy C. Hagan, Tim Dalglish, Brian Silston and Charlotte Prévost, “The Ecology of Human Fear: Survival Optimization and the Nervous System”, *Frontiers in Neuroscience*, Vol. 9, Article 55, 2015, p. 2.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸⁴³ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 84; Apoorva Patel, “Survival of the Fittest and Zero Sum Games”, *Fluctuation and Noise Letters*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2002, p. 279.

⁸⁴⁴ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 152.

⁸⁴⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1982, p. 223.

⁸⁴⁶ Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 167.

⁸⁴⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 211.

One of the ways states themselves adapt to the international anarchical environment, according to Morgenthau, is through balancing. In order to ensure survival, states simply must skillfully “balance” their course of actions in the international realm. Therefore, the survival of each state in the international arena is determined and depends on the degree to which they are able to adapt to the balance of power and the anarchical environment.⁸⁴⁸ For Morgenthau, the state either adapts and pursues the policy of balance of power or “commits suicide as a nation.”⁸⁴⁹

Again, Morgenthau directly relies on biological metaphors to develop lessons about adaptation and the international balance of power. To begin with, he accepts that the term “balance” is synonymous with the term “equilibrium” and that this concept is found and widely used in biology, among other sciences: “The concept of “equilibrium” as a synonym for “balance” is commonly employed in many sciences - physics, biology, economics, sociology, and political science.”⁸⁵⁰ Secondly and more importantly, Morgenthau illustrates this concept with a metaphorical reference to the human body. In a Spencerian manner, Morgenthau conceived the human body as a state of equilibrium or at least seeking equilibrium once the internal or external forces disrupt the existing condition:

It [balance] signifies stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium. Thus equilibrium exists in the human body. While the human body changes in the process of growth, the equilibrium persists as long as the changes occurring in the different organs of the body do not disturb the body’s stability. [...] When, however, the body suffers a wound or loss of one of its organs through outside interference, or experiences a malignant growth or a pathological transformation of one of its organs, the equilibrium is disturbed, and the body tries to overcome the disturbance by re-establishing the equilibrium either on the same or a different level from the one that obtained before the disturbance occurred.⁸⁵¹

For Morgenthau, the important mechanistic principle of the balance of power is its feature that every time the equilibrium is threatened or disturbed by a state or a group of states, there is a natural tendency for other states who want to reinstate equilibrium.

At the high level of abstraction, there are strong similarities between Hans Morgenthau’s notion of balancing and Herbert Spencer’s notion of equilibrium. Firstly, Spencer claimed that each organism struggles to maintain the equilibrium (balance) between itself and its environment.⁸⁵² Since the environment is constantly changing, adjustments are necessary until the organism either adapts (survives) or fails and dies in this process.⁸⁵³ Secondly, Spencer’s idea of “dynamic equilibrium” argues that systems are predominantly in stasis (balance), but occasionally, these systems get disturbed and have a natural tendency to fight their way back into stasis (balance).⁸⁵⁴ On the examples of societies and organisms, Spencer argued that once the previous equilibrium is

⁸⁴⁸ John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 48.

⁸⁴⁹ Hans Morgenthau, “Principles of International Politics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1956, p. 3.

⁸⁵⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, pp. 187-188.

⁸⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁸⁵² Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 84.

⁸⁵³ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 84.

⁸⁵⁴ Michael Ruse, *The Problem of War: Darwinism, Christianity, and Their Battle to Understand Human Conflict*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, p. 67.

disturbed, a new equilibrium arises, which will either re-establish the original or create a new equilibrium.⁸⁵⁵ In Spencer's words:

When through a change of habit or circumstance, an organism is permanently subject to some new influence, or different amount of an old influence, there arises, after more or less disturbance of the organic rhythms, a balancing of them around the new average condition produced by this additional influence.⁸⁵⁶

Spencer further claims: "An organism being a combination of rhythmically-acting parts in moving equilibrium, the action and structure of any one part cannot be altered without causing alterations of action and structure in all the rest."⁸⁵⁷ Spencer believed every change aims toward a balance of forces and does not end until such balance is fulfilled: "Any unequilibrated force to which an aggregate is subject [...] must continue modifying its state until an equilibrium is brought about."⁸⁵⁸ Overall, as demonstrated above, there is a strong resemblance between Morgenthau's idea of balancing and Spencer's idea of equilibrium.

In addition, Morgenthau perceived that state diplomacy, as an instrument of foreign policy, plays a particularly significant role in adapting to the international environment. In his 1955 lecture "Permanent Values in the Old Diplomacy", Morgenthau highlights that the traditional methods of diplomacy "must indeed be adapted to the ever-changing conditions of the international environment, yet at the same time their objective, rational essence must be preserved."⁸⁵⁹ One decade later, Morgenthau again emphasized that "it is vitally important that these traditional modes of thought and action be adapted quickly, and if necessary, radically to new circumstances."⁸⁶⁰ He concluded that "if we do so we will be the masters of the new age. If we fail to do so we will become its victims."⁸⁶¹ Once again, one can experience the apparent adapt or perish logic within his thought.

As a final point, Morgenthau mainly presented a clear evolutionary adaptation logic for the United States' foreign policy. He called upon and prescribed "the pragmatic adaptation to circumstances which for the time being are not subject to our [US] control."⁸⁶² He further clarified that

The fate of the United States and of the civilized world will depend upon the speed and adequacy with which the United States will be able to rediscover the perennial foundations of its foreign policy and to adapt that foreign policy to the changed conditions of a revolutionary age.⁸⁶³

Likewise, in 1962 Morgenthau wrote that

The tasks America as the leader of the Atlantic community faces today result from the need, long felt and only now being met, to adapt its foreign policies to the new circumstances of the hour; to revise the pattern of foreign policy which was established in 1947 in the form of containment – the Truman

⁸⁵⁵ Robert L. Carneiro, "Structure, Function, and Equilibrium in the Evolutionism of Herbert Spencer", *Journal of Anthropological Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1973, p. 85.

⁸⁵⁶ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1876, p. 500.

⁸⁵⁷ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Biology (Vol. 1)*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1866, p. 255.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

⁸⁵⁹ As cited in Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 166.

⁸⁶⁰ As cited in Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, p. 165.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶² Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 187.

⁸⁶³ As cited in Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010, pp. 165-166.

Doctrine – and the Marshall Plan; to renew that foreign policy through innovations commensurate with the novel problems which the Western world faces today.⁸⁶⁴

On the other hand, Morgenthau did employ the logic of adaptation for other potential great powers, such as China. In an almost prophetic way, Morgenthau saw that the future of China will depend on its ability to adapt to international circumstances: “Provided China has a rational government, it can thus be expected that both the present and the coming generation of Chinese leaders will continue to learn from experience and adapt their policies to the real world.”⁸⁶⁵

In any case, Morgenthau strongly advocated that both leaders and states must constantly adapt in order to survive the highly competitive international environment. Both humans and states must always adapt successfully to the environmental pressures and the conditions of the (political) world. The international (anarchical) environment plays a crucial role in shaping the state’s interests and the course of statesman’s political actions. Consequently, power itself must adapt to the changing circumstances. He also urged states to adapt their legal architecture according to the realities of power and national interests.⁸⁶⁶ On the other hand, for this scholar, even political science as a discipline within the social sciences must always adapt to the “ever changing circumstances of the time.”⁸⁶⁷ It is worth mentioning that Morgenthau was not the only classical realist who reminded the imperative of adaptation to the international environment.

The final part of this section will analyze how Hans Morgenthau utilized imitation (emulation) in his theory of international politics. According to the simplest definition, imitation represents the act of copying the behaviour of someone observed and is identified as the most common learning behaviour among animals and humans.⁸⁶⁸ Imitation as an evolutionary strategy relates to copying the structures and practices of others if those structures and practices are perceived as successful or desirable for survival but also for power. Charles Darwin was one of the first to discover this common characteristic in animals and humans. According to Darwin:

Apes are much given to imitation, as are the lowest savages [...] if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence [...] would prompt the other members to imitate him [...] If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant other tribes.⁸⁶⁹

In other words, Darwin explained that the origin of imitation is found in evolution and that humans share this universal disposition with higher primates.⁸⁷⁰

An important feature of imitation as a form of learning is the arms race, which we usually associate with the US-Soviet rivalry from the Cold War period. However, the arms race is actually an evolutionary phenomenon and an evolutionary fact which describes the complex and dynamic evolution of plants and animals. Richard Dawkins extensively studied the evolutionary “arms race”

⁸⁶⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics (Vol. 3)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 213.

⁸⁶⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 192.

⁸⁶⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 125; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 105.

⁸⁶⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 47.

⁸⁶⁸ Karl H. Schlag, “Imitation and Social Learning”, in Norbert M. Seel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning*, Springer, New York, 2012, p. 1490.

⁸⁶⁹ Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, p. 161.

⁸⁷⁰ Roberto Farneti, *Mimetic Politics*, Michigan State University Press, Lansing, 2015, p. x.

that is occurring between and within species.⁸⁷¹ According to Dawkins, the arms race is best reflected between the predator and the prey, where each progressively improves its capabilities and consequently its chances of survival in response to the other. Simply put, if two species compete in a given environment, any improvement of one species will give it an evolutionary advantage over its rival. If the endangered species does not want to die out, it must keep pace and enhance its capabilities and prospects for survival.⁸⁷² Another argument on this subject comes from a human history specialist and a US national security policy-maker Andrew Bard Schmookler. Schmookler, in his prize-winning book *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution*, provided a theory of social evolution by synthesizing evolutionary biology, political theory, history and psychology. Schmookler derives arguments on this topic from the evolution of early human civilizations. According to him:

We find [...] that in the history of civilization, important innovations in technology, in political structure, in economic organization, in ideology, were created quite consciously by people striving to armor themselves to survive a hostile intersocietal environment."⁸⁷³ Schmookler firmly believed that the choice has hardly been a free one: "Innovate or die"⁸⁷⁴ has often been the option that civilized peoples have confronted.

Even though Kenneth Waltz introduced and defined imitation in the form of the so-called "sameness effect", Hans Morgenthau has also indirectly recognized the importance of the imitation strategy for the sake of the state's survival and its increase of power. Imitation for Morgenthau is the product of relentless competition and innovation which exists in the international arena. Firstly, Morgenthau points out that "In the world of nature, which he [man] faces ready-made and which he leaves as he finds it, man proves himself a master of understanding, imitation, and control."⁸⁷⁵ Morgenthau here clarifies that imitation is intrinsically part of nature itself, and what is even more important, it is a part of human nature. For him, armaments and arms race also represents a peculiar form of imitation in international politics. Morgenthau believes that two main motives for armaments are the general feeling of insecurity and the fear of attack.⁸⁷⁶ From his point of view: "Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of, competition for power."⁸⁷⁷

With this in mind, the logic of imitation in Morgenthau's thought is best seen in the case of twentieth-century warfare. He pinpoints four major innovations that states had to mimic to endure the highly competitive international environment. Those innovations were: submarines, tanks, strategic and tactical co-ordination of the air force with the land and naval forces, and finally, nuclear weapons.⁸⁷⁸ Nuclear weapons naturally hold a special place in this regard:

The continuation of the nuclear armaments race follows indeed logically from the commitment to a counter-force strategy. The conventional conception of nuclear war presented by counter-force

⁸⁷¹ Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 55-80; Richard Dawkins and John R. Krebs, "Arms Races between and within Species", *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences*, Vol. 205, No. 1161, 1979, pp. 489-511.

⁸⁷² Richard Dawkins and John R. Krebs, "Arms Races between and within Species", *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences*, Vol. 205, No. 1161, 1979, pp. 489-490; Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011, p. 32.

⁸⁷³ Andrew Bard Schmookler, *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, pp. 72-73.

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁸⁷⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 7.

⁸⁷⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 451.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

strategy demands a corresponding conventional approach to competitive armaments. [...] Both sides have, then, an incentive to increase targets and counter-force weapons indefinitely [...].⁸⁷⁹

Approximately a hundred years before Morgenthau wrote these lines, the 19th-century English social Darwinist Walter Bagehot also noticed that those nations which failed to keep pace with the military strength of their neighbours were simply crushed.⁸⁸⁰ In his words: “Each nation tried constantly to be the stronger, and so made or copied the best weapons; by conscious and unconscious imitation each nation formed a type of character suitable to war and conquest.”⁸⁸¹ Likewise, Herbert Spencer also warned that even so-called “peace-loving” nations would constantly need to arm themselves defensively against predatory rivals.⁸⁸² Generally speaking, Morgenthau, just like Bagehot and Spencer, advocated that states had to emulate each other and maintain the same rate of progress in the military-technological sphere to survive.

Secondly, what is noticeable is that Morgenthau identifies that his so-called policy of prestige is intertwined with imitation:

The prestige which the United States has enjoyed among the uncommitted nations derives primarily not from the qualities of political freedom and equality of opportunity [...] but rather from its standard of living and its technological achievements, which, in contrast to those other qualities, are visible, tangible, demonstrable, and seemingly attainable by all through imitation.⁸⁸³

As an example, Morgenthau asserts that if the United States wants to restore its prestige, it “will need a demonstration of its technological superiority as spectacular as that which the Soviet Union achieved by launching its earth satellites.”⁸⁸⁴ Additionally, the United States needs to use its policy of prestige as a role model for other states to emulate it. It needs to do so not because it simply wants to but because it has to for its sheer survival as a great power. In his own words:

[...] Today such a failure is also a matter between ourselves and our will to survive; for if we fail, the nations of the world will look elsewhere for models of social organization and political institutions to emulate, and we will be alone in a hostile world. Alone in a hostile world, we would no longer be able to renew our sense of purpose through the experience of territorial expansion and universal emulation.⁸⁸⁵

Moreover, he firmly believed that “instead of embarking upon costly and futile interventions...abroad, the United States ought to concentrate its efforts upon creating a society at home which can again serve as model for other nations to emulate.”⁸⁸⁶ In sum, being a respectable role model whom other states want to imitate generates two positive features. First, the United States would remain a great power, ensuring its survival in the international arena. Secondly, by setting a good example in the international realm, the United States would incite other states to imitate its policies and accordingly wins them over against the Soviet Union.

⁸⁷⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1964, p. 31.

⁸⁸⁰ David Clinton, ““Dash and Doubt” Walter Bagehot and International Restraint”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2003, p. 91.

⁸⁸¹ Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001, p. 31.

⁸⁸² David Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate Over the Biology of War from the 'Origin of Species' to the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 47.

⁸⁸³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Vol. 2)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 148.

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1960, p. 300.

⁸⁸⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 243.

As this subchapter has shown, Hans J. Morgenthau did employ evolutionary strategies of adaptation and imitation. He reminded his readers that both states and their leaders need to adapt to international pressures and must adopt successful behaviours in order to improve their odds of survival. Interestingly enough, in the case of adaptation, Morgenthau even refers to one well-known evolutionary tactic in the animal kingdom: bluffing.⁸⁸⁷ Bluffing involves deceiving the opponents regarding one's own power, foreign policy intentions and national strength.⁸⁸⁸ For example, Morgenthau identifies that the mechanics of mutual deterrence requires an element of bluff that is either real or suspected.⁸⁸⁹ On the other hand, it was demonstrated that imitation is not only found in nature but also in the power dynamics within international relations. In addition, the influence of fear in its evolutionary sense is also something Hans Morgenthau paid attention to when he analyzed world politics. All things considered, both nature and the anarchical setting are predominantly seen as predatory environments. Consequently, both of these realms are subject to the same mechanisms that influence the survival chances of their units. Therefore, both nature and the international arena share the same logic of survival, and that is why fear, adaptation and imitation are necessary and present at both levels.

Based on this, one can conclude that fear, imitation, and adaptation, as mechanisms within the framework of Darwinism, are in fact at the core of Hans J. Morgenthau's theory because they all serve the same goal that individuals and states strive for: survival. Organisms exhibit fear as a response to potential threats or dangers in their environment, prompting actions aimed at self-preservation. Similarly, states may respond to perceived threats in the international system by adopting strategies to safeguard their security and survival. Organisms evolve and adapt to changing environments to enhance their chances of survival. States, facing evolving geopolitical landscapes, also adapt and balance their policies, strategies, and alliances to navigate the complexities of international relations and secure their interests. Organisms often mimic successful behaviors or strategies observed in others to increase their chances of survival. In a similar vein, states might imitate or learn from the actions and policies of successful or influential states to bolster their own security and survival prospects. On top of everything, one should remember that Morgenthau himself explicitly relied upon biological metaphors to explain these phenomena. Furthermore, his notion of balancing parallels Herbert Spencer's notion of equilibrium, highlighting similarities in their perspectives on the natural tendency of systems, whether in international relations or organisms, to restore balance when disrupted. In essence, Morgenthau here both implicitly and explicitly relies on Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinism, underscoring once more that classical realism depends on these ideas to maintain its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence.

6.9. Materialism

The following part of the research will explore the role materialism plays in Darwinism and classical realism. It will investigate whether classical realism and Darwinism have ontological claim on materialism. In other words, the idea behind this subchapter is basically to show that the common stock of both classical realism and Darwinism consists of a materialistic understanding of the world.

⁸⁸⁷ On bluffing in nature, see Roy Gardner and Molly R. Morris, "The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach", *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, Vol. 137, Issue 2, 1989, pp. 235-243.

⁸⁸⁸ John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 48.

⁸⁸⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-70*, Praeger, Westport, 1970, p. 155.

Charles Darwin's entire theory of evolution is positioned and viewed as utterly materialistic. The main attack on his theory in the 19th century came from those who advocated that immaterial spheres dominate and guide nature as a whole. One of the key intentions of his book *On the Origin of Species* was to solidify arguments about the materialist and the naturalist worldview.⁸⁹⁰ According to Canadian evolutionary biologist Jan Sapp:

The materialism of Darwinism, based largely on a view of the natural world as a place of persistent struggle, conflict, and war, confronted the optimistic view of natural theology of a harmonious natural world of give and take, of mutual cohabitation and a balance of nature in which each of God's creatures was created to play its part for the benefit of all.⁸⁹¹

In other words, Darwinism embraced materialism as a starting point for examining the world, as it was mostly concerned with the physical rather than spiritual, religious or other non-material facets of life.⁸⁹² For those reasons, British sociologist and social Darwinist Benjamin Kidd identified that Darwinism was the best example of Western science and "the organized form of the doctrine of the supremacy of material force."⁸⁹³ In sum, Darwinism accepted the notion that the "nature" of man and organisms is primarily grounded in materialist competition in which the pressure for resources and status generates a struggle for existence amongst them.⁸⁹⁴

Social Darwinism is especially associated with a materialist view of human nature, which holds that humans are primarily motivated by self-interest and the pursuit of material wealth and power.⁸⁹⁵ Social Darwinism suggests that competition and struggle for material resources are both natural and inevitable. Those states and individuals that are most successful in accumulating material resources are also the fittest and most deserving of power. According to Kidd, power represents primarily the characteristic or constituent quality of life and of the material universe.⁸⁹⁶ From a social Darwinist perspective, states that have greater access to material resources such as natural resources, wealth, and technology are more likely to be successful in their competition with other states. Moreover, social Darwinism often equated material wealth with power.⁸⁹⁷ Herbert Spencer was considered materialist precisely because he always emphasized topics such as population growth, warfare and economic factors.⁸⁹⁸ He and other social Darwinists vigorously opposed theories and doctrines that ignored material rationale and often explained that some non-material values generate conflicts. Even if non-material values affect the conduct of conflict, they are seen only as secondary and not regularly capable of generating and sustaining war patterns. The very fact that the material resources human beings crave are limited naturally leads to conflict.⁸⁹⁹ Therefore, from the social Darwinist point of view, war is always waged to secure tangible material resources, both economic and military. Moreover, a strong economy and industrial base are

⁸⁹⁰ Javier Pérez-Jara, Gustavo E. Romero and Lino Camprubí, "What is Materialism? History and Concepts", in Javier Pérez-Jara (ed.), Gustavo E. Romero (ed.) and Lino Camprubí (ed.), *Contemporary Materialism: Its Ontology and Epistemology*, Springer, Cham, 2022, p. 55.

⁸⁹¹ Jan Sapp, *Genesis: The Evolution of Biology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 41.

⁸⁹² Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 35; Jack Jones, "Social Darwinism Reconsidered", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 1/2, 1981-1982, p. 240.

⁸⁹³ Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, Methuen & Co, London, 1919, p. 77.

⁸⁹⁴ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 31.

⁸⁹⁵ *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Edition)*, 2004, p. 1183.

⁸⁹⁶ Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, Methuen & Co, London, 1919, p. 186.

⁸⁹⁷ Michael L. Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations*, Potomac Books Inc., Washington DC, 2006, pp. 38-39.

⁸⁹⁸ Stephen K. Sanderson, "Evolutionary Materialism: A Theoretical Strategy for the Study of Social Evolution", *Sociological Perspectives*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, p. 52.

⁸⁹⁹ Stephen K. Sanderson, *The Evolution of Human Sociality: A Darwinian Conflict Perspective*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2001, pp. 143-157.

necessary for the state to transform its resources and technology into a strong military. They believed that military and economic power were closely tied together and that states with strong militaries and economies were better equipped to survive and thrive in a highly competitive international realm. The combination of the two is what, in the end, makes a powerful state.

Classical realism has also been generally described as materialistic for pretty much the same reasons. As Alexander Wendt noticed, classical realists do vary in the extent to which they are materialists, but their focus on human nature and material capabilities is the main reason why they are generally placed in that category.⁹⁰⁰ In other words, it is widely accepted and acknowledged that political realism emphasizes materialism in terms of power, wealth, and interest. Hans J. Morgenthau was a “materialist” in the broadest sense of the word because he mostly explored problems of international politics from this position. Morgenthau indirectly admitted that international politics must be studied from a materialistic standpoint for two reasons. Firstly, he viewed human nature as utterly materialistic. The first principle of political realism found in *Politics Among Nations* outlines a materialist ontology that asserts that politics “is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”⁹⁰¹ Secondly, states in international politics focus on and emphasize material capabilities, such as military and economic power. In other words, the national interest in the form of maximization of power is defined primarily in a material sense, i.e. in economic and especially in military terms. For Morgenthau: “Traditionally a functional relationship has existed between political, military, and economic power. That is to say, political power has been throughout history a function of military and - in recent times more particularly - of economic power.”⁹⁰² He especially considered wealth as the source of power.⁹⁰³ Morgenthau also added that “In international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation.”⁹⁰⁴ Simply put, Morgenthau believes that the relative size of a state’s material resources is most likely to influence its ability to set agendas, decisions and outcomes in the international realm. In other words, the state’s power is based on its material capabilities, such as wealth, the size of its population, territory, technology and military assets. Material basis and power in classical realism are so linked together that it is impossible to exclude one without the other.

In sum, the connection between classical realism and materialism lies in their shared emphasis on the importance of material factors in shaping human behaviour and, consequently, the state’s decision-making in the international realm. Culture, ideology and religion can influence and shape a state’s behaviour in international politics, but they are seen only as marginal compared to the material factors. Following Sapp’s argument, one can say that the materialism in classical realism is largely based on a view of international politics as a place of persistent struggle, conflict and war, where material factors such as economy and military are key determinants of power.

This subchapter paid attention to materialism, upon which classical realism and Darwinism rest. Classical realism and Darwinism stand firmly on the foundations of materialism.⁹⁰⁵ Social Darwinism has especially, just like classical realism, embraced the material basis of power. States in classical realist and social Darwinist worldviews compete primarily for material wealth, status, and military power. In other words, the social Darwinist emphasis on material factors aligns closely

⁹⁰⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 30.

⁹⁰¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 4.

⁹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹⁰³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p. 362.

⁹⁰⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 33.

⁹⁰⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 320.

with that of classical realism. This alignment highlights a coherent narrative wherein social Darwinist insights into competition and survival resonate with the foundational principles of classical realism, thus reinforcing the credibility and explanatory power of the classical realist worldview within the context of international relations. By highlighting the evolutionary foundation of materialistic competition in the context of survival, ideas of Darwinism provide an additional layer of support to the classical realist hard core.

6.10. Zero-sum worldview

In addition to materialism, Darwinism and classical realism shared and integrated another important commonality - a zero-sum worldview. A zero-sum game usually comes together with the notion of relative gains and is largely affiliated with materialism. This section will start with the definition of a zero-sum game since it is necessary to explain what we mean regarding this concept. Following that, attention will be drawn to a classical realist interpretation of this phenomenon, after which the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist position on this matter will be analyzed. At the very end, it will be shown why classical realism and Darwinism (especially social Darwinism) were particularly susceptible to a zero-sum outlook.

A zero-sum game is a concept used in game theory, economics, politics, and many other areas to describe a situation in which one participant's gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of other participants. In a zero-sum game, there is a fixed amount of value or resources, and any advantage acquired by one party results in an equivalent disadvantage for another. The total amount of wealth, resources, power, or utility involved remains constant, and any benefit obtained by one player comes at the direct expense of others. Naturally, a zero-sum perspective has often been associated with competitive scenarios in which there are two or more actors.

The entire classical realist paradigm pays special tribute to relative gains and the zero-sum outlook of international politics. For classical realists, relations among states are nothing more than a zero-sum game where one state's gains equal another's losses. This situation makes relations among states extremely competitive and conflictual.⁹⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, all realists held implicitly or explicitly that anarchy and zero-sum situations are interlinked and that states will continue to struggle, as they always have, for scarce resources, whether material or social in nature.⁹⁰⁷ In such an environment, realists envisioned that cooperation among states would be very difficult since the uncertainty and the often divergent interests always raise concerns over the relative gains from security, trade and other forms of action. In the context of trade, for example, if one state is able to gain access to a larger share of a particular market, it may do so at the expense of other states that are competing for the same market share. Similarly, in the context of military competition, if one country is able to gain an advantage in military technology or capabilities, it may do so at the expense of other countries that are competing for military dominance. Another reason why states behave this way is because of their egoistical nature. As already mentioned, from a classical realist perspective, humans and states are intrinsically egoistic and zero-sum situations that anarchy imposes only enhance such selfish behaviour.

⁹⁰⁶ Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003, p. 19.

⁹⁰⁷ Randall L. Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict Over Scarce Resources", in Ethan B. Kapstein (ed.) and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 29.

Hans Morgenthau identified power as a zero-sum phenomenon, where actors (states) in the international anarchical system must deprive one another of their power position in order to add it to their own.⁹⁰⁸ In his words: “International politics can be defined, as we have seen, as a continuing effort to maintain and to increase the power of one’s own nation and to keep in check or reduce the power of other nations.”⁹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Morgenthau adds that “Each nation aims to gain a competitive advantage over the others.”⁹¹⁰ In simple terms, since anarchy is highly competitive, it automatically supports a zero-sum environment and, as one can clearly see, Morgenthau accepted the notion that international politics is a zero-sum situation in which one country’s gain comes at the expense of another country’s loss. Likewise, he recognizes that in the anarchical environment, rational states position their survival as independent units first and will therefore be concerned with the military and economic status relative to other states. Relative power is crucial because, in a zero-sum situation, it is difficult for any state to improve its chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states. Regarding this, Morgenthau underscores that: “When we refer to the power of a nation by saying that this nation is very powerful and that nation is weak, we always imply a comparison. In other words, the concept of power is always a relative one.”⁹¹¹ Since international politics is inherently competitive, states seek to maximize their power and influence relative to other states. For that reason, he reminds us that “A nation that at a particular moment in history finds itself at the peak of its power is particularly exposed to the temptation to forget that all power is relative.”⁹¹²

Biological competition has been usually described as a zero-sum game since the survival of one organism is usually at the expense of other organisms competing for the same scarce resources in the environment. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution argues that the so-called “survival of the fittest” occurs within a zero-sum environment.⁹¹³ While Darwin didn’t explicitly use the term zero-sum game or employ game theory concepts in his work, the core idea of competition for limited resources and the differential reproductive success of individuals with advantageous traits aligns conceptually with aspects of zero-sum dynamics. He highlights the idea of competition and the challenges organisms face due to limited resources, which aligns with aspects of zero-sum dynamics where one’s gain can come at the expense of others in a competitive environment.⁹¹⁴ In other words, because of the Malthusian principle of limited resources and fierce competition, natural selection is essentially understood as a zero-sum game.⁹¹⁵ In any given species population, the environment instigated zero-sum behaviour in a twofold way: between species and within species. Taking into account that natural resources are not limitless, all organisms within the environment were, in one way or the other, potential competitors. They were competitors indirectly in terms of consumption or directly in a predatory-prey manner. Furthermore, because of its competitive setting, relative gains in nature are equally important since it means that an organism’s success is not solely determined by its absolute fitness but also by its fitness relative to other organisms in its environment. In other words, an organism’s success is determined by its own abilities and how it compares to others around it. As noted by marine ecologist Raphael Sagarin “a

⁹⁰⁸ Seán Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 90.

⁹⁰⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 249.

⁹¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau, “Principles of International Politics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1956, p. 2.

⁹¹¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 174.

⁹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁹¹³ Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell, *A Better Ape*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, p. 20.

⁹¹⁴ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 50.

⁹¹⁵ David Sepkoski, *Catastrophic Thinking: Extinction and the Value of Diversity from Darwin to the Anthropocene*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2020, p. 51.

fundamental tenet of evolutionary biology is that organisms must constantly adapt just to stay in the same strategic position *relative* to their enemies - who are constantly changing as well.”⁹¹⁶

Social Darwinism and its representatives especially had a clear zero-sum mindset.⁹¹⁷ As mentioned earlier, those identified as social Darwinists strongly believed in life as a zero-sum game.⁹¹⁸ Herbert Spencer, for example, identified that life represents a zero-sum game because the environment operates according to the laws of natural selection.⁹¹⁹ Social Darwinists saw that competition was a driving force in human relations and believed that individuals, groups, and nations that could gain a relative advantage over others would survive and thrive.⁹²⁰ For them, both the social and international realm is like a zero-sum game. At the social level, they shared the conviction that success, especially economic success, is only possible at the expense of other people’s failures. At the international level, states behave like organisms competing for survival and dominance in an environment characterized by limited resources and intense competition. The successful states are those that can gain relative gains by accumulating power and wealth, either by out-competing other nations or by exploiting their resources and labour. The struggle for existence leads to the survival of the fittest, with the fittest being those who were able to gain a relative advantage in terms of resources, power and influence. Simply put, in the social Darwinist worldview, each state is pitted in a zero-sum conflict for the “survival of the fittest.”⁹²¹ In addition, social Darwinists imagined, just like classical realists, that there is antagonistic nature in the social and international realm. Again, just like realists, they were highly sceptical regarding any type of cooperation, both at the social and international levels.

This brings us to the evolutionary roots of a zero-sum game, and that is zero-sum bias. Many researchers suggest that zero-sum bias, or zero-sum thinking, is a product of evolution.⁹²² Every animal, including humans, is wired with the belief that all resources in their environment come in limited supply. According to this position, zero-sum bias can be seen as a product of the natural selection process, where organisms that could make quick and effective decisions in zero-sum situations were more likely to survive and pass on their genes to future generations. More specifically, the early humans who recognized that resources that were necessary for life were scarce and could only be obtained through fierce competition were the ones that survived within their species. In other words, zero-sum bias increased the survival chances of early humans, and natural selection has thus ensured that it continues to be an instinctive way of thinking in modern humans as well. Seen in this context, zero-sum bias has naturally led to the escalation of conflicts and incited immoral behaviour, both of which we attribute to Darwinists as well as classical realists.

Furthermore, zero-sum bias is intertwined with selfishness, which, as we saw earlier, is one of the basic tenets of classical realism and Darwinism. Here again, one comes across Richard Dawkins and his selfish gene theory. As selfishness is, according to Dawkins, a fundamental aspect of

⁹¹⁶ Raphael Sagarin, “Adapt or Die: What Charles Darwin Can Teach Tom Ridge about Homeland Security”, *Foreign Policy*, October 2009, p. 69.

⁹¹⁷ Herbert Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence”, *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 64, Number 4, 1985, p. 673.

⁹¹⁸ Piotr Radkiewicz and Krystyna Skarżyńska, “Who Are the ‘Social Darwinists’? On Dispositional Determinants of Perceiving the Social World as Competitive Jungle”, *PLoS ONE*, Vol. 16, No. 8, 2021, p. 15.

⁹¹⁹ Herbert Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence”, *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 64, Number 4, 1985, pp. 666-667.

⁹²⁰ Gregory Radick, “Darwinism and Social Darwinism”, in Warren Breckman (ed.) and Peter E. Gordon (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Modern European Thought, Volume 1: The Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 279-300; Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 85.

⁹²¹ Kenneth Payne, *Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 2018, p. 42.

⁹²² See Robert Wright, *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny*, Vintage Books, New York, 2000; Daniel V. Meegan, “Zero-Sum Bias: Perceived Competition Despite Unlimited Resources”, *Frontiers in Psychology*, Vol. 1, Article 191, 2010, pp. 1-7; Paul Rubin, *Darwinian Politics*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2002.

biological life, interactions among organisms in nature are, for the most part, intrinsically zero-sum.⁹²³ This selfishness is related to zero-sum bias because it assumes that resources are limited and must be competed for, leading organisms to prioritize their own interests over those of others. This perspective only fosters a sense of competition and focuses on self-interest rather than cooperation and the common good. As such, the idea of selfish genes is linked to zero-sum bias. Consequently, it also represents a part of human behaviour, extending further onto social interactions and finally onto (international) politics. In essence, zero-sum bias as a concept has its background in evolution and is undoubtedly aligned with the classical realist view of international relations.

Overall, the zero-sum law seems present and inevitable both in the realm of nature and the international arena. Seen in this light, classical realism is in accordance with this side of Darwinism since it also emphasizes a competitive zero-sum outlook. Firstly, classical realism concurs with Darwinism that the planet human beings inhabit contains finite resources. Consequently, human beings inevitably compete with each other and therefore create a zero-sum situation with regard to survival. Following that logic, this “intra-species” struggle for survival encompasses all other struggles and all other interests, such as state survival. In other words, since the struggle for survival is the dominant logic in human affairs, all other ensuing human-created processes represent only an adaptive variation within this ongoing context. Likewise, what is equally important to understand is that zero-sum game includes zero-sum bias (zero-sum thinking), which has its roots in evolution. If humans and states are prone to selfish behaviour, as classical realism suggests, then zero-sum bias and its evolutionary background should not be ignored in any way.

Finally, why did Darwinism and Morgenthau’s classical realism have a strong zero-sum worldview? Namely, why were these two areas highly susceptible regarding this topic? The answer is simple - because competition lies at the core of both fields. A zero-sum game is known as a strictly competitive game because units (whether organisms, humans, societies or states) are obliged to compete with each other to increase their own benefits. From a classical realist point of view, competition is an unrelenting fact of international politics. Likewise, competition in the Darwinian worldview is essential since no organic life can exist and prosper without some form of competition. Furthermore, considering this competitive and conflict-prone setting, social Darwinism and classical realism have not regarded highly cooperation and mutual benefits since such an environment, as they believed, does not favour such behaviour.

In conclusion, the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist perspective on zero-sum dynamics significantly contributes to the hard core of Morgenthau’s theory and classical realism by reinforcing their shared emphasis on competition, limited resources, and the zero-sum nature of survival struggles, whether in biological evolution or the realm of international relations. Darwinian evolution and classical realism emphasize the presence of limited resources and competition, and the Darwinian perspective on natural selection and competition aligns with classical realism’s view of states engaging in a competitive struggle for power and survival in an anarchic international environment. Both emphasize the struggle for survival, where gains for one entity often mean losses for others, be it in evolutionary biology or state relations. Darwinian scientific ideas regarding zero-sum bias and selfishness align with classical realist assertions about egoistic human nature and states prioritizing their own interests. Their belief in relative gains overshadows the potential for mutual benefit and collaborative endeavors. Consequentially, they devalue the prospects of cooperation and focus more on competition.

⁹²³ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 5.

6.11. Conclusion

This chapter was devoted to Hans J. Morgenthau, a German-American scholar and a leading figure in the classical realist school of thought. Even though classical realism dates back to antiquity, Hans Morgenthau's basic principles have remained the trademark of this theory in its modern sense to this day. His ideas, arguments and insights about world politics are indispensable for any serious inquiry. The main intention behind this chapter was to demonstrate that Morgenthau's political realism, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, draws from diverse intellectual sources, one of which was definitely Darwinism in its Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist form. To further underline this point, the aim was to show that Hans Morgenthau's theory of international politics has inadvertently and intuitively integrated ideas derived from Darwinism. In this task, three key categories played a crucial role in the analysis. The first category consists of modern researchers and representatives of scientific Darwinism, primarily evolutionary biologists, sociobiologists, primatologists, ethologists etc. The second category embodies conventional representatives of social Darwinism starting from Herbert Spencer onwards. Finally, the third category belongs to militant representatives of German social Darwinism and its two central figures: Heinrich von Treitschke and Friedrich von Bernhardi. In addition to these three mentioned categories, it is also worth remembering that even Charles Darwin himself had his share of various topics under consideration. Taken together, they all contributed to a greater or lesser extent to the classical realist hard core and protective belt. Consequently, they support the argument that ideas of Darwinism must be included in classical realism for its complete theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence. This concluding subchapter will briefly summarize some of the main findings.

Firstly, as mentioned before, pessimistic understanding of human nature is the most important determinant of classical realism. Hans Morgenthau laid special emphasis on the pessimistic understanding of human nature and the effect it has on domestic and international politics. The first thing shown is that Morgenthau accepts and refers to the most famous American social Darwinist, William Graham Sumner, regarding human nature. More importantly, it has been shown that egoism and dominance, as key facets of human nature in Morgenthau's theory, are deeply rooted in evolution. This basically means that classical realism must take into consideration the basic features of human nature they explored as the products of human evolution. Finally, social Darwinists had also their say regarding this topic. Their position regarding egoism and domination, as well as regarding the pessimistic understanding of human nature, is almost identical to the position of Hans Morgenthau. On top of that, social Darwinists and Hans Morgenthau shared the deterministic belief regarding human nature.

Hans Morgenthau's theory also aligns ideas of Darwinism regarding the tragedy of life and human struggle in this world. Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection challenged the traditional view of life as a purposeful and harmonious creation. Instead, Darwin's theory suggested that life is shaped by the "opposing forces" in the struggle for survival, which can be seen as both tragic and ruthless. On the other hand, many social Darwinists have especially emphasized life's tragic and obnoxious condition in general. Although one can sense the elements of Greek tragedies, Morgenthau's writing on this issue is most akin and consistent with Darwinism.

Another interesting point for consideration was the concept of power. What was exposed first was that the power dynamics in the animal kingdom, although complex and multidimensional, are present and very much like the classical realist depiction of that phenomenon. Bearing in mind that primates are our closest relatives, it has been shown that dominance and power-seeking are pervasive and ubiquitous characteristics in their domain as well. Furthermore, the Malthusian side of the power phenomenon in terms of scarce resources was equally considered significant for Hans

Morgenthau. On the other side of the argument, one finds social Darwinist stronger (superior) vs weaker (inferior) interplay. Social Darwinism is notorious for its view that the social and political world is a highly competitive “jungle” where individuals and states ruthlessly compete for resources and power. From Morgenthau’s and social Darwinist point of view, this power struggle is so fierce that it ultimately leads to the division between those who are strong (superior) and those that are weak (inferior). Morgenthau less, and social Darwinists more saw this as a natural law of life as such. Finally, Treitschke and Bernhardi, the leading German militant social Darwinists, identified that the international realm nourishes a permanent Darwinian struggle whose highest goal is power. They gave supreme value to power-politics in the same way that Morgenthau described it. Likewise, Ludwig Gumplowicz did not deviate much from their standpoint. In one way or another, Morgenthau’s description of power has both Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist roots.

In addition to power, survival or self-preservation was also exceptionally important. The ethos and the imperative of survival are pivotal for the entire Darwinian thought. What was especially noticeable at first glance was that the Hobbesian vision of survival and the social Darwinist one are, to the greatest extent, tantamount. Haeckel, Huxley, Sumner and Gumplowicz all shared the classical realist position of survival as a top priority. Social Darwinists saw that international politics represented a natural and inevitable struggle for survival and dominance among nations. Again, just like Morgenthau and other classical realists, Treitschke and Bernhardi recognized that survival and power are basically two sides of the same coin.

What was also noticed in this analysis was that Hans Morgenthau somewhat relativized imperialism. To reiterate, his views on economic imperialism and Monroe Doctrine are, to put it mildly, problematic. His very definition of imperialism concerns those states who want to change the existing status quo in the international system but not those who have been imperialistic for centuries and are looking to preserve their imperialistic practices. Even though the politics of imperialism is usually associated with social Darwinism, Morgenthau minimized its role in the case of the United States. Although one mustn’t overlook the fact that the later Morgenthau adamantly advocated for restraint as a component of statesmen’s prudence, particularly evident in the case of Vietnam, the earlier Morgenthau, as presented in *Politics Among Nations*, frequently linked imperialism with power politics.⁹²⁴ That is why imperialism needs to be put under a classical realist protective belt.

Another crucial dimension in this analysis was the question of morality. First of all, Charles Darwin himself was not much concerned regarding the rights and wrongs that were taking place due to the struggle for existence in the biological world.⁹²⁵ Likewise, many social Darwinists also understood that a competitive setting, sooner or later, breeds moral relativism. Furthermore, both Treitschke and Bernhardi saw that the moral law of the individual citizen is diametrically opposed to the moral law of the state. For Treitschke, the state has no moral law other than preserving its existence.⁹²⁶ Consequently, war and international law are just part of the underlying international power struggles. In this spirit, Hans Morgenthau only further elaborates on these interpretations of morality and transfers them onto the international scene.

Attention was also given to the notions of fear, adaptation, and imitation. Needless to say, these three concepts have their roots in evolutionary theory, and all three are portrayed in Morgenthau’s representation of international politics. Fear, for example, is, for Morgenthau, a paramount human drive that also compels states to seek power in order to ensure their survival. On the other hand,

⁹²⁴ See Jennifer W. See, “A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955–1965”, *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2001, pp. 419-448; Lorenzo Zambarnardi, “The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau's Critique of American Intervention in Vietnam”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, pp. 1335-1356.

⁹²⁵ Michael Ruse, *Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 82.

⁹²⁶ Henry William Carless Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich Von Treitschke*, Constable, London, 1914, p. 6.

Morgenthau revealed various mechanisms of adaptation which states must excessively use in the international arena. Probably the most important finding regarding adaptation was that Spencer's concept of "equilibrium" and Morgenthau's "balance of power" are seen as self-regulating mechanisms that maintain stability in the (international) system. Additionally, Morgenthau and Spencer used "balance of power" and "dynamic equilibrium" as metaphors. Finally, Morgenthau views imitation and emulation as important facets of international politics. According to him, there is a natural tendency in which states imitate and even surpass the achievements of other states in the pursuit of power and survival.

Materialism is also identified as a central tenet of Darwinism and classical realism. The classical realist paradigm assumes that there is a primacy of material capabilities in the international structure. They also believed that human nature, in particular, is entrenched in materialistic values. Likewise, from its very beginnings, Darwinism leaned towards a materialist belief system. Social Darwinism has especially inscribed ontological materialism in their understanding of the individual, of society, and of politics in general.

Last but not least, both Morgenthau's classical realism and social Darwinism rest upon a zero-sum worldview. Taking into account that tangible resources are fixed and that competition is endless, a zero-sum outlook really does seem like the only option on the table. Besides that, a zero-sum game is associated with things such as selfishness and zero-sum bias, both of which are grounded in evolution.

Taking everything into account, one can tell that the thread of Darwinism is never far from the surface in Hans J. Morgenthau's theory. The content of the previous subchapters has revealed that Morgenthau cannot think of human nature and the nature of international politics in anything other than in Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist terms. By acknowledging his close affinity with the ideas of Darwinism, one can better understand the biological foundations of his theory and classical realism as a whole. For those reasons, Morgenthau implicitly and explicitly relies on ideas derived from Darwinism, and if his theory wants to keep its identity, distinctiveness, and coherence, it must include the scope of those ideas and principles.

Hans J. Morgenthau's theory	Darwinian scientific ideas	Social Darwinism
Hard core	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary roots of conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary roots of power <input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary roots of egoism and domination <input type="checkbox"/> Evolutionary roots of zero-sum bias <input type="checkbox"/> Materialism <input type="checkbox"/> Fear as evolutionary tool for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Adaptation as evolutionary tool for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Imitation as evolutionary tool for survival 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Eternal competition and struggle for survival <input type="checkbox"/> Pessimistic understanding of human nature <input type="checkbox"/> Struggle for power <input type="checkbox"/> War as regular feature of power politics <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian zero-sum outlook <input type="checkbox"/> Materialism <input type="checkbox"/> Moral relativism
Protective belt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Malthusian competition for resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Imperialism <input type="checkbox"/> Strong vs weak bias <input type="checkbox"/> Balance of power <input type="checkbox"/> Geography

Table 4. Ideas of Darwinism and the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

This concluding chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will reiterate key reasons why ideas of Darwinism must be positioned as classical realism's hard core and protective belt. This chapter's second section will deepen the discussion and give prospects for future research. In other words, this chapter will conclude the study by summarizing the key research findings in relation to the research aims and research questions, and it will also review the limitations of the study and propose opportunities for future research.

Essentially, this dissertation aimed to investigate two research questions: whether classical realism implicitly or explicitly relies on ideas of Darwinism and whether these ideas are vital for maintaining the theory's coherence, distinctiveness, and theoretical identity. Consequently, it sought to explore whether the ideas of Darwinism belong to the classical realist theoretical hard-core and protective belt. From the analysis provided in the previous chapters, it is evident that the ideas of Darwinism hold a significant place within classical realism, influencing its foundational principles, shaping its theoretical identity, and contributing to its distinctiveness and coherence. The connections between classical realism and ideas of Darwinism can be summarized and applied to address the two research questions posed:

Research Question 1: Does classical realism implicitly or explicitly rely on ideas of Darwinism?

The comprehensive exploration conducted throughout this thesis demonstrates that classical realism, both implicitly and explicitly, draws upon Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist concepts. Several layers of this reliance are evident:

1. Classical Geopolitics:

Classical realism, through the lenses of classical geopolitics, substantially integrates ideas from Darwinism. For instance, classical realism relies on ideas of Darwinism through the concept of struggle, which must be understood primarily in the Darwinian sense. This is something that the theorists of classical geopolitics understood very well, and it was also recognized by the three theorists (Nietzsche, Weber and Schmitt) who directly influenced classical realism as a theory. As a result, the struggle for power in the international arena contains primarily a Darwinian (survive or perish) connotation, which classical realism persistently avoided as a fact, but classical geopolitics did not. Another reason deals with the understanding that the state is the main subject of international relations. Again, it was no coincidence that this issue came to mind in both traditions. In this regard, the ideas of social Darwinists, such as the organic-state theory of Herbert Spencer and Ludwig Gumplowicz, parallel to a great extent that of Thomas Hobbes.⁹²⁷ Like Spencer, Hobbes compared the parts of the state to the organs and later described the state as an "artificial animal."⁹²⁸ Most classical realists have extracted an analogy between the state and Thomas Hobbes's selfish individual who behaves self-interestedly.⁹²⁹ Despite its resemblance, they accepted the Hobbesian anthropomorphic understanding of the state but not a Spencerian organic one.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁷ See Harry E. Barnes, "The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions: An Exposition and Critique of the Sociological System of Ludwig Gumplowicz", *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1919, pp. 394-419.

⁹²⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: The English and Latin Texts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 16.

⁹²⁹ Jill Steans; et al, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes*, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2010, pp. 56-57.

⁹³⁰ Jonathan H. Turner, Leonard Beeghley and Charles H. Powers, *The Emergence of Sociological Theory*, Sage Publications, London, 2012, p. 65.

Even though the Hobbesian self-interested individual is mentioned in almost every classical realist textbook, one can argue that Ratzel's and Kjellen's idea of the organic state is as pertinent to the question of realist's individualization of states. They perceived states as organic entities, but they also saw states as individuals and, most importantly, as the main actors in international affairs. Therefore, Ratzel's and Kjellén's understanding of the state as an organism that acts according to its self-interest and wants power for self-preservation should be accepted and incorporated since it matches that of Thomas Hobbes and political realists.

Furthermore, classical realists continuously reminded their readers of the Thucydidean notion that relations among states are marked by anarchy in which the strongest (powerful) states dominate the weaker (less powerful) ones. Stronger vs weaker parallel is a distinguished principle of social Darwinism since its inception. Moreover, this "law of the jungle" narrative was especially alive within the scientific discourse of classical geopolitics. This idea constantly runs through the theory of classical realism, and there is no particular reason why this reliance on social Darwinism should be camouflaged in any sense. On top of that, classical realists have praised their theory because they wanted to display the world of international politics as it is - ruthless and tragic. However, Kjellén, Haushofer and Mackinder have explained the same thing by demonstrating the reality of international politics as a merciless Darwinian struggle between nation-states. Likewise, classical realism and classical geopolitics espoused the idea of a zero-sum game in which any loss of wealth (or power) by one side is a gain for the other. From such a perspective, the drive for relative status is inherent, and the ultimate consequence of such a situation is more domination and less cooperation. The zero-sum outlook is a distinct social Darwinist idea significant for both Spencer and Gumpłowicz.⁹³¹ The classical realist zero-sum perspective indirectly relies on Spencer's and Gumpłowicz's Darwinian outlook regarding this matter.

The classical realist "language of power" among theorists of classical geopolitics is something that has been insufficiently emphasized. Classical geopolitics did not exclusively concentrate on territory as the highest and most important determinant of international relations; it also paid great tribute to power. In fact, their philosophy of power is intertwined with their notion of morality, as they were concerned regarding its limits. They were highly sceptical of the idea that morality could guide state behaviour and believed that the pursuit of self-interest was the primary motive behind state actions. They saw the morality of a state as being limited by its interests and believed that attempts to impose moral values on states were likely to be ignored or exploited. Detachment of these two matters (morality and power-politics) was mostly associated with the theorists of classical realism. However, as we can now see, it was also dominant among the theorists of classical geopolitics, primarily due to their Darwinian mindset. Another point worth mentioning is Kjellén's and Mahan's understanding of egoism, which they both entwined with survival in the Darwinian sense long before Morgenthau and Niebuhr had the opportunity to analyze this concept. This is where classical realism and ideas of Darwinism again meet, and precisely because of this classical realism needs to integrate the Darwinian undertone into the meaning of this concept.

An additional reason for classical realist reliance on ideas of Darwinism has to do with the Anglo-American school of geopolitics. Current scholarship has indeed noticed that classical realists wanted to distance themselves from the German school of geopolitics and that the Anglo-American school was far more convenient for building a new international relations theory.⁹³² However, what is left unnoticed is that Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman, who belong to the Anglo-American school of geopolitics, also succumbed to the Darwinistic way of thinking and accepted some of the key ideas and principles. Even though they were more convenient role models for American

⁹³¹ Herbert J. Hovenkamp, "Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence", *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1985, p. 667; Steven Loyal and Siniša Malešević, *Classical Sociological Theory*, SAGE, Los Angeles, 2021, p. 204.

⁹³² Zhengyu Wu, "Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, p. 790.

realism, the fact remained that all three of them had clear social Darwinist insights.⁹³³ Classical realism thus relies on the ideas of Darwinism since it intentionally assimilates Anglo-American school of geopolitics.

Classical realism also leans on social Darwinism because of imperialism. Imperialism is an important part of social Darwinism, and, as is well known, the theorists of geopolitics, in one way or another, openly advocated for such policies.⁹³⁴ On the other side, the validation and justification of imperialism were taboo among theorists of classical realism. However, the spark of imperialism (in its various forms) was present but slowly faded away in the theory of classical realism. Nicholas Spykman was that turning point since this scholar belonged to classical geopolitics and classical realism. Spykman spoke of imperialism in a subtle form of power maximization while at the same time openly advocating for American colonialism just like his European counterparts (Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer) did decades earlier.⁹³⁵ Monroe Doctrine, of course, illustrated this point for Spykman and both schools of geopolitics, but as one could also see, this Doctrine was equally appealing for Carl Schmitt and even Morgenthau himself. After Spykman, imperialism was slowly replaced with “spheres of interest” and similar terminology that was adequate for the academic discourse in the US. Nicholas Spykman was the last theorist of classical geopolitics but the first theorist of classical realism in which the elements of social Darwinism have been explicitly identifiable. Imperialism in its various forms was also found in the case of the two recognized predecessors of classical realism: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. Even the classical realist concept of balance of power was also associated with imperialism in classical geopolitics. In particular, this concept was first adopted by the German theorists of classical geopolitics, namely by Kjellén and Haushofer and then later by Mackinder and Spykman.

Overall, classical geopolitics, an influential precursor to classical realism, significantly embodies ideas of Darwinism. Concepts like the struggle for power, survival, and dominance mirror social Darwinist principles of competition, survival, and the dominance of the strongest. The theorists within classical geopolitics, such as Ratzel, Kjellén, Haushofer, and Mackinder, embody these Darwinian elements and offer a foundation for classical realism’s theoretical underpinnings. Classical realism thus implicitly borrows its rationale from classical geopolitics, not without but together with its social Darwinist background. This is a very pertinent point because it is difficult to identify realist themes separately from classical geopolitical themes, and at the same time, it is also impossible to exclude geopolitical topics from social Darwinist ones. Struggle for power and survival, egoism, state-centrism, moral relativism, and other principles are all part of the social Darwinist framework. This is what theorists of classical geopolitics recognized and accepted, while classical realists did not, even though they constantly referred to the biological basis of human nature and state behaviour. The integration of geopolitical principles, especially those rooted in Darwinism, therefore shapes classical realism’s focus on the nature of international politics. If classical realism is compelled to include a geopolitical background, it should also include social Darwinism as its inherent component. One can then safely say that one of the reasons why ideas of Darwinism are the hard core and protective belt of classical realism is because of classical geopolitics and its social Darwinist representatives. This is beneficial since it better reflects classical realism as an IR theory.

⁹³³ Milomir Stepić, *Geopolitika: ideje, teorije, koncepcije*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, p. 260.

⁹³⁴ Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 203.

⁹³⁵ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 318.

2. Influence of Key Thinkers (Nietzsche, Weber, Schmitt)

Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt, who had a direct and recognized influence on the development of classical realism, are shown to have subscribed to Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas. Their thoughts, closely connected with social Darwinism, profoundly shaped the trajectory of classical realism and its core principles, influencing later realist thinkers like Hans Morgenthau. Their understanding of struggle, egoism, survival, power, etc. is somewhat associated with ideas derived from Darwinism, and their perspectives significantly contribute to the theoretical identity of classical realism by infusing this theory with Darwinian concepts.

Their affiliation with the ideas of Darwinism transpires on several levels. For instance, Friedrich Nietzsche, who clearly influenced Hans Morgenthau, identified that natural selection is the cause of egoism. For Nietzsche, natural selection breeds selfishness and procreation (i.e. reproduction) results from drives that are ultimately selfish. One often finds in Nietzsche's writings that "health" equals "selfishness." His evolutionary understanding of power is equally important to point out. With Nietzsche's philosophical backing, Morgenthau created his way of looking at human nature and the nature of politics in general, which later laid the ontological and theoretical framework for the entire realist paradigm. In other words, Nietzsche's interest in naturalism was crucial to developing his philosophical project and later to developing classical realism as a theory within IR.

Likewise, the Darwinian notion of struggle (*Kampf*) runs through all three theorists that were analyzed. Like many Victorian-era social Darwinists, Nietzsche underlines the importance of struggle and competition for life in general. It is no accident that he was perceived as a social Darwinist since he advocated for the eternal struggle between "social interest groups, nations, and races."⁹³⁶ Max Weber's understanding of struggle is basically the same as Nietzsche's. Likewise, Carl Schmitt's concept of the political is fundamentally grounded on a social Darwinist narrative of a violent and deadly struggle. Besides that, Schmitt, as a recognized forerunner of classical realism, even referred to those unrecognized theorists (i.e. theorists of classical geopolitics) and integrated their (Darwinian) understanding of the struggle for space. In addition, Schmitt also follows the logic of Kjellén, Haushofer and Mackinder with regard to the fierce Darwinian reality of international politics. Even the line of organicism, which first appeared in the German branch of geopolitics, eventually found its place in the works of this controversial German intellectual. The clearest expression of Carl Schmitt's organic state theory is found in his *The Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual (Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen)*, published in 1914. Just like in the case of classical geopolitics, Schmitt blends the ideas of Thomas Hobbes and German organic tradition into his organic state theory.⁹³⁷ On top of that, one can see a joint attack on liberalism that starts with the theorists of classical geopolitics, continuing to Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt, and eventually reaching Hans J. Morgenthau himself.

Just like the unrecognized forebears of classical realism, those recognized theorists also advocated for imperialism, usually as a normal reaction resulting from increased state power. Pursuing and accumulating more power eventually leads to some form of imperialism. In other words, once more power appears, imperialism (in its various forms) ultimately follows. With that in mind, classical realism relies on social Darwinism since most of those analyzed encouraged such a foreign policy approach. Economic imperialism in the works of Halford Mackinder parallels the same way in the works of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. They all shared a social Darwinist approach to economic expansion, which essentially contains a zero-sum principle that economic gain for one state must be

⁹³⁶ Dirk Robert Johnson, "Nietzsche's Early Darwinism: The "David Strauss" Essay of 1873", *Nietzsche-Studien*, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2001, p. 73.

⁹³⁷ Benjamin A. Schupmann, *Carl Schmitt's State and Constitutional Theory: A Critical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 131-132.

at the expense of another.⁹³⁸ Thus, it is important to highlight that both unrecognized and recognized forebears of classical realism did not just advocate for more space but more power and economic capabilities.

3. Hans J. Morgenthau

The third and most important reason why classical realism relies both implicitly and explicitly on the ideas of Darwinism has to do with its founder – Hans J. Morgenthau. This German-American scholar undoubtedly symbolizes this IR theory as he is the one who established the standards and guidelines of modern political realism. One of Morgenthau's peculiar talents was his unflinching capacity for objectivity regarding international politics and life in general. Life itself, according to Morgenthau, has evolutionary background because “[...] life is in constant flux. Life is always in a “period of transition”.”⁹³⁹ However, one does not only find his explicit relationship with Darwinism in these types of sentences, which are quite frequent in his writings, but also in the breadth and depth of his captivating theory. This research has identified several connections between Hans Morgenthau's theory and ideas of Darwinism. These connections primarily revolve around a pessimistic understanding of human nature, the concept of power, the struggle for survival, the tragedy of life, morality, fear, adaptation, imitation, materialism, and a zero-sum worldview.

To begin with, Morgenthau's emphasis on the pessimistic understanding of human nature aligns with the social Darwinist view of human nature as egoistic and dominant. Morgenthau's theory implicitly relies on Darwinism because, just like him, many social Darwinists also framed determinism with regard to human nature. Likewise, modern scientific findings show us that these negative human traits can be traced back to the principles of evolution. Similarly, Morgenthau's depiction of power dynamics and the struggle for power reflects Darwinian roots. Simply put, if one peels the layers of power, one finds evolution at its foundation. As an illustration, of no less importance, are animal societies because they regularly wage wars in the service of power. Darwinian scientific ideas altogether reinforce the general argument that power is entwined with life itself. On the other hand, power is also an important facet in the social Darwinist perspective, especially among those German militant representatives of social Darwinism. Furthermore, the analysis has shown that even though for classical realist's survival in the anarchical environment is Hobbesian in nature, it is equally Darwinian because social Darwinists also pointed to the uncertainty of survival in a dangerous environment. Classical realists, as proponents of Thomas Hobbes, drew on his notion of “survival” without taking into account that this was something that Darwin and his followers were also famous for, not just Hobbes. Bearing in mind that international politics is determined by the struggle for power and survival in the anarchical environment, both international law and morality can only be ephemeral compared to a chaotic world that is ruled by the fittest.

Likewise, the tragic and ruthless aspects of life highlighted in Darwinism are also consistent with Morgenthau's understanding of the tragedy of life and the struggle in international politics. Additionally, concepts such as fear, adaptation, and imitation that are rooted in Darwinian scientific ideas are noted to have their rightful place in Morgenthau's theory of international politics. Apart from that, perhaps the most relevant finding regarding adaptation deals with Morgenthau's balance of power, which is almost identical to Spencer's understanding of equilibrium. This analysis also pointed out that both Darwinism and classical realism share a materialist perspective and that the zero-sum worldview, which sees competition and limited resources as inherent aspects of both theories, is also emphasized as a common feature.

⁹³⁸ Scott Gordon, “Darwin and Political Economy: The Connection Reconsidered”, *Journal of the History of Biology*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1989, pp. 437-459.

⁹³⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947, p. 14.

In the early stages of his career, Morgenthau demonstrates many similarities with classical geopolitics, especially his understanding of politics as a struggle for survival and power maximization. Simply put, the struggle for existence is pervasive because we live in a world of scarcity, and self-interests inherently must collide. Likewise, since all actors always try to increase their power, expansion (territorial or other) seems as the natural result of a power fluctuation in the environment. Unlike classical geopolitics, classical realism discreetly employed a specific platform for territorial expansion – the Monroe Doctrine. As already mentioned, this Doctrine came in handy to the theorists of geopolitics from continental Europe as a means to justify and validate expansionist policies of their own countries in the form of *Lebensraum*. Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, and later Carl Schmitt highly valued its practicability and usefulness for the US foreign policy while simultaneously recognizing its genuine applicability to German expansionist policies. Hans Morgenthau was one classical realist who unpretentiously identified that the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was just to secure America's unique position, fundamental interests and domination in the Western Hemisphere.⁹⁴⁰ What is less known and acknowledged is that this Doctrine also served for the United States to establish colonies in the period of the rapid growth of its power during the last decade of the 19th century.⁹⁴¹

For obvious reasons, Hans Morgenthau circumvented the fact that the maximization of power leads to territorial expansion. He was also hesitant to acknowledge his reliance on classical geopolitics and Carl Schmitt concerning Monroe Doctrine. Nonetheless, his thoughts on this Doctrine bear the mark of Carl Schmitt and classical geopolitics. Lastly, while it is known that Monroe Doctrine was utilized for the *Lebensraum* concept, what has been bypassed so far is that *Lebensraum* has been slowly transformed into *Großraum* and then into realist (Spykman-Morgenthau) power maximization. That is why Hans Morgenthau remains quite vague as far as imperialism is concerned. The narrative he used in *Politics Among Nations* to discuss the matter of imperialism directly opposes that of anti-colonial discourse. Specifically, he tended to portray the American empire as a natural outcome that is justified by the privileges associated with being a “great power.” Bearing that in mind, one can only ratify Matthew Specter's claim that realism has empire ingrained into its DNA. This DNA has seeds of social Darwinism, considering that classical realist official and unofficial predecessors were also associated with social Darwinist line of thought and all pretty much endorsed imperialism in one way or another.

Research Question 2: Does classical realism need ideas of Darwinism to maintain its theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence?

The analysis strongly supports the argument that ideas of Darwinism are essential for classical realism's theoretical identity, distinctiveness, and coherence. As demonstrated in the respective chapters, although variously interpreted and with different degrees of emphasis, foundational Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas are present in the forebears of classical realism and the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. It has been shown that many foundational Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist assumptions are relevant for classical realist theory. As such, both Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist ideas are at the hard core and protective belt of this IR theory.

First of all, the results indicate sufficient Darwinian scientific material in both recognized and unrecognized forebears of classical realism to ignore Darwinism as an important determinant. These theorists even occasionally quoted each other, and all found it difficult to avoid and resist the language of Darwinism in their writings. They also had a social Darwinist trait that ultimately

⁹⁴⁰ Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011, p. 20; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004, p. 70.

⁹⁴¹ Rutledge M. Dennis, “Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race”, *The Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 1995, p. 245.

affected their epistemology. This clear Darwinian line of thought is what the previous scholarship has not considered important for the theory of classical realism. In other words, IR researchers did not tend to look at Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and Carl Schmitt from the angle of Darwinism. Likewise, a deeper connection between classical realism and classical geopolitics involving Darwinism has not been achieved until now. The spirit of Darwinism in both recognized and unrecognized forebears of classical realism can help us better understand and deconstruct this IR theory.

Although social Darwinism was primarily used to legitimize laissez-faire capitalism, one can see that it has major applications for classical realism as well. If we leave aside the strong racial charge against some social Darwinists, a lot connects social Darwinism and classical realism. For instance, like classical realists, many social Darwinists wanted to portray the brutal and harsh reality of international politics. Treitschke, Bernhardt, Haeckel, Gumpowicz are some of those proponents. Therefore, without much objection, one can call them realists in the broader sense of the word. In international politics, social Darwinism refers to the belief that countries that are the most competitive and able to adapt to changing circumstances will be the most successful in the long run. Social Darwinist introspection regarding human nature is highly beneficial for classical realism, especially the negative side of it. Both social Darwinism and classical realism are grounded in materialism and emphasize the importance of competition and struggle in shaping human behaviour. At the same time, classical realism and social Darwinism argue that competition, grounded on material factors, is a central feature among states in the international anarchical environment.

German militant representatives of social Darwinism especially came in handy regarding international politics. They used the same catchphrases as Hans J. Morgenthau when pondering international politics. Treitschke, Bernhardt and Ratzel all believed that international politics was primarily driven by the struggle for power among nation-states. They identified that states are primary actors in international relations which act according to their own self-interest. They argued that a strong and assertive nation-state was necessary for survival in the international system and that the pursuit of power was a natural and legitimate aim of any state. They also rejected the idea of universal moral principles since power is inherently amoral, and moral considerations should not constrain states in their pursuit of power. In other words, wars and conflicts are inevitable features of international politics, and international law and morality are often ignored in favour of power politics.

Additionally, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, primatology, and ethology all fall within the realm of Darwinian scientific ideas, collectively contributing to the explanation of key classical realist principles. These areas especially enrich classical realist position on egoism, dominance, survivalist instinct and power phenomenon. They also help us to recognize and better understand other subsidiary elements (fear, adaptation, imitation etc.) in the classical realist perception of international politics. As for Hans J. Morgenthau, the results seem to point out a decided shift from simple Darwinian analogy to considerable Darwinian ontology. Morgenthau's incorporation of Darwinian scientific elements shapes the hard core and protective belt of classical realism, providing a coherent framework to understand human nature, state behavior, and power dynamics in international relations. Specifically, his emphasis on the pessimistic side of human nature, the struggle for power and survival, tragic aspects of life, fear, adaptation, imitation, and zero-sum echoes Darwinian scientific principles.

In conclusion, the deep-rooted connections between classical realism and the ideas of Darwinism are foundational to understanding the theory's theoretical identity, coherence, and distinctiveness. While classical realists insist on the biological foundation of their theory, it is essential for them to unequivocally accept that the scientific ideas of Darwinism constitute this biological foundation.

From the struggle for power and survival to the pessimistic view of human nature, Darwinism forms an indispensable framework upon which classical realism is built. This interwoven relationship underscores that both Darwinian scientific ideas and social Darwinism are not merely incidental but integral to classical realism's theoretical bedrocks. To truly grasp the essence of classical realism, one must acknowledge and embrace both the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist concepts deeply embedded within the theory, as they provide the necessary coherence and explanatory power for understanding the dynamics of international politics. As such, the imperative of Darwinism implicitly and explicitly reinforces classical realism as a theory of IR. If *Realpolitik* and *Machtpolitik* are considered parts of classical realism, then ideas of Darwinism in its broadest sense should be too.

* * *

In sum, this dissertation contributes to the scholarship shown in this literature review in several aspects. On the one hand, it contributes to the literature by advancing the current understanding of classical realism, and, at the same time, it clarifies the theoretical foundations of this theory. It also proposes a new point of view of classical realism, i.e., the Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist angles that are present but often suppressed in most works written by classical realists. Simply put, Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist thinking amongst classical realists and their predecessors was always “in the air” whether they recognized it or not. In this respect, the ideas of Darwinism, both in Darwinian scientific and social Darwinist senses, can fundamentally enhance the insights of classical realism as an IR theory.

The attention will now be drawn to potential areas for future studies since there is room for new insights into this topic. Before that, it is necessary to briefly clarify why ideas of Darwinism can be important for the discipline of International Relations (IR). First of all, Darwinism, with its foundational ideas about survival, adaptation, and competition, can offer interesting lenses through which to view IR. Likewise, ideas of Darwinism can bridge the gap between the understanding of individuals, states and international politics and introduce new ways of thinking about war and morality in international relations. On the other hand, ideas of Darwinism do not only imply competition; they also involve cooperation, symbiosis, and mutual aid as survival strategies. This could provide a nuanced understanding of why states often cooperate and help each other. In other words, theories advocating cooperation and mutual support can also find a basis in the ideas of Darwinism.

One way forward regarding potential future studies is for other researchers to take this study and build on it further. In order to additionally strengthen classical realism with Darwinism, it is beneficial to include other representatives of this theory in the analysis. Even though Hans J. Morgenthau is, without a doubt, the most significant figure in the classical realist landscape, many other scholars have contributed to this theory. For instance, future research can investigate in more detail the extent of the interest of certain classical realists in Charles Darwin himself. Edward H. Carr mentioned Darwin and Darwinism several times in his most well-known book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.⁹⁴² Henry Kissinger was also interested in the founder of evolutionary theory in his senior undergraduate thesis, *The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant*.⁹⁴³ Despite the fact that Reinhold Niebuhr was a theologian by vocation, he was very keen to contribute with an essay for the anniversary regarding Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* along

⁹⁴² See Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964.

⁹⁴³ See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant*, Bokförlaget Stolpe, Stockholm, 2023.

with two great evolutionary biologists of that time - Julian S. Huxley and Theodosius Dobzhansky.⁹⁴⁴ George F. Kennan also deserves the spotlight in this respect. This American diplomat, historian and classical realist can be associated with organicist thinking, which we mostly attribute to social Darwinism.⁹⁴⁵ Future research that might deal with this topic and deliver new knowledge can certainly enhance current IR scholarship.

Interesting to ponder for future studies is the organic theory (organicism) and its embodiment in the realm of international politics. As mentioned before, in the context of social Darwinism, organic theory typically refers to the idea that states are viewed as living organisms. This concept has roots in social and political thought dating back centuries but has also been applied in contemporary IR theory. Alexander Wendt especially found this subject intriguing for the analysis. In any case, here are some new potential research directions for this topic.

For starters, one can provide a historical overview of organic theory in IR. Tracing the development of organic theory in IR, how it has been applied, and its influence on other theories. This would involve historical and literary analysis and might uncover new insights about the development of IR as a discipline. The next stage would involve comparing the organic theory with other theories in IR, such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism. How does the organic view of the state differ from these other perspectives? To further explore this topic, one may also employ a case study. For example, one could use an organic lens to interpret the development of the European Union, viewing it as an organism that has grown and evolved over time. Moreover, organic theory might explain or interpret globalization. Does the international system behave more like a single organism as the world becomes more interconnected? Furthermore, future studies might employ organic theory to predict future IR trends. More specifically, if the international system is like a living organism, what does that suggest about its future evolution? Future studies can also offer linkages with sociobiology or evolutionary theory by investigating the intersections between organic theory in IR and concepts from sociobiology and evolutionary theory. Finally, researchers can explore the fundamental challenges and limits of organic theory in IR. These research directions could be explored using various methods, including historical analysis, case studies, comparative analysis, and theoretical modelling. As with any theoretical approach, it is important to recognize the limitations of organic theory and to use it as one tool among many for understanding the complex realities of international relations.

While realism, which could be compared to social Darwinist survival of the fittest imagery, focuses on power and conflict, liberalism, another major theory in IR, emphasizes the potential for cooperation, interdependence, and international institutions. From a Darwinian scientific perspective, we might see this as analogous to symbiosis or mutualism in nature, where different species collaborate for mutual benefit. Just as evolution is not solely about competition, international politics is not only about conflict; states often achieve more by working together than they could alone. Liberalism in IR can use ideas of Darwinism to enhance its position on why nations adaptively collaborate in areas such as trade, environmental conservation, healthcare, and security, fostering the argument that cooperation might be advantageous for long-term world stability and prosperity. Positive sum games are also a part of the evolutionary process and can offer arguments for cooperative patterns among humans and states.⁹⁴⁶ Trivers, Hamilton, Hauser, Nowak and many others might be beneficial for studies trying to implement positive aspects of Darwinism in IR. Kropotkin's insights on human nature can be useful for liberalism, especially with regard to international peace-building and cooperation.

⁹⁴⁴ See Julian S. Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Reinhold Niebuhr, Oliver L. Reiser, Swami Nikhilananda, *A Book that Shook the World: Essays on Charles Darwin's Origin of Species*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1958.

⁹⁴⁵ See Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

⁹⁴⁶ See Martin A. Nowak, "Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation", *Science*, Vol. 314, Issue 5805, 2006, pp. 1560-1563.

The ideas of Darwinism can offer some valuable insights and enhancements to Marxist International Relations (IR) theory. The concept of imperialism within Marxist IR theory can be further explored through the lens of economic Darwinism. Imperialistic endeavors by powerful nations can be seen as extensions of the drive for economic survival and expansion. The competitive dynamics between states in the global arena, particularly in the quest for resources and markets, can be analyzed as a form of natural selection, where the most economically dominant nations exert influence over others. By incorporating the concept of economic Darwinism into Marxist IR Theory, scholars can deepen their understanding of the evolutionary dimensions of economic systems, class dynamics, and global capitalism.

In addition to the previously mentioned, future researchers should analyse using more sophisticated methods. Besides content analysis, there are a few other research methods that might be helpful for studying the connection between Darwinism and IR. Genealogy as a research method represents one such possibility. This research method has its roots in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and is increasingly getting acknowledged in IR.⁹⁴⁷ Genealogy, as a research method in political science, can provide insights into the historical processes that have shaped present political structures, norms, and ideas. It does not aim to trace a linear or progressive history; instead, it focuses on identifying discontinuities, shifts, and changes over time. The genealogical analysis is thus a recursive one, meaning that the researcher constantly goes back and forth between certain steps as he or she gathers more data and develops analysis.

For instance, using genealogy as a research method for the topic dealing with Darwinism and certain IR theory would involve examining the historical development and transformation of these ideas and how they have intersected and influenced each other. One future research could try to collect a range of historical documents that provide information about the development and dissemination of Darwinism and particular IR theory. This could include Charles Darwin's "On the Origin of Species", foundational texts of the IR theory in question, academic papers, and texts from other philosophers who might have influenced these theories. Analyzing power relations would probably be a crucial step in this genealogical analysis. One would need to examine how power dynamics influenced the development and adoption of Darwinism and particular IR theory. For instance, how did the power structures of the time influence the acceptance or rejection of these theories? Did these theories serve to legitimize certain power structures or practices? How were these theories used in political discourse, and what power dynamics were at play in this usage? Furthermore, researchers should identify shifts and changes by tracking the transformations in these theories over time. This begs the question how did the understanding and usage of Darwinism and that IR theory change? Likewise, can we identify key historical moments that led to shifts in these theories? Finally, genealogy would question present established assumptions. For example, how have historical contingencies and power dynamics shaped our current understanding of these theories? Also, are there alternative narratives or understandings that have been marginalized?

Process tracing can be another method for future analysis regarding Darwinism and IR.⁹⁴⁸ This qualitative research method is used to identify the causal mechanisms linking independent variables (potential causes) to the dependent variable (outcome) in a particular case. Process tracing can be a very complex and time-consuming method, requiring a thorough and careful data analysis. However, it is particularly useful in case study research, where the researcher seeks to understand the complex chain of events that lead to a particular outcome. Applying process tracing would involve identifying the causal pathways through which Darwinian concepts might have influenced the development of a particular IR theory or vice versa. Here are some steps one might follow.

⁹⁴⁷ See Srdjan Vucetic, "Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, pp. 1295-1312.

⁹⁴⁸ See David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing", *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2011, pp. 823-830.

Firstly, one should start by clearly defining the theories of Darwinism and specific IR theory and their key principles. The next step would be case selection since process tracing is typically conducted as part of a case study. In this case, the “event” could be the development of that IR theory. One would trace the process by which this theory emerged and developed over time. Following that, it would be necessary to identify independent and dependent variables. The independent variable could be the principles of Darwinism, and the dependent variable could be specific tenets of that IR theory that one believes was influenced by Darwinism. Then one would identify causal mechanisms or chains that connect the independent and dependent variables. This might involve identifying key individuals who were influenced by Darwinian ideas and went on to shape that IR theory. Alternatively, causal mechanisms can be some major event where the influence of Darwinian concepts was particularly evident. Data collection would be very important in this type of analysis. Process tracing could involve a range of sources, including historical documents, academic literature, personal letters or memoirs of key theorists, and more. During such analysis, one would look for evidence that supports or contradicts proposed causal mechanisms.

Network analysis as a research method can also be helpful for future studies on the interconnection between Darwinism and IR theories.⁹⁴⁹ This research method serves to analyze the relationships among different entities, such as individuals, groups, or even concepts. It involves creating a graphical representation (a network) where the entities are represented as nodes and the relationships between them as edges. Using network analysis for any such topic involves mapping the relationships between key theorists, ideas, and publications in both fields. First, one would need to identify the so-called nodes, which, in this case, could be key theorists in Darwinism and IR theory, their influential texts or even key concepts central to both theories. The edges or links in this network could represent various types of relationships. For instance, they might represent influence (e.g., one theorist citing another), collaboration (e.g., co-authorship of texts), or similarities in concepts or arguments. Just like in the case of process tracing, gathering data for network analysis can also be time-consuming and may involve digging into historical texts, tracing citations in scholarly works, and more. In this respect, one can include digital tools and databases, especially for citation analysis. Afterwards, one creates a visual representation of such a network with the data collected. Various software tools are available for this, such as Gephi or UCInet. The next step would be to analyze the network by looking for certain patterns and determining the most influential nodes. In this respect, a few additional questions arise. For instance, are there clusters of nodes that are more closely connected to each other? Also, how do Darwinism and that particular IR theory relate to each other in this network? Finally, based on the analysis, one can conclude the relationship between the two. One might find that Darwinism heavily influenced certain theorists or that both fields share key concepts. Network analysis might be useful in combination with other research methods for a more comprehensive understanding of the topic in question.

⁹⁴⁹ See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations”, *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, pp. 559-592.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Books

Alison McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018.

Albert Somit (ed.) and Steven A. Peterson (ed.), *Handbook of Biology and Politics*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017.

Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, *The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.

Alexander Anievas (ed.), Nivi Manchanda (ed.) and Robbie Shilliam (ed.), *Race and Racism in International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 2015.

Alexander Reichwein (ed.) and Felix Rösch (ed.), *Realism: A Distinctively 20th Century European Tradition*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.

Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Alexandros Stogiannos, *The Genesis of Geopolitics and Friedrich Ratzel*, Springer, Cham, 2017.

Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981.

Alfred Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1917.

Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles, With Other Essays*, Little Brown, New York, 1908.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 1894.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions*, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, London, 1910.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon International Politics*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2003.

Alison Stone (ed.), *Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2011.

Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

André Pichot, *Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitler*, Verso, London, 2009.

- Andreas Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014.
- Andreas C. Göransson, *Crossing the Threshold: Visualization Design and Conceptual Understanding of Evolution*, Linköping University Electronic Press, Linköping, 2021.
- Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, Kennikat Press, New York, 1942.
- Andrew Bard Schmockler, *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.
- Anne Aschenbrenner, *Social Darwinism and Its Consequences for 19th Century Society*, GRIN Verlag, Munich, 2015.
- Anil Kumar Singh, *International Regimes and World Order*, K. K. Publications, New Delhi, 2014.
- Annette Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2004.
- Anthony Lang (ed.), *Political Theory and International Affairs: Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's the Politics*, Praeger, Westport, 2004.
- Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017.
- Agustin Fuentes (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Primatology*, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, 2017.
- Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.
- Benjamin A. Schupmann, *Carl Schmitt's State and Constitutional Theory: A Critical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
- Benjamin Frankel, *Roots of Realism*, Routledge, New York, 2013.
- Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, Methuen & Co, London, 1919.
- Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004.
- Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003.
- Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.
- Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriffdes Politischen*, Duncker Humblot, Berlin, 1963.
- Carl Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage des Voelkerbundes*, Duemmlers, Berlin, 1926.
- Carl Schmitt, *Land und Meer : Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung*, Reclam, Leipzig, 1942.

- Carl Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar — Genf — Versailles 1923-1939*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1940.
- Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Großraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1995.
- Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Antelope Hill Publishing, Quakertown, 2020.
- Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Telos Press Publishing, New York, 2003.
- Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1941.
- Carl Schmitt, *Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung: Mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1941.
- Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011.
- Charles Darwin, *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited by the H.M.S. Beagle*, Henry Colburn, London, 1839.
- Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.
- Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.
- Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- Charles W. Kegley and Shannon L. Blanton, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Wadsworth Publishing, Boston, 2010.
- Charles Crawford (ed.) and Dennis Krebs (ed.), *Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology*, Taylor & Francis, New York, 2008.
- Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005.
- Christian J. Emden, *Nietzsche's Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
- Christian Reus-Smit (ed.) and Duncan Snidal (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
- Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2001.
- Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: Eine Intellektuelle Biographie*, Haupt, Bern, 1993.

- Claude Raffestin, Dario Lopreno and Yvan Pasteur, *Géopolitique et Histoire*, Editions Payot, Lausanne, 1995.
- Colin S. Gray (ed.) and Geoffrey Sloan (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 2013.
- Craig Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Macmillan Press, London, 1999.
- Daniel H. Deudney (ed.) and Richard A. Matthew (ed.), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999.
- Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007.
- Daniel C. Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, Penguin Books, New York, 1995.
- Daniel Maliniak; et al., *The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada*, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg (VA), 2007.
- Daniel T. Blumstein, *The Nature of Fear*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2020.
- Daniel R. Wilson (ed.), David Smillie (ed.) and Johan M. van der Dennen (ed.), *The Darwinian Heritage and Sociobiology*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 1999.
- Daniela Russ (ed.) and James Stafford (ed.), *Competition in World Politics: Knowledge, Strategies and Institutions*, Verlag, Bielefeld, 2021.
- Dario Maestriperi, *Macchiavellian Intelligence*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007.
- David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974.
- David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
- David Criekemans (ed.), *Geopolitics and International Relations: Grounding World Politics Anew*, Brill–Nijhoff, Leiden, 2021.
- David Criekemans, *Geopolitiek: "Geografisch Geweten" Van de Buitenlandse Politiek?*, Garant, Antwerpen, 2007.
- David H. DeGroot, *Haeckel's Theory of the Unity of Nature*, B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam, 1982.
- David Paul Crook, *Darwin's Coat-tails: Essays on Social Darwinism*, Peter Lang, New York, 2007.
- David Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate Over the Biology of War from the 'Origin of Species' to the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
- David Sepkoski, *Catastrophic Thinking: Extinction and the Value of Diversity from Darwin to the Anthropocene*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2020.
- David Weinstein, *Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer's Liberal Utilitarianism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

- Dennis Krebs, *The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary Account*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
- Dirk Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
- Douglas P. Fry (ed.), *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
- Duncan Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
- Edith Hankev (ed.) and Thomas Kroll (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005.
- Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964.
- Edward. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, MacMillan and Co, London, 1946.
- Edward Manier, *The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1978.
- Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*, Knopf, New York, 1998.
- Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
- Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
- Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
- Edwin van de Haar, *Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory: Hume, Smith, Mises, and Hayek*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2009.
- Erasmus Darwin, *The Temple of Nature; or, The Origin of Society*, J. Johnson, London, 1803.
- Eric Van Rythoven (ed.) and Mira Sucharov (ed.), *Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions*, Routledge, New York, 2020.
- Ernst Haeckel, *Freie Wissenschaft und freie Lehre*, Schweizerbart'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Stuttgart, 1878.
- Ernst Haeckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, Reimer, Berlin, 1868.
- Ernst Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man (Volume I)*, Watts & Co, London, 1910.
- Ernst Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes (Vol. 2)*, Henry S. King, London, 1876.
- Ernst Haeckel, *The Wonders of Life*, Watts and Co., London, 1904.

- Ethan B. Kapstein (ed.) and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999.
- Felix Berenskoetter (ed.) and Michael J. Williams (ed.), *Power in World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2007.
- Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011.
- Frans de Waal, *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007.
- Frans de Waal, *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006.
- Frans de Waal, *The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2009.
- Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics, 7th edn*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969.
- Frederick Lewis Schuman, *International Politics: The Western State System in Transition*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1941.
- Friedrich Jodl, *Allgemeine Ethik*, J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Stuttgart, 1918.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Aufzeichnungen über Geschichte und historische Wissenschaften*, Musarion Gesamtausgabe, München, 1922.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Vintage, New York, 1966.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Vintage, New York, 1968.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unfashionable Observations - Vol. 2*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unfashionable Observations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unpublished Writings: from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *Antropogeographie. 1. Teil: Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte*. J. Engelhorn, Stuttgart, 1899.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *die Erde und das Leben: Eine vergleichende Erdkunde*, 2 vols, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig, 1902.

- Friedrich Ratzel, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika, Vol. II*, Munich, R. Oldenbourg, 1893.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *Lebensraum: Eine biogeographische Studie*, H. Laupp, Tübingen, 1901.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, R. Oldenbourg, München/Leipzig, 1897.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *Sein und Werden der organischen Welt*, Gebhardt und Reisland, Leipzig, 1869.
- Friedrich Ratzel, *Die Erde und das Leben: Eine vergleichende Erdkunde*, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig, 1901-1902.
- Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, Wm. Dawson & Sons, London, 1914.
- Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Edward Arnold, London, 1914.
- Gavin Rae, *The Problem of Political Foundations in Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016.
- Gearoid O Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, London, 2005.
- Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996.
- Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge [ur], *Uvod u geopolitiku*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2007.
- Geoffrey Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future*, Pinter, London, 1998.
- Geoffrey R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, Brighton, 1988.
- George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979.
- George J. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1983.
- George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1987.
- Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
- Glendon Schubert (ed.) and Roger D. Masters (ed.), *Primate Politics*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1991.
- Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
- Gregory J. Moore, *Niebuhrian International Relations: The Ethics of Foreign Policymaking*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020.
- Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Bockhaus, Leipzig, 1893.
- Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Socialism*, Fisher Unwin, London, 1899.

- Hajo Holborn (ed.), *Republic to Reich: The Making of the Nazi Revolution*, Vintage, New York, 1973.
- Halford J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1907.
- Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1919.
- Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, NDU Press, Washington, D.C., 1996.
- Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1962.
- Halford J. Mackinder, *Money-Power and Man-Power*, Simpkin Marshall, London, 1906.
- Hans Gerth (ed.) and Wright Mills (ed.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Routledge, London, 1991.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Human Rights & Foreign Policy*, Council on Religion & International Affairs, New York, 1979.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, Knopf, New York, 1951.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*, University Press of America, Washington DC, 1982.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Knopf, New York, 1967.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Peking University Press, Beijing, 2004.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (7th edition)*, McGraw-Hill Education, New York, 2006.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics (Vol. 1)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Vol. 2)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics (Vol. 3)*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, Latimer House Ltd., London, 1947.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946.

- Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1960.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-70*, Praeger, Westport, 1970.
- Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: Twilight of Geopolitics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942.
- Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, Vol. 2*, Boldt, Boppard am Rhein, 1979.
- Harold James, *The War of Words: A Glossary of Globalization*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2021.
- Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1939.
- Heinrich Pesch and Rupert Ederer, *Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics: Excerpts from the Lehrbuch Der Nationalökonomie*, University Press of America, Lanham, 1998.
- Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 1)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916.
- Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics (Vol. 2)*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916.
- Heinrich von Treitschke, *Selections from Treitschke's Lectures on Politics*, Gowans & Gray, London, 1914.
- Henry A. Kissinger, *The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant*, Bokförlaget Stolpe, Stockholm, 2023.
- Henry William Carless Davis, *The Political Thought of Heinrich Von Treitschke*, Constable, London, 1914.
- Henry Kissinger, *Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy*, Penguin, New York, 2022.
- Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1876.
- Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1872.
- Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics: Abridged and Revised Together with the Man Versus the State*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1892.
- Herbert Spencer, *The Data of Ethics*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1879.
- Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Biology (Vol. 1)*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1866.
- Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology (Volume 2)*, D. Appleton, New York, 1914.
- Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, Macmillan, London, 1969.
- Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology: Volume 1*, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1888.

- Herman Siemens (ed.) and James Pearson (ed.), *Conflict and Contest in Nietzsche's Philosophy*, Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2019.
- Herman W. Siemens (ed.) and Vasti Roodt (ed.), *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008.
- Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and Hess*, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2016.
- Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
- International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, 2015.
- Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Human Ethology*, De Gruyter, New York, 1989.
- Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals and Aggression*, Viking, New York, 1979.
- Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000.
- James M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*, Outlook Verlag, Frankfurt, 2020.
- James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Frances Pinter, London, 1980.
- James S. Pearson, *Nietzsche on Conflict, Struggle and War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022.
- Jan Sapp, *Genesis: The Evolution of Biology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
- Jane Maienschein (ed.) and Michael Ruse (ed.), *Biology and the Foundation of Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
- Janet Radcliffe Richards, *Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction*, Routledge, New York, 2001.
- Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003.
- Javier Pérez-Jara (ed.), Gustavo E. Romero (ed.) and Lino Camprubí (ed.), *Contemporary Materialism: Its Ontology and Epistemology*, Springer, Cham, 2022.
- Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael Ruse, *Social Darwinism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.
- Jerry Bergman, *How Darwinism Corrodes Morality*, Joshua Press Incorporated, Peterborough (ON), 2017.

- Jerry Bergman, *The Darwin Effect: Its Influence on Nazism, Eugenics, Racism, Communism, Capitalism and Sexism*, Master Books, Green Forest (AR), 2014.
- Jessie Hill, *Social Darwinism and Its Influence on the Imperialism of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, The Author, Raleigh, N.C., 1999.
- Jill Steans; et al, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes*, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 2010.
- Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- Jodok Troy, *Desire and Imitation in International Politics*, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2021.
- John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
- John Agnew (ed.), Katharyne Mitchell (ed.) and Gerard Toal (ed.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003.
- John Agnew and Luca Muscarà, *Making Political Geography*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2012.
- John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995.
- John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2003.
- John Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, Arnold, London, 2002.
- John Bellamy Foster, *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 2000.
- John Bew, *Realpolitik: A History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.
- John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001.
- John Lachs (ed.) and Robert B. Talisse (ed.), *American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia*, Routledge, New York, 2008.
- John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.
- John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
- John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

- Jonathan H. Turner, Leonard Beeghley and Charles H. Powers, *The Emergence of Sociological Theory*, Sage Publications, London, 2012.
- Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2002.
- Jonathan Kirshner, *An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2022.
- Jörg Brechtefeld, *Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996.
- Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff barriers to Trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990.
- Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1983.
- Julian S. Huxley, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Reinhold Niebuhr, Oliver L. Reiser, Swami Nikhilananda, *A Book that Shook the World: Essays on Charles Darwin's Origin of Species*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1958.
- Karl Christian von Loesch (ed.) and Arnold Hillen Ziegfeld (ed.), *Volk unter Völkern*, F. Hirt, Breslau, 1925.
- Karl Haushofer (ed.) and Kurt Trampler (ed.), *Deutschlands Weg an der Zeitenwende*, Eher Verlag, Munich, 1931.
- Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon: Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft*, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1913.
- Keith Dowding (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Power*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2011.
- Ken Booth (ed.), *Realism and World Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2011.
- Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, London, 1979.
- Kenneth Payne, *The Psychology of Modern Conflict: Evolutionary Theory, Human Nature and a Liberal Approach to War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015.
- Kenneth Payne, *Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 2018.
- Kenneth Thompson (ed.) and Robert J. Myers (ed.), *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau*, The New Republic Book Company, Washington, DC, 1977.
- Kenneth W. Thompson, *Masters of International Thought*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1980.

- Klaus Dodds (ed.) and David Atkinson (ed.), *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000.
- Klaus Dodds (ed.), Merje Kuus (ed.) and Joanne Sharp (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, Routledge, New York, 2016.
- Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2004.
- Kostas Gavroglu (ed.), Yorgos Goudaroulis (ed.), Pantelis Nicolacopoulos (ed.), *Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989.
- Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.
- Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003.
- Laurie M. Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism*, Northern Illinois University Press, Ithaca, 2020.
- Lee Alan Dugatkin, *Power in the Wild: The Subtle and Not-So-Subtle Ways Animals Strive for Control over Others*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2022.
- Lisa M. Given (ed.), *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Sage Publications, London, 2008.
- Louiza Odysseos (ed.) and Fabio Petito (ed.), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, Routledge, London, 2008.
- Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outlines of Sociology*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999.
- M. Kürşad Özekin (ed.) and Engin Sune (ed.), *Critical Approaches to International Relations: Philosophical Foundations and Current Debates*, Brill, Leiden, 2022.
- Madhavan K. Palat (ed.), *India and the World in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, New York, 2018.
- Manuel Knoll (ed.) and Barry Stocker (ed.), *Nietzsche as Political Philosopher*, De Gruyter, Boston, 2014.
- Marc Hauser, *Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong*, Ecco, New York, 2007.
- Marks Isaac Meyer, *Fears and Phobias*, Heinemann Medical Books, London, 1969.
- Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*, Routledge, London, 1992.
- Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Clarendon Press, London, 1990.

- Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
- Marvin Perry, Margaret Jacob, James Jacob, Myrna Chase, Theodore H. Von Laue, *Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society, Volume II: From 1600*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, Boston, 2008.
- Mary Maxwell, *Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990.
- Matthew Specter, *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2022.
- Max Weber, “Die deutschen Landarbeiter”, *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 5. Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses*, Berlin, 1894.
- Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.
- Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1988.
- Max Weber, *Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung I: Schriften und Reden. Bd. 4, Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Schriften und Reden 1892-1899*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1896.
- Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
- Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Scribner’s, New York, 1958.
- Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964.
- Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Edition)*, 2004.
- Michael C. Williams (ed.), *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
- Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
- Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1997.
- Michael J. Meese; Suzanne C. Nielsen; Rachel M. Sondheimer, *American National Security*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2018.
- Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1986.
- Michael L. Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations*, Potomac Books Inc., Washington DC, 2006.
- Michael P. Marks, *Metaphors in International Relations Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011.

- Michael Ruse (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
- Michael Ruse, *Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1985.
- Michael Ruse, *The Problem of War: Darwinism, Christianity, and Their Battle to Understand Human Conflict*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019.
- Michael Taylor, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2007.
- Michael W. Doyle (ed.) and John G. Ikenberry (ed.), *New Thinking In International Relations Theory*, Westview, Boulder, 1997.
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1997.
- Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re Enchantment*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010.
- Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought 1860-1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- Milomir Stepić, *Geopolitika: ideje, teorije, koncepcije*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016.
- Nebojša Vuković, *Logika imperije: Nikolas Spajkman i savremena američka geopolitika*, Konras, Beograd, 2007.
- Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York, 1942.
- Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1944.
- Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
- Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011.
- Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002.
- Norbert M. Seel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning*, Springer, New York, 2012.
- Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
- Orville Skye, *Darwinism And Morality: The Implications And Effects Of Darwinism On Society*, Independently Published, 2021.
- Otto Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber and Sociology Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971.
- Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2019.

Patrick James, *Realism and International Relations: A Graphic Turn Toward Scientific Progress*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022.

Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 2011.

Patrick Tort (ed.), *Dictionnaire du darwinisme et de l'évolution*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1996.

Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.

Paul Rubin, *Darwinian Politics*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2002.

Peter J. Taylor, *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality*, Longman, London, 1993.

Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, New York University Press, New York, 1972.

Phil Kelly, *Classical Geopolitics: A New Analytical Model*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016.

Piers J. Hale, *Political Descent: Malthus, Mutualism, and the Politics of Evolution in Victorian England*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014.

Polly Low (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Thucydides*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2023.

Ragnar Björk (ed.) and Thomas Lundén (ed.), *Territory, State and Nation: The Geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2021.

Raphael Sagarin (ed.) and Terrence Taylor (ed.), *Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008.

Raphael Sagarin, *Learning From the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Disease*, Basic Books, New York, 2012.

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953.

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932.

Richard D. Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, Pitman, London, 1980.

Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.

Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, Bantam Press, London, 2006.

- Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
- Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
- Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Feng Zhang, *Justice and International Order: East and West*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2022.
- Richard Ned Lebow, *The Quest for Knowledge in International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022.
- Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
- Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall, *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2016.
- Richard W. Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 1996.
- Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004.
- Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Investigation into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations*, A Delta Book, New York, 1966.
- Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.
- Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, New York, 1985.
- Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage, New York, 2003.
- Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987.
- Robert H. Frank, *The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.
- Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, Vintage, New York, 2004.
- Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.
- Robert Schuett (ed.) and Miles Hollingworth (ed.), *The Edinburgh Companion to Political Realism*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018.
- Robert Schuett, *Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations: The Resurrection of the Realist Man*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010.
- Robert Wright, *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny*, Vintage Books, New York, 2000.

- Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2004.
- Roberto Farneti, *Mimetic Politics*, Michigan State University Press, Lansing, 2015.
- Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005.
- Roger D. Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
- Roland Dannreuther (ed.) and Wojciech Ostrowski (ed.), *Global Resources: Conflict and Cooperation*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013.
- Rudi Supek, *Herbert Spenser i biologizam u sociologiji*, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1965.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Hirzel, Leipzig, 1917.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Kurt Vowinckel, Berlin, 1924.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Wentworth Press, Sydney, 2019.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Festskrift Till Hugo Geber*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1913.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Grundriß Zu Einem System Der Politik*, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1920.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Samtidens stormakter*, Politiska handböcker 1, Stockholm, 1914.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Staten som Lifform*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1916.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Stormakterna: konturer kring samtidens storpolitik IV*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1914.
- Rudolf Kjellén, *Stormakterna: konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, Vol. 1*, Hugo Gebers Forlag, Stockholm, 1905.
- Samuel Barkin, *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
- Sanford Lakoff, *Ten Political Ideas that Have Shaped the Modern World*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2011.
- Seán Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.
- Shiping Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010.
- Shiping Tang, *The Social Evolution of International Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
- Stanley A. Rice, *Encyclopedia of Evolution*, Infobase Publishing, New York, 2007.
- Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva*, Westview Press, Boulder & London, 1987.

Stefano Guzzini (ed.), *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?: Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London & New York, 1998.

Stephen K. Sanderson, *The Evolution of Human Sociality: A Darwinian Conflict Perspective*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2001.

Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt*, Routledge, New York, 2011.

Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics*, Routledge, New York, 2006.

Stephen Turner, *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

Steve Lamy et al., *Introduction to Global Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017.

Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: 1890-1990*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1994.

Steven E. Lobell (ed.), Norrin M. Ripsman (ed.) and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (ed.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

Steven Loyal and Siniša Malešević, *Classical Sociological Theory*, SAGE, Los Angeles, 2021.

Terry Nardin (ed.) and David R. Mapel (ed.), *Traditions of International Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, Wiley Online Library, 2014.

Thomas A. Spragens Jr, *The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2014.

Thomas Glick (ed.), *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1974.

Thomas Glick (ed.), Miguel Angel Puig-Samper (ed.) and Rosaura Ruiz (ed.), *The Reception of Darwinism in the Iberian World*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2001.

Thomas H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics: And Other Essays*, Barnes & Noble, New York, 2006.

Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Broadview Press, Peterborough, 2002.

Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: The English and Latin Texts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2012.

Thomas Lemke, *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction*, New York University, New York, 2011.

Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

- Tim Dunne (ed.), Milja Kurki (ed.) and Steve Smith (ed.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
- Timothy Shanahan, *The Evolution of Darwinism: Selection, Adaptation and Progress in Evolutionary Biology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
- Torbjörn L. Knutsen, *The History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992.
- Vibeke Schou Tjalve, *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008.
- Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell, *A Better Ape*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022.
- Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001.
- Warren Breckman (ed.) and Peter E. Gordon (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Modern European Thought, Volume 1: The Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019.
- Whitley R.P. Kaufman, *Human Nature and the Limits of Darwinism*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016.
- Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1988.
- William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009.
- William Graham Sumner, *Social Darwinism: Selected Essays*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963.
- William Graham Sumner, *The Forgotten Man*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1933.
- William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1911.
- William P. Thompson (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
- William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2001.
- William R. Thompson (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.
- Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.) and Gangolf Hübinger (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe: Abteilung I Schriften und Reden*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1984.
- Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.), Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.), Birgit Rudhard (ed.) and Manfred Schön (ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung II: Briefe*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1990.
- Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.
- Yunus Tuncel, *Agon in Nietzsche*, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 2013.

• Articles

A. J. Kleinheksel; Nicole Rockich-Winston; Huda Tawfik; Tasha R. Wyatt; “Demystifying Content Analysis”, *American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education*, Vol. 84, Issue 1, 2020.

Ahti Laitinen and George Maude, “Biologism, Politics and International Politics”, *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1986, pp. 113-128.

Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, “An Evolutionary Approach to Political Science and Public Policy: The Folly of Democratic Nation Building”, *International Political Science Association Triennial Congress*, 9-13 July, 2006, Fukuoka, Japan, pp. 7-23.

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, Issue 2, 1992, pp. 391–425.

Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004, pp. 289-316.

Alfons Söllner, “German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau's Political Realism”, *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, pp. 161-172.

Alfred Mahan, “A Twentieth-Century Outlook”, *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, Vol. 95, 1897, p. 521-533.

Alfred T. Mahan, “The Deficiencies of Law as an Instrument of International Adjustments”, *The North American Review*, Vol. 194, No. 672, 1911, pp. 677-681.

Andrew A. G. Ross, “Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics”, *International Theory*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 273-299.

Anne Orford, “Regional Orders, Geopolitics, and the Future of International Law”, *Current Legal Problems*, Vol. 74, 2021, pp. 149–194.

Antonello La Vergata, “Darwinism and the Social Sciences, 1859–1914”, *Rendiconti Lincei*, Vol. 20, 2009, pp. 333-343.

Apoorva Patel, “Survival of the Fittest and Zero Sum Games”, *Fluctuation and Noise Letters*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2002, pp. 279-284.

Arne Öhman and Susan Mineka, “Fears, Phobias, and Preparedness: Toward an Evolved Module of Fear and Fear Learning”, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 108, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 483–522.

Arnold Wolfers, “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1951, pp. 39 – 63.

Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 5/2, 1995, pp. 3-94.

Azar Gat, “So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 571–599.

Barbara Kunz, “Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power”, *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, pp. 189-208.

Biao Zhang, “Hans Morgenthau, Realist Theory of International Leadership, and the Future of Global Order”, *Chinese Political Science Review*, Vol. 2, 2017, pp. 512-530.

Brian Leiter, “Classical Realism”, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 244-267.

Bryan S. Turner, “Max Weber and the Tragedy of Politics: Reflections on Unintended Consequences of Action”, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 19, Issue 4, 2019, pp. 377–390.

Carl Schmitt, “Der Begriff des Politischen”, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 58, 1927, pp. 1-33.

Carl Schmitt, “Der Staat als Lebensform. Von Rudolf Kjellén”, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Vol. 10, 1925, p. 1010.

Casper Sylvest, “John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism”, *International Relations*, Volume 22, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 441-455.

Catherine Wilson, “Darwin and Nietzsche: Selection, Evolution, and Morality”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013, pp. 353-369.

Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1942, pp. 478-490.

Charles D. Tarlton, “The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann”, *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, pp. 584-614.

Charles H. Pence, “Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Critique of Darwin”, *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, Vol. 33, 2011, pp. 165-190.

Charles Kruszewski, “International Affairs: Germany's Lebensraum”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 1940, pp. 964-975.

Chris Brown, “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature”, *International Relations*, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 257-270.

Christopher Adair-Toteff, “Imperialism: Necessary and Beneficial?—Review of the Works of Hobson, Weber, and Schumpeter”, *International Critical Thought*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014, pp. 86-97.

Christopher J. Fettweis, “On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now”, *Orbis*, Vol. 59, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 233-248.

Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan, “The Question of Space in Carl Schmitt,” *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2015, pp. 268–289.

Craig Venter and Daniel Cohen, “The Century of Biology”, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 73-77.

Daniel T. Blumstein, et al., “The Peacock's Tale: Lessons from Evolution for Effective Signaling in International Politics”, *Cliodynamics: Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 191–214.

- Daniel V. Meegan, “Zero-Sum Bias: Perceived Competition Despite Unlimited Resources”, *Frontiers in Psychology*, Vol. 1, Article 191, 2010, pp. 1-7.
- David Chandler, “The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2008, pp. 27–48.
- David Clinton, ““Dash and Doubt” Walter Bagehot and International Restraint”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2003, pp. 89-109.
- David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing”, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2011, pp. 823-830.
- Dean Mobbs, Cindy C. Hagan, Tim Dalgleish, Brian Silston and Charlotte Prévost, “The Ecology of Human Fear: Survival Optimization and the Nervous System”, *Frontiers in Neuroscience*, Vol. 9, Article 55, 2015, pp. 1-22.
- Dirk R. Johnson, “One Hundred Twenty-Two Years Later: Reassessing the Nietzsche-Darwin Relationship”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2013, pp. 341- 352.
- Dirk Robert Johnson, “Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873”, *Nietzsche-Studien*, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 62-79.
- Dominic D. P. Johnson and Bradley A. Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism”, *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 35, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 1–26.
- Dominic D.P. Johnson, “Survival of the Disciplines: Is International Relations Fit for the New Millennium?”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 749-763.
- Donald Hanson, “Hobbes’s “Highway to Peace””, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, Issue 2, 1984, pp. 329-354.
- Doyne Dawson, “The Origins of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories”, *History and Theory*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1-28.
- Duncan S. A. Bell and Paul K. MacDonald, “Start the Evolution without Us”, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001, pp. 187-198.
- Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., “The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1952, pp. 382-401.
- Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations”, *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, pp. 559-592.
- Eran Halperin; Daniel Bar-Tal; Rafi Nets-Zehngut; Drori Erga, “Emotions in Conflict: Correlates of Fear and Hope in the Israeli-Jewish Society”, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 233–258.
- Felix Rösch, “Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau”, *International Politics*, Vol. 50, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 815–829.
- Friedrich Ratzel, “Die Nordatlantischen Mächte”, *Marine Rundschau*, Vol. 14, 1903, pp. 1047-1062.

- Friedrich Ratzel, "Lebensraum: A Biogeographical Study [1901]", *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 61, 2018, pp. 59-80.
- Gary L. Ulmen, "American Imperialism and International Law: Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs", *Telos*, Vol. 72, 1987, pp.43–71.
- George Modelski and Kazimierz Poznanski, "Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1996, pp. 315-319.
- George Modelski, "Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?", *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-24.
- George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1978, pp. 214–235.
- Gideon Rose, "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1998, pp. 144-172.
- Greg Russell, "Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 119-140.
- Gregory Claeys, "The "Survival of the Fittest" and the Origins of Social Darwinism", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2000, pp. 223-240.
- Gregory Moore, "Nietzsche, Spencer, and the Ethics of Evolution", *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, No. 23, 2002, pp. 1-20.
- Halford J. Mackinder, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength", *National and English Review*, Vol. 15, 1905, pp. 136–145.
- Halford J. Mackinder, "On the Scope and Methods of Geography", *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1887, pp. 141-174.
- Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History", *The Geographic Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, pp. 421-437.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1952, pp. 961-988.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "Man and Society", *Morgenthau Papers*, Box 172, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 3. January 1965.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil", *Ethics*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 1945, pp. 1-18.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1964, pp. 23-35.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, 1950, pp. 833-854.

- Hans J. Morgenthau, “Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen”, *Container* 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1930.
- Hans Kohn, “Treitschke: National Prophet”, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1945, pp. 418-440.
- Hans Morgenthau, “Principles of International Politics”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1956, pp. 1-13.
- Hans W. Weigert, “Haushofer and the Pacific”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1942, pp. 732–742.
- Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, pp. 185-200.
- Harmut Behr and Amelia Heath, “Common Sense, Thomas Reid, and Realist Epistemology”, *International Politics*, Vol. 50, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 1–15.
- Harmut Behr and Amelia Heath, “Misreadings in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and Neo-realism”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 327–349.
- Harry E. Barnes, “The Struggle of Races and Social Groups as a Factor in the Development of Political and Social Institutions: An Exposition and Critique of the Sociological System of Ludwig Gumplowicz”, *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1919, pp. 394-419.
- Harmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, “Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating ‘Divides’ in International Relations Theory”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, p. 3–17.
- Hedley Bull, “Hobbes and the International Anarchy”, *Social Research*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1981, pp. 717–738.
- Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach”, *World Politics*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 1966, pp. 361–377.
- Henry Kissinger, “Hans Morgenthau: A Gentle Analyst of Power”, *New Republic*, No. 83, 1980, pp. 12–14.
- Herbert Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence”, *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 64, Number 4, 1985, pp. 645-686.
- Iain Wilson, “Darwinian Reasoning and Waltz’s Theory of International Politics: Elimination, Imitation and the Selection of Behaviours”, *International Relations*, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 417–438.
- Ian Klimke and Mark Bassin, “Lebensraum and Its Discontents”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 61, 2018, p. 53-58.
- Jack Jones, “Social Darwinism Reconsidered”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 1/2, 1981-1982, pp. 239-266.
- Jack O'Neill, “Evolutionary International Relations: A Biopolitical Framework for Teaching World Politics”, *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1986, pp. 44-53.

- Jacob Als Thomsen, "Carl Schmitt: the Hobbesian of the 20th Century?", *Social Thought & Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1/2, 1997, pp. 5-28.
- Jacques Gervet and Muriel Soleilhavoup, "Darwinism and Ethology: The Role of Natural Selection in Animals and Humans", *Acta Biotheoretica*, Vol. 45, 1997, pp. 195-220.
- Janice Leung, "Machiavelli and International Relations Theory," *Glendon Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, pp. 3-13.
- Jan-Willem Honig, "Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau's German Years", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 1995, pp. 283-313.
- Jean Gottmann, "The Background of Geopolitics", *Military Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1942, pp. 197-206.
- Jennifer W. See, "A Prophet Without Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955-1965", *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2001, pp. 419-448.
- John Keiger, "Thinking The Causes of World War I", *Horizons*, Issue No. 1, 2014, pp. 52-63.
- John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten, "Political Geography of Panregions", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-20.
- John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing, "The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior", *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2004, pp. 707-723.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 5-56.
- Jonathan H. Turner and Norman A. Dolch, "Classical Statements on Geopolitics and the Aftermath of War", *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1994, pp. 91-102.
- Joseph M. Parent and Joshua M. Baron, "Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 193-213.
- Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", *World Politics*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 1988, pp. 235-251.
- Joshua S. Goldstein, "The Emperor's New Genes: Sociobiology and War", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1987, pp. 33-43.
- Karl Haushofer, "Amerika in Kampf der Kontinente", *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Vol. 19, 1942, pp. 530-534.
- Karl Hwang, "Power in Alexander Supan's Guidelines to General Political Geography (1918/1920)", *Przegląd Geopolityczny*, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 23-44.
- Keith L. Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 1992, pp. 281-301.
- Klaus Kost, "The Conception of Politics In Political Geography and Geopolitics in Germany until 1945", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 1989, pp. 369-385.

- Knutsen L. Torbjørn, "Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis", *The International History Review*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2014, pp. 835-857.
- Kurt T. Gaubatz, "The Hobbesian Problem and the Microfoundations of International Relations Theory", *Security Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001/2, pp. 164-186.
- Kyle O'Shea, "Survival Of The Selfish: Natural Selection And The Myth Of Altruism", *The Intellectual Standard*, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2012, pp. 26-28.
- Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1960, pp. 15–51.
- Leslie W. Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics", *Political Geography Quarterly*, Supplement to Vol. 5, No. 4, 1986, pp. S21-S36.
- Lester F. Ward, "The Political Ethics of Herbert Spencer", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 4, 1894, pp. 90–127.
- Louiza Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: the Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2002, pp. 403–418.
- Lorenzo Zambarnardi, "The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau's Critique of American Intervention in Vietnam", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, pp. 1335-1356.
- Lucian M. Ashworth, "Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57, 2013, pp. 138–149.
- Lucian M. Ashworth, "Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 279–301.
- Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1999, pp. 59-76.
- Manfred Lachs, "Some Reflections on the Settlement of International Disputes", *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, Vol. 68, 1974, pp. 323-331.
- Marco Cesa, "Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz", *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 177–191.
- Mark Bassin, "Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel's Political Geography", *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1987, pp. 473-495.
- Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2006, pp. 5-16.
- Martin Seligman, "Phobias and Preparedness", *Behavior Therapy*, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 1971, pp. 307–320.
- Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory", *International Relations*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 1960, pp. 35–48.

- Martin A. Nowak, “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation”, *Science*, Vol. 314, Issue 5805, 2006, pp. 1560-1563.
- Matthew Rendall, “Realism, Reckless States, and Natural Selection”, *International Relations*, 2022, pp. 1–22.
- Max Weber and Ben Fowkes, “The National State and Economic Policy (Freiburg Address)”, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1980, pp. 428-449.
- Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2004, pp. 633–665.
- Michael Joseph Smith, “Hans Morgenthau and the American National Interest in the Early Cold War”, *Social Research*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1981, pp. 766-785.
- Michael W. Doyle, “Thucydidean Realism”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 1990, pp. 223–237.
- Murielle Cozette, “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of Scholarship”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2008, pp. 5–27.
- Murielle Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 667-679.
- Nancy L. Kondracki; Nancy S. Wellman; Daniel R. Amundson, “Content Analysis: Review of Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education”, *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior*, Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 224-230.
- Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships”, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, pp. 116-156.
- Neta Crawford, “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’”, *International Relations*, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 271–288.
- Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, “Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1939, pp. 391–410.
- Nicolas Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory”, *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 2, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 281–304.
- Ola Tunander, “Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century Rudolf Kjellén’s ‘The State as a Living Organism’”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, pp. 451-463.
- Olivier Zajec, *Nicholas John Spykman, l’invention de la géopolitique américaine: Un itinéraire intellectuel aux origines paradoxales de la théorie réaliste des relations internationales*, Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 2016, pp. 497-530.
- Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, “The State as a “form of life” and the space as Leistungsraum: the reception of Ratzel in the First and Second World Wars”, *Geographica Helvetica*, Vol. 78, 2023, pp. 29-39.

- Paul Bookbinder, "Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt", *Social Science*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1981, pp. 133-145.
- Petar Popović, "Hans Morgenthau and the Lasting Implications of World War I", *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2020, p. 121-134.
- Peter Breiner, "Raymond Aron's Engagement With Weber: Recovery or Retreat?", *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 99-122.
- Pheng Cheah, "The Rationality of Life: On the Organismic Metaphor of the State", *Radical Philosophy*, Vol. 112, 2002, pp. 9-24.
- Phil Kelly, "Rescuing Classical Geopolitics: Separating Geopolitics from Realism", *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2019, pp. 41-58.
- Piotr Radkiewicz and Krystyna Skarżyńska, "Who Are the 'Social Darwinists'? On Dispositional Determinants of Perceiving the Social World as Competitive Jungle", *PLoS ONE*, Vol. 16, No. 8, 2021, pp. 1-19.
- R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 26-50.
- Raphael Sagarin, "Adapt or Die: What Charles Darwin Can Teach Tom Ridge about Homeland Security", *Foreign Policy*, October 2009, pp. 68-69.
- Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan, "Traveling in Paradox: Edward Said and Critical International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2007, pp. 83-99.
- Reed Davis, "Beyond Nihilism: Classical Realism and the Perils of Scientific Naturalism", *Modern Age*, 2014, pp. 32-44.
- Richard D. Alexander, "The Evolution of Social Behavior", *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 325-383.
- Richard Dawkins and John R. Krebs, "Arms Races between and within Species", *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences*, Vol. 205, No. 1161, 1979, pp. 489-511.
- Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 204-236.
- Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984, pp. 225-286.
- Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism", *International Organization*, Vol. 48, Issue 2, 1994, pp. 249-277.
- Richard Ned Lebow, "You Cannot Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations", *International Politics Reviews*, Vol. 1, 2013, pp. 2-10.
- Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, pp. 469-488.

- Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1990, pp. 389-416.
- Richard Wolin, “Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1992, pp. 424-447.
- Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988, pp. 591–613.
- Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation”, *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1988, pp. 317–349.
- Robert L. Carneiro, “Structure, Function, and Equilibrium in the Evolutionism of Herbert Spencer”, *Journal of Anthropological Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1973, pp. 77-95.
- Robert Schuett, “Freudian Roots of Political Realism: The Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Power Politics”, *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 53–78.
- Robert L. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism”, *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1971, pp. 35-57.
- Ronen P. Palan and Brook M. Blair, “On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, pp. 385-399.
- Roy Gardner and Molly R. Morris, “The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach”, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, Vol. 137, Issue 2, 1989, pp. 235-243.
- Rudolf Kjellén, “Undersökningar till politikens system 1: Öfverindelning och terminologi”, *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, Vol. 21, 1918, pp. 98–128.
- Rutledge M. Dennis, “Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race”, *The Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 1995, pp. 243-252.
- Scott Gordon, “Darwin and Political Economy: The Connection Reconsidered”, *Journal of the History of Biology*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1989, pp. 437-459.
- Seán Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil”, *Journal of International Political Theory*, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 94–112.
- Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, pp. 451-471.
- Shiping Tang, “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 31–55.
- Silviu Costachie, “German School of Geopolitics: Evolution, Ideas, Prospects”, *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, Year XIII, No. 2, 2011, pp. 264-276.
- Srdjan Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, pp. 1295-1312.

- Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No. 3, 1977, pp. 41-60.
- Stephen K. Sanderson, “Evolutionary Materialism: A Theoretical Strategy for the Study of Social Evolution”, *Sociological Perspectives*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, pp. 47-73.
- Stephen Turner and George Mazur, “Morgenthau as Weberian Methodologist”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 477–504.
- Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 110, 1998, pp. 29–46.
- Steven Shapin, “Weber’s Science as a Vocation: A Moment in the History of “is” and “ought””, *Journal of Classical Sociology*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 290–307.
- Suavi Aydin, “The Misuse and Abuse of Darwinian Concepts in Social Theory (or was Darwin a Social Darwinist?)”, *Hacettepe Journal of Biology and Chemistry*, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 177–192.
- Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State And The Power Of Geography: The Life Work Of Rudolf Kjellén”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 1992, pp. 307-323.
- Tarak Barkawi, “Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1998, pp. 159-184.
- Thomas F.X. Varacalli, “National Interest and Moral Responsibility in the Political Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2016, pp. 108-128.
- Timothy W. Luke, “Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order”, *Alternatives*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 229–258.
- Ulrik Enemark Petersen, “Breathing Nietzsche's Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau's Concepts of Power and Human Nature”, *Alternatives*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 83–118.
- W. J. Cahnman, “The Concept of Raum and the Theory of Regionalism”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1944, pp. 455-462.
- W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by Reading Thucydides”, *The Monist*, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2006, pp. 232-244.
- Werner Stegmaier, “Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution”, *Nietzsche-Studien*, Vol. 16, 1987, pp. 264–287.
- William E. Scheuerman, “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man vs Power Politics”, *Constellations*, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 506–530.
- William D. Hamilton, “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior”, *The American Naturalist*, Vol. 97, No. 896, 1963, pp. 354-356.
- Zenonas Norkus, “Max Weber on Nations and Nationalism: Political Economy before Political Sociology”, *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004, pp. 386-418.

Zhengyu Wu, “Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2018, pp. 786-823.

- **PhD Thesis**

Semra Ranâ Gökmen, *Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations*, PhD Thesis, METU - Middle East Technical University, 2010.

Peter Davidsen, *The Emancipation of Political Science: Contextualizing the State Theory of Rudolf Kjellén (1899-1922)*, PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2021.

- **Internet Sources**

<http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1339561&dswid=-2438>

darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2009/10/darwin-thucydides-and-international.html.

www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/social-darwinism

<https://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/>

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy/History-of-materialism#ref68540>.

BIOGRAPHY

Zoran Kovačević was born on October 21 1989, in Belgrade, Serbia. In the same city, he finished both elementary and high school. In 2008, Zoran enrolled in undergraduate Political Science studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. He finished those studies in 2012 with an average of 8.5/10. After his undergraduate studies, in 2013, he enrolled in a master's International Politics studies at the same Faculty. He finished it successfully in December 2015 with an average of 9/10. The title of his master's thesis was "The Influence of the Holocaust on International Relations during the Cold War". During his master's studies, Zoran received a Go Styria scholarship from the University of Graz and, under the supervision of Prof. Florian Bieber, stayed there for one semester in order to write his thesis. Zoran enrolled in Doctoral academic studies in Political Science—International and European Studies in the academic year 2015/2016. In 2019, he was awarded the Erasmus Plus scholarship by the European Union and stayed for one semester at La Sapienza University of Rome as an exchange student.

In the course of his undergraduate, master's, and doctoral studies, he participated in many extracurricular activities in Serbia and abroad. These included fully funded research seminars, summer schools, and language courses. Likewise, he has had several volunteer experiences, such as an electoral monitoring mission in Serbia organized by the OSCE in 2012. Since 2022, he has been a member of the Central and East European International Studies Association. His native language is Serbian; he is fluent in English and has basic knowledge of German and Italian. Areas of his academic interest include theories of international relations, geopolitics, the history of political ideas, and political psychology. So far, he has published four scientific articles in domestic journals within these academic disciplines. Finally, Zoran has years of working experience as an underwriter, help desk specialist, freight dispatcher and key account manager for both domestic and international companies.

Izjava o autorstvu

Ime i prezime autora: Zoran D. Kovačević

Broj indeksa 39/2015

Izjavljujem

da je doktorska disertacija pod naslovom

Ideas of Darwinism in the Classical-Realist Theory of International Relations

- rezultat sopstvenog istraživačkog rada;
- da disertacija u celini ni u delovima nije bila predložena za sticanje druge diplome prema studijskim programima drugih visokoškolskih ustanova;
- da su rezultati korektno navedeni i
- da nisam kršio/la autorska prava i koristio/la intelektualnu svojinu drugih lica.

U Beogradu,

Potpis autora

Izjava o istovetnosti štampane i elektronske verzije doktorskog rada

Ime i prezime autora: Zoran D. Kovačević

Broj indeksa: 39/2015

Studijski program: Doktorske međunarodne i evropske studije

Naslov rada: Ideas of Darwinism in the Classical-Realist Theory of International Relations

Mentor: prof. dr Filip Ejđus

Izjavljujem da je štampana verzija mog doktorskog rada istovetna elektronskoj verziji koju sam predao/la radi pohranjena u **Digitalnom repozitorijumu Univerziteta u Beogradu**.

Dozvoljavam da se objave moji lični podaci vezani za dobijanje akademskog naziva doktora nauka, kao što su ime i prezime, godina i mesto rođenja i datum odbrane rada.

Ovi lični podaci mogu se objaviti na mrežnim stranicama digitalne biblioteke, u elektronskom katalogu i u publikacijama Univerziteta u Beogradu.

U Beogradu,

Potpis autora

Izjava o korišćenju

Ovlašćujem Univerzitetsku biblioteku “Svetozar Marković” da u Digitalni repozitorijum Univerziteta u Beogradu unese moju doktorsku disertaciju pod naslovom:

Ideas of Darwinism in the Classical-Realist Theory of International Relations

koja je moje autorsko delo.

Disertaciju sa svim prilogima predao/la sam u elektronskom formatu pogodnom za trajno arhiviranje.

Moju doktorsku disertaciju pohranjenu u Digitalnom repozitorijumu Univerziteta u Beogradu i dostupnu u otvorenom pristupu mogu da koriste svi koji poštuju odredbe sadržane u odabranom tipu licence Kreativne zajednice (Creative Commons) za koju sam se odlučio/la.

1. Autorstvo (CC BY)
2. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno (CC BY-NC)
- 3. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno – bez prerada (CC BY-NC-ND)**
4. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno – deliti pod istim uslovima (CC BY-NC-SA)
5. Autorstvo – bez prerada (CC BY-ND)
6. Autorstvo – deliti pod istim uslovima (CC BY-SA)

U Beogradu,

Potpis autora

1. Autorstvo. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, i prerade, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence, čak i u komercijalne svrhe. Ovo je najslobodnija od svih licenci.

2. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, i prerade, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence. Ova licenca ne dozvoljava komercijalnu upotrebu dela.

3. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno – bez prerada. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, bez promena, preoblikovanja ili upotrebe dela u svom delu, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence. Ova licenca ne dozvoljava komercijalnu upotrebu dela. U odnosu na sve ostale licence, ovom licencom se ograničava najveći obim prava korišćenja dela.

4. Autorstvo – nekomercijalno – deliti pod istim uslovima. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, i prerade, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence i ako se prerada distribuira pod istom ili sličnom licencom. Ova licenca ne dozvoljava komercijalnu upotrebu dela i prerada.

5. Autorstvo – bez prerada. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, bez promena, preoblikovanja ili upotrebe dela u svom delu, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence. Ova licenca dozvoljava komercijalnu upotrebu dela.

6. Autorstvo – deliti pod istim uslovima. Dozvoljavate umnožavanje, distribuciju i javno saopštavanje dela, i prerade, ako se navede ime autora na način određen od strane autora ili davaoca licence i ako se prerada distribuira pod istom ili sličnom licencom. Ova licenca dozvoljava komercijalnu upotrebu dela i prerada. Slična je softverskim licencama, odnosno licencama otvorenog koda.

