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MODERNITY IN JAPAN AND SERBIA IN THE SECOND  
HALF OF THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

Doctoral Dissertation

Belgrade, 2020

UNIVERZITET U BEOGRADU  
FILOLOŠKI FAKULTET

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MODERNOST U JAPANU I SRBIJI U DRUGOJ POLOVINI  
XIX VEKA

doktorska disertacija

Beograd, 2020

УНИВЕРСИТЕТ В БЕЛГРАДЕ  
ФИЛОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ФАКУЛЬТЕТ

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СОВРЕМЕННОСТЬ В ЯПОНИИ И СЕРБИИ НА  
ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XIX ВЕКА

Докторская диссертация

Белград, 2020

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Date of Defense: \_\_\_\_\_

I wish to thank my family for their support in my academic journey.

I also wish to thank Professor Keiichi Kubo for the conversations in which he helped me channel my research, and for being a mentor and a friend during my research at Waseda University in Tokyo.

Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my mentor, Professor Ljiljana Marković, for providing me with the necessary knowledge, support and freedom to pursue my academic interests and for her guidance during my doctoral studies.

Their guidance has shaped my research. The successes of this work are shared with them, the mistakes are mine alone.

*This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Janja, without whose love, patience, and support this dissertation would not have been possible.*

## **MODERNITY IN JAPAN AND SERBIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19<sup>th</sup> CENTURY**

**Abstract:** The subject of the thesis is a comparative analysis of the influences of modernity in Japan and Serbia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Modernity is used as the theoretical framework of the research. While modernity is a multifaceted term we use in order to denote a set values, principles and norms that influence social, cultural and political developments of one society and enable the process of modernization; modernity has the driving capacity to move society in the direction of progress. The notion of modernity is applied to societies of Japan and Serbia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century having in mind that this was crucial period for the opening of these two states towards the West and modernity. Having in mind the comprehensiveness of the notion of modernity, it is not possible to study this concept in its entirety. Therefore, we decided to narrow our research by focusing on two relevant and intertwined indicators of modernity: education and the intellectual elite. This research was guided by the following hypotheses: The acceptance of modernity is not possible without the successful implementation of the Western model of education; contact between the intellectual elite and the West is a necessary prerequisite, but insufficient by itself for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented; the modern intellectual elite must be included into the political discourse in order for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented; the success of modernization depends on the reasons for the acceptance of modernity. The scientific aim of this research is to explain the process of acceptance of the concept and ideas of modernity in Japan and Serbia. This scientific aim was pursued by using the following research methods: content analysis, comparison, critical qualitative text analysis.

**Key words:** Modernity, Multiple Modernities, Japan, Serbia, Meiji, Education, Intellectual elite, Political elite, 19<sup>th</sup> century

**Scientific Field:** Philology

**Scientific Subfield:** Japanese Studies

**UDC Number:**

## **MODERNOST U JAPANU I SRBIJI U DRUGOJ POLOVINI XIX VEKA**

### **Sažetak:**

Predmet ove doktorske disertacije jeste uporedna analiza uticaja modernosti u Japanu i Srbiji u drugoj polovini XIX veka. Modernost predstavlja teorijski okvir ovog istraživanja. Modernost je sveobuhvatni pojam koji u istraživanju koristimo da označimo vrednosti, principe i norme koje utiču na društveni, kulturni i politički napredak jednog društva i omogućavaju proces modernizacije; modernost ima pokretačku snagu da društvo vodi u pravcu napretka. Pojam modernosti primenjujemo na društva Japana i Srbije u drugoj polovini XIX veka imajući u vidu da je ovo razdoblje bilo presudno za otvaranje ove dve države prema Zapadu i prema modernosti. Imajući u vidu sveobuhvatnost pojma modernosti, ovaj koncept nije moguće u potpunosti istražiti. Stoga smo se odlučili da naše istraživanje usredsredimo na dva relevantna i povezana pokazatelja modernosti: obrazovanje i intelektualnu elitu. Ovo istraživanje vođeno je sledećim hipotezama: prihvatanje modernosti nije moguće bez uspešne primene Zapadnog modela obrazovanja; kontakt između intelektualne elite i Zapada je neophodan preduslov, ali nedovoljan sam po sebi, da se ideje modernosti uspešno primene; moderna intelektualna elita mora biti uključena u politički diskurs kako bi ideje modernosti bile uspešno primenjene; uspeh modernizacije zavisi od razloga prihvatanja modernosti. Naučni cilj ovog istraživanja jeste da se objasni proces prihvatanja koncepta i ideja modernosti u Japanu i Srbiji. Metode istraživanja su analiza sadržaja, poređenje, i kritička kvalitativna analiza teksta.

**Ključne reči:** Modernost, višestruke modernosti, Japan, Srbija, obrazovanje, intelektualna elita, politička elita, 19. vek

**Naučna oblast:** Filologija

**Uža naučna oblast:** Japanologija

**UDK broj:**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of the thesis is a comparative analysis of the influences of modernity in Japan and Serbia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This is a period that is marked with the bloom of modernity in the Western world; a period of innovation, liberal thought and industrialization.

This period is also a turning point for both Japan and Serbia, the two countries that will be analyzed in the doctoral dissertation. In 1868 Japan witnessed the reestablishment of Imperial rule in. This was a big political and societal shift that brought about significant changes, having in mind that this was the first time Japan was opening to the West. Before that period, from the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Japan was under the self-imposed isolationist rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the reestablishment of the Imperial government, Japan stepped into the international spotlight, for the first time seeking recognition and equality, however, at a significant lag. Serbia has been openly fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire since 1804, after centuries of imposed Ottoman rule. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Serbia gained recognition as an independent country. This newly established independence followed by establishment of a constitutional monarchy marks Serbia's first entrance onto the international scene as a modern nation state, also at a significant lag. As we can see from these short remarks, both Japan and Serbia in the timeframe of the research shifted towards the West. However, they shared the burden of being latecomers to the global scene.

The word lag is used in a neutral way, and does not in any way imply a status of lesser value. It only denotes an almost two-century late start in a modern society, a society where democratic institutions, higher education, industrialization and economic progress dictate primacy. In the time of their awakening, both of these societies, Japan and Serbia willingly and consciously accepted the rules of this new global game. Regardless of the pace of implementation, they both adopted the same liberal values, adopted western political institutions, decided to educate their intellectuals at western universities in order to create an intellectual elite and both started the process of modernization through industrialization. Both societies have looked at the West as a successful model for progress, which we can see from the various ways in which Western values affected the society and culture of the day, from large things to small, from the rise of western-style political institutions to fashion. Both nations were two pre-modern societies that have opened up to the West relatively late.

Their development processes in the period of modernity are marked with similarities that give us the opportunity and justification to conduct a comparative study of the influences of modernity on these two societies in this given cultural-historical context. Regardless of these similarities in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when both societies started running the race late and seemingly employed similar if not the same "recipe for success" on an institutional level, today it is clear that they did not develop in the same way. However, this does not mean that both countries did not reach modernity. In order to explain this, we will use the theoretical basis of multiple modernities, developed by S. N. Eisenstadt.

The theoretical framework of the doctoral dissertation will be based on the notion and idea of modernity. We will use the concept of modernity as a tool: on one hand it is an idea that affects development in a given country; on the other hand it is the subject of the reaction of the societies where it is implemented. Modernity is a term used in the humanities and social sciences to define both a historical period, as well as a collection of particular socio-cultural norms, attitudes and practices that began in post-medieval Europe and have developed since, in various ways and at various times around the world. Authors of works covering the topic of modernity all have varying interpretations of it.

In order to properly understand the notion of modernity, it is essential to make a distinction between this notion and the term of modernization. While these two terms most certainly share some

traits, we will look at modernity as a “condition of social existence that is radically different to all past forms of human experience”<sup>1</sup> while “modernization refers to the transitional process of moving from “traditional” or “primitive” communities to modern societies”.<sup>2</sup> In fact, in our research we will look at modernity as a goal to be achieved, while modernization is defined as a process. For Arnason modernity is centered around ideas, values and socio-cultural norms.<sup>3</sup>

Perović reiterates “that every patriarchal society has traits of modern in it, and vice versa.”<sup>4</sup> Therefore, we see that modernity necessarily includes a relation towards the old, pre-modern system. Delanty explains that modernity implies the “awareness that nothing is settled for once and for all ... that the present is not determined by the past”.<sup>5</sup> This means that modernity has the driving capacity to move society in the direction of progress. In this move towards “tomorrow” and leaving the traditional past aside, it is important to follow some model or tried and tested pattern. In the case of modernity, the role of that model is usually played by the West, more specifically Western Europe. Wittrock explicitly claims: “The modern world emerged out of processes of industrialization, urbanization, and political upheaval at the northwestern edge of the Eurasian landmass.”<sup>6</sup> Delanty therefore marks Europe as a reference culture for others with regard to modernity.<sup>7</sup>

Eisenstadt revisits this classical view on modernity. He contrasts the view on only one way of modernity to the idea that even though modernity started as a specific type of society in Europe with its reach to other parts of the world, many forms of the modernities emerged. He calls this model *multiple modernities*.<sup>8</sup> This Eisenstadt’s concept will be of special importance in this work, since we are looking at two very different societies employing very similar modern ideas, achieving different results in the long run. We will argue that this is because modernity is always a two-way street. It is a process that changes its features with every new culture that embraces it.

Modernity is a broad term that includes but is not limited to: the rejection or questioning of tradition, a move from feudalism to capitalism, the creation of a nation-state; and social, technological and scientific progress. It is a concept that introduces politically, socially and culturally liberal ideas from the West: ideas such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the basis for civil society. Many institutional reforms are also a part of modernity, such as a Westernized system of education and Western political institutions. All of these factors that are aspects of modernity are also themes that are at the same time very current issues in both Japan and Serbia at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They represent common points that will be used as a justification for the usage of these two states as suitable case studies.

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<sup>1</sup> Robbie SHILLIAM. “Modernity and Modernization”. in: Robert A. Denemark (ed.). 2010. *The International Studies Encyclopedia, Volume VIII*. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 5214.

<sup>2</sup> Robbie SHILLIAM. “Modernity and Modernization”. in: Robert A. Denemark (ed.). 2010. *The International Studies Encyclopedia, Volume VIII*. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 5214.

<sup>3</sup> Johann P. ARNASON. “Civilizational Analysis: A Paradigm in the Making” in: Robert HOLTON, William Richard Nasson. 2009. *World Civilizations and History Of Human Development*. EOLSS Publications. pp. 8-9.

<sup>4</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srske države”. in: Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 236.

<sup>5</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. pp. 25-26.

<sup>6</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 39.

<sup>7</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3. No. 3. pp. 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 24.

In order to conduct the research on the acceptance of modernity in Japan and Serbia it is necessary to focus upon relevant factors of modernity. As we explained, modernity is a comprehensive phenomenon and it is not possible to study it in a detail as a whole. Therefore, we decided to narrow our research by focusing on two relevant and intertwined indicators of modernity: education and intellectual elite.

The scientific aim of this research is to explain the process of acceptance of the concept and ideas of modernity in Japan and Serbia. A special emphasis will be put on education as a pivotal factor in this process, as well as the emergence of intellectual elite. The social aim of the doctoral dissertation is to show that in order for modernity to take root, societal impetus is needed; it is not a force of nature that happens by itself. Through the examples of Japan and Serbia, we will show how societies can and do affect the ways in which modernity is implemented. We will also present and outline both effective and ineffective practices that contribute to the establishment of modernity and all that it brings in a society. It is our hope that it can serve as a good blueprint for developing societies even today.

This research is guided by two general and two particular hypotheses which we will present.

The first general hypothesis of this thesis is: *The acceptance of modernity is not possible without the successful implementation of the Western model of education.*

The primary hypothesis of the thesis deals with the relationship between the state and education as one of the primary and fundamental conditions for the successful implementation of modernity. “The state's attitude toward education is twofold; it can, by its regulations and laws, to make education a truly modernizing factor, which will be the driver of general development, or, by contrast, by keeping a traditional approach, make it an obstacle for further development”<sup>9</sup>

Because of their relative isolation from the modernized West, Japan and Serbia did not have proper mechanisms for a successful education of its' citizens. In order to become modern nations, both societies looked to the countries of Western Europe, and Japan also looked to the United States and decided to introduce a Western model of education. “Education is an integrative part of creating a nation. Every modern nation and nation states that arose in the 19<sup>th</sup> century understood this fact, as education became one of their primary national interests.”<sup>10</sup>

By “Western model of education”, and “mass education” we mean a state organized educational system for the masses with an aim of creating a nation state and a national identity by promoting the political system, values, language, culture and traditions of that specific society. As Trgovčević recalls: “State organization of education is a parallel process with the process of creating a nation stated and building a national identity.”<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, mass education and the modern nation state are intertwined and go hand in hand: “...mass schooling made sense in so many contexts because it became a central feature of the Western, and subsequently the world, model of the nation-state and its development. Nation-states expand schooling because they adhere to world models of the organization of sovereignty (the modern state) and the organization of society as composed of

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<sup>9</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 220.

<sup>10</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku” in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 191.

<sup>11</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku” in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 191.

individuals (the modern nation).”<sup>12</sup> Western model schooling was the necessary step a pre-modern society had to undertake in order to make the transition into a modern nation-state.

Parallels between the implementation of a Western educational system in Japan and Serbia are apparent in laws that entered into force in both countries just a decade apart. “With grand language, in 1872 it [Meiji government] declared four years of elementary education to be compulsory for all children, boys and girls: ‘In a village there shall be no house without learning, and in a house, no individual without learning.’ This important step reflected the new leaders’ understanding of the sources of Western power.”<sup>13</sup> In Serbia, “[t]he biggest change came to be with the enactment of the Law for elementary schools on the 11<sup>th</sup> of January 1883, which prescribed compulsory education ‘for every child that lives in Serbia’. Minister Stojan Novaković has, with it, followed then newest European norms.”<sup>14</sup>

It is impossible to separate education – especially at a societal level in such a pivotal time for both Japan and Serbia – from social, political and economic factors that have influenced certain changes and moves specific to each of these societies. As Trgovčević puts it: “Observing education as one of the components of modernization changes in Serbia is possible only if it is explored as a part of the overall social, economic and political circumstances.”<sup>15</sup> Even though this statement is made explicitly for the case of Serbia, it is true for most cases, and we shall employ this statement into practice in this doctoral dissertation, by creating further, derived hypotheses that will serve as support to this primary hypothesis.

The first particular hypothesis of this thesis is: *Contact between the intellectual elite and the West is a necessary prerequisite, but insufficient by itself for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented.*

By this contact we mean the direct or indirect financing, promoting and state funded scholarships to Western universities by the Japanese and Serbian governments. Both the Japanese and Serbian state recognized the need for the modernization of the education system and the need to create a modern intellectual elite. They recognized this would bring them into the 20<sup>th</sup> century as an accepted new nation state. In order to succeed, there needed to exist a connection between them and the Western societies that served as beacons for modernity for both Japan and Serbia.

There is clear evidence that such a connection with the West was the official objective in both societies. Sending state-funded students for overseas studies at prestigious Western universities was the official policy of both governments. In this way, an intellectual elite with connections and experiences from the West would be created, but also a new social stratum, which would include a new generation of teachers, university professors, military officers, political, economic and social leaders. These efforts by both Japan and Serbia are well documented. In the case of Japan there was a clear effort by the government and private leaders to educate and westernize the population: “Students were sent abroad, and Western scholars and specialists in all fields were invited to Japan to assist in the modernization of the country. A massive educational effort was launched to ‘enlighten’

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<sup>12</sup> John W. MEYER, Francisco O. RAMIREZ, Yasemin Nuhoglu SOYSAL. 2002. “World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980”. *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 65. No. 2. pp. 129.

<sup>13</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 67.

<sup>14</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku” in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 193.

<sup>15</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 228.

the populace.”<sup>16</sup> As for Serbia: “...Almost every year, the state sent a certain number of state funded students for overseas studies.”<sup>17</sup> Stojanović also provides clear evidence of government stipends for Serbia’s citizens: “Thanks to government stipends, first generation intellectuals educated at Western universities brought in liberal ideas to Serbia.”<sup>18</sup>

The second particular hypothesis of the thesis is: *The modern intellectual elite must be included into the political discourse in order for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented.*

In a system that is establishing a modern, Western education system, sending its’ citizens to Western universities, creating its’ own new intellectual and social elite whose members are to be the nations’ new leaders in various walks of life; the political elite must include the intellectuals into the political discourse, as they are the connection to the West that the state itself has produced in order to modernize itself. Trgovčević writes: “19<sup>th</sup> century universities had a specific role that was not only scientific, but educational and patriotic as well. They did not merely offer just concrete knowledge, they also served as a vessel for transmission of specific cultures.”<sup>19</sup> With this in mind, Trgovčević offers a very specific role for these students with newly accepted cultural values: “In the time of the creation of nation states, education was a primary national objective, because the goal was the creation of a homegrown, national elite, that would secure and perform basic state functions.”<sup>20</sup>

In this context, inclusion into the political discourse does not mean that an idyllic and utopian relationship exists between the intellectual elite and the political elite. It does not mean that all decisions are necessarily made with the same ideas in mind and that those decisions are spearheading in the most efficient and direct way towards modernity. What it means is that there exists a conscious effort to make decisions and compromises for the greater good of society. It means that the state needs and should reap the benefits of its’ own investments.

Shigenobu Ōkuma, Statesman and two-time Prime Minister of Japan acknowledges Western influence as a fundamental factor for Japans success in his work *Fifty Years of New Japan*: “This leap forward is the result of the stimulus which the country received on coming into contact with the civilization of Europe and America ... Foreign intercourse it was that animated the national consciousness of our people, who under the feudal system lived localized and disunited, and foreign discourse it is that has enabled Japan to stand up as a world-Power.”<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, Latinka Perović speaks of the intellectual elite in the first decades of Serbian statehood, as having a “missionary” and “ideological” role of bringing in the light from Western Europe to Serbia. There were, however, disagreements in the new elites’ stance towards Europe.<sup>22</sup> There were those who believed Serbia’s place is among the nations of Europe, and those who believed

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<sup>16</sup> Mikiso HANE, Louis G. PEREZ. 2009. *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 104.

<sup>17</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 226.

<sup>18</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 29.

<sup>19</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. pp. 48-49.

<sup>21</sup> Shigenobu ŌKUMA. “Conclusion” in: Shigenobu ŌKUMA, Marcus B. HUIISH (eds.). 1909. *Fifty Years of New Japan (Kaikoku Gojumen Shi)*. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. p. 555. As cited from: Morris LOW. 2005. *Building a Modern Japan: Science, Technology, and Medicine in the Meiji Era and Beyond*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ, “Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 236.

that: “...there are so many good and healthy institutions and customs in the Serb people, that they should only be nurtured and supplemented with those good institutions that are found in the Russian people and other Slavic tribes, while taking from the West only technical and scientific knowledge and using it in the Slavic-Serbian spirit”<sup>23</sup> To the reader, Pašić’s words might be reminiscent of the Japanese slogan: “Japanese spirit, Western technology”. However, the socio-political climate in Serbia was far from ideal for such an approach. The aforementioned divide would prove to be somewhat of a problem during the years of political and intellectual growth in the early years of modernity in Serbia. Despite these divides in the Serbian political and intellectual elites, King Milan of Serbia, in the opening of the General Assembly in 1883, when speaking of Serbia’s duties, stated that it has “the first duty of a match with Europe, a match on the path of education, on the path of work, on the path of transformation according to the rights and demands of modern states.”<sup>24</sup> From these words we can conclude that the political priority of the state indeed was a path of modernity.

The second general hypothesis of the thesis is: *The success of modernization depends on the reasons for the acceptance of modernity.*

For this hypothesis we come back to Trgovčević’s statement: “Observing education as one of the components of modernization changes in Serbia is possible only if it is explored as a part of the overall social, economic and political circumstances.”<sup>25</sup> In order to come full circle in this research where the concentration lies in the intellectual elite and the education system, we must take a step back and look at the overall social and political climate of the time in these two societies. While not directly tied to education and the intellectual elite, it paints a broader picture of the climate and circumstances in which modernity as an idea and as a concept was accepted in these societies.

In this research we will argue that the process of the acceptance of modernity is a process that is considerably affected by the human factor. This means that a society must make a decision to go the way of modernity. This decision can be made taking various factors into consideration. We will explain which factors were decisive in the choice of Serbia and Japan to embrace modernity.

In Japan, after the Meiji Restoration there was a sudden influx of Western ideas and ideals, and a sudden craze for all things Western. The Japanese intellectual and political leaders “wanted to join the community of nations as an equal member and thus be eligible to participate in the game of international power politics.”<sup>26</sup> In order to join in on this game, Japan had to be on par with the rest of the countries of Western Europe that had a significant head start on Japan. The wisdom of the political and intellectual elite was in their humility: “The Meiji leaders did in fact recognize that in terms of military strength and economic development, Japan was indeed far behind the Western nations. They even suspected that this was true in political, social, and cultural affairs.”<sup>27</sup> Even though in the early years of the Meiji Era, we can discern the beginnings of liberal democratic values, written in early drafts of the famous Five Charter Oath, parliamentarianism, democracy and other liberal values were far from full bloom.

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<sup>23</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 239. footnote omitted

<sup>24</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 237. footnotes omitted

<sup>25</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. in: PEROVIĆ, Latinka, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 228.

<sup>26</sup> Mikiso HANE, Louis G. PEREZ. 2009. *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> Mikiso HANE, Louis G. PEREZ. 2009. *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 84.

In an active fight for independence and statehood that lasted more than half a century, the Serbian political elite needed Western support for an expansion of territory in order to unify the Serb people scattered around the Balkan Peninsula. The political elite used the acceptance of modernity mirrored in the political application of Western institutions and practices as a means to an end. Historian Dubravka Stojanović writes about the point of view on democracy in Serbia: “In the introduction of liberal constitutions, parliamentary institutions and democratic customs, they [one group of Serbian historians] see only the façade that hides the non-democratic, pre-modern and autocratic ways of governing, a façade that was necessary for the democratic states of West, primarily France and England, to diplomatically support Serbian aspirations for unification.”<sup>28</sup> This does not mean that there was not a real modernist movement within the intellectual elite as the important bearer of the implementation of modernity; merely that “the national concept was always put in front of the concept of development, as a priority.”<sup>29</sup>

These short remarks illustrate a clear correlation between the success of modernization and the reasons of acceptance of modernity. Japan wanted to use modernity in order to become a relevant actor on the international scene. Japanese leaders recognized that in order for their wish to participate in international power politics to come true, modernization and the acceptance of modernity had to be high on their priority list. They understood that modernity needed to be accepted in all facets of society if Japan was to move forward. Even coming late in the game had its potential advantages. Historian Marius Jansen observed: “Japan can do things more rapidly than the West did, since it can profit from that example. “Latecomers” to modernity and civilization can leapfrog over experimentation.”<sup>30</sup> Serbian leaders recognized the need for modernization, but put it aside for issues that were deemed of greater importance- national unification. Even if the Serbian intellectual elite truly recognized the concept of modernity, they did not have the necessary strength to have their voice heard in order to follow through completely.

The doctoral dissertation is structured in seven Chapters: an introductory Chapter, five Chapters that deal with the main topic, the concluding chapter and bibliography.

In this introductory Chapter of the doctoral dissertation, the basic assumptions of the research and the aim of the work is presented.

The second Chapter clearly defines and analyzes the notion of modernity as a theoretical concept that will be used throughout the research. In this Chapter cover several authors that have varying interpretations of the idea of modernity. We created a specific understanding of modernity that is used throughout the research, with special emphasis on Eisenstadt’s concept of multiple modernities.

In the third Chapter we start with the presentation of the state of affairs in Western Europe in order to set the benchmark for the application of the concept of modernity to Japan and Serbia. Next, we move to a short look at the immediate time period that precedes the acceptance of modernity in order to establish a starting point for both Japan and Serbia.

In Chapter four we take a close look at Japan after the Meiji Restoration and throughout the Meiji Era. After we present Meiji Era Japan, we take a closer look at Serbia from its independence at the Congress of Berlin throughout the nineteenth century. In these presentations we focus on relevant data and information pertaining to the acceptance of the ideas of modernity.

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<sup>28</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 26.

<sup>29</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 74.

<sup>30</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 378.

The fifth Chapter analyzes in depth the state of both Japan and Serbia in the implementation of the idea of modernity through education.

Chapter six is devoted to the study of the role of the intellectual elite in the implementation of the ideas of modernity, most notably through its' relationship with the political elite.

The final part of the dissertation presents the conclusions drawn from the research.

This research is guided by the following methods: content analysis, comparison, critical qualitative text analysis.

We use content analysis in order to conduct a thorough research of various types of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources that are used include: laws and regulations in both Japan and Serbia; various lists of government funded students studying abroad in the set research period; speeches of relevant and prominent cultural, intellectual and political leaders of the time. Secondary sources include scientific works addressing this topic (books, journals, articles, relevant research) of other eminent authors in the field of culture, sociology, history and politics.

We use the method of comparison in order to compare and contrast Japan and Serbia in the given research period. In order to successfully compare these two societies, it is necessary to first establish similarities between the two countries in order to justify the reasons for comparison. After the justification has been brought to light, we will contrast the two and enter deeper into the particularities of each society.

We use critical qualitative text analysis to transfer the general theoretical framework of modernity onto the particular subject matter, Japan and Serbia in the set research period. Using this method, we come to understand the particularities of each of the societies and their application of the concept of modernity and the institutions it brings with it. In that way we will gain a better understanding of Japanese as well as Serbian society, in the research period. Furthermore, we use this method to transfer the knowledge and information drawn from the previously processed subject matter, in order to draw wider conclusions applicable to the notion and understanding of the concept of modernity. In that way we enrich the theoretical discussions about this topic.

## 2. FRAMING MODERNITY

The theoretical framework of this research is based on the notion of modernity. We will use this concept as a tool: on one hand it is an idea that affects development in a given country; on the other hand, it is the subject of the reaction of the societies where it is implemented.

Modernity is a multifaceted term that is used in the social sciences and humanities. We can discern at least two groups of meanings of this notion. One of its' meanings refers to a historical period, while the other meaning refers to a set of norms and practices in a specific time and place. Modernity as a historical period begins in post- Renaissance Europe, and from there its' collection of norms and practices have developed, unequally, in various ways and at various times around the world. Having in mind that modernity is a term that encompasses a broad range of meanings, we will look at various authors covering the topic for their perspectives on modernity in order to gain a more complete understanding of the term and its usage.<sup>31</sup>

Firstly, we will take a closer look at the bifurcating explanation of the term given by Wittrock. In it, he reaffirms the multiplicity of the term itself, by pointing out to the usage of the term to denote a time period on the one hand, and the usage of modernity as a variety of different processes in different societies on the other. Wittrock explains:

“When we speak of modernity and of modern societies, we seem to mean one of two things. First, we may speak as if we were giving an encompassing name to a whole epoch in world history, the modern age, as distinct from, say, the medieval age or classical antiquity. Such a terminology makes it legitimate to discuss questions as to when exactly the modern age may be said to have come into existence, what its origins may have been, or, indeed, if it has now come to an end. Second, we may speak as if we were actually characterizing distinct phenomena and processes in a given society at a given time. We may say that the technology used in some branch of industry of a country is modern but that patterns of family life are not. It is then an empirical question to determine to what extent different institutions and phenomena of a country may be described as modern.”<sup>32</sup>

Another author covering the topic similarly suggests the duality of the meaning of the term. Berman underlines that modernity includes both a wide array of correlated historical developments and cultural phenomena, but also subjective experiences they produce and the perpetual impact on culture, politics and institutions.<sup>33</sup> There appears to be a consensus between the two authors on the temporal aspect of the definition of modernity. However, where Wittrock concentrates on institutions and phenomena in countries, Berman asserts individual experiences as the defining second feature of modernity.

Besides this noted duality of the term modernity, a fact that further complicates giving a 'clean' definition of modernity is that the study of modernity is often done simultaneously with the study of modernization. It is not uncommon to see these two terms used interchangeably in some instances. Therefore, it is important in the beginning to stress the difference between these two

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<sup>31</sup> For a more comprehensive understanding on the sociological aspect of modernity please consult: Peter WAGNER. 2008. *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>32</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Marshall BERMAN. 1988. *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 15-36.

notions, as this difference is of great importance for our theoretical framework. This might seem as a note on the terminology, however it reflects deeper substantial differences. Also, by insisting on the differentiating modernity and modernization, we will shed light on the very notion of modernity.

Martinelli ties modernity to the notion of modernization and states that: “under modernization we refer to a set of processes of change of a broad scope through which a particular society strives to acquire economic, political, social and cultural features that are considered to be inherent to modernity”.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, we see how modernization is depicted as a process, while modernity is a goal to be achieved. As Ortiz rightly states “the modern was conceived as having intrinsic value, a goal to be reached.”<sup>35</sup>

Shilliam adds to this distinction by emphasizing that: “modernization refers to the transitional process of moving from “traditional” or “primitive” communities to modern societies” while “modernity refers to a condition of social existence that is radically different to all past forms of human experience.”<sup>36</sup> Therefore Shilliam points out to another trait of modernity and that is the rigid contrast between the old and the new ways. As Marković rightly states: “the progress of human societies and cultural development, the possession of knowledge and its increase that lead to development in the realm of technology, the economy, and human affairs, inevitably leads to destruction of the old and creation of the new”.<sup>37</sup> Delanty shares this view: “What is modernity? It is best defined as a condition of awareness that nothing is settled for once and for all and that therefore the future is not predetermined. It expresses the idea that the present is not determined by the past, especially by the recent past. Most invocations of modernity announced a rupture of present time from the past, generally the recent past.”<sup>38</sup>

One author that gives us a clear distinction between modernization and modernity is Arnason. He addresses modernization as a theory that was interested in the processes of societal progress through various mechanisms, whereas modernity itself deals with the ideas, values and socio-cultural norms, of the very question what it means to be modern. “Modernization theory was primarily interested in the processes that made societies more modern: industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization and (more controversially) secularization were the most salient trends of this kind... What it meant to be modern was a much less debated question; but it came to the fore at a later stage and became central to a broader shift of focus from modernization to modernity.”<sup>39</sup>

We can conclude that Arnason makes a decisive distinction between modernization and its processes and modernity. This is an important distinction to make when defining modernity, especially for the purposes of this thesis. While the processes of modernization and its mechanisms are an important factor for the states that are the subject of our research, our focus will not be on the bureaucratic, industrializing, and urbanizing methods and mechanisms. These important mechanisms will be mentioned as they paint an important picture of the time period we are covering, and they are tied to modernity as such. However, we will concentrate on the ideas that came from Western Europe

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<sup>34</sup> Alberto MARTINELLI. 2010. *Modernizam: process modernizacije*. Podgorica: CID. p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> Renato ORTIZ. 2000. “From Incomplete modernity to World Modernity”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 255.

<sup>36</sup> Robbie SHILLIAM. “Modernity and Modernization”. in: Robert A. Denemark (ed.). 2010. *The International Studies Encyclopedia, Volume VIII*. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 5214.

<sup>37</sup> Ljiljana MARKOVIĆ. 2015. “Japan, the First Quest of Modernization in East Asia”. *European Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3. p. 421.

<sup>38</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. pp. 25-26.

<sup>39</sup> Johann P. ARNASON. “Civilizational Analysis: A Paradigm in the Making” in: Robert HOLTON, William Richard Nasson. 2009. *World Civilizations And History Of Human Development*. EOLSS Publications. pp. 8-9.

and America, the values and the norms that made these, and other processes possible in order to reach the goal of creating a modern state.

In order to understand the ideas pertaining to modernity, it is helpful to shed light on the historical roots of the phenomenon of modernity. Even though Berman approaches modernity, modernism and modernization as inextricably tied with each other, its findings are nevertheless useful in illuminating the part of the definition of modernity concerning its historical aspect.<sup>40</sup> Berman separates modernity into three phases. The first phase is from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, where people are being tempted by modern life, not knowing how to properly deal with all the aspect that come with it. The second phase begins in the 1790s where, in the wake of the French Revolution and its echoes throughout the world, a modern society was born. This modern society shared its sense of revolutionary life that had a tremendous impact on personal, social and political life. The modern society of the nineteenth century had a unique perspective on the world, as it both lived in and experienced the modern world, while also having experience with life in the premodern world. It is from these two experiences brought together that modern ideas were born.<sup>41</sup> The third phase as Berman explains, happened in the twentieth century. In this phase modernization has reached global proportions and the ever-growing global culture achieves its zenith in art and thought, on the one hand. On the other hand, because of its pervasiveness and expansion, modernity shatters and loses its power to give meaning to the people living in the modern world. Berman concludes that we are experiencing life in a modern age that has lost touch with its modern beginnings.<sup>42</sup>

Another important aspect in the research of modernity is to locate its geographical center. A vast number of authors covering the topic would agree that Europe was the cradle of the modern notion of modernity. After the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment had taken Britain and Europe, Europe became a beacon of ideas, practices and norms that concomitant with modernity. Speaking of the time period between the late eighteenth and early twentieth century, Delanty comments: “This was a time in which the rise of Europe roughly coincides with the emergence of modernity. It is therefore reasonable to suppose there was a relation between the idea of Europe and the emergence of modernity”.<sup>43</sup> Landes is especially explicit about the centrality of Europe in the idea of modernity. According to his view: “As the historical record shows, for the last thousand years, Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development and modernity.”<sup>44</sup> Wittrock also points out that: “The modern world emerged out of processes of industrialization, urbanization, and political upheaval at the northwestern edge of the Eurasian landmass.”<sup>45</sup>

Having in mind this centrality of Europe with regard to modernity, Delanty defines Europe as a reference culture. He states that Europe was influential and powerful reference culture, but also a

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<sup>40</sup> Marshall BERMAN. 1988. *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 16-17.

<sup>41</sup> It is interesting to note how Berman sees the birth of modernity and modern ideas as a marriage of the old and the new. It contrasts the previously mentioned views expressed by Shilliam and Marković, that both reaffirm that the view that modernity is radically different to all preexisting times – that it is in fact a break with the past.

<sup>42</sup> Marshall BERMAN. 1988. *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 16-17.

<sup>43</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 10.

<sup>44</sup> David S. LANDES. 1998. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are so Rich and Some so Poor*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company: p. xxi

<sup>45</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 39.

temporary one.<sup>46</sup> Its position as a reference culture was active from the eighteenth century, peaked during the nineteenth, and by the twentieth century its relevance had waned in the world.<sup>47</sup> Delanty also presents two reasons why Europe was the reference culture for others. These reasons are as follows: “It was first of all one of the first globally oriented cultures and, as argued, it was a mobile culture that offered those cultures it came into contact with a set of ideas that were easily translatable.”<sup>48</sup>

However, the ideas and values of modernity transcended their birthplace. Marković illustrates this point by explaining that “A quest for modernization is a desire to catch up with the current level of a neighbouring civilization, or the world civilization, that ensues after a dialogue between or among civilizations.”<sup>49</sup> Marković suggests that modernity (and its processes) spreads as a result of the wish of the states to emulate one another and each other’s progress. Wittrock points out that modernity can be seen “as an age when certain structuring principles have come to define a common global condition.”<sup>50</sup> What made this transcendence possible was the emergence of globalization- in an ever-smaller world nations gained more and more close neighbors. “The formation of modernity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is the first major period of cultural crystallization when transformations in different parts of the world are directly interconnected.”<sup>51</sup> To conclude with Wittrock’s words: “Modernity may thus be delineated in terms of a conjunction, with global implications, of a set of cultural, institutional, and cosmological shifts.”<sup>52</sup>

Social institutions that are looked at as markers for modernity, according to Wittrock, have spread across the globe from Europe but “In the process, however, they have often been so profoundly transformed as to render a belief in one single homogenous modernity hopelessly naive.”<sup>53</sup> Several authors noticed this plurality of modernities and gave their contribution to further our understanding. One of the pioneers was most certainly S. N. Eisenstadt, and we will succinctly present his theory.

Eisenstadt revisits the classical view on modernity and states new emerging perspectives that came to be from its critical evaluation, through examining Axial Age civilizations and comparative civilizational analysis. In contrast to the view that there is only one way of modernity, and that it is the final step in a society's evolution, he states that it started as a specific type of society in Europe. However, through its' expansion it reached other parts of the world, creating many forms of modernity. In Eisenstadt's words: “While the common starting point was once the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West, more recent developments have seen a multiplicity of

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<sup>46</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 9.

<sup>47</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 10.

<sup>48</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 29.

<sup>49</sup> Ljiljana MARKOVIĆ. 2015. “Japan, the First Quest of Modernization in East Asia”. *European Review* Vol. 23, No. 3. p. 421.

<sup>50</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 55.

<sup>51</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 58.

<sup>52</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 53.

<sup>53</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127. No. 3. p. 20.

cultural and social formations going far beyond the very homogenizing aspects of the original version.”<sup>54</sup> He calls this model *multiple modernities*.

Eisenstadt professes that his view on modernity differs to the classical view of the emergence of modernity. Where the classical approach speaks of merging industrial societies in which the political, cultural and industrial progress was an almost conscious and inevitable effort, he builds his view on the rising wave of recognition of a variability of ideologies and dynamics ever more present in the spread of modern societies. On this view he says: “modernity is best analyzed as the emergence of a distinct new civilization, which promulgated a distinct cultural and institutional programme, a distinct mode of interpretation of the world”.<sup>55</sup>

In Europe, the new civilization of modernity came to be out of a synchronicity of cultural inclinations and the development of capitalism and new political systems paired with military expansions and imperialism, ingrained in the arrangement. Eisenstadt denotes that this type of growth was anything but new, especially in the case of *great* civilizations, but what was novel was the intensity that came with modernity: “great technological advances and the dynamics of modern economic and political forces made this expansion, the changes and developments triggered by it and their impact on the societies to which it expanded, much more intensive”.<sup>56</sup>

The expansion of modernity resembled earlier imperial expansions of the past, in their disregarding symbols and institutions of the affected societies, but on the other hand it revealed new possibilities.<sup>57</sup> “The result was a tendency—new and practically unique in the history of mankind—towards the development of universal, worldwide institutional, cultural and ideological frameworks and systems. All of these frameworks were multi-centered and heterogenous (sic), each generating its own dynamics and undergoing continual changes in constant relations to the others”.<sup>58</sup> The countries had very dynamic relations and these new frameworks encouraged the societies’ constant change, and more importantly they “were closely interwoven with the specific cultural programs of modernity as it crystallized first in Europe”.<sup>59</sup>

Eisenstadt’s theory further differs from the classical theories of modernity, which presumed that the type of modernity that flourished in Europe would eventually triumph globally: “with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.”<sup>60</sup> However, “The actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity.”<sup>61</sup>

In the process of the expansion of modernity from European civilization, societies that embraced modernity did so on their own terms. “The appropriation by non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas.”<sup>62</sup> An example of the reinvention and reinterpretation of imported ideas can be seen here: “It is a commonplace to observe that the distinct varieties of modern democracy in India or Japan, for example, may be attributed to the encounter between Western modernity and the cultural traditions

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<sup>54</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 45.

<sup>56</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 50.

<sup>57</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 49.

<sup>58</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 50.

<sup>59</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 50.

<sup>60</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 15.

and historical experiences of these societies”<sup>63</sup> Therefore, modernity does not prevail in its original European institutional form, but undergoes significant changes in order to flourish in other cultures.

Having in mind these reformulations of modernity it does not come as a surprise that various model of modernity emerged in different parts of the globe, at various times. Eisenstadt portrays this by elucidating the following:

“Thus, while the spread or expansion of modernity has indeed taken place throughout most of the world, yet it did not give rise to just one civilization, one pattern of ideological and institutional response, but to at least several basic versions which in turn are subject to further variations. New questionings and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity develop continuously within all societies—and competing cultural agendas have emerged in all of them.”<sup>64</sup>

Wittrock explains that “a set of technological, economic, and political institutions, with their origins in the context of Western Europe, have become diffused across the globe at least as ideals, sometimes also as working realities.”<sup>65</sup>

It is insightful to present how different cultures and societies embraced the Western model of modernity. Wittrock underlines that existing cultural differences between cultures and societies prevail: “different cultural entities have to adapt to and refer to a set of globally diffused ideas and practices. In their core identities, these societies remain characterized by the form they acquired during much earlier periods of cultural crystallization ... ”<sup>66</sup> Wittrock further explains that the core identities of these societies are also product of transformation and reinterpretation “but they have continued to structure the most profound cosmological and societal assumptions of their civilizations, and it would be exceedingly naive to believe that they are now suddenly about to disappear.”<sup>67</sup> As much as these core identities remain intact, their encounter with modernity results in inevitable changes. Eisenstadt presents this as follows: “Just as when historical civilizations expand, so does the expansion of modernity challenge the symbolic and institutional premises of the societies that are incorporated into it. This challenge calls for responses from within these societies, which have the effect in turn, of opening up new options and possibilities”.<sup>68</sup>

One of the facts that come to be apparent in a more detailed look at Eisenstadt’s work on multiple modernities is the definite separation of the two often-clustered terms- modernity and Westernization. Delanty is in accordance with this stance: “Modernity is not European, but a condition that can arise in any society or civilization. It has been much associated with Europe, but this view can be criticized for reducing modernity to its European expression.”<sup>69</sup> However, this does not mean that the Western type of modernity is devoid of importance. Even though it is not the only

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<sup>63</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 23.

<sup>64</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 53.

<sup>65</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 54-55.

<sup>66</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 54-55.

<sup>67</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 54-55.

<sup>68</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill: p. 24.

<sup>69</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 24.

authentic modernity, it is its progenitor. As such, it became a reference point, or more precisely a *reference culture* for others.<sup>70</sup>

After establishing that modernity is inevitably tied to, but not equated with Western model, it is important to explain which traits of this model of modernity did travel around the globe. As we can see, modernity is a broad term that includes but is not limited to: the rejection or questioning of tradition, a move from feudalism to capitalism, the creation of a nation-state; and social, technological and scientific progress. It is a concept that introduces politically, socially and culturally liberal ideas from the West: widely available education, national military, ideas such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the basis for civil society.<sup>71</sup> It also brings the beginnings of democratic principles and formal institutions; it brings in modern ideas and mechanisms such as industrialization, which boosts the economy of a country, it brings the creation of roads and railways, which physically connects and unifies the country. By connecting individual citizens to each other and to the world by means of modernity, societies connect to each other as well as modernity itself even further. Many institutional reforms are also a part of modernity, such as a Westernized system of education and Western military tactics and practices.

All these enumerated features of Western model of modernity could be subsumed under three aspects, which Wittrock deems as institutional projects of Western modernity – “a democratic nation-state, a liberal market economy, a research-oriented university.”<sup>72</sup> While these tangible factors are usually the subject of research of modernity, Wittrock wisely points out to another crucial aspect of modernity. He explains that these factors cannot be understood in vacuum and without the study of conceptual changes in which they are rooted. He states that: “these institutional projects were premised on new assumptions about human beings, their rights and agency.”<sup>73</sup> This is in line with Delanty’s view that: “One aspect of the notion of modernity that is striking is that it reflects a strong faith in the capacity of human agency to shape society in light of guiding ideas and in knowledge.”<sup>74</sup> Finally, Eisenstadt credits Wittrock on this stance by stating that: “The cultural program of modernity entailed some very distinct shifts in the conception of human agency, and of its place in the flow of time.”<sup>75</sup>

In order to explain conceptual changes in human agency that are necessary for the comprehensive understanding of modernity Wittrock introduces the concept of promissory notes. He states that: “These conceptual changes entailed promissory notes that came to constitute new affiliations, identities, and, ultimately, institutional realities.”<sup>76</sup> Wittrock explains that: “... modernity cannot be identified just with a successful industrial and democratic revolution. It has to be understood in terms of promissory notes that served as ever more generalized reference points in

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<sup>70</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 2-3.

<sup>71</sup> For the purposes of this text, it is important to clarify the use of the terms freedom of speech and freedom of the press. By these terms, it is implied that the ideas, both practical and philosophical, brought to Japan and Serbia in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, are beginning to take shape in the wider social arena of conversation among the newly formed elites and more educated populace. It does not signify freedom of speech or freedom of the press in the form of buzzwords to which we are accustomed today.

<sup>72</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 36-37.

<sup>73</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 36-37.

<sup>74</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol. 3, No. 3. p. 26.

<sup>75</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. “Multiple Modernities”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. pp. 36-37.

debates and in the formation of affiliations and the creation of new institutional forms.”<sup>77</sup> He further states explicitly that: “modernity is a set of promissory notes, i.e., a set of hopes and expectations that entail some minimal conditions of adequacy that may be demanded of macrosocietal institutions no matter how much these institutions may differ in other respects.”<sup>78</sup>

Wittrock defines six prerequisites for these promissory notes: First, they need to be declarations about a variety of achievements that may be attained by members of a community, which need to be expressed explicitly rather than as ill-defined wishes.<sup>79</sup> Second, they must speak of the community rather than one person.<sup>80</sup> Third, they must be deeply held principles that may be expected rather than simply wished for.<sup>81</sup> Fourth, a promissory note “depends for its assertability on the validity of claims about the nature and history of human beings as members of the posited community.”<sup>82</sup> Fifth, political institutions come to personify and exhibit these promissory notes; by embodying these promissory notes, the institutions normalize and legitimize them as a regular trajectory.<sup>83</sup> And sixth, promissory notes must be expressed in a public forum, in our case public spheres.<sup>84</sup>

Wittrock defines public spheres as:

“fora where common matters are the focus of debate and deliberation but where discourse is not only occurring about the rulers and form of rulership. It has to be a discourse to which access is in principle open and that is, furthermore, also directed at the rulers and often enough carried on with the objective of influencing or changing the polity and the sphere of officialdom.”<sup>85</sup>

Habermas defines the public sphere simply as a “society engaged in critical public debate”<sup>86</sup>. Therefore, we may look at public spheres as any form of speech or writing intended for or open to the public.

Apart from providing a new lens through which modernity is to be studied, Wittrock notices that the social sciences have for a long time provided no available tools that would help us better understand that there were multiple modernities forming in various places around the world over long stretches of time. He gives three reasons for this academic disregard: (1) During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, modernization was equated with Westernization; (2) scholars disregarded both

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<sup>77</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 38.

<sup>78</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 55.

<sup>79</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 37.

<sup>80</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 37.

<sup>81</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 37.

<sup>82</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 37.

<sup>83</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 37.

<sup>84</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 38.

<sup>85</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No. 1. p. 38.

<sup>86</sup> Jürgen HABERMAS. 1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: MIT Press. p. 52.

institutional changes in economic and political orders as well as intellectual and cultural processes that were often integral to change, both politically and institutionally speaking; (3) because a great number of properties central to the modern age appeared at the turn of the eighteenth century were at odds with the traditional political and social order, there was a lack of appeal in exploring longer waves of change in the various stages of cultural programs of modernity.<sup>87</sup>

After elucidating these shortcomings of the research of multiple modernities and introducing a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of modernity, we can move forward in the application of this model to different case studies.

First of all, it is important to emphasize on which perspective of modernity this research will lean on. We are in accordance with Wittrock's view that discourse about modernity is formulated in the political framework. Wittrock explains this in the following manner: "The discourse about such transcendence might be religious and philosophical, as in the axial age, or ecclesiastically ecumenical, as in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe. In the formation of modernity in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophical reflection was, however, explicitly political."<sup>88</sup> This same fact can easily be pushed a century forward in the case of our latecomers – Japan and Serbia. Therefore, we may assume going forward in our research the cultural perspective of modernity is, in late nineteenth century, by its nature political.

The discourse on modernity is political in the sense that it builds on the idea of the modern nation-state in an ultimately global arena. Wittrock rightly sees "the modern nation-state as the archetypal political order of modernity."<sup>89</sup> Eisenstadt succumbs to this view. When speaking of modernity spreading from the West to other parts of the world, he states: "In all these societies the basic model of the territorial state and later the nation-state was adopted, as were the basic premises and symbols of Western modernity. So, too, were the West's modern institutions- representative, legal and administrative."<sup>90</sup>

Apart from politically termed discourse on modernity, light should be shed on another important aspect in the study of multiple modernities. That is the role of specific social actors in its implementation. Eisenstadt explains this as follows:

"These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern. Through the engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized."<sup>91</sup>

However, it is important to point out that social actors engaged in the implementation of modernity are not necessarily consonant with each other. Eisenstadt notices that "different types of elite groups bear different type of orientation or visions."<sup>92</sup> Eisenstadt portrays that there are two opposing forces at work. He states:

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<sup>87</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. "Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions". *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. pp. 20-21.

<sup>88</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. "Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition". *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 56.

<sup>89</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. "Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions". *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 22.

<sup>90</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 14.

<sup>91</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 2.

<sup>92</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. p. 34.

“In the discourse on modernity, several themes developed, none more important than the one that stressed the continual confrontation between more "traditional" sectors of society and the so-called modern centers or sectors that developed within them. So, too, there was an inherent tension between the culture of modernity, the modern "rational" model of the Enlightenment that emerged as hegemonic in certain periods and places and others construed as reflecting the more "authentic" cultural traditions of specific societies.”<sup>93</sup>

For the purposes of this work we will focus on two specific social strata – the intellectual and political elites. One of the thesis statements of this paper is the symbiotic relationship between the intellectual and the political elite, in order to further advance modernity. The term symbiotic is not to be reminiscent of *idyllic*. The notion is used in order to outline that despite differences and potential disagreements that might transpire, there is a clear purpose and a common goal that transcends these differences and disagreements. Their engagement in the implementation of modernity could be one of the most important factors achieving and experiencing the effects of modernity, especially to a latecomer in the late nineteenth century.

Therefore, two major factors that will be the guidelines for this research are the Western model institutions and the intellectual and political elites. Within the framework of the above-defined model of multiple modernities and through the prism of these guidelines we will analyze reception of modernity in two states – Japan and Serbia.<sup>94</sup> This comparative analysis will be set in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as this period is a turning point for both Japan and Serbia in terms of acceptance of modernity.

Japan witnessed the reestablishment of Imperial rule in 1868. This was a big political and societal shift that brought about significant changes, having in mind that this was the first time Japan was opening to the West. Before that period, from the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Japan was under the self-imposed isolationist rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the reestablishment of the Imperial government, Japan stepped into the international spotlight for the first time seeking recognition and equality, however, at a significant lag.

Serbia has been openly fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire since 1804, after centuries of imposed Ottoman rule. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Serbia gained recognition as an independent country. This newly established independence followed by establishment of a constitutional monarchy marks Serbia's first entrance onto the international scene as a modern nation-state, also at a significant lag.

As we can see from these short remarks, both Japan and Serbia in the timeframe of the research shifted towards the West. However, they shared the burden of being latecomers to the global scene. The word lag is used in a neutral way, and does not in any way imply a status of lesser value. It only denotes an almost two-century-late start in a modern society, a society where modern political institutions, higher education, industrialization and economic progress dictate primacy. In the time of their awakening, both of these societies, Japan and Serbia willingly and consciously accepted the

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<sup>93</sup> S. N. EISENSTADT. 2000. "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p 12.

<sup>94</sup> It is useful to note that studies concerning the application of the notion of multiple modernities have already been conducted on different case studies, e.g.: Chih- Chieh TANG. 2018. "A rewriting experiment of modernity from the perspective of connected histories: Taiwan as a laboratory of modernity". *Journal of Historical Sociology*. pp. 1-16; Aurea MOTA, Gerard DELANTY. 2014. "Eisenstadt, Brazil and the multiple modernities framework: Revisions and reconsiderations". *Journal of Classical Sociology*. pp. 1-19; Renato ORTIZ. 2000. "From Incomplete modernity to World Modernity". *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 249-260.

rules of this new global game.

Regardless of the pace of implementation, both Japan and Serbia adopted the same liberal values, adopted Western political institutions, decided to educate their intellectuals at Western universities in order to reinvigorate their intellectual elites and both started the process of modernization through industrialization. Both societies have looked at the West as a successful model for progress, which we can see from the various ways in which Western values affected the society and culture of the day, from large things to small, from the rise of Western-style political institutions to fashion.

Both Japan and Serbia were two pre-modern societies that have opened up to the West relatively late. Their development processes in the period of modernity are marked with similarities that give us the opportunity and justification to conduct a comparative study of the influences of modernity on these two societies in this given cultural- historical context. After establishing that Japan and Serbia started the process of accepting the idea of modernity at roughly the same time and in the seemingly same way, the main subject of this research will be to map out the specific ways in which they undertook these processes and arrived at different results. Moreover, we will visit different applications of selective appropriation of ideas by Japan and Serbia, and the effectiveness of this appropriation in the given research period. We will do this by comparing the influences, borrowed ideas and inspirations in the form of promissory notes.

Finally, despite all the above-mentioned similarities between Japan and Serbia we cannot overlook their obvious stark differences. However, these differences do not stand in the way of conducting a fruitful comparative study. The similarities and differences *per se* are not the focus of this research. What stands in focus is the idea of modernity as a reference culture for these two societies. In the words of Wittrock:

“To the extent that there is a strong, and growing, coherence and correspondence between such defining institutional structures and behavioral patterns across different countries, hypotheses about the convergence of modern societies may be said to have received increased empirical support. Whatever other differences may or may not exist between different countries is irrelevant when we decide whether any two countries are modern to the same extent or not.”<sup>95</sup>

With the theoretical framework set, we may move forward in laying out relevant aspects of the two countries that are the subject of the research. In the next Chapter we will start by shortly observing the relevant aspects of Japanese and Serbian society, respectively, in the time period preceding the main focus of our research. We do this in order to establish the starting point for both of these countries regarding the implementation of modernity. Moreover, we will present Western Europe through the lens of modernity in order to set a point of reference for these two societies in the research period.

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<sup>95</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 32.

### 3. WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN AND SERBIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERNITY

In this Chapter we establish the relevant framework for the analysis of the selected case studies: Japan and Serbia and the beginning of their relationship with modernity. The notion of modernity is thoroughly explained in the previous chapter and it is established that the beginnings of modernity are inextricably tied to Western Europe from the age of Enlightenment in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, in order to analyze the manner in which Japan and Serbia embraced modernity, it is necessary first of all to explain the state of modernity in Western Europe (Chapter 3.1.).

After the presentation of the state of affairs regarding modernity in Western Europe, we will shortly present circumstances ruling at the time in Japan and Serbia (Chapter 3.2. and 3.3.). We will take a short look at the immediate time period that precedes the acceptance of modernity in these states in order to establish a starting point for both Japan and Serbia.

#### 3.1. Western Europe as a *reference culture* for modernity

In the beginning it is insightful to determine the meaning of the terms Europe and the West that we will use in this chapter.

In this work the term Europe denotes the collection of modern nation states of Western Europe. Even though we are aware that there are significant differences in cultures, institutions, political systems and nations inhabiting Europe, one can discern strong similarities that create common ground for their joining. Delanty explains this in the following terms: “what is common in the history of Europe is not a shared culture or common institutional framework, but the existence of modes of communication that facilitated similar logics of development”.<sup>96</sup>

On the other hand, when we use the term West we refer to Western Europe with the addition of the New World, most often the United States. While there are certain similarities between the two entities, it is important to make a distinction between Western Europe and the United States. These similarities obviously stem from the fact that The United States were inhabited by settlers that came from Europe and brought with them European values, as Delanty illuminates: “With regard to the New World, the significant factor here lies in the formation of new settler societies that initially at least were composed of Europeans who brought with them the cultural and social values and institutions of the home countries.”<sup>97</sup>

However, these newly rooted ideas provided for different outcomes. This can most evidently be described as evidence of multiple modernities. Delanty points out that the European values “changed to suit the circumstances of the new lands”<sup>98</sup>. He distinguishes that “The divergence of the Old and the New Worlds is most evident in the rise of the republican idea.”<sup>99</sup> However, it is also interesting to point out that these ideas had reverberated back to Europe. This cross-fertilization brought major political changes to Europe such as the French Revolution. This established The United States as another major hub of modernity besides Europe. Finally, we can call upon Wittrock’s work to summarize the position of Europe and The United States as reference cultures for modernity. In his words: “the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the period in which the notion of some kind of symmetry- between different civilizations in terms of travel, exploration, and exploitation- became

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<sup>96</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 17.

<sup>97</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. pp. 20-21. (footnote omitted).

<sup>98</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 21.

<sup>99</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 21.

replaced with the reality of growing European and American supremacy and domination on a global level.”<sup>100</sup>

After establishing the terminological definitions, it is necessary to explain why we find it so important to present the state of affairs in Western Europe from its encounter with modernity in 18<sup>th</sup> century and throughout 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>101</sup>

Firstly, it is necessary to one again reiterate the centrality of Western Europe as the reference culture for modernity. Delanty gives us a common thread for Europe in order to understand its evolution from a marginal global boondock to the title of reference culture it held in the nineteenth century. There are several aspects that he marks as common: an interconnectedness and plurality of powers<sup>102</sup>; a rise in the importance of civil society<sup>103</sup>; movements such as the Renaissance the Enlightenment, that rejected the recent past in favor of the present (or a reinterpretation of the older past that nonetheless is a break with the recent past)<sup>104</sup>; “the double pursuit of individual and collective liberty”<sup>105</sup>; and finally large-scale borrowing from other cultures or cultural “cross-fertilization” in large part thanks to European colonization.<sup>106</sup>

These aspects acted as meta-cognitive principles that enabled the establishment of one common modernity. As Delanty explains: “The relatively early development of modernity in Europe does not mean that the form that modernity took defined for once and for all modernity in Europe nor elsewhere. The solutions varied from the early modernity of England in the seventeenth century to the constitutional and democratic state by the end of the nineteenth century. These different models of modernity were not so divergent that there was no relation between them, for if this were the case it would not be possible to refer to Europe in a meaningful sense.”<sup>107</sup>

Secondly, having in mind this position of Western Europe as a reference culture, it does not come as a surprise that Western Europe was an ideal that both Japan and Serbia strived for. Delanty explains that: “The global spread of ideas of European origin can be explained by two additional factors. The worldwide diffusion of European ideas can be partly accounted for by the fact that there was a certain co-emergence of European consciousness and of modernity. This resulted in Europe becoming equated with modernity. However, it must be clearly established that while Europe did

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<sup>100</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. pp-36-37.

<sup>101</sup> For a detailed analysis of the technological and industrial developments in Europe from the 18<sup>th</sup> onwards, please consult: David S. LANDES. 1988. *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For political history of Europe, please consult: Čedomir POPOV. 1989. *Građanska Evropa: Politička istorija Evrope. Druga knjiga* Novi Sad: Matica srpska.

<sup>102</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 12.

<sup>103</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 14.

<sup>104</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. pp. 14-15.

<sup>105</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 15.

<sup>106</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 16.

<sup>107</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 29.

become a reference culture for much of the rest of the world, it did not exhaust the nature of modernity.”<sup>108</sup>

Western Europe was apt to be a role model because its modernity contained ideas that are not *per se* only European. Delanty further explains this by stating: “Here a key point is that Europe fairly early developed – certainly long before the so-called Rise of the West – the basic elements of a world culture, that is a cultural matrix that lent itself to cultural translation. This is because the key elements of European culture are themselves translations, having evolved out of earlier appropriations of ideas that were not themselves European.”<sup>109</sup> Delanty emphasizes that “European civilization was itself constituted through centuries of cross-fertilization from other cultures, especially those of the East and the Mediterranean” and that “it is possible to argue that the most salient aspects of European science and technology were derived from other civilizations.”<sup>110</sup> Delanty adds that: “The fact itself that much of European culture was transmitted through translations, including Arabic translations is a striking illustration of the role of translation in not simply transmitting culture but in transforming it.”<sup>111</sup> To conclude: “an enduring feature of the legacy of Europe was its transnational tendency. It frequently (sic.) became entangled in other cultures and led to hybrid outcomes, but within Europe and beyond.”<sup>112</sup>

Thirdly, a solid theoretical framework that contains a control variable must be established; a benchmark of what to look at when comparing Japan and Serbia. We will use Western Europe as that benchmark. Therefore, we will present a closer look of what Western Europe looked like when Japan and Serbia were opening up as new nation states on the global scene. In the mid to late nineteenth century the countries of Western Europe and the United States have had two centuries or more of development, due to the wonders of the Industrial Revolution. This is important because it also gives us a sense of the difference between the pre-modern and the modern, the agricultural and the industrialized.

By establishing Western supremacy in modernity as well as a short description of how it got to its place as the modernity hegemon, we are able to see all the necessary steps it needed to undertake in order to achieve its goal. Some of these happened naturally, some were a byproduct of other machinations and others were intentional goals. By addressing these steps and how they occur, we can then proceed to successfully compare and contrast Japan and Serbia. Through this comparison we will be able to see their steps and assess whether some were missed, skipped or indeed repeated.

Having in mind the above-explained centrality of Western Europe as the reference culture for Japan and Serbia in the study of modernity it is important to acquaint with its features that distinguished it as modern.

It is insightful to start this presentation by elucidating a temporal meeting point of Western Europe and modernity. Wittrock states that “it may be possible to speak of a type of early modernity already in the European context in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when four interconnected

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<sup>108</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 23.

<sup>109</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 23.

<sup>110</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 9. Delanty cites John Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization* (Cambridge, 2004) to purport his claims.

<sup>111</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 23.

<sup>112</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 24.

processes of deep transformation occurred.”<sup>113</sup> Wittrock mentions the feudal revolution, beginnings of separation of church and state power, the rise of cities and urban life and all it entails as some of these interconnected processes.<sup>114</sup> However, it is undisputed that the turning point for the relation of modernity and Europe can be set in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and is inextricably tied to the Enlightenment. It would be wise to define this term in temporal terms as well as its ideals, so as to better understand how and when the term fits into the studies of modernity.

First, it is important to note that it is difficult to distinguish the age from the set of ideas and they seem to go hand in hand. Zafirovski points out that many authors concede to the fact that the term ‘Enlightenment’ both designates a historical era and a conceptual paradigm.<sup>115</sup> Enlightenment as an age is largely considered to be the eighteenth century: “The advance of knowledge, whether devout Christians liked it or not, meant the advance of reason. In the course of the eighteenth century, the world, at least the world of the literate, was being emptied of mystery.”<sup>116</sup> Outram indicates the mid-eighteenth century as the start of the use of the word Enlightenment, but that a closer look at the literature and the ideas from the time indicate that the ideas of Enlightenment were in circulation well before the word itself. “It is more difficult, however, to find the point at which the Enlightenment began. As we have seen, words for it seem to have entered languages from the 1750s onwards. But it is clear that recognizably Enlightenment clusters of ideas and concerns, such as the struggle for religious tolerance, are already present before that date.”<sup>117</sup>

From the information presented above we can deduce that the Age of Enlightenment takes place in Western Europe in the eighteenth century, that from the mid-seventeen hundreds it has entered the language as a valid and relatively widely used term in intellectual circles. We can also see that its ideals are, in the broadest terms, connected with the search for knowledge and the spread of reason.

Second, it is useful to outline the values and ideas of the Enlightenment so that we may better understand how they fit in our research. Secularism is one of the important values of the Enlightenment. Its value is that it brought to a separation of the state from the church, which before that had the monopoly on knowledge and authority. Delanty underlines:

“The Enlightenment thinkers were the first to perceive the spirit of the age to be secular and dynamic. Church and state were no longer seen as a symbiotic unity but as separate spheres. The Enlightenment can be seen as the expression of a fully-fledged European identity. The rationalism and inquiring spirit of the century was fully expressed in the emergence of a more differentiated society in which state and church fulfilled different roles.”<sup>118</sup>

However, it should be noted that the church did not cease to create a defining identity of Europe; it had merely filled a different societal role. “The secularism of the age did not extend to a rejection of the prejudices of Christianity. What it did do, however, was simply to accommodate them

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<sup>113</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 40.

<sup>114</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 40.

<sup>115</sup> Milan ZAFIROVSKI. 2011. *The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society*. New York: Springer. p. 17.

<sup>116</sup> Peter GAY. 1969. *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Volume II: The Science of Freedom*. New York: Alfred A. Kopf. p. 27.

<sup>117</sup> Dorinda OUTRAM. 2006. *Panorama of the Enlightenment*. Getty Publications. p. 27.

<sup>118</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 1995. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 70.

in a differentiated world-view by which religion was only one cognitive dimension among many others.”<sup>119</sup>

In observing the ideas of the Enlightenment, it becomes quickly apparent that there is much in common with the ideas of modernity. Zafirovski states that

“ideals and social structures of liberty, equality, justice, democracy, inclusion, individualism, social progress, secularism, pluralism, scientific and technological rationalism, economic prosperity and freedom, free markets, the pursuit of happiness and well being, dignified humane life, optimism and hope, universalism, and humanism are primarily rooted in, advocated, and advanced by the Enlightenment.”<sup>120</sup>

Moreover, it is explicitly said by Zafirovski that “Modern Western and other democratic societies’, including Europe’s and America’s, fundamental values and institutions are, first and foremost, the creations and legacies of the Enlightenment.”<sup>121</sup> With this statement in mind, it is right to conclude that the Enlightenment and the Western model of modernity are inextricably linked.

Zafirovski absolutely grounds this statement by saying that the Western model of modernity is derived from the Enlightenment. Another point he makes that further asserts this statement as a crucial one for the purposes of this research is the connection to the notion of Eisenstadt’s theory of multiple modernities. In his own words:

“In this sense, modern liberal-democratic, egalitarian, rationalistic, secular, pluralist, advanced, humanistic, and progressive society, or simply modernity, is the child of the Enlightenment (Habermas 2001). Conversely, the latter is the prime intellectual creator of modernity (Beck 2000; Habermas 2001), specifically its liberal Western version in light of actual or possible “multiple modernities,” including illiberal and non-Western ones (Eisenstadt 2003; Jepperson 2002; Eisenstadt and Sachsenmaier 2002), just as the existence of Eastern forms of “enlightenment” (Angel 1994). In short, the “modern project” of society admittedly originates in and derives from, above all, the Western Enlightenment (Smart 2000).”<sup>122</sup>

In conclusion to this small but important segment, we have presented evidence that the Enlightenment is an important part of Europe’s history regarding the development of the idea of modernity. The Enlightenment and modernity are intricately connected by means of values and ideas for society and its institutions. The Enlightenment is not only tied to modernity as its temporal precursor, but as its intellectual parent.

The focal point for both modernity and our research is however the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>123</sup> While modernity in Europe started to flourish during the age of Enlightenment, the full potential of the exportability of the Western European model of modernity was realized in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most notably through colonialism. Delanty explains:

“In view of the worldwide dominance of Europe in the nineteenth century, it is difficult not to conclude that the European variant gained dominance for a time

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<sup>119</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 1995. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 70.

<sup>120</sup> Milan ZAFIROVSKI. 2011. *The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society*. New York: Springer. p. 19.

<sup>121</sup> Milan ZAFIROVSKI. 2011. *The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society*. New York: Springer. p. 19.

<sup>122</sup> Milan ZAFIROVSKI. 2011. *The Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society*. New York: Springer. p. 19.

<sup>123</sup> Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL. 2014. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

and influenced the shape that other forms assumed. This was in no small part due to the fact that it was the first major location of the emergence of modernity. Earlier expressions of modernity in other parts of the world were undoubtedly influenced in part or in whole by the European model, which in many cases was either the French or British variant.”<sup>124</sup>

In that period European states experienced important changes on various levels. “It is possible to depict the formation of modernity in Europe<sup>[17]</sup> as the result of a series of basically continuous processes where political, economic, and intellectual transformations mutually reinforced and conditioned each other.”<sup>125</sup> For the purposes of our research of central importance are the political and intellectual transformations that will shortly be presented.

As for political changes Wittrock offers a good succinct overview:

“In the western part of Europe, at the turn of the nineteenth century, most countries were in a period of often slow and highly embattled transition from forms of constitutional monarchy to some form of parliamentary democracy. Some of these countries (such as Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries) could draw on age-old traditions of parliamentary assemblies and local self-government. However, none of these countries could be said to have been full-blown parliamentary democracies by the turn of the nineteenth century.”<sup>126</sup>

Wittrock adds that “centuries-old ideas of representation in the form of estates and parliaments were complemented with demands for participation and even popular sovereignty.”<sup>127</sup>

In the intellectual sphere a special place of the knowledge was recognized. Wittrock explains that “one of the most important expressions of modernity is the use of knowledge. This can be understood in two senses; knowledge in the sense of science and science-directed public policy”.<sup>128</sup> Also, it is important to mention that public spheres came out of the shadows of censorship and state control. Wittrock elucidates:

“New public spheres also emerged outside of courts, academies, and salons, outside of the control and purview of royal sanction and control. Whether in scholarly, political, or artistic life, fora are created that are based on the idea that public discourse should not be subject to persecution or censorship but should rather enable the expression of opinion on all aspects of political and public life.”<sup>129</sup>

It can be insightful to close this chapter by citing Kume Kunitake, private secretary to Prince Iwakura Tomomi during the Iwakura mission, a diplomatic mission that traveled from Japan to the

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<sup>124</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 27.

<sup>125</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 40.

<sup>126</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 35.

<sup>127</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 48.

<sup>128</sup> Gerard DELANTY. 2015. “Europe and the emergence of modernity. The entanglement of two reference cultures”. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity*. Vol.3, No. 3. p. 28.

<sup>129</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 2000. “Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1. p. 48.

United States and Europe. This is how he epitomizes his impressions of the developed nations of the West, in awe of the wealth and industriousness of the leading countries:

“In all the leading countries of Europe, the arts and sciences are flourishing; at the same time, no piece of land is left untouched by the hoe and no hill is without its wheel-ruts. There is no shortage of money, and wealth and luxury are at unprecedented levels so that city life is magnificent. Everything is at its finest in Britain, France and as far as the mountains and plains of Germany.”<sup>130</sup>

This quote by Kume is indicative of several important points we made. Besides showing the state of affairs in Western Europe during our research period, it vividly depicts Japanese interest and admiration for the European model of modernity. In order to better understand the Japanese perspective, we will not turn to the short presentation of relevant aspects of Japan in the Edo Period.

### 3.2. Edo Japan and Early Modernity

In this part of the Chapter we will discuss the Edo period, a time period in Japan preceding our research period. It is important to do this, as we will be looking at changes that Japan underwent from a premodern to a modern society. In order to track these changes successfully, we must present the state of affairs during the Edo period.<sup>131</sup> It should be noted that the Edo period is a period spanning more than two and half centuries (1603-1868) during which there was a substantial amount of cultural and economic progress. It is a rich time that mandates that each of the many cultural, political, social, economic and historical aspects deserve their own respective research. However, we will concentrate on shortly and accurately presenting only certain aspects of the Edo period that we deem are necessary in order to provide meaningful information for the research of the aspects of Meiji Period covered in the thesis.

In the years prior to the Edo Period, there were centuries of unrest with no clear hegemon. Although there was an institution of emperor, it was not a strong political institution for most of its existence, until modern times. Gordon explains in detail the role of the emperor in Japanese society through the ages, and states:

“With a few exceptions, emperors from the ninth through the nineteenth centuries were of little political consequence. They continued to play a religious role as priests in the indigenous Shinto tradition, but other figures came to rule in the name of the emperor: first aristocratic families linked to the imperial court and then military families with diverse social and political bases. Thus, the high political profile of the modernized monarchy in the nineteenth century was a major break with the past.”<sup>132</sup>

The situation of a country in which there was no one clear ruler was fertile ground for many warring territories with warlords at their helm called daimyō.<sup>133</sup> They were individuals who had a

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<sup>130</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 391.

<sup>131</sup> For a detailed and insightful of the relevant literature and research trends in the field of Early Modern Japan, please consult: Philip C. BROWN. 2003. “The Political and Institutional History of Early Modern Japan”. *Early Modern Japan*. pp. 3-82.

<sup>132</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3.

<sup>133</sup> On the specificity of daimyō rule, especially its political and economic aspects, please consult: Mark RAVINA. 1999. *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

sizeable military force under their command and held territory with the help of said loyal military force. Gordon elucidates on the daimyō, and on the political climate that brought to their rise:

“By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, more cohesive bands of warriors had come together under the leadership of military lords called daimyō (literally, “great name”). By the mid-1500s, political power was extraordinarily fragmented. The Japanese islands were divided into several hundred political units, or domains, under the control of ambitious and mutually suspicious daimyō lords, each of whom could mobilize a substantial force of samurai warriors.”<sup>134</sup>

Jansen informs us that: “Three-quarters of Japan was under the control of *daimyō*; their domains stretched from Kyushu in the southwest to the fringes of Hokkaido in the north.”<sup>135</sup> These domains, called *han*, as Jansen informs us – differed in size, importance and social structure.<sup>136</sup> Finally, to paint a clear picture of the extent of their military power, we underline the fact that at certain points during this period, the number of samurai warriors that followed a small number of lords was measured in the hundreds of thousands.<sup>137</sup> This makes the subsequent unification by the three extraordinary men an even greater feat.

The beginning of Edo period is marked with the coming to power of Tokugawa Shogunate.<sup>138</sup> This period takes its name from the city of Edo which was the *de facto* capital of the Tokugawa “unified” Japan and the seat of the *bakufu*; or the tent government. Tokugawa Shogunate established peace in the land after centuries of warfare. Wittrock aptly summarizes: “In the case of Japan, the long period of strife and civil war ended with the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate...”<sup>139</sup> Peace was one of the defining characteristics of this period in Japan, as Andrew Gordon clarifies: “The most important feature of Tokugawa history was the absence of warfare. The contrast to what came before was immense.”<sup>140</sup>

The Tokugawa Shogunate came to power in 1603 and was the first ruling family to “unify” Japan. What is meant by this “unification” is that there was one ruler that had unchallenged power and influence over most of the lords and territory of the three islands in Japan (during this period, Japan had no control over the people nor the territories of the northern island, Hokkaido).<sup>141</sup> The two individuals that played significant part in the process of the “unification” of Japan are the so-called unifiers of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Oda Nobunaga. These men were important in creating what will be 250 years of unprecedented peace in Japan.

Gordon presents how Oda Nobunaga created many political institutions and practices that later held the Tokugawa government in place, despite also being known for his ruthlessness. These institutions and practices included relative village autonomy, a bureaucratic program of tax collection

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<sup>134</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 3.

<sup>135</sup> Marius B. JANSEN 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 49.

<sup>136</sup> Marius B. JANSEN 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 50.

<sup>137</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 9. For more detail on the han system, please consult: Harold BOLITHO. “The han” in: Marius B. JANSEN (ed.). 1995. *Warrior rule in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-253.

<sup>138</sup> For more on the Tokugawa rise to power, please consult: John Whitney HALL, “The *bakuhan* system” in: Marius B. JANSEN (ed.). 1995. *Warrior rule in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 147-201.

<sup>139</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 31.

<sup>140</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 9.

<sup>141</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 1.

and through this, the right to reassign a subordinate lord.<sup>142</sup> Oda Nobunaga also used surveys of quality and quantity of agricultural land and began disarming villagers.<sup>143</sup>

Gordon also introduces us to the second unifier, who continued on Oda Nobunaga's institutions after his death, albeit with a different approach. Toyotomi Hideyoshi was "a low-born foot soldier of unimposing appearance"<sup>144</sup> that opted for diplomacy instead of force. Through building alliances and accepting pledges of allegiance of enemies he defeated or managed to win over, "he extended dominion [sic] over all of Japan by 1591."<sup>145</sup> Gordon informs us that by 1598 he was unchallenged, and left a council of regents to rule in his sons place until he came of age.<sup>146</sup> One of these regents was Tokugawa Ieyasu, the proverbial *pater familias* of the Tokugawa clan. The first shogun of the Tokugawa family came into power by clever political and war games.

"After Hideyoshi died, Ieyasu—who was one of the regents—lost little time in gathering his allies. In 1600 he destroyed the forces of the other regents, loyal to Hideyoshi's son, in the famous battle of Sekigahara. This gave him essentially unchallenged hegemony. In 1603 he had the emperor grant him the ancient title of shogun."<sup>147</sup> In 1605, after a short period of time as shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu—opting to ensure hereditary rule—transferred power to his son and ruled from the shadow until his death.<sup>148</sup> "The Tokugawa house began its rule under the dominating presence of Ieyasu. Until his death in 1616, by which time Hidetada had already been shogun for a decade, the decisions that mattered were Ieyasu's."<sup>149</sup>

The policies, political games, relationships with lords and peasants, and an institutionalization of practices established by these three leaders were important prerequisite steps that were vital to the specific type of rule that was in place during the Tokugawa period or the so-called Edo period.

During the Edo period, a social order was established based on Confucian ideas, which mandated a caste system.<sup>150</sup> As Gordon explains:

"In the orthodox vision of the Tokugawa social order, which drew on Chinese Confucian ideas, society was divided into four classes arranged in a hierarchy of moral virtue as well as secular authority: warrior, farmer, artisan, and merchant. Many, however, did not quite fit into any of these groups. Some were people of

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<sup>142</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 9-12.

<sup>143</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 10.

<sup>144</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 10.

<sup>145</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 11.

<sup>146</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 11.

<sup>147</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 11. For more detailed information of the battle of Sekigahara and Tokugawa Ieyasu's rise to power, please consult: Marius B. JANSEN 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 33-37.

<sup>148</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 11.

<sup>149</sup> Marius B. JANSEN 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 43.

<sup>150</sup> For the insight on the relationship between Confucianism and economy in Japan, please consult: Jonh H. SAGERS. 2006. *Origins of Japanese Wealth and Power: Reconciling Confucianism and Capitalism, 1830–1885*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

respect or celebrity: Buddhist priests, actors, and artists.”<sup>151</sup>

Berry presents a more detailed view of the role of the warrior, or the samurai:

“This community of power also constituted the highest order in an encompassing system of social status. The system classified all persons in hereditary groups (most broadly those of samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants) and regulated most aspects of being. Thus identification as a samurai, for example, denoted ancestry, profession, residential and marital choices, education, treatment before the law, and codes of dress, diet, and etiquette.”<sup>152</sup>

However, the caste system was hiding more complex stratification within the castes themselves. Social mobility was more possible in later years of the bakufu rule in part due to these stratifications within the castes that were fueled by different factors. Jansen portrays this by stating:

“Rather than seeing Japanese society as layered with the samurai on top, then, it would be better to think of Tokugawa status society as consisting of a series of complementary hierarchies, each of which had its own upper, middle, and lower classes. The warrior rulers, of course, enjoyed clear predominance, but one did not have to go very far down in samurai (*bushi*) ranks to reach forms of financial and personal insecurity. Agriculturalists ranged from village leaders whose sturdy dwellings with proud walls and massive beams were light years away from the dark and dirt-floored cabins of tenants and landless laborers. The life of artisans could range from that of contractors and specialists who purveyed by appointment to the political elite to those who cobbled together an existence from waxed-paper umbrellas and utilitarian baskets. The category of merchant included proud houses of wealth and influence like the Mitsui and Sumitomo as well as peddlers who eked out a living by hawking boiled potatoes.”<sup>153</sup>

As Gordon rightly depicts: “Two centuries of economic growth and social change eroded the boundaries between status groups and generated new tensions among the primary status groups of farmer and samurai. These tensions produced intense pressures for reform.”<sup>154</sup>

It is insightful for a moment to note that Wittrock depicts the Tokugawa Shogunate “as a type of feudal absolutism higher in degree than European absolutist regimes.”<sup>155</sup> According to his words this is because:

“the Tokugawa shogunate, while never being fully able to dispense with the culturally symbolic role of the Emperor, still could exert a degree of centralized control of society unmatched by even the most absolutist European monarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Precisely because of these features the Tokugawa shogunate may also be described as a type of feudal absolutism higher in degree than European absolutist regimes.”<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 16.

<sup>152</sup> Mary Elizabeth BERRY. 1998. “Public Life in Authoritarian Japan”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 141.

<sup>153</sup> Marius B. JANSEN 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 124.

<sup>154</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

<sup>155</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 31.

<sup>156</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 31.

Wittrock gives us a closer look on the features of the Tokugawa Shogunate feudalism:

“Among the most fundamental of these characteristics, and in significant contrast to European feudalism, were the comparatively larger distance between social strata- between the lords and the samurai at large, and between peasants and the higher samurai; the continued dependence of the lords (the *daimyō*) on the bakufu, the central government of the shogun; and the relative lack of arenas of adjudication and contestation where rights and obligations could be asserted in the face of government.”<sup>157</sup>

Expanding on this type of feudal rule, Berry further explains the structure in the following manner: “roughly 250 *daimyō* who administered semiautonomous domains in a federal form of rule. Under the *daimyō* a large body of samurai officials executed the primary tasks of governance.”<sup>158</sup>

Moreover, it is especially important to emphasize the role of the emperor in this period. Wittrock writes: “Furthermore, the emperor himself was not at the peak of the feudal pyramid; he was instead located outside the system of feudal arrangements, providing the ultimate legitimacy for the entire cultural and societal order by mediating between the divine realm and the people of Japan at large.”<sup>159</sup>

Even though the emperor was considered of divine origin and therefore inept to be acknowledged as part of the feudal system, nevertheless there was a special relationship between the institutions of emperor and shogun. Gordon explains this in detail:

“A second critical settlement gave the shogun effective control over the potentially most potent Japanese political symbol, the emperor. Ieyasu continued the Nobunaga and Hideyoshi policies of economic support for the court, raising it considerably from the genteel poverty of the previous century. The position of supreme military ruler, or shogun, was in theory a grant from the emperor. For this reason, the Tokugawa family could raise their own legitimacy by simultaneously enhancing imperial prestige and carefully controlling the emperor.”<sup>160</sup>

Wittrock summarizes this relationship in the following manner: “There was, then, both a fundamental bifurcation and a deep mutual dependence between the symbolic cultural-legitimizing role of the emperor and the more immediately political role of the shogun and its central government.”<sup>161</sup>

To be even more precise about this unique “division of power” between the emperor and the shogun it is useful to present Deal’s insight:

“The shogunate continued to consolidate its power by issuing a series of laws limiting the privileges of the imperial court and the nobility as well as a legal code regulating the activity of religious institutions. The emperor and his court were ordered to concern themselves only with cultural and scholarly affairs, leaving the political responsibilities to the shogun, and religious organizations were carefully

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<sup>157</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 28.

<sup>158</sup> Mary Elizabeth BERRY. 1998. “Public Life in Authoritarian Japan”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. pp. 140-141.

<sup>159</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 28. (Footnote omitted).

<sup>160</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 14.

<sup>161</sup> Björn WITTROCK. 1998. “Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions”. *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 28.

monitored to make sure that they were not breeding attitudes of dissension toward the government.”<sup>162</sup>

Besides this intricate relationship between the emperor and the Shogunate, what solidified the Shogunates’s rule is system of alternate attendance or *sankin kōtai*. “One final measure that the Tokugawa Shogunate took to solidify its power early in the Edo period was to require alternate-year attendance from its *daimyō*. This meant that each *daimyō* was required to move his family to the capital city and himself to alternate years in residence at Edo and at his domain governing his vassals. The *daimyō* was to leave his family hostage in the hands of the Shogunate in Edo during the years he spent living in his domain as a sign of his loyalty to the shogun.”<sup>163</sup> Authors covering the Edo period are in agreement when they speak of the importance of the system of alternate attendance or *sankin kōtai*. Jansen states that: “Of all the institutions established by the Tokugawa regime none was more central than the requirement that the *daimyō* spend alternate years at the shogun’s capital of Edo.”<sup>164</sup> Gordon marks it as of one of the most important and emblematic policies of the power and establishment of the Tokugawa rule.<sup>165</sup>

The *sankin kōtai* system had immense repercussions on the development of Japan. First of all, this system has weakened the power of the *tozama daimyō*. “Begun as a system of hostages, the system became the basis of a rotating service life for the elite. By its workings future *daimyō* were born and raised at the metropolitan center and never visited their domain until they were invested as *daimyō*, after which they rotated between Edo and their fief. Within a generation or two the system had transformed the military leaders of Sengoku times into cultured urban aristocrats trained to appreciate the finer points of the tea ceremony, cuisine, culture, and costume.”<sup>166</sup>

Moreover, this system created a significant economic toll on the *daimyō*. Gordon explains how the former opponents’ families were “held hostage” in Edo, and they were required to come and spend time in the capital every other year, moving their entire court with them. He also limited the lords by giving them one castle per domain. These practices were financially strenuous on the lords, as financing two households; one in their respective domain and the other in Edo, as well as moving an entire court every other year to Edo and back was not a cheap task.<sup>167</sup>

Gordon also tells us of another significant byproduct of this specific way of dealing with potential rivals: spending a limited amount of time in the home domain weakens the connection with the domain, especially for heirs to the lords who have spent their entire childhoods in Edo. Their connection to the domain is weakened more with every generation.<sup>168</sup> Jansen is in accordance with this view:

“It fixed the attention of the ruling class on life at the capital; after the first generation of feudal lords, *daimyō* were born in Edo and did not visit their domains until they attained their majority. The system also drained the economies of provinces in all parts of Japan. It required the development of a system of national

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<sup>162</sup> William E. DEAL. 2006. *Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan*. New York: Facts on File. p. 104.

<sup>163</sup> William E. DEAL. 2006. *Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan*. New York: Facts on File. p. 104.

<sup>164</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 128.

<sup>165</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

<sup>166</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 57.

<sup>167</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 10-14.

<sup>168</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 10-14.

communications that did more to unify the country than Ieyasu's victory at Sekigahara."<sup>169</sup>

Finally, authors notice the economic progress of the country that came as a consequence of the *sankin kōtai*. Jansen explains that this system "required the development of a system of national communications that did more to unify the country than Ieyasu's victory at Sekigahara."<sup>170</sup> Gordon adds that trade from different cities was established during the long travels to Edo and back from all places throughout Tokugawa Japan to Edo.<sup>171</sup> Therefore, the *sankin kōtai* was one of the most important innovations during the Edo period that boosted the economy, connected the various domains and unified the country.<sup>172</sup>

However, it should be noted that despite all of these unifying factors, there had always remained opposition forces under the surface. Jansen tells us of outer domains like Satsuma and Chōshū that quietly embodied this opposition:

"some of the great *tozama* domains like Chōshū fostered a hereditary resentment of Tokugawa dominance. In Satsuma, too, upper samurai donned their armor each year on the anniversary of the defeat at Sekigahara and headed for their temple to meditate on that event. Satsuma had special arrangements for the reception of bakufu inspectors that guaranteed that they would not learn much about the domain."<sup>173</sup>

With the unification within the country, came the isolation towards the rest of the world. Deal provides us with an explanation:

"This policy was known as national seclusion or *sakoku* and included laws restricting travel into or out of the country, prohibiting the actions of Christian missionaries who had been in Japan since the early 1500s, banning the importation of scientific books and other materials from Europe, and calling for the deportation of all foreign-born peoples or people born to foreign parents."<sup>174</sup>

Jansen suggests that the isolationist policies were not a complete cutoff from the world, but an ever changing set of strategies that concentrated on different parts of the world at different times:

"In fact there was a foreign policy, and it is because it was concerned more with Asia than with the West that Western writers have used terms like "seclusion" and "isolation." It was also a policy in constant change. Throughout the period, although limitations on foreign trade became more exacting, policymakers focused their fears more on the West than on Japan's Asian neighbors. It can be argued that the famous decrees that closed the country were more of a bamboo blind than they were a Berlin wall."<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 128.

<sup>170</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 128.

<sup>171</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp: 20-24.

<sup>172</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 21.

<sup>173</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 50.

<sup>174</sup> William E. DEAL, 2006. *Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan*. New York, NY: Facts on File. p. 104.

<sup>175</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 64.

However, Rozman does accept Deal's position, by stating: "As is well known, the self-imposed *sakoku* policies isolated Japan from the burgeoning foreign trade, the international division of labor, and the national competition seen by many as primary causes of domestic social changes elsewhere."<sup>176</sup> Gordon denotes: "The foreign relations of Tokugawa Japan are often summed up in a single word, "seclusion," or by two words, "closed country." Indeed, in the 1600s the Tokugawa did cut off trade with countries that insisted on selling religion together with material goods."<sup>177</sup> Wittrock further reinforces this view by stating:

"The Tokugawa shogunate is associated with a policy of isolationism and an emphasis on, not to say creation and imposition of, cultural and social codes of tradition- in the midst of a society undergoing rapid change, in which rural and feudal values were extolled while a vibrant urban life was becoming ever more prominent in economic, if not political, terms."<sup>178</sup>

According to Gordon, aside from its numerous advances in unifying and connecting the country economically, geographically and perhaps even starting to connect it nationally, the *bakufu* had major drawbacks that could not stand the test of time, especially not in the beginning of a global community. Gordon further substantiates this view, by reminding us that even though it has made significant important moves that allowed Japan to connect, the bakufu's inability to tax the "economic resources of the entire country, or of mobilizing human resources throughout the land, [and] it could not sustain a monopoly on the conduct of international relations"<sup>179</sup>. Finally, Gordon states that perhaps the regime and status quo of the Tokugawa Shogunate would have remained intact for several decades beyond the 1860s, had it not been for the Western intervention whose seriousness was significantly enhanced with the help of gunboats in 1853.<sup>180</sup> This turning point in the history of Japan and its comprehensive consequences will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4.1.

### 3.3. Serbia, the Battle for Independence, and Modernity

In order to better present the state of affairs in Serbia before our research period, it is necessary for us to pick a starting point for our digest. We shall start from the year of the First Serbian Uprising, in 1804. It is also useful to mention that due to the obvious substantial differences between Japan and Serbia, it will be necessary to depart from the structure of the previous Chapter when needed. In that way we will ensure that a more comprehensive image of Serbia is obtained.

In 1804 the First Serbian Uprising took place in Orašac, Central Serbia. The Uprising was led by Đorđe Petrović – Karađorđe. Karađorđe was a livestock merchant and revolutionary<sup>181</sup> who was elected to lead the struggle against Ottoman Empire after the Slaughter of the *Knezes* (Chieftains).<sup>182</sup> The Slaughter of the Chieftains happened after the four *dahiyas* (janissary leaders) returned to the *pašalık* of Belgrade and assassinated Haji- Mustafa (the pasha of Belgrade), they established a private rogue rule of the Belgrade *pašalık*. The four *dahiyas* proceeded to eliminate the Serbian chieftains in

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<sup>176</sup> Gilbert ROZMAN. "Social change" in: Marius B. JANSEN (ed.). 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 502.

<sup>177</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 17.

<sup>178</sup> Björn WITTRÖCK. 1998. "Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions". *Daedalus*, Vol. 127, No. 3. p. 31.

<sup>179</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 19.

<sup>180</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 20.

<sup>181</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 43.

<sup>182</sup> For more on the The Rebellion against the dahis see: Aleksandar FOTIĆ, Nikola KUSOVAC (eds.). 1995. *Illustrated history of the Serbs: The First Serbian Uprising*. Belgrade: Litera. p.8.

order to instill fear and break the spirit of the Serb people. However, this act of tyranny, as well as other methods of their tyrannical rule has instigated the First Serbian Uprising.

The First Uprising was the first time a successful armed uprising against the Ottoman Empire was fought. It also marked the start of a long battle for independence. To be more precise, the Uprising was directed against the *dahiyas* in the *sanjak* of Smederevo. The 4 *dahiyas* were janissaries in charge of the *sanjak*, and they went against the Sublime Porte's authority. An interesting point is that the Serbs fought against the *dahiyas*, and not directly against the Ottoman Empire, at least at first. Since the Porte did not support the *dahiyas*, they would not interfere in the Serbs' rebellion at this point in time.<sup>183</sup>

After Serbian rebels killed the *dahiyas*, they had effectively ridded themselves of Ottoman rule.<sup>184</sup> The Sublime Porte requested that the uprising should come to an end. However, the Serbs asked for complete freedom, and did not want to concur with the Sublime Porte's requirement, until their requests were met.<sup>185</sup> In order to abridge the gap between these two unrelenting positions, Petar Ičko was appointed as a representative of the revolutionaries in the negotiations with the Sublime Porte.<sup>186</sup>

In 1806 a peace agreement was proposed, known as Ičko's peace. It was a series of conditions given to the Sublime Porte that would provide the Serbian people greater autonomy and control over their lands, expel janissaries and other Turks from Serbia, give Serbs the right to perform official duties for the Sultan's emissary in Serbia and have Serbs protect the borders of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>187</sup> The Porte has agreed to the terms of the peace, but due to the advance of the Uprising to Belgrade and the Ottoman-Russian conflict among other events, the peace agreement fell through. However, the value of this piece was again recognized by Miloš Obrenović when he led the Second Uprising.<sup>188</sup>

Pavlović informs us that by the summer of 1813 the Ottoman Empire crushed the Uprising by using brute force and repression. Many rebels fled to neighboring countries, including Karađorđe, who fled to Russian Bessarabia.<sup>189</sup> However this "interbellum" period did not last for long.

In 1815 the Second Serbian Uprising took place in Topola, Central Serbia. Miloš Obrenović, a wealthy merchant and one of the more prominent Serbs of the time, led the Uprising. It was a spontaneous uprising that was a reaction the failure of the First Uprising and the subsequent repressive measures. This Uprising brought Serbia a step closer to autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The violent struggles during the Second Uprising lasted much shorter than in the first one, but the diplomatic efforts also contributed to its effectiveness.<sup>190</sup>

An important insight regarding the First Serbian Uprising is its connection to modern ideas embodied in the French Revolution:

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<sup>183</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. p. 18.

<sup>184</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. p. 18.

<sup>185</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. pp. 44-45.

<sup>186</sup> Bogdan Lj. POPOVIĆ. 2010. *Diplomatska istorija Srbije*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike. p. 40.

<sup>187</sup> The main points of Ičko's peace can be seen in detail in: Bogdan Lj. POPOVIĆ. 2010. *Diplomatska istorija Srbije*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike. pp. 41-42.

<sup>188</sup> : Bogdan Lj. POPOVIĆ. 2010. *Diplomatska isttorija Srbije*. Beograd: Zavod za Udžbenike. pp. 43-44.

<sup>189</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 45.

<sup>190</sup> Aleksandar FOTIĆ, Nikola KUSOVAC (eds.). 1995. *Illustrated history of the Serbs: Serbia 1813-1858*. Belgrade: Litera. pp. 8-15.

“The historical importance of the 1804-13 Serbian revolution – which, overshadowed by the Napoleonic wars, attracted little attention in Europe – was manifold. For the Balkan nations it was a French revolution adapted to local conditions: the principle of popular sovereignty was opposed to the principle of legitimacy; a new society was created in which, due to the lack of the aristocracy and well-established middle classes, agrarian egalitarianism was combined with the emerging aspirations of a modern nation.”<sup>191</sup>

It is also interesting to note the side effects these two uprisings had on the openness of Serbia to the West. As Mišković notes:

“After the two uprisings of 1804 and 1815, the Sultan subsequently tried to re-establish his authority in the Belgrade *pašalık*. In order to do so, he granted and gradually extended the Christians’ autonomy rights. This act marked the beginning of Belgrade’s secession from the Ottoman *millet*-system. The small principality became an attractive destination for Christians from the surrounding *vilayets* and from the Habsburg Empire. The Habsburg Serbs, in particular, seized the opportunity to escape the constant conflict with Vienna regarding their autonomy rights.”<sup>192</sup>

After the Second Serbian Uprising, the role of Miloš Obrenović was integral to the success of Serbian endeavors towards independence. According to Pavlović, Miloš was determined to remain in power and had swiftly and mercilessly extinguished any opposition; a clear example is the assassination of Karađorđe.<sup>193</sup> Miloš Obrenović has, by 1830 secured his position as the sole political figure in Serbia, securing more and more autonomy from the Sublime Porte over the years of his “reign”.<sup>194</sup>

Miloš Obrenović’s efforts resulted in the adoption of the Second Imperial charter or *Hatt-i sharif* in 1830. The *Hatt-i sharif* proclaimed the formation of the Principality of Serbia, with Miloš Obrenović appointed as hereditary ruler. Serbia’s position as an autonomous principality was secured by an agreement between the Sublime Porte and Russia.<sup>195</sup> Some important aspects were freedom of movement within the Ottoman Empire and a softening of the position on the reclamation of Serbian lands taken in 1813 at the End of the First Uprising, which were later given in the 1833 *Hatt-i sharif*.<sup>196</sup>

Additionally, Pavlović informs us that from 1830 to 1833, every Turk that was not part of the garrison had to leave the country within the year. Miloš Obrenović was proclaimed hereditary ruler of the autonomous Principality of Serbia. The evermore-autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire had to pay a yearly tax.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Dušan T. BATAKOVIĆ. 2006. “A Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Uprising in European Perspective”. *Balkanica XXXVI*. Belgrade: Serbian Academy Of Sciences And Arts Institute For Balkan Studies. p. 127.

<sup>192</sup> Nataša MIŠKOVIĆ. “Mission, Power And Violence: Serbia’s National Turn”. in: Hannes GRANDITS, Nathalie CLAYER, Robert PICHLER (eds.). 2011. *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*. London: I. B. Tauris. pp.205-206.

<sup>193</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 46.

<sup>194</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 46.

<sup>195</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 80.

<sup>196</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. pp. 38-39.

<sup>197</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 47.

An important landmark of this nascent period of the Serbian state was the adoption of the Constitution of the Principality of Serbia, also known as the *Sretenje* Constitution in 1835.<sup>198</sup> This was the first constitution of the Principality of Serbia, voted for in the Kragujevac State Assembly. The importance of the *Sretenje* Constitution lies in its modernity. The Constitution called for separation of power<sup>199</sup>, established the needs of the Serbian people such as national emancipation, the end of feudalism and autocratic rule.<sup>200</sup> It was one of the first democratic Constitutions of Europe, inspired by the French, and especially the Belgian Constitution of 1831. It was a short-lived constitution that had little practical effect, but its' cultural effects were felt long after it has been replaced.

The *Sretenje* Constitution was in effect for only a short period of time, as it was suspended *de facto* after 14 days and *de jure* after 55 days, under pressure from the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria. It was met with negative reception from these states for several reasons; two of which are cited by Đorđević: "On the one hand, the nature of the provisions regarding the National Assembly, and the fact that Serbia has independently passed its supreme law"<sup>201</sup>

An interesting point is the interest of Russia and Austria standing in the way of the *Sretenje* Constitution. Why? There can be several explanations, but without getting deep into the problematic of a situation that possibly calls for a whole distinct research project, suffice it to say the commonsensical explanations that come to mind. Both countries, Russia and Austria-Hungary were authoritarian and multinational. Giving more rights to a national minority would undermine the centralization of power and would result in territory "crumbling". Austria-Hungary also had a Serb majority populated territory of Vojvodina, supporting Revolutionary Serbia in its quest for European inspired rights, constitutional liberalization and ultimately independence would be counterproductive to the multinational Dual Monarchy. As Pavlović aptly depicted: "Austria was the most persistent protector of the status quo and the Sultan's sovereign rights, always ready to intervene when Austria itself was being threatened."<sup>202</sup> In the case of Russia, despite Slavic and Orthodox ties, it was an absolute monarchy and had no interest in supporting liberal ideas such as the *Sretenje* Constitution, to name just one reason.

Even though it lasted for such a short period of time and had little practical effect, the *Sretenje* Constitution is nevertheless revealing, especially in the context of our research. The fact that the representatives of the people accepted it as the highest legal act, shows us the wishes, needs and aims of the Serbian people. These wishes, needs and aims were clearly striving towards modern ideals exemplified in the values of modernity. Therefore, this act is a prime example of Wittrock's promissory notes.

During this national re-awakening, and the subsequent long and arduous battle for independence, a conviction that depicted the Ottoman Empire as backward was constantly present in revolutionary Serbia. Moreover, Europe was seen as the progressive force and there was a pursuit to emulate its values. The need to mirror Europe was constitutionally established from the 1830s and with the promulgation of the *Sretenje* Constitution, but we could also argue that the cultural aspect of Europe as a role model was present long before. This pursuit can be seen through various ways in which the Serbian political elite strived to become a part of the European family, rather than being kept in the proverbial "darkness" of their Ottoman overlords.

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<sup>198</sup> For a more detailed presentation of the *Sretenje* Constitution, consult: Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. pp. 41-42.

<sup>199</sup> Ustav Knjaževstva Srbije. 1835. Chapter 3.

<sup>200</sup> Ustav Knjaževstva Srbije. 1835. Chapter 11.

<sup>201</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. p. 41.

<sup>202</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 109.

The constitutions are an extremely plastic example of this emulation and strong desire. As we have previously established, Europe as a construct of ideas was at that point indivisible from the notion of modernity. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Serbia was on its path to modernity as soon as it started its struggle for independence. From independence, through the end of feudalism and the recognition of both the nation and citizens' rights Serbia was emulating European trends and tracing the steps of modernity seventy years before it had reached the beginning of its journey towards modernization.

In 1838 a new Constitution of Serbia, also known as The Turkish Constitution was adopted and was in effect until 1869. It was known by this name as it was written in the form of Turkish *ferman* (Islamic State Royal decree). This was the manner in which the Sublime Porte exhibited power over Serbia and reminded it that Serbia was subservient to the Ottomans. However, it did create more opportunity for, and a balance of power with the State Council. In addition, the legislative powers of the Council were equated to those of the Prince (*knez*), while he remained the Head of State in matters concerning foreign policy.<sup>203</sup> However, Đorđević asserts that the rise to power of the Council and the division of power between the Council and the Prince did not substantially provide rights and powers of the National Assembly, thus confirming that “neither was ready to take responsibility before the people”.<sup>204</sup>

Miloš Obrenović stepped down from his role as Prince and went into exile in 1839, only four months after the Constitution was adopted.<sup>205</sup> After a short rule by his sons, a new prince from the Karađorđević dynasty came to power (although with no hereditary status) - Aleksandar Karađorđević. However, the Principality was governed by the Defenders of the Constitution (*Ustavobranitelji*), whose rule lasted from 1842 to 1858. During their rule the Defenders of the Constitution have made their first steps into transforming Serbia into a modern state.<sup>206</sup> This was done in a multitude of ways, and we will present only the relevant ones for this research. Such example worth mentioning is the *Ustavobranitelji* realization of their need for educated people, and the steps they took to achieve this need. They expanded the Lyceum, a predecessor of the University of Belgrade, and started to send students abroad in order to gain knowledge and bring it back home. By 1858, there were about two hundred Serbs educated abroad that lived in Serbia. Pavlović dubbed them the nation's first indigenous intelligentsia.<sup>207</sup> With them they brought ideas and values from Western Europe, mostly from Paris. These Parisian educated men became professors at the Lyceum, and subsequently became the liberal opposition to the more traditional generation of the Defenders of the Constitution, both ideologically and politically.<sup>208</sup>

After attempting to seize more power, as well as losing popularity due to his decision of neutrality during the Crimean War,<sup>209</sup> Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević was dethroned. In 1859, Miloš Obrenović returned to rule after an almost twenty-year exile. After Miloš Obrenović died, he was succeeded by his son, Mihailo Obrenović. Mihailo pushed for further independence from the Porte, by passing laws that gave Serbia more autonomy, and an establishment of a military, to name

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<sup>203</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. p. 42.

<sup>204</sup> Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. p. 45.

<sup>205</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 84.

<sup>206</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 84.

<sup>207</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. pp. 85-86.

<sup>208</sup> For more detailed information, please consult: Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio, pp. 80-88.

<sup>209</sup> Nevill FORBES, Arnold J. Toynbee, D Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth. 1915. *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press. p. 121.

some of his accomplishments as a ruler.<sup>210</sup> Although accomplished, his rule was cut short by his assassination in 1868; his son Milan Obrenović, who was not yet of age ascended to the throne.

In 1869, the Constitution of Serbia, also known as the Viceroyalty Constitution (*Namesnički Ustav*) was promulgated. This was Serbia's third Constitution, and the first constitution that was adopted by Serbian sovereign rulers, meaning without the need of Ottoman approval. Its name is derived from the Viceroys that governed Serbia whilst Milan Obrenović, the heir, was a minor. The Constitution was in force from 1869 to 1888 and again from 1894 to 1901. This is the first constitution in which the principle of separation of power was adopted, and the representative system was established. It was also the first Serbian constitution to recognize the private and political rights of Serbian citizens.<sup>211</sup> Stojanović elucidates that while the constitution did not in effect create a basis for a true parliamentary system, it did bring about changes that helped pave the way of more political freedoms in Serbia.<sup>212</sup> Also, during his rule, Serbia became an independent country. This independence was a result of diplomatic effort, both domestic and foreign, at the Congress of Berlin.

This Chapter succinctly describes Serbia's striving towards independence while also harboring early ideas of modernity. However, Serbia could not succeed in the complete acceptance of modernity without first gaining its independence. Therefore, the turning point for Serbia's relationship towards modernity is the establishment of independent Serbia at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. We will address this issue, as well as the period that came after the independence of Serbia in Chapter 4.2.

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<sup>210</sup> Nevill FORBES, Arnold J. Toynbee, D Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth. 1915. *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-122.

<sup>211</sup> For more detailed information regarding the Constitution of 1869, please consult: Miroslav ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1984. *Pregled razvitka političkih i pravnih ustanova Srbije od kraja XVIII do početka XX veka*. Gradina. pp. 65-67.

<sup>212</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 29.

## 4. JAPAN AND SERBIA AT THE TURN OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

Although it is by a bit of a stretch of the imagination that we can draw direct parallels between pre-modern Japan and Serbia, it is not impossible to see the strands of similarities of the two states in many ways. The one interesting parallel is the need for these two pre-modern societies to adopt a Western model in order to escape their respective “hegemons”.

As for pre-modern Japan, Gordon explains that Asian world gravitated towards Imperial China. Even though Japan successfully drew from Chinese and Korean cultures and had not subsided to Chinese hegemony because of obvious geographic obstacles, it failed to imagine or devise a regional plan until the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>213</sup> There was also the later question of the Unequal Treaties that was pushed on Japan as well as other Asian countries by the West: The United States and Britain in particular. This can presumably be seen as another incentive for Japan to come out of the shadows of greater powers and into a new role in the existing international order.<sup>214</sup>

As for the case of Serbia, in the nineteenth century it was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which made it the obvious hegemon. Throughout the whole century Serbia was striving towards independence and modernity.

Having in mind these states of affairs in both nineteenth century Japan and Serbia it is possible to draw a parallel between them. When this parallel is drawn, the effort and aspirations to step onto the international scene were obvious. In this arena Western style institutions and political culture were the name of the game. In short, common sense dictated that playing alongside the West was far wiser for both of these countries if they wanted to keep or reach independence.

In this Chapter we will present the turning points in Japan and Serbia in their endeavors to take their place in the international community. In the case of Japan it was most certainly the Meiji Restoration in 1868; while the crucial year for Serbia was 1878 when it gained independence. We will shortly present these events, as well as the relevant occurrences that transpired thereafter.

### 4.1. Japan in the Wake of the Meiji Restoration

The Meiji Restoration was an event that took place during 1868. This marked the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate and re-established Imperial rule in Japan.<sup>215</sup> The Meiji Restoration signified the consolidation of power and the practical rule under the Emperor of Japan. This event was the start of paramount changes within Japan in the social, political and cultural spheres.<sup>216</sup> The changes brought rapid industrialization and an introduction of Western ideas and practices that can be characterized as an influx of modernity.

The Meiji Restoration and the following Meiji period has linked itself inextricably to modernity with the promulgation of the Charter Oath, on the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1868. The *Gokajō no Goseimon*, or

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<sup>213</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 4.

<sup>214</sup> For more details on Japan in comparative studies, please consult: Johann P. ARNASON. 1999. “Comparing Japan: The Return to Asia”. *Japanstudien*. Vol.10, No.1. pp. 33-54; Raymond GREW. 2002. *Comparing Modern Japan: Are There More Comparisons To Make?*. Tokyo: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien. pp. 69-102.

<sup>215</sup> For a detailed analysis on the specificities of events that led to and followed the Meiji Restoration, please consult: W. G. BEASLEY. 1972. *The Meiji Restoration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

<sup>216</sup> For various aspects of the establishment of the Meiji state, its precursors and a broader picture of the socio-political landscape of Meiji Japan consult: Marius B. JANSEN (ed.). 1995. *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

the Charter Oath in Five Articles, can be considered as a formal proclamation of the aims of the new Imperial rule. The five articles are as follows: “

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by open discussion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall be united in vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state.
3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall all be allowed to pursue their own calling so that there may be no discontent.
4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws of Nature.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.”<sup>217</sup>

At first glance, the Charter Oath most definitely outlines the politics of Modern Japan. It signifies a break from tradition, an abolishment of the caste system and further, an increase in social mobility, an opening of the political conversation and an opening to the world in search of knowledge. It is a break with the past in which inefficient hereditary practices are to be replaced with “men of talent” who will be able to show their full potential.<sup>218</sup> . The fifth article is the most important for our research. It puts knowledge at the forefront of Japanese public interest and ties the search for it with loyalty to the Empire. In the Charter Oath’s vagueness lies its genius. Jansen further states that: “It is the mark of a successful document of state that, phrased in general terms, its meaning can expand with changing circumstances”.<sup>219</sup>

Despite the modern echo of the Charter Oath, we do concur with Jansen in his statement that it is a vow of slow change as much as it is a progressive proclamation.<sup>220</sup> The wording suggests that although things are changing, and that progress is coming, the old ways are far from gone. Classes remain and public discussion sets the minds of domain leaders at ease. A break with evil customs of the past, a vague condemnation that judging by the wording, everyone would agree with is given a Confucian finish and sets up the future rule.

Even though the Meiji Restoration was a crucial event in the history of Japan and marks the beginning of modern Japan, there is still debate among authors covering the subject on whether the moniker *restoration* is more appropriate than some alternatives mentioned in the relevant literature covering this topic. The most popular and relevant alternative appellations are *revolution* and *renewal*. There is significant debate among authors covering this subject regarding the interpretation of both the Japanese name *Meiji Ishin*, as well as the conditions in which the restoration itself took place. Namely, at the core of this debate is whether there was a *restoration* of Imperial rule from the olden times; an implementation of a new kind of Imperial rule – *renewal* or a *coup d’état* – *revolution*. *ō*

The semantics are indeed important in the search for a more complete understanding of this period. Behind each of these words lay a collection of processes that signify different outcomes and

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<sup>217</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 338.

<sup>218</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 338.

<sup>219</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 339.

<sup>220</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 338-339.

different specific situations in which the Meiji state came to power. Also, the terminology used depends on the aspects an author is covering in any specific text.<sup>221</sup> Therefore we may look at these words almost as loaded language, as every specific word carries with it a cluster of meanings.

The word *revolution* invokes violence and struggle. We think of the French or American Revolutions, or the October Revolution as representative of this word. However, these revolutions were so-called bottom-up revolutions, and some authors addressing the topic of Meiji Japan argue that the Meiji Revolution was a *top-down* revolution. Top-down revolutions are generally more peaceful and organized, because they are, as the name suggests, instructed and carried out from above rather than below. Being that the samurai, members of the ruling class, were at the forefront of the restoration, this is not wrong. However, Gordon challenges the notion of historians that the Meiji Restoration was a revolution from above - an aristocratic revolution, calling the conclusions misleading. It was the intermediate status of the middle and lower rank samurai that were frustrated with their insecure position in Tokugawa Japan, “coupled with their sense of frustrated ambition and entitlement to rule”<sup>222</sup> that sparked and carried out the revolution in Japan and it was precisely those same men who came out as the leaders of the new Meiji State.

Regarding the terms renewal and restoration from a Japanese linguistic point of view, Shinichi Kitaoka offers an interesting and insightful explanation:

“The people called it go-issin, the “great renewal,” however. This term was used in particular for the new government’s moves to introduce elements of Western civilization. The Japanese terms *ishin* (“restoration”) and *issin* (“renewal”) sound almost the same. However, this similarity of pronunciation masks the vast difference between restoration and innovation. The people understood that what was really happening was a great leap forwards, not backwards”.<sup>223</sup>

Therefore, Kitaoka suggests that the core meaning of the term was in fact renewal, rather than restoration.

As to the most popular and prevalent moniker of this event that marked the beginning of modern Japan – *Restoration* – we concur that the word itself suggests a return to a previous state – to restore something. Whether it is an act of goodness that restores someone’s faith in humanity, or an old chair that is restored to its old charm, the word signifies a return to a previous, preexisting condition. In this case, it is meant to signify a return to an older order, a restoration of Imperial rule in Japan. A restoration in this sense, it surely was not – a conclusion shared with Kitaoka, who finishes his concordant thought by saying: “Nothing could have been further from the truth”.<sup>224</sup> To add to this discussion we can recall Gordon who states that the small group of people that spearheaded the movement had the idea of the reestablishing the emperor as the ruler of Japan, but in actuality strong emperors throughout history were the exception- not the rule.<sup>225</sup>

Therefore, the notion of *restoration* of Imperial rule in this classical sense is not correct. There is no reestablishment of a prior, same order that was before the bakufu took power. But the word *restoration*, from both a political and a cultural perspective makes sense. Presenting the restoration of an ancient order is decisively more palatable than shaking up a system that was in place for over

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<sup>221</sup> Shinichi KITAOKA. 2018. “The Significance of the Meiji Restoration”. *Asia-Pacific Review*. Vol. 25, No 1. p. 7.

<sup>222</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 75.

<sup>223</sup> Shinichi KITAOKA. 2018. “The Significance of the Meiji Restoration”. *Asia-Pacific Review*. Vol. 25, No 1. p. 6.

<sup>224</sup> Shinichi KITAOKA. 2018. “The Significance of the Meiji Restoration”. *Asia-Pacific Review*. Vol. 25, No 1. p. 6.

<sup>225</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61.

two and a half centuries. The young emperor would be used as a cohesive factor for all of Japan, a symbol of continuity and of the Japanese way. As the imperial family traced their roots to the goddess Amaeterasu and the creation of Japan,<sup>226</sup> as well as their deep devotion as high priests to the native religion of Shinto,<sup>227</sup> the face of the new “old” political order was the obvious and best choice. Therefore, we may conclude that the word restoration was there to set the people at ease, to establish continuity, to create a symbol of stable rule and to unify a new nation under one order: politically, culturally and religiously. These aspects of the Imperial Family’s qualities also played a vital role in the later Meiji Era and onwards establishment of State Shinto and the ideology of Emperor Worship, which were aspects of a state and not religious matters.<sup>228</sup>

This small presentation on the semantic and terminological conversation regarding the Meiji Restoration is not made so as to bring confusion and uncertainty of this event, but it stands to show the complexity of its’ causes. It also shows us the depth of change the country had to go through as well as the thought and careful planning needed to create such a smooth and effective shift from one social, political and cultural order to the other in such short a time.<sup>229</sup> Although, Gordon reaffirms that even though the Restoration itself at the time did not have an immediate change, when we look at Japan just a decade later, we can see that the changes are indeed fantastic.<sup>230</sup>

The Meiji Restoration took place because of a combination of several interconnected external and internal factors. The main external factors were foreign influence and Unequal Treaties that were signed with the foreign powers. Foreign influence came as a result of the opening of international trade in 1853 with Commodore Perry. Commodore Perry used force to coerce the Shogunate to open Japan’s borders for trade. The first of these treaties was the one with the United States, the Treaty of Kanagawa. Similar treaties with the other Great Powers soon followed. The treaty of Kanagawa led to the Harris treaty of 1858. The treaties ensured the opening of ports for trade, extraterritoriality for its citizens in the event of a crime, and set trade tariffs Japan could not change.<sup>231</sup> “The extra-territorial rights of the Western powers in Japan were also grounded in their argument that the legal system, political structure and a sense of individual rights of the Western powers in Japan were not on the Western level. Meiji Japan needed to demonstrate efforts towards, and the results of, the modernisation to the West.”<sup>232</sup> Therefore, the subsequent Meiji Restoration and Meiji Japan

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<sup>226</sup> Lafkadio HERN. 2012. *Japan: pokušaj tumačenja, I*. Beograd: Kokoro: pp. 86-87; For the primary source on the genealogical and mythological aspects of the Imperial Family, consult: Donald L. PHILLIPI. 1968. *Kojiki*. Princeton University Press, University of Tokyo Press.

<sup>227</sup> For more details on Shinto, please consult: Vilijem Džordž ASTON. 2010. *Šintoizam – drevna religija Japana*. Beograd: Liber.

<sup>228</sup> Susumu SHIMAZONO. “State Shinto and religion in Post-War Japan” in: James A. BECKFORD, N. J. DEMERATH III (eds.). 2007. *The SAGE Handbook Of The Sociology Of Religion*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 697-709.

<sup>229</sup> For more on the developments due to the acceptance of modernity in the cultural and artistic sphere of modern Japan, please consult: Marina JOVIĆ-ĐALOVIĆ. 2015. *Književnost i osećaj: Moderne tendencije u Japanskoj proznoj književnosti*. Beograd: Filološki fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu. pp. 57-119.

<sup>230</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 61.

<sup>231</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 50. For a more detailed look at the unequal treaties, please consult: W. G. BEASLEY: “The foreign threat and the opening of the ports” in: Marius B. JANSEN. 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>232</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. “Educational Borrowing in Japan in the Meiji and Post-War Eras”. in: David PHILLIPS, Kimberly OCHS (eds.). 2004. *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford, UK: Symposium Books. p. 147.

leadership envisioned a state that would be on par with the foreign powers, institutionally and politically.

After the Black Ships and Commodore Perry's gunboat diplomacy, the bakufu realized quickly that the internal status quo needed to change. "The agreements Perry and Harris had wrung from reluctant bakufu negotiators made it necessary for Japan to abandon policies of seclusion and enter the international order on terms defined by the West. The struggle to regain its sovereignty then forced Japan to embark on policies of centralization and institutional innovation in order to build a modern nation-state, and involved the basic restructuring of domestic society."<sup>233</sup>

The internal impetus came from internal discontent, mainly dissent from the *tozama daimyō*, the outer lords. This period of discontent in the late Edo period leading up to the Meiji Restoration is known as the *Bakumatsu* period (1853-1867).<sup>234</sup> This period is marked with the decline of power of the bakufu, and the growing movement to restore the Imperial rule, and to a certain degree antiforeigner sentiment. Many authors see the slogan *Sonnō jōi* (Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians) as the embodiment of this period.

It might seem strange that antiforeigner sentiment drove the movement that would lead to the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent opening to the West, and the embracing of its civilizational practices. However, Hirakawa posits the statement that leaders used the slogan *Sonnō jōi* to ride the wave of discontent as a means to an end. In his own words:

"It is interesting to note that once the antiforeigner loyalists had toppled the bakufu and seized power themselves, they immediately proclaimed a policy of peace and opened the country to foreign trade and diplomatic intercourse. This fact exposed the slogan "revere the emperor, expel the barbarians" for what it had really been - a catchphrase devoid of meaningful content that was used to unite and mobilize the energies of dissident samurai activists."<sup>235</sup>

The most vocal in the *Sonnō jōi* movement among the *tozama daimyō* were the Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa domains.<sup>236</sup> Jansen informs us of their aspiration in the following manner: "Han statesmen worked with court nobles in devising schemes that would increase the court's—and, not incidentally, their domains'—leverage in national affairs."<sup>237</sup> However, these three domains were not in complete unison, which was the consequence of their unequal strength. Satsuma and Chōshū "were large enough and strong enough to see themselves as central to a new structure."<sup>238</sup> For them, the new structure implied not only the resignation of the bakufu's powers, but a complete reorganization of the state leadership, with the emperor at its helm. Moreover "Satsuma leaders Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi had been working with the court noble Iwakura Tomomi...to secure a court authorization for striking down the bakufu."<sup>239</sup> On the other hand Tosa was only striving to put an end to bakufu, without such clear plans for the future structure.

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<sup>233</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 294.

<sup>234</sup> For more on the bakumatsu period, and the detailed research on the Meiji Restoration itself and its progenitors consult: George M. WILSON. 1992. *Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration*. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>235</sup> Sukehiro HIRAKAWA. "Japan's turn to the West" in: Marius B. JANSEN (ed.). 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 495.

<sup>236</sup> For more details on the involvement of the Chōshū domain in the events of Meiji Restoration, please consult: Albert M. CRAIG, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, New York: Lexington Books.

<sup>237</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 298.

<sup>238</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 311.

<sup>239</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 311.

This request for an Imperial court authorization shows that the Satsuma and Chōshū clans have put themselves under the authority of the court and wish to proceed with the violent takeover with his blessing and on his behalf. “A battle on the approaches to Kyoto, at Toba-Fushimi, followed on January 27. In sharp fighting bakufu units were subjected to withering fire along the way. Unprepared for battle and poorly led, they fell back on Osaka. Keiki [Yoshinobu] returned by ship to an Edo he had not visited during his brief reign as shogun. The Restoration War (*Boshin sensō*, so named for the zodiacal cycle) had begun. It would continue until the surrender of the last bakufu naval units in Hokkaido in the spring of 1869.”<sup>240</sup>

Even though Satsuma and Chōshū succeed in the overthrow of the bakufu and cleared the path for future modernization, it would be both necessary and fair to point out to the attempts of the bakufu at modernization. Tokugawa Yoshinobu was the 15<sup>th</sup> and last shogun and a part of a movement in which the shogunate aimed to modernize the country and prepare the bakufu for the next century. Alistair Swale states that the intellectual wave of modernity had reached the shores of Japan and was beginning to flourish in the 1850's.<sup>241</sup> He states further that the Western experiences came by not only by government sponsorships, but also by the Satsuma and Chōshū clans' young men that were dispatched to the United States and to Western Europe decades before the Meiji government did so.<sup>242</sup>

Swale further states that there was a dissonance between the bakufu's leniency and fancy of Western things and their policies and conservatism towards their own. One example that we can find in Swale's text is a mission in 1860 to the United States for the purposes of a ratification of the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, where the Japanese diplomats had a curfew set for 6 in the evening and were closely watched by their superiors.<sup>243</sup> This, along with the fact that English was a language spoken by few and far between,<sup>244</sup> confirms the notion that the Bakufu's system was archaic and non-conforming with the new order. While its *hans* were sending young men to be educated and Western fashion and science were condoned, even seen as a hot commodity, the failure to release itself of its own firm grip and its rules and, blindsided by the forceful opening, move forward with the times, marked the beginning of the end for the bakufu. This viewpoint is acknowledged by Swale: “As for the Bakufu itself, it remained an institution whose organizational culture was increasingly ossified and incapable of substantial adaptation”.<sup>245</sup> Having in mind this characteristic it does not come as a surprise that the bakufu did not succeed in its aim and that it met its own demise. Tokugawa Yoshinobu stepped down as shogun on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November 1867.

Even though the bakufu had eventually failed to modernize itself and move forward to the next century, its endeavors have proven to be intrinsic to the progress reached during the Meiji period. In order for the Meiji government to follow through with the Restoration in such a swift manner, and to transform and develop the state from a pre-modern agrarian society into a modern industrial power, the values, ideas and methods had to be seeds that were planted into the generation that led the Restoration- not the one that came after it.

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<sup>240</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 311.

<sup>241</sup> Alistair D. SWALE. 2009. *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 32.

<sup>242</sup> Alistair D. SWALE. 2009. *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 38.

<sup>243</sup> Alistair D. SWALE. 2009. *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 39.

<sup>244</sup> Alistair D. SWALE. 2009. *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 39.

<sup>245</sup> Alistair D. SWALE. 2009. *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 43.

The Restoration of Imperial Rule took place on January 3<sup>rd</sup> 1868 when young Emperor Meiji ascended to the Chrysanthemum Throne as Emperor of Japan, therefore putting the Emperor in the political center. This centrality of the Emperor's figure was one of the biggest differences from the previous political order, the Tokugawa Shogunate. Emperors in Japan were more often than not, disinterested in politics and had an affinity for the arts, and the ones that were involved in leading the country were rare.<sup>246</sup> However, the revolutionaries and restorationists have created a coup d'état under the banner of revering the emperor and have made this political move in his name. The whole new nation-state was centered around not on a new, modern the centralized government, but even more so on the figure of the Emperor. The Emperor was considered to be of divine origin and a descendent of a continuing imperial dynasty. This characteristic made him a binding factor in the creation of a new national identity.<sup>247</sup>

The evolving image of the Emperor that was used throughout the Meiji era points to his rising importance as a national symbol. It is evident that the Emperor was used both as a symbol of unification for the Japanese, and a symbol of the country's strong determination towards the world scene and to modernity. Gordon writes about the way the emperor was dressed, and the various portraits throughout the years that were taken of him, what this all meant to the country and to the populace.<sup>248</sup> In the beginning, the young Emperor was dressed in traditional court dress and traditional Japanese seating. However, later we see the Emperor clad in western clothing and full imperial regalia. he was no longer a boy as he was in 1868, but through his new portrait projected the image of a determined and dignified leader. A photographed painting of the Meiji Emperor was enshrined in schools across Japan, setting an image of the emperor as a symbol of a strong, modern, and unified Japan. During the Meiji period, the imperial institution has grown to become a powerful force of unification among the Japanese, it "came to link individuals to immediate communities of family, workplace, and neighborhood—and beyond that to the imagined community of nation and empire".<sup>249</sup>

One of the ways the image of the emperor was used as a unifying force of Japan was not only through his portraits, but more importantly through the development of a national polity with him at the center. This national polity came to be known as *kokutai*. As Marković explains *kokutai* is "[a] specific Japanese conception of state unity that unites the Emperor, the Japanese people and the Japanese islands into one organic whole."<sup>250</sup> This construct was connected to the notion of the Emperor's claim to divinity as elaborated in the *Nihon Shoki* and *Kojiki*, and was later immortalized in the Meiji Constitution. As Tipton elucidates: "The Meiji Constitution and Imperial Rescript on Education had established the sanctity of the *kokutai* (the national essence or polity), with the emperor at its centre."<sup>251</sup>

Another example of the Emperor's unifying power and potential was later realized through education. Namely, Minister of Education Mori Arinori "found it unrealistic to foster patriotism simply through general instruction in history, geography, and national literature and language...in Japan's case, the Emperor and the imperial family, whom he considered Japan's 'incomparable asset

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<sup>246</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 2-3.

<sup>247</sup> For more details on the life of Emperor Meiji please consult: Donald KEENE. 2002. *Emperor of Japan. Meiji and his World, 1852-1912*. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>248</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 69.

<sup>249</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 70.

<sup>250</sup> Ljiljana MARKOVIĆ. "Japan, prva potraga za modernizacijom u Istočnoj Aziji" in: Aleksandra Vraneš (ed.). 2013. *Kultura: u potrazi za novom paradigmom*. Beograd: Filološki fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu. p. 53.

<sup>251</sup> Elise K. TIPTON. 2008. *Modern Japan: A Social and Political History*. New York: Routledge. p. 101.

and greatest treasure,’ would provide a symbolic foundation on which national identity could be built.”<sup>252</sup>

Within three years of the young emperor’s restoration, swift and significant changes were made that shifted the political, societal and cultural order of Japan, from the feudal pre-modern times of the Tokugawa Shogunate, to a re-established empire with a thirst for an emergence on the global scene, and an understanding that a complete revision of the system was necessary in order for the aspirations of the leaders to come true.

Early Meiji Era leaders recognized the failures of the Tokugawa order and strived to circumvent them. These shortcomings were “military and economic weakness, political fragmentation, and a social hierarchy that failed to recognize men of talent.”<sup>253</sup> Therefore, the new leaders aimed to create a national government that would secure unification, meritocracy and social and economic progress. In the first decade and a half, they came to what would become the system that followed the European systems, through a system of trial and error.

One of the most amazing features of the Meiji Restoration was surely the sheer speed with which the new government operated and decided to go “out with the old, in with the new”, dismantling the old system and while dismantling it, building a new one in its stead. When one reads and researches this from today’s perspective it looks like a swift change, as if a very capable team made up of a wrecking crew and a building crew went together and reshaped the country.

A small insight into Gordon’s text shows us exactly with what kind of swiftness and thoroughness these changes came about: “Thus, within the short span of three years, a political order in existence for over two and a half centuries simply disappeared.”<sup>254</sup> The bakufu itself, along with 280 semi-autonomous domains ceased to exist, as the Meiji leaders were building a new political landscape and a national system with which to govern the newly formed 72 prefectures. Gordon continues with the changes introduced:

“The central government would now collect taxes from domain lands. The *daimyō* were ordered to move to Tokyo. Many castles were dismantled. Within just three months, the number of political units was consolidated dramatically, from 280 domains to 72 prefectures. Most of the new governors were not former *daimyō*. They were middling samurai from the insurgent domains now controlling the government.”<sup>255</sup>

The *daimyō* were relieved of their governing duties and received a handsome salary.

The speed of the Meiji Restoration and its subsequent machinations is even more astonishing when we take into account the comprehensiveness of the adopted measures. In the previous paragraph we have laid out Gordon’s succinct overview of these measures. In the following paragraphs we shall elucidate several factors of importance in more detail.

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<sup>252</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. “Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912”. in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO, Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 45. footnote omitted.

<sup>253</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 62.

<sup>254</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 63.

<sup>255</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 63.

It is necessary to underline another characteristic of this period. Namely, Bytheway and Schiltz turn our attention to a specific trend that enveloped Japan since the 1850s:

“From the time of Japan’s opening in 1854 it was imperative that Japan adopt foreign knowledge and, as the slogan *wakon yōsai* (Japanese spirit, Western technology) proclaimed, imbue it with the Japanese soul. This notion is not, in any way, unique to the Japanese. Intellectuals were saying much the same thing, at much the same time, in all those parts of the world confronted by the might of the industrialised economies.”<sup>256</sup>

From this excerpt we may see that Japan was experiencing similar sentiments and employing similar mechanisms when challenged by Western supremacy as many other states have during this time. However, while the “Western technology” part of the equation is the same in all parts of the world, the differences that will come lie in the specificity of the local culture. This is true of all cultures, Japan included.

In order to comprehend the Meiji Restoration it is necessary to present the role and status of the samurai.<sup>257</sup> Their role is central having in mind that they were the ones who spearheaded the movement for the reinstatement of the Emperor. Their status in the Tokugawa shogunate was as follows. Even though it was a system that much resembled the feudal era in medieval Europe Gordon states that the samurai were “not a securely landed elite”.<sup>258</sup> They were not tied to the land as the European feudal estate, but were rather employees of the feudal lord; they had salaries that were a hereditary right.

With the Meiji Restoration and the promulgation of the Charter Oath there was a strong societal shift from a strict caste system to a ‘casteless’ system. The feudal system was no longer necessary, and in the world they were striving towards, a hereditary military class was no longer needed.<sup>259</sup> This meant that the samurai would eventually lose their hereditary status. They lost the right to wear swords, a samurai badge of honor. Their stipends were slowly but surely taken away from them. While the farmers could continue farming; the merchants could continue their business without major changes and the craftsmen’s nature of work remained the same it was the samurai class that came out of Edo society without a sense of purpose. This was disconcerting to many samurai but also to the new champions of the Meiji Era. Also, they could not be overlooked, especially having in mind that they were 1 800 000 or 400 000 families strong.<sup>260</sup>

The frustration of the samurai culminated in the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 where a faction of dissatisfied samurai followed one of the early Meiji leaders, Saigō Takamori in an armed rebellion against the new Imperial government in an armed conflict.<sup>261</sup> “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 was

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<sup>256</sup> Simon BYTHEWAY, Michael SCHILTZ. “The Dynamic of Wakon Yosai: The Paradoxes and Challenges of Financial Policy in an Industrializing Japan, 1854-1939” in: Dawn BENNET, Jaya EARNETT, Miyume TANJI (eds.). 2009. *People, Place and Power: Australia and the Asia Pacific*. Perth: Black Swan Press. p. 60.

<sup>257</sup> For more details on the role of the samurai class in the making of modern Japan, please consult: Eiko IKEGAMI. 1995. *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>258</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 62.

<sup>259</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1960. “The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period”. *Journal for Asian Studies* Vol. 19, No. 4. p. 433.

<sup>260</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1960. “The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period”. *Journal for Asian Studies* Vol. 19, No. 4. p. 433.

<sup>261</sup> For a detailed account of the Satsuma rebellion, an important passage in the History of the Meiji Era that this work will not concentrate on, please consult: James H. BUCK. 1973. “The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima Through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle”. *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol 28. No 4.

the final act of organized military resistance to the reforms of the Restoration Government. This civil war pitted a well-trained samurai army commanded by Saigō Takamori and deeply imbued with the traditional concepts of feudal Japan against the Imperial Army of 'conscripted farmers'.<sup>262</sup>

Having in mind the complicated nature of this problem that arose from the dissolution of the samurai class, the new government had created a program to rehabilitate the samurai or *shizoku jusan*, implemented from the beginning of the Meiji Era in 1868 until 1889.<sup>263</sup>

Several Meiji leaders expressed their solicitude for the future of the samurai in the new order. As Harootunian reminds us Iwakura Tomomi was the loudest and clearest voice of concern for the samurai, saying that the samurai are the most useful group in their society, that they were the leaders of society for the past three hundred years and that they should be utilized to help modernize the state, as their success is tied to the success of the nation.<sup>264</sup> Iwakura, though the loudest supporter, was not the only one. Several other leaders had ideas of employing the vast talent of a now lost class to enrich and empower a new nation: "In their many memorials and petitions concerning the problem of samurai, government leaders such as Iwakura, Ōkubo, and Kido indicated that a rehabilitation policy need not be limited to protecting former samurai, but could be considered as another technique which the government would accumulate capital."<sup>265</sup>

By applying social and economic mobility, relegating samurai to all manners of different jobs – such as agricultural work in which they had no experience, to encouraging entrepreneurship and work in government institutions – The Meiji leaders aimed at using the displaced class largely in favor of economic development of the country, albeit to little success. The Meiji government, although not successful in the completion of its own goals "by erasing the dangers of class rebellion and relocating a large social group with no apparent function in an industrialized society, the Meiji government did realize a measure of success".<sup>266</sup>

Ultimately, the samurai did serve the new Meiji state. While the class as such was abolished, many samurai took up government positions, teaching positions and took up places in the business world. Hailing from a system in which they were the highest class, it is natural that they belonged to the most educated social stratum. Both the samurai and the new Meiji state used that to their own advantage. The abolishment of the samurai class was on the one hand integral to the creation of modern Japan for the needs of rising social mobility and budding egalitarianism, as well as clearing the states' substantial financial burden of samurai stipends. On the other, it was the new system that prospered from the ex-samurai, as they were at least firstly, the men of talent needed to thrust Japan forward into the twentieth century.

Therefore, it was a portion of these samurai who, inspired by their own dissatisfaction as well as the dissatisfaction of the agriculturists and smaller merchants, decided to form a political movement in order to streamline a broad spectrum of public interest. Norman explains that in the time of transition, as was the time when these movements appeared "no clear-cut political divisions

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<sup>262</sup> James H. BUCK. 1973. "The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. From Kagoshima Through the Siege of Kumamoto Castle". *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol 28. No 4. p. 427.

<sup>263</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1960. "The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period". *Journal for Asian Studies*, Vol. 19. No 4. p. 434.

<sup>264</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1959. "The Progress of Japan and the Samurai Class, 1868-1882". *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 28. No. 3. pp. 258-259.

<sup>265</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1960. "The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period". *Journal for Asian Studies*, Vol. 19. No 4. p. 434.

<sup>266</sup> Harry HAROOTUNIAN. 1960. "The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period". *Journal for Asian Studies*, Vol. 19. No 4. p. 444.

appear, only the hazy outline of tendencies which later were to become sharply defined as political parties with definite programs”<sup>267</sup>

In 1881 a first party that emerged was *Jiyuto* (Liberal Party). Norman tells us more of its participants and ideology. It was a “widespread and loosely connected movement” made of “small landowners and peasants under the leadership of former *samurai* and big landlord merchants”<sup>268</sup> It promoted ideas of liberalism, but of moderate nature. Norman describes it as: “conciliatory liberalism, a liberalism which strove primarily for democracy, for people’s rights, for freedom of enterprise – all for the respectable classes.”<sup>269</sup> Norman explains that this ideology of liberalism later morphed into unyielding conservatism with the formation of the *Seiyukai* in 1900.<sup>270</sup>

Apart from this party, two others were also formed: *Kaishinto* (Reform Party) and *Rikken Teiseito* (Constitutional Imperial Party). At the head of the Reform Party was Ōkuma Shigenobu. This party gathered “bureaucrats who were out of office, the city intelligentsia, and some of the larger merchants and industrialists, particularly the Mitsubishi Company.”<sup>271</sup> They also advocated for the liberal ideas, more precisely English liberalism and utilitarianism. However, Norman insightfully points out that their program was also moderate, moreover “Its program was so watered down that by contrast it makes the *Jiyuto* platform revolutionary. The essence of the *Kaishinto*’s political philosophy can best be epitomized in its watchword “*Onken Chakujitsu*,” which might be paraphrased as “moderate and sound, slow but steady.”<sup>272</sup>

As the reaction to the formation of these two parties, the government decided to form its own party to counter their influence. Therefore, in 1882 *Rikken Teiseito* (Constitutional Imperial Party) was established with the firm conservative backbone.<sup>273</sup> The party was meant to rival the Liberal and the Reform parties and to push the idea of German-model statism, although it could not match the popularity or organization of either of the two aforementioned parties.<sup>274</sup>

As Norman informs us, the main issue of the day was sovereignty – a subject on which the three parties had differing interpretations. Namely, the Liberal Party held the belief that sovereignty belongs to the people. The Reformists stayed true to their English political roots and argued that the Throne and the parliament as the representative of the people shared sovereignty. Finally, the Constitutional Imperial Party maintained that the sovereignty was inseparable for the Emperor himself, and that “he alone could grant a constitution to the people as a gift.”<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 167.

<sup>268</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 173.

<sup>269</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 173.

<sup>270</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 174.

<sup>271</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 176.

<sup>272</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 176.

<sup>273</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 176.

<sup>274</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 176.

<sup>275</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 177.

After a series of Government pushes to quell the rising popularity of political parties, promises of a national assembly by the year 1889 and playing parties against each other, both the *Kaishinto* and the *Jiyuto* dissolved.<sup>276</sup> The parties would not play a major role on the political scene of Japan until the creation of the Diet. This chain of events described by Norman aptly depicts the early years of the political culture in Japan in the first years of the establishment of the Imperial rule and it is proof that change was a gradual and painful process in the realm of political institutions and the division of power.

Another institution that was established was the new peerage system. This system was put in place so as to “formalize a divide between emperor and commoners”<sup>277</sup> and “to protect the imperial institution from popular radicalism”.<sup>278</sup> By appointing titles of Prince, Duke, Count or Marquis, Viscount and Baron to nobles and *daimyōs*, the new government ensured that *daimyōs* and nobles alike “enjoyed a little more than prestige.”<sup>279</sup> It should be pointed out that this new peerage did not receive land or castles, and that “the only function of this new peerage was to people an anticipated House of Peers in the future Diet.”<sup>280</sup> Itō Hirobumi, who was integral to the institution of the peerage, said that it was done in order to prevent the people from slipping “into the spirit of republicanism... although it might seem contrary to the trend of the times and against people’s sentiments, the peerage provided the opportunity “to take advantage of the fact that the last flow of feudal reverence for the Emperor has not died out.”<sup>281</sup>

Itō Hirobumi, one of the most important political figures in Meiji politics was in charge of drafting a constitution. Itō Hirobumi was on his way to Europe to study forms of government on the Old Continent. “The year after the emperor’s promise of a parliament, an imperial rescript commanded Itō to head a commission to study the governmental institutions of other countries.”<sup>282</sup> While in Europe, “he was able to consult with Arinori, now minister to London, and Aoki Shūzō, minister to Berlin. His principal investigations were carried on in Germany... and Vienna”.<sup>283</sup>

Upon Itō’s return, a constitution was drafted in secret in 1886 and 1887 with a team of people and with the help of Law professor Hermann Roessler from Germany, who he brought on as a legal advisor.<sup>284</sup> Roesler “had been recruited to come to Japan as adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1878; by 1881 he was first legal adviser to the government, and he earned such trust from the leadership group that from then to 1893, when he left Japan, there were few major decisions on which his advice was not requested.”<sup>285</sup> Therefore, it is to be noted that this endeavor was not devoid of one emblematic characteristic of the early Meiji state, the *Oyatoi gaijin* or the hired foreigner.

Some of Roelser’s thoughts on the constitution as presented by Jansen serve as a helpful addition to a better understanding on the creation of the Meiji Constitution:

“Although a number of constitutional provisions in the final product followed the example of the Prussian constitution of 1850, it should not be concluded that the goal was to create an East Asian Prussia. Roesler was highly critical of Prussian

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<sup>276</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. pp. 177-180.

<sup>277</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 391.

<sup>278</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 391.

<sup>279</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 392.

<sup>280</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 392.

<sup>281</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 392.

<sup>282</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>283</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>284</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 92.

<sup>285</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

statism. He argued the case for what he called a social monarchy, and wrote that the voting and taxing rights were the central features of a constitutional order. At the same time he was equally opposed to the separation of powers incorporated in Western European and especially English practice, and thought ultimate power should be united in the monarch. Gneist and Stein were also relatively moderate in the German spectrum of constitutional thought, and their vision of a *rechtsstaat*, or government of laws, was by no means unchallenged by more reactionary contemporaries. Yet they were united on the dangers involved in leaving matters entirely to representatives of the people, and argued that disparities of wealth and irresponsible individualism could combine to create irreparable fissures in the body politic. Roesler's idea of a "social monarchy" sought to counter both factionalism and autocracy."<sup>286</sup>

Norman comments that Itō Hirobumi has expressed that the "Constitution was a gift of the Emperor to his people not a concession to the demand of the people for a Constitution."<sup>287</sup> An important aspect of the Constitution is the central role that is given to the Emperor regarding the amendments: "Only the Emperor can initiate amendments to the Constitution which have to be approved by the Upper and Lower Houses and its interpretation lies with the courts of the country and, in the last analysis, in the hands of the Privy Council."<sup>288</sup>

Finally, Fraser, Mason and Mitchell compare the constitutional system in Japan to that of countries in Western Europe, asserting that it "was not so very different in form and operation, or even in its actual wording and many of its underlying assumptions, from that of contemporary Belgium say, or the United Kingdom of Italy... By 1890, Japan was also on the verge of taking a full and independent part in the Western-inspired international order of the time."<sup>289</sup> This statement depicts the success of the Meiji leaders in the execution of their plan a mere seventeen years after the Restoration. Therefore, we may deduce that the system was under influence and has taken considerable inspiration from continental European legal systems.<sup>290</sup>

According to some authors, one of the most prominent institutions of the Meiji Era was the Privy Council. "[I]n 1888 the Privy Council was created through the initiative of Ito Hirobumi, who was its first President. Its function originally was to pass judgment on the Constitution, which was nearing completion. But after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, the Privy Council remained as the watchdog of autocratic rule."<sup>291</sup> From this we can see that the Privy Council has outgrown its primary reason of existence. Norman informs us of the power the Privy Council wielded: "Its own composition and its power to decide any conflict of opinion which may arise between the different organs of government regarding the interpretation of the Constitution have made it the last

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<sup>286</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>287</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 188.

<sup>288</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 188. For more details on the content of the Constitution, please consult: Marina JOVIĆ-ĐALOVIĆ. 2015. *Književnost i osećaj: Moderne tendencije u Japanskoj proznoj književnosti*. Beograd: Filološki fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu. pp. 66-67.

<sup>289</sup> Andrew, FRASER, R. H. P. Mason and Philip Mitchell. 2005. *Japan's early parliaments, 1890- 1905: Structure, Issues and Trends*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 4.

<sup>290</sup> For more on the Western European legal influences in Meiji Japan, please consult: Wilhelm RÖHL, 2005. *History Of Law In Japan Since 1868*, Leiden: Brill. pp. 23-28.

<sup>291</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 188. footnote omitted.

stronghold of conservation.”<sup>292</sup> Gordon provides more information on the Privy Council and its role in Meiji politics, as well as its relationship with the *genrō*, a moniker given to the several statesmen of the time:

“This council continued to function as an extra-constitutional advisory group once the constitution was promulgated. It served as one site where the Meiji leaders could manage the political system. This small group of leaders came to be known as the Meiji “oligarchs” (*genrō* in Japanese), a term coined by the press in 1892.” “The original oligarchs were the key men, such as Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, who had come to dominate the cabinet and the bureaucracy in the 1880s. The *genrō* were an informal body, in the sense that there was no constitutional provision for them. But informal did not mean ambiguous or unclear. The identity of the oligarchs was well known. For the rest of their lives, they continued to pull the strings of politics, but as they grew older they stepped back from the front lines of political battle to positions such as leadership of the Privy Council.”<sup>293</sup>

Although the importance of the Privy Council is debated, the oligarchs or *genrō* that at times occupied the Privy Council have had tremendous influence on Meiji politics. Especially in our research, it is important to mention it as one of the hubs of the intellectual and political elite, regardless of the strength of the institution *per se*.

Another major change in the Japanese political and social system was the abolishment of the *Dajōkan* and the establishment of the cabinet system. As Kazuhiro states: “In December 1885, a major restructuring of the government abolished the *Dajōkan*, which had served as Japan’s governing body since shortly after the Restoration. In its place, a modern cabinet system was introduced.”<sup>294</sup> Jansen mentions that the reasons for this Westernization of the executive branch was done partly because the government wanted to take in order to put itself in position for the treaty reforms with the West, and partly because of internal reasons such as protection of the court and centralization of power where “political direction derived from an appointed prime minister, under whom functional ministries took shape.”<sup>295</sup>

The Prime minister was the head of the cabinet. The Constitution allowed the formation of government under both party and non-party cabinets, thereby creating a complex relationship between the cabinet and the newly formed National Assembly – the Diet. As Fraser, Mason, and Mitchell inform us: “This was to be the great bone of contention during the first two or three decades of Diet history. But the forces concerned had not only to contend with each other; they had to work together, if the system were to be sustained and the nation’s cause advanced.”<sup>296</sup>

As we can see, seventeen years after the promulgation of the Charter Oath, a modern, Western inspired cabinet system of government was introduced, moving the state organization one step closer to the West. Kazuhiro further states: “This ended the nominal control of the government ministries by members of the nobility, formally opening positions of national leadership to a broad spectrum of

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<sup>292</sup> E. Herbert NORMAN. 2000. *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 188. footnote omitted.

<sup>293</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 92. footnote omitted.

<sup>294</sup> Takii KAZUHIRO. 2007. *Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*. Tokyo: International House of Japan. p. 92.

<sup>295</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 392.

<sup>296</sup> Andrew FRASER, R. H. P. Mason and Philip Mitchell. 2005. *Japan’s early parliaments, 1890- 1905: Structure, Issues and Trends*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 5.

the nation's citizens."<sup>297</sup> This comment signifies that the exclusive hereditary rule of the nobility was losing its power, and that now formally, the "men of talent" could take up leading positions in the state. Meritocratic leadership over hereditary leadership was therefore legally encoded. "It also signified the establishment of an executive branch of government that, while still responsible to the emperor, was also autonomous."<sup>298</sup> Finally, this segment shows us that even though the Emperor was nominally the ultimate authority in the country, a significant portion of responsibility was given to the executive branch, a definite move towards Western style constitutionalism.

Gordon informs us that regardless of the fact that the Constitution had a 'deliberative assembly' in mind, Ministers were not responsible to the newly formed Diet, but to the emperor himself. Although at first, ministers and state officials, were taken from the ranks of samurai from the Satsuma and Chōshū domains and their allies, the government soon employed a more detached approach of a merit based system it was promising from the very end of the Edo period, of using "men of talent" instead of a birthright system. Thus, performance on the civil service examination became the key prerequisite for service in the ministries of the Empire of Japan. These steps that were taken were immensely important for the new Meiji state. Gordon emphasizes that creating a more efficient system building upon the Tokugawa legacy, the Meiji leaders created a state with an unprecedented legitimacy and power ever seen in the history of Japan to that day.<sup>299</sup>

A National Assembly - the Diet was established and codified in the constitution in 1889. It is right to say that although the Diet was established then, the idea of a bicameral legislature was hardly a new idea in Japanese political and intellectual circles. Serious conversation on the adoption of such a system dates back to the 1850s, in the final years of the bakufu. "The pivotal point around which this strategy turned was the proposal to create a bicameral assembly which would provide representation for some groups in Japanese society. It was obviously a conscious attempt to adapt Western techniques of government in order to refurbish the old feudal system which had long outlived its usefulness."<sup>300</sup> Although never realized under the bakufu, it shows us the clear intent of the readiness for the implementation of these Western techniques of government, long before their institutionalization.

The Diet was a bicameral legislature that consisted of an Upper House, the House of Peers, and a Lower House, the House of Representatives. Regarding the House of Peers, we have established earlier that with the creation of the new peerage system, many of the old *daimyō* and nobles were to be admitted into the Upper House as Peers. However, Fraser, Mason and Mitchell accentuate that "Despite its name, the House of Peers was by no means a collection of effete and antiquated aristocrats...about half the total membership lacked titles, being appointed on personal merit or elected as wealthy commoners."<sup>301</sup>

The Representatives of the Lower house were elected. However, suffrage and office were not universal, in fact it was given only "to men of substantial property."<sup>302</sup> This is an important aspect of early Meiji political life, as it excluded most of the population from active participation in any

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<sup>297</sup> Takii KAZUHIRO. 2007. *Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*. Tokyo: International House of Japan. p. 92.

<sup>298</sup> Takii KAZUHIRO. 2007. *Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*. Tokyo: International House of Japan. p. 92.

<sup>299</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 64.

<sup>300</sup> Nobutaka IKE. 1948. "Western Influences on the Meiji Restoration". *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. 17, No. 1. p. 1.

<sup>301</sup> Andrew FRASER, R. H. P. Mason and Philip Mitchell. 2005. *Japan's early parliaments, 1890- 1905: Structure, Issues and Trends*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 199.

<sup>302</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 126.

decision-making whatsoever. Therefore, “[t]he first men elected to the Diet were primarily landlords. In addition, a sprinkling of businessmen and former bureaucrats won seats, as did some urban professionals such as journalists, publishers, and lawyers. Roughly one-third of these representatives were former members of the samurai class.”<sup>303</sup>

Even as this limitation on suffrage and holding office existed Fraser maintains a somewhat idyllic, if not true depiction of the situation in the Diet by stating: “in the rooms and chambers of the Diet building, prince mixed with commoner, bureaucrat with businessman, Westernized intellectuals and urban professional men with traditionally minded but shrewd landlord- farmers.”<sup>304</sup>

With all of these limitations in mind, Gordon reiterates an important fact “[t]hat a constitutionally mandated, elected national assembly—with more than advisory powers—now existed.”<sup>305</sup> Even though in the early years of the Meiji Era there were these significant limitations, “this clearly implied that a politically active and potentially expandable body of subjects or citizens also existed. Indeed, as the oligarchs decided to adopt a constitution, they were acutely aware that such a body politic was in the process of forming itself and developing its own ideas about the political order.”<sup>306</sup>

Finally, the promulgation of the Constitution, the creation of the modern cabinet system, and the subsequent formation of a national assembly was an undeniable marker of the influence of modernity in Japan in the early Meiji years. Fraser’s note on the Diet can serve as an illustration: “The Imperial Diet of the 1890s and early 1900s, then, may from this standpoint be thought of as a genuine culmination of Japanese as well as Western experience, and as crowning the events of the 1870s and 1880s when resolute domestic efforts had been made, as well as foreign pressure exerted, to catch up with and join the ‘civilized’ West.”<sup>307</sup>

## 4.2. Serbia in the Wake of the Independence

Congress of Berlin was as a meeting of state officials for the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. Treaty of San Stefano was a treaty that effectively put and end to the Russo-Turkish conflict. It was adopted at the Congress of San Stefano that was held from February 19<sup>th</sup> until March 3<sup>rd</sup> of 1878. Major consequence of this Treaty was the creation of Greater Bulgaria that would cover large territory, imposing on the Greek, Serbian, Albanian, and today’s North Macedonian territories. While the Ottoman Empire was still officially holding Bulgaria as a vassal state, Bulgaria was de facto under the control of the Russian Empire. Therefore, Russian Empire was a major advocate of Bulgaria in both the Treaty of San Stefano as well as later, at the Congress of Berlin.<sup>308</sup> Having this relationship

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<sup>303</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 126.

<sup>304</sup> Andrew FRASER, R. H. P. Mason and Philip Mitchell. 2005. *Japan’s early parliaments, 1890- 1905: Structure, Issues and Trends*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 5.

<sup>305</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 93.

<sup>306</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 93.

<sup>307</sup> Andrew FRASER, R. H. P. Mason and Philip Mitchell. 2005. *Japan’s early parliaments, 1890- 1905: Structure, Issues and Trends*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 5.

<sup>308</sup> For a look on the Russian Policy towards Serbia at the Congresses of San Stefano and Berlin, please consult: Radoslav RASPOPOVIĆ. “Zadaci ruske spoljne politike na Balkanu u drugoj polovini XIX vijeka i međunarodno pravni značaj odluka u San Stefanu i Berlinu za Srbiju i Crnu Goru”. *Istorijski časopis*, Vol. XLIX. pp. 197-220.

in mind, the Treaty of San Stefano would have given Russia a major advantage in Europe.<sup>309</sup> Pavlović illuminates that most European states thought Greater Bulgaria would be a Russian protectorate, as well as that the Treaty of San Stefano was merely supposed to outline the preliminary conditions of the peace treaty.<sup>310</sup> Having this in mind, the revision of this treaty was called for by Major European powers.

The Congress of Berlin was held from June 13<sup>th</sup> until July 13<sup>th</sup> of 1878. Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the newly united Germany presided the Congress. States who participated were: Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Great Britain, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. While Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia were not permitted to attend the Congress, they could propose the wishes and needs of their respective governments in a written manner.<sup>311</sup>

Three questions were pivotal for Serbia: the recognition of Serbia's independence, the question of tributes to the Ottoman Empire, and territorial expansion. The first two questions were solved without major difficulties. European powers have recognized sovereignty and independence of Serbia, and the question of tributes was solved with the help of the Russian diplomacy. The third question was one that came across the most difficulties. Expansion to the south was met with great resistance from Italy, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, while the Bosnian lands to the west were fiercely protected by Austria-Hungary. Finally an expansion eastward was opposed by Russia, who was advocating Bulgarian interests, stemming from the Treaty of San Stefano. However, Serbia gained four okrugs: the Niš, Pirot, Vranje and Toplica okrugs, which became part of the newly independent Principality of Serbia. The end results of the Congress of Berlin greatly reduced the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Serbia. For the first time as a modern country Serbia was independent and therefore free to move towards Europe culturally and diplomatically. At the helm of this newly independent state was Prince Milan Obrenović. In 1882, with the support of Austria-Hungary, Milan Obrenović was crowned King of Serbia.

In order to understand state of modernity in Serbia of that time, it is important to present relevant occurrences in social and political realm. This period as marked by the rising public sphere of Western-type civil society. Stojanović places significant importance on the rise of civil society in Serbia. She highlights its importance in the rise of modernity and the relationship the new civil society was creating with the state. She states: "Civil society emerged as a kind of spokesperson for these new expectations, a medium that conveyed newly formulated social and political demands to those who determined the direction of the state"<sup>312</sup>

Stojanović further informs us that the first manifestations of the institutionalization of civil society were political parties, which formed in the 1870s throughout Europe.<sup>313</sup> Furthermore, with the rise of literacy contributed to the rise in popularity and significance of printed media. Newspapers facilitated the involvement in political discourse and the dissemination of ideas, and became a "fundamental institution of civil society"<sup>314</sup> Finally, in addition to the political parties, social clubs

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<sup>309</sup> For more detailed information on the Treaty of San Stefano, please consult: Bogdan Lj. POPOVIĆ. 2010. *Diplomatska istorija Srbije*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike. pp. 423-428.

<sup>310</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 167.

<sup>311</sup> For a detailed look of Stojan Novaković's observations on the Congress of Berlin, please consult: Mihailo VOJVODIĆ. 2002. "Stojan Novaković o Berlinskom kongresu". *Istorijski časopis*, Vol. XLIX. pp. 183-196.

<sup>312</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 237.

<sup>313</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 238.

<sup>314</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 238.

and the media Stojanović, invokes Habermas and turns our attention to the clubs, cafes, kafanas as “the primary institutions where political social and cultural energy of the rising civil society was formulated.”<sup>315</sup> All of these institutions provided by Stojanović are examples of the public spheres that are significant in the rise of modernity, and through which modernity can be observed.

The rise of these aforementioned public spheres in Serbia in the mid nineteenth century, as mentioned by Stojanović, was not different from their counterparts in Paris, or in Germany at roughly the same time. These were places where ideas were exchanged, literary evenings were held, philosophical and political discussions were encouraged. In the mid eighteenth sixties in Belgrade socialist circles were forming as well.<sup>316</sup> All of these illustrations show us that even though smaller in size, the intellectual and civil society was indeed modern and dynamic in Belgrade.

This period was also marked by the creation of political parties. These political parties will be presented and analyzed from the standpoint of their role in the implementation of modernity in independent Serbia. Stojanović informs us that two political parties were formed in 1881 that would be pivotal in the future political, social and cultural life in Serbia. Stojanović mentions that the rise of political parties in Serbia did not lag far behind those in Europe, as the first parties appeared only six years after the first political party was formed in England in 1875.<sup>317</sup> However, Stojanović outlines significant differences in the rise of political parties of Serbia from its European counterparts. Rather than forming as interest groups from a politically conscious civil society, parties in Serbia were formed in a poor and mostly illiterate society from a predominately foreign-educated, minutely numbered civil elite.<sup>318</sup>

This is underlined by Stojanović as one of the key differences that will mark the future development of Serbian political life. She states: “In a society without a powerful financial, banker, entrepreneurial, large landowner or industrial layers of society, the fight for freedoms and the efforts made against state omnipotence fell to the most educated, most often civil servants, a social layer that almost entirely depended on the state.”<sup>319</sup> The state offered sponsorships for education of future civil servants, both at home and abroad. Stojanović further mentions education as the only means of social mobility, creating a dependent relationship between the state and the intellectual elite.<sup>320</sup>

The parties that were established were the Peoples Radical Party and the Progressive Party. To a lesser extent, but a nevertheless important political player was the Liberal Party.<sup>321</sup> In order to better grasp the cultural essence of these parties it is useful to cite more comprehensively Stokes, who describes the three political parties in the following manner: “The first [the Liberals] represented a generation of the 1860s in power through most of the 1870s, and the original creative element of Serbian politics. The second [the Progressives] made up the next generation, educated abroad, typically lawyers, more liberal than the Liberals but not in any sense democrats. The Progressives opened up Serbian politics in the early 1880s by permitting the legal formation of political parties.

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<sup>315</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 239.

<sup>316</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. pp. 31-32

<sup>317</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 240.

<sup>318</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 240.

<sup>319</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 240.

<sup>320</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. pp 240-241.

<sup>321</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 29.

But it is the third group, the Radicals, that was the most important. The Radicals took the legitimating idea of the Liberals and the legal opportunity offered them by the Progressives and created the first political party in the Balkans characterized by organizational continuity, regular links between local and national levels, the ability to take power, and organized efforts to mobilize the electorate”<sup>322</sup>

There was an interesting mix between the intellectual and political elites in the Serbian political life. According to Stojanović, civil servants were the representatives of the political elite and they formed political societies, which later formed into Parties. Party leaders however, came from a narrow intellectual elite.<sup>323</sup> As Stojanović further elucidates, a specific political culture formed around the political parties and political leaders, passionate disagreements, a chaotic state of underdeveloped political discourse where programs, political positions of little consequence, and where “the political party was perceived as a family and the political leader as a father.”<sup>324</sup> Therefore, it is important to mention “the fathers” of political parties in Serbia: Nikola Pašić was the leader of Radicals, while Progressives did not have one leader, but was rather led by a group of four men - Milan Piroćanac, Čedomilj Mijatović, Stojan Novaković and Milutin Garašanin.

Pavlovic adds to the insight about the parties in Serbia by emphasizing that Peoples Radical Party was a right wing, catchall party that was inspired by Russian *narodnichestvo* and, at its beginning, socialism, and later leaned towards republicanism.<sup>325</sup> Radicals gathered around the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, and Nikola Pašić in that regard points out: “The Radical Party’ wanted to prevent the people from ‘copying the errors of Western industrial society, wherein a proletariat and immense wealth are being created, seeking instead to build industry on a collective [*zadruga*] basis.”<sup>326</sup> In the sphere of politics they advocated for the “the people’s state”, meaning that “the people itself would create this state, organised in its own ‘people’s party’, which was the Radical Party. For, according to the Radicals, there existed on the one hand the people, which was the same as the Radical Party, and on the other ‘the proprietors’, personified by the Liberals and Progressives, who wished to be the people’s ‘tutors’.”<sup>327</sup>

The Progressive Party was a left wing faction of the Old Conservatives. As Pavlović states, the Progressives were without a doubt Western oriented: “supporters of Western European constitutional framework, convinced that the modernization of an underdeveloped Serbian society should be initiated in cooperation with the Crown by an educated elite”.<sup>328</sup> Popović-Obradović notices that the Progressives formulated their ideology even before their formal creation: “as the party of a tiny liberal-urban intellectual elite, with elements of a conservative political position.”<sup>329</sup> She explains that the party did not give up on this programme, even after several electoral defeats, and she marks this as a unique case in Serbian political life.<sup>330</sup> This is even more astonishing having in mind that

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<sup>322</sup> Gale STOKES. 1990. *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia*. London and Durham: Duke University Press. p. 3. (footnote omitted)

<sup>323</sup> STOJANOVIĆ, Dubravka. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p 241.

<sup>324</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 39.

<sup>325</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. pp. 181-182.

<sup>326</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 99.

<sup>327</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, p. 100. footnote omitted

<sup>328</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 181.

<sup>329</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 93-94.

<sup>330</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 93-94.

this ideology could not attract big number of people in Serbia: namely its ideas on the “restriction on the ruler’s power”, doubts on the “participation of wider social layers in politics” and orientation towards capitalism were addressed to the middle class which was only slowly beginning to emerge in Serbia.<sup>331</sup> On the other side laid a populist-socialist alternative of the Radical Party, which proved more attractive to Serbian people.

However, without this wide support in the people, Progressives did have support of King Milan who thought that their political programme was apt for his vision of ruling. This might be explained by the fact that Radicals and Progressives had diverging stances on the prerogatives of the king. While Progressives “called the monarchy into question as a form of rule, but not the prerogatives of the king as head of the executive. The Radicals did the opposite: they left the monarchy untouched, but rendered the powers of the crown practically non-existent.”<sup>332</sup>

That is how it came to be that from 1880-1882 Milan Piroćanac was head of government. It is important to underline all of the modernizing features during his tenure. Pavlović informs us of the following: “Among confirmed freedoms and rights were the freedom of the press, speech and assembly, as well as the independence of the judiciary; taxes and schools were reformed; a standing army was organized; a National Bank authorized to issue banknotes and the first railway was constructed.”<sup>333</sup> Popović-Obradović adds that during the tenure of Milan Piroćanac “a law guaranteeing freedom of the press, meeting and association, which led practically overnight to the formation of political parties” was adopted.<sup>334</sup> Also, “independence of the courts was also legally established, obligatory primary schooling introduced, the popular army dissolved and conscription into a standing army decreed. Finally, at its sittings in 1881 and 1882, the assembly decided to proceed to revision of the regency constitution. Its decision was confirmed by the prince.”<sup>335</sup>

Rule of Milan Obrenović ended soon after he became King. A series of unpopular decisions beginning with the 1883 Timor Rebellion; the lost preventive war against Bulgaria coupled with the lack of support and understanding from both politicians and people in 1885;<sup>336</sup> and finally, his complicated and tumultuous relationship with his wife Natalija<sup>337</sup> all culminated with Milan preparing to abdicate in favor of his son in 1888. After signing the promulgation of the 1888 constitution, King Milan stepped down in lieu of his son Aleksandar, who was not yet of age. Due to his youth, Serbia was governed by a Viceroyalty composed of three members: Kosta Protić, Jovan Ristić and Jovan Belimarković.

It is important to take a closer look at the 1888 constitution, Serbia’s fourth Constitution. An interesting thing to note is that the representatives of all political parties (Progressive, Radical and Liberal) were participants in the composition of the Constitution and took part in the preparatory work. Stojanović assesses that the Constitution was a result of the consensus between King Milan

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<sup>331</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 93.

<sup>332</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 102.

<sup>333</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 187.

<sup>334</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 94-95. footnotes omitted

<sup>335</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 94-95. footnotes omitted

<sup>336</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. pp. 183-184.

<sup>337</sup> For a more detailed look on the relationship between King Milan and Queen Natalija, as well as King Milan from Natalija’s perspective consult: Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ, Svetlana TOMIĆ, Ivana HADŽI-POPOVIĆ (eds.). 2015. “Kraljica Natalija: Ruža i trnje”. Beograd: Laguna.

and the political parties, and that it was mostly the result of the previous political liberalization pushed by the Progressive governments. Popović-Obradović informs us of the following:

“Opting for constitutional reform and taking the initiative into his own hands, King Milan made his conditions clear: first, the new constitution could be brought in only as a ‘two-way agreement between the king and the people’; secondly, its content had to embody a compromise not just with the crown, but also between all the parties, regardless of their actual strengths. The content of the draft constitution would be decided on through the joint and consensual efforts of equal number of representatives of all the parties, who would form a constitutional council headed by the king himself.”<sup>338</sup>

A team of experts was sent to France, Belgium, Greece and Denmark to gain valuable insight in constructing a sound Constitution for the Kingdom of Serbia.<sup>339</sup> Envoys were given the task to study electoral laws of the said countries in order to note “all the things that are contrary to the freedom, moral and peace among citizens.”<sup>340</sup> This task echoes liberal ideas and it does not come as a surprise that The Constitution was largely inspired by the 1831 Belgian Constitution, a standard for parliamentary monarchies of the time.<sup>341</sup> It is also interesting to note that members of Radical Party (Stojan Protić, Jovan Đaja and Andra Nikolić) approached the issue of constitutionalism from a liberal standpoint. Therefore, “In line with the party’s new constitutional policy, Stojan Protić got down to translating modern European constitutions into the Serb language, beginning with that of Belgium.”<sup>342</sup>

However, Pašić was not completely satisfied with that liberal shift that occurred in the Radical party regarding constitutional matters. Popović-Obradović informs us that he formulated a new primary goal:

“It seems that during his time in emigration he had adopted as his primary political aim, to be pursued at all costs, not the transformation of Serbia into a ‘people’s state’ but a close association with Russia. To deter Serbia from tying itself to Austria and Germany, and to reorient it towards the Orthodox East, i.e. Russia, was for him an aim to which all else had to be subordinated, even state independence.”<sup>343</sup>

Stojanović makes a valuable remark regarding the Constitution by stating: “Although it was in power only until 1894, the political consensus that was met regarding its promulgation was proof that Serbia’s elite was gravitating towards European parliamentary and liberal ideals.”<sup>344</sup> As Popović-

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<sup>338</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 114.

<sup>339</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio, p. 184. For a more detailed presentation of these visits consult:

<sup>340</sup> Miroslav D. PEŠIĆ, Božica B. MLADENOVIĆ. 2016. “Funkcionisanje parlamentarnog sistema u Kraljevini Srbiji od 1889. do 1892. godine”. *Istorijski časopis*. Vol. LXV. p. 332.

<sup>341</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 30.

<sup>342</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 110.

<sup>343</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 112.

<sup>344</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 30.

Obradović explains: “On the whole, all parties accepted the liberal-democratic standards of the time in regard to the body of individual and political rights and freedoms.”<sup>345</sup>

Nevertheless, some differences could be noticed: the Radicals preferred universal suffrage while the Progressives and Liberals opted for more restrictive suffrage rights;<sup>346</sup> the Radicals envisioned the monarch deprived of power while the Progressives and Liberals pushed for a constitutional monarchy.<sup>347</sup>

By accepting a modern draft of the Constitution, the Radical Party diverted off its ideological course. Popović-Obradović quotes Milivoje Popović in order to elucidate this fact: “As Milivoje Popović noted, “the peasant-based Radical Party won a purely political constitution in which political freedoms and parliamentarism were secured on the model advocated by the liberal ideologues of the 1870s rather than that advocated by the founders of the Radical Party itself.””<sup>348</sup> This shift in the ideological course was possible because of the “[t]he practically unconditional trust of the politically illiterate population – won by many years of propagating the idea of a ‘people’s state’ – permitted the Radical Party to change its constitutional programme without risking any loss of votes”.<sup>349</sup> This also falls in line with the aforementioned “chaotic” political culture of nineteenth century Serbia, devoid of ideological consistence, described by Stojanović.

In 1893 When Aleksandar Obrenović, Milan’s son took the role of the King of Serbia. As Pavlović denotes, Aleksandar was known for his despotic tendencies like his father, and was not as malleable or impressionable as his political council thought or hoped for. His rule was marked by political instability reflected in the frequent changes of constitutions and problematic relationship with the government. As Stokes denotes: “In the sickly atmosphere created by the quarrels of Milan and Natalija as well as by the youthful and ill-considered attempts to assert personal authority by the ill-equipped King Alexander, neither the Radicals nor anyone else were able to establish an effective government for very long.”<sup>350</sup> This was a clear display of authoritarian power a tendency to dismantle the liberal and progressive path of the state.

King Milan returned to Serbia in 1897 and his influence on Aleksandar cannot be overlooked. As Popović-Obradović states: “personal rule was introduced into Serbia after a decade of party struggles and a parliamentary life of sorts, and the idea of enlightened absolutism was revived.”<sup>351</sup> However, Aleksandar’s authoritative nature and political instability were all fueling his unpopularity, and Aleksandar had made a number of decisions that were not well received by the people. His marriage to divorcée Draga Mašin in 1900, more than a decade his senior did not help his stature amongst his subjects.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 118.

<sup>346</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 118.

<sup>347</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 118.

<sup>348</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 119. footnote omitted.

<sup>349</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 120.

<sup>350</sup> Gale STOKES. 1990. *Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia*. London and Durham: Duke University Press. p. 292.

<sup>351</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 131.

<sup>352</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 185.

Aleksandar Obrenović abolished the 1888 Constitution and replaced it with the 1869 Constitution, and in 1901 he imposed the Constitution. The 1901 Constitution called for bicameral legislature where “three fifths of the newly formed Senate was appointed by the king himself.”<sup>353</sup> Popović-Obradović explains: “The constitution of 1901 was in content closest to Progressive views on the Serbian constitutional issue, i.e. to Piroćanac’s draft of 1883 and Novaković’s similar draft made in 1896.”<sup>354</sup>

It is interesting to note the way in which public conversation went between the Radicals and Progressives regarding the failure of the Constitution. The Radicals claimed that regular political life was obstructed by the monarchical government and the return of King Aleksandar and Milan to the political scene.<sup>355</sup> On the other hand the Progressives held that the political arena was already tainted by the *modus operandi* of the Radical Party in years prior. Popović-Obradović states: “During the four years of the duration of the 1888 constitution, argued Svetomir Nikolajević, all its principles and institutions were destroyed, other than royal authority. In these ‘dangerous circumstances’, it was the monarch’s ‘duty’ to use his authority to protect ‘the foundations of the political structure’.”<sup>356</sup>

This time, the Radicals’ leniency towards its original ideology resulted in a bifurcation within its ranks. The points of contention were “The joint government with the Progressives, who were a symbol of anti-Radicalism, and acceptance of the senate, perceived as a highly conservative institution.”<sup>357</sup> Having in mind that Pašić was the “father” of the Radical Party and that he subsequently became a senator despite the party’s veracious opposition to this type of institution, it does not come as a surprise that sentiments towards Pašić within the party became its dividing line.<sup>358</sup>

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of May of 1903 (June 10<sup>th</sup> by the new calendar), King Aleksandar Obrenović and Queen Draga were assassinated by a group of conspirators in the military ranks. They would later form a secret society of officers known as Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt), also known as the Black Hand (Crna Ruka). Since King Aleksandar Obrenović and Queen Draga did not have children, the assassination marked the end of the Obrenović dynasty. From 1903, Petar Karađorđević, the grandson of Karađorđe Petrović ascended to the throne by election of the National Assembly. This marked the beginning of the rule of the Karađorđević dynasty.

Of the events that transpired, and of the cultural social and political climate in Serbia, Popović-Obradović states:

“The fact that a new king was elected in 1903 represented in itself no novelty in Serbian political history. On the contrary, it simply confirmed that in Serbian monarchism the elective principle prevailed over the hereditary principle. Nor was the act of the coup as such, including the regicide, without roots in the tradition of Serbian monarchism. Both of these – election and violent dynastic change – were only the latest testimony of the absence of any idea of divine or historical right as

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<sup>353</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 185.

<sup>354</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 133.

<sup>355</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 128.

<sup>356</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 128-129.

<sup>357</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 138.

<sup>358</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 138.

the source of princely rule's legitimacy in Serbia.”<sup>359</sup>

In 1903 the Parliament returned the 1888 Constitution to power with some notable enhancements, mainly concerning giving greater power to the parliament itself. As Pavlović states: “The power of the Crown was limited, and Parliamentary rule was reestablished.”<sup>360</sup>

Popović-Obradović informs us that the power of the National Assembly can be observed from the fact that the new King had been elected by the parliament after it had adopted a new constitution. Furthermore, that the coronation was conditional upon the King's agreement with the constitution. According to Popović-Obradović this meant that: “the legitimacy of the monarchy and the royal power would derive solely from the will of the national assembly, based upon a constitution that it had adopted quite independently, and upon its own choice of the crowned head who was to rule under that constitution.”<sup>361</sup>

Because of this supremacy of the National Assembly and the relative stability due to the promulgation of the liberal constitution, historians often dubbed this period as the “golden age of democracy” or “the golden age of parliamentarism”.<sup>362</sup>

However, Stojanović informs us that even though the liberal constitution was adopted, and the power of the monarchy was subdued in favor of the parliament, several factors influenced political life in Serbia that would render this moniker void. In her discussion, Stojanović points out to the relationship between political party as being poisonous, where members of different political parties would perceive each other as true enemies rather than rivals that had the common good in mind. By delegitimizing the “political other”, space for regular political conversation was quickly running out.<sup>363</sup> Furthermore, the separation of powers was brought into question as the executive branch often took “certain legislative competencies” in its own hands.<sup>364</sup> Furthermore, the military clique that involved in the conspiracy of the May Coup facilitated further degradation of institutions. According to Stojanović, they enjoyed considerable influence over the King and made decisions concerning the state in secret and without “control of democratic institutions.”<sup>365</sup> Finally, Stojanović turns our attention to the political parties themselves. While the parties were formed in the wake of the freedom of association Law of 1881, under names that evoked their European counterparts ideas, the internal organization lacked semblance to a modern political party. This included a “nearly military subordination within the party, the inviolability of their irremovable leaders, prohibitions of factions and differing opinions...” and more irregularities.<sup>366</sup> Therefore, from these insights we may see that while on paper the constitution and the laws and institutions provided a picture of a modern political landscape and a budding modern system, the reality was that the inner workings of the system were far from its written counterpart.

Pavlović also states that the Golden Age is a relative term. There were many positive notions

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<sup>359</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System In Serbia 1903–1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee For Human Rights In Serbia. p. 157.

<sup>360</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio, p. 256.

<sup>361</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System In Serbia 1903–1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee For Human Rights In Serbia. p. 156.

<sup>362</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 61; Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio, p. 256; Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System In Serbia 1903–1914*. Belgrade: Helsinki Committee For Human Rights In Serbia. p. 27.

<sup>363</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. pp. 62-63.

<sup>364</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 64.

<sup>365</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 64. footnote omitted.

<sup>366</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogleđi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p. 65.

about the return of parliamentary rule, and the reestablishment of the 1888 Constitution. However, there were problems in this period as well. The military conspirators of the May Coup of 1903 were not arrested, and Pavlović states that they had a leading role in the country.<sup>367</sup> These conspirators, the officers that in 1910 formed the secret society Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt), also known as the Black Hand (Crna Ruka) had considerable influence in the state, and had ambitions of placing Serbia in the role of a unifier, a Piedmont of South Slavic lands and peoples.<sup>368</sup>

Forbes also tells us that the first years since the May Coup were, understandably, received poorly in the West.<sup>369</sup> Following the regicide of King Aleksandar Obrenović and Queen Draga, diplomatic relations with several Western Powers were halted. However, King Peter had behaved most admirably and reverted the attention from the court.<sup>370</sup>

As Pavlović further informs us, modernization was slow in Serbia in these first years of King Petar's rule. The intellectual elite was extremely small and there was no true wealthy and independent class.<sup>371</sup> This stance echoes the already presented opinion of Stojanović, who saw this as one of the greatest obstacles in the implementation of modernity.

This was a period that was also marked by the Annexation Crisis of 1908, where tensions rose between Serbia and Austria Hungary, the First and Second Balkan Wars where Serbia gained territories and has shown itself as an able military force.<sup>372</sup> King Petar I ruled until 1914. From June 24<sup>th</sup> 1914 onwards his son, Aleksandar Karađorđević, who will later become King of Yugoslavia, rules as regent.

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<sup>367</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 256.

<sup>368</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 256.

<sup>369</sup> Nevill FORBES, Arnold J. Toynbee, D Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth. 1915. *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press. p. 131.

<sup>370</sup> Nevill FORBES, Arnold J. Toynbee, D Mitrany, D. G. Hogarth. 1915. *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press. p. 131.

<sup>371</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 259.

<sup>372</sup> Stevan K. PAVLOVIĆ. 2001. *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945*. Beograd: Clio. p. 262.

## 5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERNITY THROUGH EDUCATION IN JAPAN AND SERBIA

In Chapter 2 where we presented the theoretical framework of this research, we emphasized, in line with the other authors, that the modernity is a broad term that encompasses many facets. Therefore, if we were to embark on an all-encompassing research, it would prove to be a near impossible task. In order to do an effective and comprehensive study, several factors were chosen as the lens through which we would observe modernity in Japan and Serbia. The first factor is education.

It would be right to explain in more detail why we chose education for our research. Education is a vehicle of modernity. By this we mean that education is effective at creating and perpetuating the ideas of modernity. This is evident through the study of the Western model of modernity. In this case education was an important factor in reaching modernization, prosperity and industrialization for several reasons.

Firstly, through state organized and sponsored compulsory elementary education, the state could create and perpetuate national identity. By carefully planning the curriculum, the government could use the educational system to perpetuate a desired construct of national identity and thereby establish a nation state in the mind of the people. Trgovčević elucidates this fact: “The process of organization of education is parallel to the process of creating a nation-state and building a national identity.”<sup>373</sup> She also ties this process with modernity: “Education is an integral part of nation-building/nation-making. This fact was understood by all modern nations and nation-states created in the nineteenth century. Therefore, education became one of the primary national interests.”<sup>374</sup>

Secondly, by educating the people, the government would create for itself loyal subjects of the state, and employees of the state administration. Thirdly, by sponsoring students for overseas higher education, stimulating them to return as experts in their respective fields, the state gains a new intellectual elite. This new intellectual elite was interconnected and usually overlapped with the emerging or established political elite.

Therefore, one of the thesis statements is that the acceptance of modernity is not possible without the successful implementation of the Western model of education. Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal provide us with a clear definition of Western mass education:

“As an institution, Western mass education involves the following features: (1) It focuses on the socialization of individuals for membership in society. (2) It aspires to extend membership to all individuals within the society. (3) It articulates a secular vision of progress, in which action and achievement take place in this world, not in some transcendental cosmos. (4) It sets forth an increasingly standardized curriculum (Benavot et al. 1991). (5) And it putatively links mastery of the curriculum with personal development and the latter with the progress of the nation-state.”<sup>375</sup>

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<sup>373</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku.” in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 191.

<sup>374</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku.” in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 191.

<sup>375</sup> John W. MEYER, Francisco O. RAMIREZ and Yasemin Nuhoğlu SOYSAL. 1992. “World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980”. *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 65, No 2. p. 131.

In both Japan and Serbia, the understanding that education brought about cultural and economic prosperity was obvious. The governments of both Japan and Serbia had brought about educational reforms, in grand language, claiming that there would be “No child in Serbia without education” or “No house without learning” in Japan. The fervor of the use of this grandiose language when bringing about new education laws might be a sign of the times, but also might be an indicator that both governments very well understood the consequences of these laws.

Therefore, in this chapter we will present important educational reforms that Japan and Serbia undertook as well as the development of their educational policies. We will demonstrate the state of affairs in educational systems in Japan and Serbia, using the legal framework as a starting point. Further on, we will look at the efficacy of the relevant laws in practice in both countries, as well as the challenges in making these laws into practice. We will explain how the elementary, middle and university education were conceived. We will also mention states’ policies to send abroad students in order to establish contact with the West. This is an important trait of educational policies having in mind that another thesis statement is that contact between the intellectual elite and the West is a necessary prerequisite for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented.

### 5.1. Educational Policies in Meiji Japan

In the wake of the proclamation of the Charter Oath change was coming fast. With the opening of the country and the encouragement to find knowledge and bring it home, a cultural tidal wave of modernity was approaching that would merge with the status quo and change the newly Restored Empire of Japan. In Duke’s words:

“Among the five so-called oaths or declarations of intent of the new government, number five ultimately became the most important. It symbolically marked the end of three hundred years of isolation and the opening of the country (*kaikoku*) to the international community: “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, so as to strengthen the foundation of Imperial rule.” The interpretation and application of this single provision would prove highly controversial as the Restoration movement matured. In one declaration, the goal of assimilating modern western knowledge with seemingly incompatible ancient Japanese traditions epitomizes the basic scenario for the entire Meiji era.”<sup>376</sup>

This goal of an unlikely marriage between the modern and the traditional in the sphere of education was to be conducted by the newly formed Ministry of Education in 1871. Due to the abolishment of the feudal han system and the formation of a centralized form of government for the first time this new Ministry was “in a position to construct a national public school system. As long as the country remained divided among several hundred feudal clans each subservient to a local *daimyō*, a national plan for education was inconceivable. With the formation of a centralized form of government, a centralized system of education designed by the newly organized Ministry of Education inevitably followed.”<sup>377</sup> Morikawa underlines this by stating: “education became a means of integrating the diverse and multi-layered social ranks, regional identities, and cultural mores of Edo-period feudal society, and forming a newly centralised and unified system of values.”<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. pp. 47-48.

<sup>377</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 69.

<sup>378</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. “Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912”. in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO and Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 34.

It should be underlined that Western-type education was to be implemented by the Ministry of Education officials that were leaning towards modernity and the West. However, it should be noted that their educational roots lie firmly in Tokugawa era schools that were painted with Confucian teachings. In Duke's own words: "Even though the Ministry of Education was initially staffed primarily by modernists with a western bias, their educational background should not be overlooked. At the time of their appointment they were all samurai by birth who had themselves been educated in feudal clan schools during the Tokugawa era."<sup>379</sup> By underlining their education in Tokugawa Era schools that were heavily influenced by Confucianism and Chinese Classics, Duke underlines another important characteristic of the minds that worked on modernizing education in Meiji Japan, which was "their common background as products of feudal Tokugawa Japan."<sup>380</sup> This interesting mix of east and west is another example of multiple modernities rather than a pure implementation of a foreign method and the Western-type modernity. This mix would permeate Meiji society and indeed the educational system.

Regarding this interplay in the implementation of Western-type education into Japan in a relatively short amount of time, and indeed many aspects of Western civilization that Japan was adopting Morikawa states the following:

"Under the objective of emulating the West, parts of Western civilisation had to be quickly assimilated into Japanese culture without due regard to the cultural and historical context in which Western civilisation formed over long periods of time. As a consequence, certain aspects of Western civilisation repeatedly conflicted with Japanese culture, which had also taken shape within a specific cultural and historical context. Civilisation and culture clashed over and over again, particularly in the educational arena".<sup>381</sup>

Lafcadio Hearn also notices this connection between modern and traditional values. He starts by noting that "[w]ith the help of the government, the nation is educated following a European plan and the entire curriculum includes the main subjects of Western style studies, excluding Greek and Latin. It seems that the entire education system – kindergarten through university – is modern".<sup>382</sup> However, he also explains that "the effect of the new education has affected the minds and sentiments of the people less than was expected."<sup>383</sup> He attributes this sentiment to the fact that Chinese classics still held a significant part of the curriculum, but most importantly to the fundamental difference in the Japanese and European understanding of education and its ends.<sup>384</sup>

Having all of the above stated in mind we can certainly make the conclusion that the Chinese classics and Confucianism still played an important role in the classroom. It should not be forgotten that while modernity has permeated the Japanese education system through its leaders and officials in charge of the national curriculum, there was still a strong base of traditional Japanese education involved in said curriculum. Therefore we can discern that there was a distinct new modern pattern forming, a mix between Western education and Eastern values.

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<sup>379</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 68.

<sup>380</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 68.

<sup>381</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. "Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912". in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO and Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 34.

<sup>382</sup> Lafakdio HERN. 2013. *Japan: pokušaj tumačenja II*. Beograd: Kokoro. p. 161.

<sup>383</sup> Lafakdio HERN. 2013. *Japan: pokušaj tumačenja II*. Beograd: Kokoro. p. 161.

<sup>384</sup> Lafakdio HERN. 2013. *Japan: pokušaj tumačenja II*. Beograd: Kokoro. p. 161.

This new educational pattern was crowned by the educational reform epitomized in the 1872 Law on Education or the Gakusei.<sup>385</sup> In Duke's own words it is "the most significant historical document in the annals of Japanese education."<sup>386</sup> This Law contained inclination towards the Western model of education by introducing mass education. As Shibata underlines: "Thus the state education system became the key institution of the Meiji regime based on its political assumptions about the formation of the Japanese Emperor state."<sup>387</sup> Gordon tells us that the Japanese leaders knew that one of the fundamental prerequisites of Western power lie in the education of the general populace.<sup>388</sup> Gordon explains that Japan's "initial models were primarily American and French, and the 1872 decree established a system of elementary and middle schools and national universities."<sup>389</sup> Gordon further informs us that "With grand language, in 1872 it declared four years of elementary education to be compulsory for all children, boys and girls: "In a village there shall be no house without learning, and in a house, no individual without learning".<sup>390</sup>

Jansen provides us with further information regarding the distribution of school districts: "The Fundamental Code [the Gakusei] set ambitious goals for what was to be a national system; it envisioned a grid of 8 university districts, each of which would divide into 32 middle school districts, each in turn would have 210 primary schools. Here France provided the model of administrative organization... The underlying intent was clear: popular education was to be a major goal of state policy."<sup>391</sup>

Gordon states that "At the outset, the government announced that schools were to encourage practical learning as well as independent thinking."<sup>392</sup> The preamble of the Education Ordinance of 1872 stated that the purpose of education was to enable a student to "make his way in the world, employ his wealth wisely, make his business prosper, and thus attain the goal of life."<sup>393</sup> It is insightful to cite in more detail this document, as it entails valued information on the value of knowledge and serves as a good example of promissory note:

"Learning is the key to success in life, and no man can afford to neglect it. It is ignorance that leads man astray, makes him destitute, disrupts his family, and in the end destroys his life. Centuries have elapsed since schools were first established, but man has gone astray through misguidance. Because learning was viewed as the exclusive province of the samurai and his superiors, farmers, artisans, merchants, and women have neglected it altogether and do not even know its meaning. Even those few among the samurai and his superiors who did pursue learning were apt to claim it to be for the state, not knowing that it was the very

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<sup>385</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 1.

<sup>386</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 61.

<sup>387</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. "Controlling national identity and reshaping the role of education: the vision of state formation in Meiji Japan and the German *Kaiserreich*". *History of Education*, Vol. 33. No. 1. p. 78.

<sup>388</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 67.

<sup>389</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 67.

<sup>390</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 67.

<sup>391</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 403.

<sup>392</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 67.

<sup>393</sup> Kenneth B. PYLE. "Meiji conservatism" in: Marius B. JANSEN. 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 680.

foundation of success in life ... The Department of Education will soon establish an educational system and will revise the regulations relating thereto from time to time; wherefore there shall, in the future, be no community with an illiterate family, nor a family with an illiterate person ... Hereafter ... every man shall, of his own accord, subordinate all other matters to the education of his children.”<sup>394</sup>

Gordon gives the following remark: “As compulsory education took root, the idea that one’s life course—at least that of young men—should be open at the outset and should reflect one’s talent and efforts became one of Japan’s most fundamental and widely held social values.”<sup>395</sup> However we can deduce that even though these ideas took root *en masse* after the establishment of compulsory education, meritocracy was one of the major values that motivated the lower rank samurai – the Meiji leaders to push for this system to change. As Gordon concludes: “In Tokugawa Japan, a major tension set the merit ideal—that men of talent should hold office—against the hereditary status system. The Meiji social revolution resolved this ideological tension clearly in favor of merit”.<sup>396</sup>

Gordon informs us that this radical reform and the introduction of compulsory education were met with divergent reactions. On one hand stood the young men who were excited “at the opportunity to better themselves and serve their country, if possible in the new capital of Tokyo.”<sup>397</sup> On the other hand were the ones who were worried about the financial burden that compulsory education laid on the state. “The elementary schools were to be financed by a 10 percent local surcharge to the national property tax. In the 1870s angry taxpayers reacted to compulsory schooling as they had to the draft: They rioted. Crowds of people destroyed at least two thousand schools, usually by setting them afire.”<sup>398</sup> Morikawa comments on the reasons for this violent backlash “For some local residents, schools built in the Western style and schoolteachers wearing Western clothes symbolised an intrusion of literally incomprehensible Western arts and sciences into their time-honoured, harmonious social order. Nevertheless, they did not reject education itself.”<sup>399</sup> However, rioting was only a part of the problem, as “passive resistance of simply not going to school was even more widespread. Rates of attendance for school-age boys and girls stood at 25 to 50 percent of the eligible population for the first decade of the new system”.<sup>400</sup>

However, after these initial resentments the attendance of the school became not only a well-accepted practice but also almost universal. Gordon presents us the numbers: “By the end of the nineteenth century, rates of elementary school attendance reached levels of 90 percent or more. By 1905, 98 percent of school-age boys and 93 percent of girls were attending elementary schools as the law required.”<sup>401</sup> Jansen provides us with further statistics: “Enrollment grew steadily, though in some areas, slowly, until by 1905 it was virtually universal... In more “developed” parts of Japan, where a

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<sup>394</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 402-403.

<sup>395</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

<sup>396</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

<sup>397</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 67.

<sup>398</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

<sup>399</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. “Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912”. in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO and Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 37.

<sup>400</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

<sup>401</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 68.

variety of schools already existed, progress was slow, but in more remote and “backward” domains rates of attendance—and hence of literacy—rose dramatically.”<sup>402</sup> Concerning attendance by sex, an expected trend for the time followed at first: “Male pupils at first outnumbered females, as could be expected, but that distinction too was gradually lost.”<sup>403</sup>

The swiftness with which the Gakusei was promulgated on a nation-wide level tells of the new government’s understanding of the importance of centralized education. The language that was used also reveals that the importance of education was recognized. Moreover, it tells us of the sudden rise in power and authority, as this would be the first time in Japan that a central government would preside over a national education system.

This government’s firm grip on the education system can be seen by the changes that it introduced as the reaction to the rise of literacy of the commoners. Gordon explains that “[i]t became clear that commoners were using their education to read newspapers and sign petitions that criticized the government. The Ministry of Education responded with a more state-centered, moralistic curriculum.”<sup>404</sup>

Duke marks the years between 1872 and 1890 as crucial periods for Japanese education as the leaders of the Meiji era “struggled valiantly to determine the aims of education for a modern country.”<sup>405</sup> As Duke informs us the Gakusei has sparked a two-decade long search for the right approach to education in Japan. “The proclamation of the Gakusei provoked a discussion of profound importance to the future of Japan: what are the aims of education in a modern nation? Never before in the long history of the Japanese people had this issue been addressed.”<sup>406</sup>

This crucial discussion Duke mentions, refers to the interplay between the three important influences that Japanese education was centered on:

“The first, Kangaku, was based on Chinese culture and learning. Its origin dates back to the seventh century, when the powerful and somewhat overwhelming influence of China reached Japan.... The second, Wagaku, incorporated indigenous Japanese cultural elements in existence before the entry of Chinese cultural influences. And the final influence, Yōgaku, referred to all things western then in the early stages of influence upon Japan.”<sup>407</sup>

This excerpt shows us that besides the openness towards modernity, Japanese leaders did not impede the traditional aspects of Eastern thought. Rather they sought to comprehensively connect these, at first glance diverging discourses. It is useful to reiterate that this is yet another example of multiple modernities at work.

Morikawa provides us with another practical example of this East-West syncretism: “The year 1878 also marked a key event when Kido and Tanaka put into practice the slogan ‘Eastern morals,

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<sup>402</sup>Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 404.

<sup>403</sup>Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 404.

<sup>404</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 105.

<sup>405</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 1.

<sup>406</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 1.

<sup>407</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 2.

Western arts and sciences' by ensuring that the people's acquisition of knowledge and virtues, along with patriotism, would contribute to the overall welfare of the nation-state."<sup>408</sup>

In 1879 a new ordinance was put in place. Mori and Tanaka "reviewed the Code of Education and replaced it with the Ordinance of Education of 1879. This new law limited state intervention in Educational administration and transferred it to the local school boards which consisted of members elected by local people."<sup>409</sup> While this law may be commendable in its progressiveness, we can safely assume that the Meiji government had the exact opposite in mind for education – centralization was of utmost importance for the Meiji leaders. "Yet the ideas of Mori and Tanaka were prematurely radical for the other government officials. As a consequence, the ordinance was nullified in the following year."<sup>410</sup> We can see from this excerpt that at times the intellectual elite even though engaged in the political discourse is met with resistance from the political leadership.

Duke informs us: "Finally, in 1890, the discussion ended with the promulgation of the "Imperial Rescript on Education", which was deemed suitable for Japan to enter the twentieth century as a modern state."<sup>411</sup> Motoda Eifu and his associates drafted this document.<sup>412</sup> It was promulgated by the Emperor "who informed the new minister of education that since Japanese were "easily led astray and confused by foreign doctrines, it was essential to define the moral basis of the nation for them."<sup>413</sup> Furthermore, "[i]n form the document was a compromise; Motoda's wish that it make explicit reference to Confucius was rejected, but the Confucian relations were enumerated and credited to Japanese tradition."<sup>414</sup> This document was highly praised by the public. It was delivered to every school alongside the emperor's portrait. Every day this document was read with the utmost respect and was always "followed by three banzais for the emperor and patriotic song."<sup>415</sup>

Gordon explains that this Imperial Rescript was a culmination of the conservative reform led by Mori Arinori: "The government promoted Confucian ideals of loyalty, obedience, and friendship in the schools. It also turned to German advisors as it adopted a moralistic curriculum that stressed lessons of filial piety and loyalty to the state."<sup>416</sup>

It is interesting to see the shift in the legal framework of the education order. While in 1872 a law was enacted, after the adoption of the Constitution in 1889 Imperial rescripts took primacy. It is important to note how this shift came to be:

"There was no specific article relating to education in the Meiji Constitution of 1889, the assumption being that education was under the direct authority of the

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<sup>408</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. "Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912". in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO and Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 38.

<sup>409</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. "Educational Borrowing in Japan in the Meiji and Post-War Eras". in: David PHILLIPS, Kimberly OCHS (eds.). 2004. *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford, UK: Symposium Books. p. 152.

<sup>410</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. "Educational Borrowing in Japan in the Meiji and Post-War Eras". in: David PHILLIPS, Kimberly OCHS (eds.). 2004. *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford, UK: Symposium Books. p. 152.

<sup>411</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 1.

<sup>412</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 410.

<sup>413</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 410. footnote omitted

<sup>414</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 410.

<sup>415</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 356, 410.

<sup>416</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 105.

Emperor. There was great debate, in the context of the new political system, about whether the form of regulations pertaining to education was such that they should be classified as laws forming part of the legislature, or such that they should be treated as Imperial decrees. In the end, with the exception of one part of the laws, which dealt with educational finance, the prevailing opinion in prewar Japan was that as far as educational administration was concerned, education regulations should be thought of as Imperial decrees. The Imperial Rescript on Education, issued in 1890, was in practice the supreme education law in prewar Japan.”<sup>417</sup>

This excerpt’s importance is threefold: it provides insight into the weak role the Diet played in matters concerning education; the importance and power of the Emperor; and the importance of education in the Meiji system, having in mind that it was promulgated by the most revered instance in the state.

Hirakawa underlines the importance of both the Charter Oath and the Imperial Rescript on Education by stating that “[t]he Charter Oath issued in 1868 and the Imperial Rescript on Education promulgated in 1890 may be considered official proclamations that mark the beginning and end of an era.”<sup>418</sup> It is useful to point that these two documents were not just adopted any twenty years apart, during which social and political changes could be identified. They were adopted during times of tectonic changes in the Japanese social, political and cultural world. Therefore, their difference in substance should not come as a surprise. It was expected that in the earliest years of the Meiji Era the basis of the new system of education would lean heavily on both Western institutions, a centralized education program as well as a substantially Western-oriented curriculum. This was based on the fifth oath of the Charter Oath, which encourages knowledge to be sought out through the world in order to strengthen Imperial rule.

While in the early years of the Meiji Era the primacy belonged to the quest for knowledge outside Japan’s borders, later on the pendulum swung towards the strengthening of Imperial rule. Even though these two tendencies are not necessarily opposing, one clearly symbolizes progress and openness, while the other leans towards tradition and loyalty. Throughout this work we have stated that there were three distinct cultural forces at play that marked the almost twenty-year-long discussion concerning education in these tumultuous times. Therefore, it was also expected that when the system was in place and began to truly function, it was possible to imbue a more Japanese spirit into the curriculum of the centralized education system. “The Imperial Rescript on Education thus positioned education as based on natural teachings, in contrast to Mori’s notion of artificially programmed national education.”<sup>419</sup> This is a symbolic illustration of multiple modernities: in a Western carved system a Japanese substance was able to thrive.

Beyond compulsory elementary schools, study at the highs schools and University was voluntary. In Gordon’s words “It was limited to those who could pass the entrance examinations and whose parents could afford the tuition and the loss of a working child’s income.”<sup>420</sup> Gordon provides us with numbers as well: “By 1905, about 104,000 students, roughly 10 percent of the eligible

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<sup>417</sup> Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency. 2004. *The History of Japan’s Educational Development: What implications can be drawn for developing countries today*. pp. 57-58.

<sup>418</sup> Sukehiro HIRAKAWA. “Japan’s turn to the West”. in: Marius B. JANSEN. 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 495.

<sup>419</sup> Terumichi MORIKAWA. “Ideals of self-reliance and personal advancement: Modern education in the Meiji era 1868 to 1912”. in: Masashi TSUJIMOTO and Yoko YAMASAKI. 2017. *The History of Education in Japan (1600-2000)*. London and New York: Routledge. p. 47.

<sup>420</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

population, went on to attend a variety of middle schools.”<sup>421</sup> He also presents us with different types of high schools: “The “normal schools” trained students, young boys as well as some girls, for careers as teachers. In addition, a huge variety of vocational middle schools prepared youths for careers as technicians, clerks, or engineers.”<sup>422</sup> However, some students did not stop at vocational middle schools, but aimed to attain higher education and more social prestige: “A small minority of middle-schoolers continued to climb the education ladder by attending private and public higher schools... The most prestigious higher schools were seven national institutions for young men. Beginning with the First Higher School, in Tokyo, these were founded between 1886 and 1901. Together they admitted 5,300 male students per year.”<sup>423</sup> Another important distinction was between ““Special Higher Schools,” which prepared students for the Imperial University, and ordinary secondary education.”<sup>424</sup> This separation of high schools represented a direction towards elitism curated by Mori Arinori.

It is also interesting to note that higher school education was open to women. Gordon tells us that “In 1899 the government required each prefecture to found at least one higher school for girls. A number of Western missionary groups also opened higher schools for young women.”<sup>425</sup>

Gordon gives us insight on the substantial aspect of higher education. In Gordon’s words:

“Ironically, as students climbed to the higher reaches of this very hierarchical order, they were encouraged to think more freely. The higher schools and universities in particular gave the students a large degree of autonomy. Students organized the school’s extracurricular life on their own. In the classroom they were encouraged to read widely in Western philosophy and political thought. This openness at the top reflected the thinking of Mori Arinori, the minister of education who oversaw the founding of the higher schools. His goal was to nurture an elite of patriotic future leaders of the nation. He believed such people needed to learn initiative and responsibility. For this purpose, they had to be given autonomy in their formative years.”<sup>426</sup>

As for the Universities, it is necessary to note that the first of the Imperial Universities was Tokyo University. It emerged “from a congerie of educational institutions that went back to the Tokugawa School of Western Learning”.<sup>427</sup> Nakayama tells us more on the nature of the roots of Japanese higher education. “Unlike the continuous and spontaneous development of Western universities, whose medieval origin preceded that of modern nations, the prototype of modern Japanese universities is a purely artificial product created by a Western-oriented modern

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<sup>421</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

<sup>422</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106. For a more detailed view on the development of teacher education, please consult: Nobuo K. SHIMAHARA. “Teacher Education Reform in Japan: Ideological and Control Issues” in: Nobuo SHIMAHARA, Ivan Z. HOLOWINSKY. 1995. *Teacher Education in Industrialized Nations: Issues in Changing Social Contexts*. New York and London: Garland Publishing. pp. 155-194.

<sup>423</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

<sup>424</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 408-409. footnote omitted.

<sup>425</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

<sup>426</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

<sup>427</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 408.

government.”<sup>428</sup> From this we can see that Japanese university was a direct implementation of the western-inclined Meiji government. As Nakayama frames it “the model of modern Japanese universities is derived from bureaucratic institutions.”<sup>429</sup> However, it is wise to underline that the nature of that bureaucratic system hails from medieval China, rather than the West.<sup>430</sup> Therefore, through this particular mix of cultural and intellectual influences, a practical embodiment of multiple modernities once again is discernable.

Tokyo University was marked as Imperial by Mori Arinori in order to stand out from its competition – several private schools. These were primarily:

“Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Keiō and a rival, Waseda, that was established by Ōkuma in 1882 after he had been driven out of the government. The graduates of these schools, and of additional private institutions set up for the study of modern law and foreign languages, many by missionaries, played important roles in political agitation, journalism, and private enterprise.”<sup>431</sup>

Therefore we can see Keio, Waseda and other private institutions as bastions of Western values.

Jansen cites Masamichi Inoki in order to elucidate who were the young attendees of Tokyo Imperial University.

“Its top graduates were honored by the emperor and assured of prestigious careers. Its costs were born entirely by the central government. In makeup the student body was drawn for the most part “in fact if not by statute to the sons of upper- and upper-middle class families (of civil bureaucrats, military officers, landlords, rich farmers, businessmen, and industrialists), except for a very small number of students holding scholarships provided by former feudal lords and other rich people.”<sup>432</sup>

From this excerpt we can see the truly special place that was given to the students of Tokyo Imperial University by the government.

Another important trend that continued from the late Edo Period was the study abroad. Jansen tells us that “The Education Ministry, together with most branches of the executive, was devoting impressive proportions of its budget to hiring foreign teachers and sending students abroad.”<sup>433</sup> This trend coupled with the aspiration of the new Meiji state to create educated and western oriented leadership. As the country was centralizing its authority and unifying, it had a need for an educated class that would fill the roles of the nation’s new leaders. As Duke illustrates: “Amid the haste to open schools for the nobility, coupled with the issuing of the Charter Oath seeking knowledge from “throughout the world,” the Dajōkan, the highest governmental organ, called for members of noble families to become leaders of the country. They were urged to come to Tokyo, the new administrative

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<sup>428</sup> Shigeru NAKAYAMA. 1989. “Independence and choice: Western impacts on Japanese higher education”. *Higher Education*, Vol. 18. p. 32.

<sup>429</sup> Shigeru NAKAYAMA. 1989. “Independence and choice: Western impacts on Japanese higher education”. *Higher Education*, Vol. 18. p. 33.

<sup>430</sup> Shigeru NAKAYAMA. 1989. “Independence and choice: Western impacts on Japanese higher education”. *Higher Education*, Vol. 18. p. 33.

<sup>431</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 408.

<sup>432</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 408. footnote omitted.

<sup>433</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 405.

capital, from Kyoto where most lived.”<sup>434</sup> Studying abroad for young nobles and samurai became a way of distinguishing themselves for the new roles they were encouraged to fill. As Duke brings light to the subject:

“Members of the nobility were also encouraged to go abroad to learn about modern western societies in order to assume leadership positions. Although only a limited number of noble families sent their youth abroad for study, it became fashionable for motivated samurai youth to study abroad in preparation for leadership positions at home.”<sup>435</sup>

This information is valuable as it again shows us the connection between the West and the future leaders. By encouraging the future leaders to learn about western societies and setting this skill as almost a prerequisite for future leadership, the government that was already full of students from Western universities, was ensuring a further influx of modernity. This influx would then perpetuate in both the future Japanese leadership and Meiji society as a whole.

A defining element of the new Meiji State, especially in its early years, is without a doubt the institution of the hired foreigner, or the *oyatoi gaijin* - foreigners that worked in Japan as hired experts. It is almost a physical manifestation of a seed of modernity. According to Gordon, thousands of hired foreigners from almost two-dozen nations were sponsored by the new government and brought to Japan to help with the rapid modernization of the country. Well paid, their advice and knowledge were integral to the rapid modernization of the country.<sup>436</sup> However, while well paid and desired, their purpose was singular and the term suggests it, as Gordon notices: “This term had a pejorative connotation suggesting that the foreigners brought no value beyond detailed technical expertise”.<sup>437</sup> After their purpose of transferring knowledge and advice is complete, their Japanese students replaced them, Jansen reminds us: “The Meiji government and society, like those of developing states in the twentieth century, were intensely nationalistic, but the country's skill in using and then replacing outside foreign employees is too often forgotten”.<sup>438</sup>

Duke informs us of a major change that occurred after the mid 1870s concerning the *oyatoi gaikokujin*. In 1875 a new policy was taking action: carefully selected Japanese students went abroad to study western ideas and practices in numerous western countries. Upon the return of the educated Japanese, the hired foreigners were to be relieved of their duties and replaced with their newly educated Japanese counterparts.<sup>439</sup>

Although the Meiji restoration brought with itself a systemic change to the country, higher education at western institutions was already sought after during the late Tokugawa era. Education at Western universities was in part a sign of the times that would come, and in part was due to the relationships the late Tokugawa Era domains had with foreigners amidst the relaxation of isolation. This claim can be purported by the fact that future leaders of Meiji Japan such as Itō Hirobumi and

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<sup>434</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 48.

<sup>435</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 48.

<sup>436</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 72.

<sup>437</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 72.

<sup>438</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 466.

<sup>439</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 182. footnote omitted.

Mori Arinori studied at London University.<sup>440</sup>

Therefore, sending students abroad was not an idea ushered in by the Meiji Government, it was done decades prior by the bakufu, as explained by Duus: “Since the 1850s the number of Japanese, usually samurai, sent abroad by bakufu or domain governments to study in the West had grown slowly but steadily.”<sup>441</sup> He further states that there were also students who studied the so-called Dutch Studies or *Rangaku*, and that they studied not predominately medicine, astronomy and technology like their predecessors, but also studied law, society and philosophy<sup>442</sup>, so it can be said that Duus argues that they not only studied Western technology but also the Western spirit. What is most important for the spread of modernity is that “The new Western experts emerged as a new intellectual elite in the 1860s and 1870s, replacing the old-style Confucian scholars as the critics and arbiters of social ideas.”<sup>443</sup>

It is also interesting to underline is the unlikely connection between a group of young samurai and Dutch-American missionary that resulted in a study abroad program that would have significant reverberations through the early Meiji Era. Duke notes that:

“another group of samurai youth destined for leadership in modern Japan was studying at a small college in America. Under the most unlikely circumstances, Rutgers College in the tiny community of New Brunswick, New Jersey, became the primary institution in America hosting Japanese students during the feudal period. It originated through an uncommon individual, the Dutch-American Guido Verbeck, who sent his students to Rutgers as a teacher from Japan during the closing years of the Tokugawa period.”<sup>444</sup>

As stated by Duke, some of the future leaders of the early Meiji Era were sent to be educated at Rutgers College in New Jersey. He attributes this unorthodox study abroad program to one Guido Verbeck, a Dutch- American Christian missionary and educator who was stationed at Nagasaki. As Jansen further illuminates – there, “farther from the center, was able to work with young samurai from Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Saga, some of whom went on to become leaders in the future Meiji government. They studied English with him and plied him with questions.”<sup>445</sup>

As Jansen further suggests, it was Guido Verbeck that was instrumental in advising on some of the most defining moments of the Early Meiji Era, in addition to his role of educating samurai and helping to send them to study at Rutgers: “After the Restoration it was Verbeck who first suggested the dispatch of an embassy overseas, and the Iwakura mission owed much to his advice. Moreover, Verbeck’s ties with the Dutch Reformed community and Rutgers in New Brunswick, New Jersey, made him a strategic figure in the recruitment of additional teachers.”<sup>446</sup> This view is further substantiated by Duke: “The concentration of Japanese students at Rutgers College during the late Tokugawa period as a result of Guido Verbeck’s efforts would have broad repercussions. As would be expected, many of the Japanese students returned home to play major roles in the modernization

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<sup>440</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 40.

<sup>441</sup> Peter DUUS. 1976. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. p. 87.

<sup>442</sup> Peter DUUS. 1976. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. p. 87.

<sup>443</sup> Peter DUUS. 1976. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. p. 87.

<sup>444</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 40.

<sup>445</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 463.

<sup>446</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 463.

process during the Meiji era.”<sup>447</sup>

Through this example we can see several of our research questions being encompassed. Through the small glimpse into the life and work of Verbeck we can observe the repercussions of multiple modernities. Therefore Guido Verbeck is important to us here for several reasons. First, he is the representation of the “ties with the West” that we have marked as important factors in the quest for modernity. He is a link between the young samurai and an institution of higher learning in the West, in this case, Rutgers College in New Jersey, and later would be an important advisor in the Ministry of Education. Second, his advice due to either his expertise or experience or both has directly influenced the realization of the Iwakura Mission, which was by all means one of the most important events in the early Meiji Era from the aspect of modernity. Finally, through these examples, it is apparent that the hired foreigners were instrumental at the very outset of the Meiji Era for providing their expertise as well as their connections in order to help realize the modernizing aspirations of the young Meiji State.

## 5.2. Development of Education System in Serbia throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century

In order to better understand the evolution of education in Serbia, it is helpful to shortly resent the beginnings of the legal regulations regarding education in the Principality of Serbia. It is necessary to note that during this period the needs for education reforms were being met with understanding, and progressive sets of laws were being promulgated. This validates the claim that the ideas of modernity have already permeated into the political and social culture of Serbia at the time before its independence.

It should be noted that the primary school began to operate during the first Serbian uprising, under the leadership of Dositej Obradović. Soon after his arrival in Serbia in 1807 he was appointed director of all schools and in 1811 he was appointed Minister of Education.<sup>448</sup> Already in 1808 there were schools not only in Belgrade but also in other places throughout Serbia, and in 1813 there were 40 schools with about 1500 students.<sup>449</sup>

As early as 1830, with the promulgation of the Hatt-i sharif, Serbia gained the right to organize education in the Serbian language. Subsequently, the Constitution of peoples' schools (*Ustav narodnih škola*) was promulgated in 1833.<sup>450</sup> Trgovčević further informs us: “The first general law on education was brought during the time of the *Ustavobranitelji* (1844) and that was the foundation of the education system during the nineteenth century.”<sup>451</sup> The 1844 general Law on Education was the first law in Serbia that defined the whole education system. Ćunković elucidates on the specific stratification of education envisaged by the law. The law defined four types of schools: elementary, business-trade school (*posleno-trgovačka*), high school or gymnasium, and the Lyceum. The Law

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<sup>447</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: p. 46.

<sup>448</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 13.

<sup>449</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 14.

<sup>450</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku”. in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 191.

<sup>451</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 220.

contained four segments that provided basis for organization and content for each type of school.<sup>452</sup>

Ćunković provides us with a more detailed look on what the 1844 Law contained. Concerning elementary education, it established a difference in the duration of the elementary schools in villages and towns. Namely, in envisaged that elementary education would last for three years in the villages and four years in towns. The Law also prescribed school attendance when children reached the age of seven. For the first time the attendance of school by the female children were regulated by the law. The Law provided that in villages and sparsely populated areas, female children would attend school with male children. However, they would be required to leave school at the age of ten and no female child upon reaching ten years of age would be admitted to school. In towns and cities however, female children would attend school separately.<sup>453</sup>

Ćunković further underlines the importance of the 1844 Law. For the first time, the law outlines a teacher's qualifications, both scholastic and moral. The municipality in charge of financing the school is also in charge of the selection of the teacher, although the choice needs to be finalized with the blessing of the school principal.<sup>454</sup> Financing the schools was left to the municipalities, as was the construction of school buildings where needed. However, it is important to note that the Law did not make school compulsory yet, although there were ambitions to do so in the future.<sup>455</sup>

Ćunković brings forth with a detailed look at the evolution of the school network in Serbia and provides us with statistical evidence of a clear rise in the number of schools, teachers and schools in Serbia. After a year of the Law's implementation, in the 1845/46 school year, statistical data show that in 18 okrugs (the City of Belgrade included), there were 187 schools, one of which was a female school, 213 teachers and 6201 students.<sup>456</sup> Most of these schools were public, but there were 12 private institutions throughout Serbia with the number of students that amounted to 120.<sup>457</sup> By the school year of 1869/70 there were 342 schools, 39 of which were female schools; 550 teachers, 63 of which were female teachers; and 23,382 students, 2,438 of which were female students.<sup>458</sup> The number of private schools was also on the rise. While there was no data available on the number of private schools, Ćunković asserts that the rise can be deemed apparent as in Belgrade alone there were 10 private schools, 9 of which were female schools.<sup>459</sup>

By establishing that the education system was in its infancy during the Principality period in years before independence, we aimed to show that although it was small and slow, there was a push for modernity in the education. The government was aiming for, and striving towards a more complex system of education. The presented reforms of education, the establishment of laws on education, schools, etc. all indicate that, quite naturally and logically, even before the period of complete independence of Serbia, modernity as a concept was very much alive and that modernization is being done slowly but constantly.

The system of education was growing concurrently with the growth of Serbian autonomy and its ever-growing appetite for independence and formation of a modern state. This falls in line with the statement put forth by Trgovčević: "State organization of education is a parallel process with the process of creating a nation-state and the construction of a national identity. In most countries, these

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<sup>452</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 36.

<sup>453</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 38.

<sup>454</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. pp. 38-39.

<sup>455</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 38.

<sup>456</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 45.

<sup>457</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 45.

<sup>458</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 110.

<sup>459</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 110.

two goals have become points around which social values and social relationships are determined.”<sup>460</sup> Trgovčević asserts that the education system in the nineteenth century, especially a state-sponsored compulsory education system was becoming a new standard for developed nations. School was taking its place as one of the foremost national interests.<sup>461</sup> Serbia followed suit, as Trgovčević states that “the strengthening of education in the early 70’s, when most of the political forces of the time saw in it an important support for the political and spiritual emancipation of Serbia and its much needed economic development.”<sup>462</sup> While mentioning political forces, Trgovčević puts the ministers of education on a pedestal: “The ministers of education of that time can be attached to no less importance”<sup>463</sup> Special place is deserved for Stojan Novaković, of the Progressive Party, who was minister both in the 1870s several times, as well as in 1882 when the Law on Elementary Schools was enacted. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the law fulfilled all of the aforementioned modern requirements, as Novaković was following the latest European trends.<sup>464</sup>

In 1882 Law on Elementary Schools was adopted. It was dubbed by Trgovčević as the most significant change in education in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>465</sup> Ćunković explains that this Law contained set of progressive measures.<sup>466</sup> The Law prescribed a compulsory elementary education for both sexes. Because of the more comprehensive role given to the elementary school, the duration of education was prolonged from 4 to 6 years.<sup>467</sup> Ćunković asserts that the new role of the elementary school was much more comprehensive. We can purport this statement by looking at the language that is used to describe the mission of elementary education: “by educating and upbringing to spread among the people a basis of knowledge (...) and to prepare students for civic life and education in high schools.”<sup>468</sup> This new role shows us that the elementary school is a stepping-stone to a larger system of education that was being put into place. By equipping students with the necessary knowledge to enroll in high schools, this system was striving to establish a self-sustainable educational model. For the first time, teacher competence or professionalism was established: in order to become a teacher one had to graduate from the teacher’s school or the higher women school, and pass the prescribed teacher’s test.<sup>469</sup> Finally, education was now a right of every citizen, thereby

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<sup>460</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku”. in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. pp. 191-192.

<sup>461</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku”. in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 192.

<sup>462</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 220.

<sup>463</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 220.

<sup>464</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku”. in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 193.

<sup>465</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>466</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 154.

<sup>467</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 154.

<sup>468</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 154.

<sup>469</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 155.

establishing a legal mechanism for the modernization of education.<sup>470</sup>

The modern character of the Law itself, however, was not enough to push things forward as there were again economic bumps on the road: a lack of funds for the necessary infrastructure and therefore problems with the integration of all children into the school system, as well as the deficiency of qualified teachers and the funds needed for the fulfillment of such requirements.<sup>471</sup> Having in mind these obstacles in the implementation of the Law, legislators specified a transitional period that would last until 1890 for the Law to be implemented in its entirety.<sup>472</sup> However, Trgovčević tells us that the Law proved to be too ambitious for Serbia at that time yet again. After the implementation deadline was up, less than half of the planned number of children started attending school.<sup>473</sup> It seemed that for a variety of reasons and despite the influx of ideas of modernity Serbia's modernization efforts were going one-step forward- two steps back.

An interesting parallel can be made between the Law on Elementary Schools of 1882 in the Kingdom of Serbia and the Education Law of 1872 in Meiji Japan. First, it is interesting to notice that both Laws were adopted four years after Serbia's and Japan's historically accepted ascensions to the world scene.<sup>474</sup> The years themselves are interesting as they show two things: first, a definite fast response to follow the trend of developed nations; and second, the swiftness of the promulgation of the laws tell us of the importance both Japan and Serbia placed on education. Second, we can discern the specific language that was used in the proclamation of both Laws. In Serbian Law it was stated that a compulsory education would be given to "every child that lives in Serbia".<sup>475</sup> In a similar fashion in Japan it was proclaimed that: "In a village there shall be no house without learning, and in a house, no individual without learning."<sup>476</sup> This grand language can be seen as a promissory note, that shows that the importance of the implementation of a Western inspired centralized education system was well heard and understood by the leaders and was set as an important goal to be reached.

As stated above, Trgovčević's assessment was that the 1882 Law was too ambitious for Serbia at the time. One of the main features of the Law was compulsory education for all children living in Serbia. However, after the transitional period (which would allow for a slower and better application of the law due to various constraints) has elapsed, less than half of the children eligible for school

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<sup>470</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>471</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>472</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.; Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku". in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 194.

<sup>473</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>474</sup> 1868 as the year of the Meiji Restoration; 1878 as the year of Serbia's independence at the Congress of Belin.

<sup>475</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>476</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press: p. 67.

were integrated into the school system.<sup>477</sup> This was when the Law on Peoples' Schools of 1898 was enacted.<sup>478</sup> According to Ćunković, the Law was a consequence of larger political games by the court and the conservative parties. The aim of the Law was to reorganize the school system so that the higher education would be reserved for the children of the richer echelons of society, with an end goal of creating future conservative officials. Conversely, the children of the poorer tier village folk would be provided only basic education.<sup>479</sup>

The 1898 Law had other significant changes regarding the organization of the school system, among which was a return to the four year elementary school with a reduced curriculum that Trgovčević called overall less ambitious.<sup>480</sup> Though more modest than the one preceding it, the Law prescribed free education for all children during four years of education, as well as the opening of optional village schools, with specified programs aimed at continued education for the village youth.<sup>481</sup> While the Law did prescribe compulsory education for all, it raised the minimal number of eligible children in order to open a school: from 30 to 50, thereby making the realization of this practically less likely.<sup>482</sup>

There is an important societal trend from the perspective of modernity that can be seen in through the enactment of these laws and their implementation. There is a clear determination from the government to elevate and enhance the nation's education by creating a stable and modern school network. However, one can also observe the lack of necessary supporting means in this endeavor. Apart from clear economic challenges that hindered the full application of the 1882 Law, we can discern infrastructural obstacles.

Most notably, these infrastructural obstacles can be seen in the lack of educated teachers.<sup>483</sup> To overcome these obstacles, the government promulgated the Law on the Regulation of Normal Schools in 1870.<sup>484</sup> Such school opened in 1871 in Kragujevac and was a boarding school for students that have finished a four-year high school. Upon graduation, the students, who were state grantees, were required to provide a teaching service of a minimum of six years.<sup>485</sup> Later the school moved to Belgrade, and two more teacher schools opened their doors- in Niš in 1881, and in Jagodina in 1883,<sup>486</sup> which informs us of both a rising need for teacher schools, as well as the measures the

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<sup>477</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>478</sup> Zakon o narodnim školama. 26. juli 1898. godine.

<sup>479</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 160.

<sup>480</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>481</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>482</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 160.

<sup>483</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 222; Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 133.

<sup>484</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 133.

<sup>485</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 133.

<sup>486</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 222.

government was taking in order to meet the needs of the growing school network.

The need for a teacher school was recognized in the beginnings of the creation of a school network, in 1846. However, the promulgation of the Law on the Regulation of Normal Schools was put into motion as an answer to unfavorable reports on the quality of education in elementary schools in 1870,<sup>487</sup> almost a quarter century after the need for such schools was noted. Even so, the move towards a self-sustaining education network was being created.

This report on the state of education and the lack of educated teachers was done by Đorđe Natošević, “a renowned reformer of education in Vojvodina” who was invited to do the same in Serbia. His engagement, although short-lived, left behind these reports that would “initiate a broader discussion about the reform.”<sup>488</sup> The government recognized the need for a school that would educate future educators, and saw it as a solution to this problem. Recognizing the need for a systemic change; a need for a school network; a need for institutions dealing with the education of competent teachers for the education of primary and secondary school students, is an indication of modernity on an institutional level.

In order to depict the progress in the quality of education it is insightful to lean on Ćunković, who provides us with a source from the 1860s, from Svetozar Marković’s opinion piece *Kako su nas vaspitavali*. In this piece, Marković shares his frustration with the state of education in high schools at the time by saying: “Instead of nurturing our minds and teaching us to think, and by doing so awaken in us a thirst for knowledge, they made us learn a bunch of words to which we knew no meaning.”<sup>489</sup> An interesting parallel can be drawn with Japan, as Gordon mentions that: “At the outset, the government announced that schools were to encourage practical learning as well as independent thinking.”<sup>490</sup> Therefore, it is important to note how from the outset the education in Japan was much more practically oriented. However, Marković later turns to the 1870s and speaks of a new teaching staff, students of the Great School, which introduced contemporary methods and enthusiasm into the classroom, thereby showing us that Serbia slowly but surely progressed in these matters.<sup>491</sup>

We will turn our attention to higher education in Serbia, more specifically, the University of Belgrade. It is an institution that was by its nature and from its inception a bastion of the ideas of modernity. The beginnings of the University of Belgrade can be traced to 1808 and the establishment of the Great School by Dositej Obradović, an Enlightenment thinker that was a protagonist in the beginnings of the national awakening movement. Ćunković informs us that the School was founded out of a necessity for more comprehensive education than that attained in an elementary school. The purpose of the Great School was to create new state officials that would be working for the newly formed revolutionary government, and serve the future state.<sup>492</sup> Ćunković further elucidates that the form of the School followed the practical needs of the new cultural, social and political situation that has arisen in Serbia at the tumultuous beginning of the nineteenth century. He further acknowledges: “It was neither a high school nor a university although it had elements of both. It was a kind of vocational school focused on the education of officials and public servants in the newly created

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<sup>487</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 133.

<sup>488</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 101.

<sup>489</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 124.

<sup>490</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 67.

<sup>491</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 124.

<sup>492</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 17.

conditions of political and social life.”<sup>493</sup> However, in 1813 after the First Uprising came to naught, the Great School ceased with its operation.<sup>494</sup>

As Serbia gained autonomy and was gradually becoming more independent in administrative affairs, there was again a need for educated officials that would serve the state. Therefore we may again attribute the establishment of the Lyceum, in 1838 in Kragujevac to the expansion of the state administration and the lack of educated persons to fulfill the necessary roles. Furthermore, Trgovčević gives us a broader culturally significant picture, where she states: “Education as one of the foundations of civil society that emerged as a mass phenomenon during the 19th century is one of the indicators of the extent to which the studied society has embraced the process of modernization.”<sup>495</sup> This insight permits us to observe the need for an institution of higher learning in this case not only as a form of administrative necessity, but as a byproduct of modernity.

In its first years, the Lyceum offered what could best be described as a continuation of a high school education, giving a broad education on many subjects, ranging from mathematics to Christian studies.<sup>496</sup> However, after the General Law on Education of 1844, three years after the Lyceum moved to Belgrade,<sup>497</sup> the Lyceum was treated as an institution of higher education with two distinct departments, one of Law and the other of Philosophy. A natural technical department was established in 1853, which served later as the basis for the Technical faculty.<sup>498</sup>

With the need for a reform of higher education becoming more evident, the Law on the Organization of the Great School was enacted on the 25<sup>th</sup> of September 1863. The Great School moved into the building commissioned by Miša Anastasijević, a Serbian business magnate. The Great School was divided into three schools: Philosophy, Law and Technical. The School of Philosophy would have a 3-year curriculum, while the Law and Technical Schools would have 4-year curricula. Along with their school study program the students are obligated to partake in a number of classes of the other two schools.<sup>499</sup> As the Great school came to ever-closer in its essence to a university Trgovčević asserts that this was a major change in the field of constructing an intellectual elite, as it now had an institution of higher learning that could produce a homegrown intelligentsia.<sup>500</sup>

Ćunković later states that although there has been a formal separation into three separate schools, which implies a more narrow and deep delve into a subject matter, the requirement to partake in classes of the other two schools tells the same story of the old system still in place and a concentration on a broad education that would serve state officials in a better capacity than it would suit the students and professors for more scientific and academic work.<sup>501</sup>

However, there were still significant drawbacks in the organization of Great School. Ćunković points to the facts that the School itself had no autonomy whatsoever, which was depicted in the fact that the school did not choose its professors or its rector- they were chosen by the Prince. Professors were relegated to a position that is more similar to that of an ordinary state official. Also,

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<sup>493</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 18.

<sup>494</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 19.

<sup>495</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 222.

<sup>496</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 88.

<sup>497</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 90.

<sup>498</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 223.

<sup>499</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. pp. 138-139.

<sup>500</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. Beograd.: *O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Istorijski institut. p. 240.

<sup>501</sup> Srećko ĆUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 141.

students were treated more akin their high school counterparts than students of an institution of higher learning.<sup>502</sup> We can see from this depiction that while significant progress was made, the budding homegrown intellectual elite was in an unenviable position.

Trgovčević ties the beginnings of the University with what she defines as the “planned elite”, people on government stipends sent abroad to study and return to Serbia in order to engage in the affairs of the state, on a cultural societal and/or political level. Many of these foreign students, this planned elite, returned to Serbia and to the Lyceum as highly educated professors.<sup>503</sup>

Ultimately, it is right to observe Trgovčević’s insight into the gradual evolution of the University of Belgrade into a full-fledged institution of higher learning:

“The gradual evolution of the University, which followed the natural path of scientific progress was a testament to the minds of the decision makers at the university, especially the professors. The university was founded only when it could be both an educational and scientific institution as opposed to other schools, this was an example of an institution where modernization had a continuous flow.”<sup>504</sup>

Therefore, the gradual transformation of the University of Belgrade has created an institution that was fully equipped with creating and perpetuating a homegrown intellectual elite by 1905. However, as briefly mentioned above, efforts made towards creating an intellectual elite and educating the states future civil servants was recognized and pursued far earlier than the complete evolution of the University of Belgrade.

An interesting piece of information is given by Trgovčević concerning the social structure of students attending high school and the Great School in the 1900/01 school year. The numbers are as follows: “15.04% children of farmers, 13.54% hailed from workers’ families, and 40.11% were children of civil servants, teachers, officers or intellectuals or those who are fulfilling the roles of the state bureaucracy, and 4.11% were miscellaneous.”<sup>505</sup> Trgovčević concludes that this statistic ultimately shows that a farmer’s child was sixty times less likely to attain higher education than a child of a civil servant.<sup>506</sup> The state did its best to help underprivileged to attain a better education by providing grants to good students. Social mobility, Trgovčević states, was possible because of education itself as students rose to civil servant and officer positions by getting an education.<sup>507</sup>

Another major effort by Serbia was creating an intellectual elite by sending state grantees to study abroad. One of the authors that has given the most comprehensive study of the education of Serbian students abroad and a planned state effort to create an intellectual elite is by far Ljubinka

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<sup>502</sup> Srećko ČUNKOVIĆ. 2016. *Školstvo i prosveta u Srbiji u XIX veku*. Beograd: Pedagoški muzej. p. 141.

<sup>503</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 223.

<sup>504</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 223.; Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. pp. 20-21.

<sup>505</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 24.

<sup>506</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 25.

<sup>507</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 25.

Trgovčević. For the purposes of our research, it is both necessary and wise to lean on her considerable experience and her complete findings.

Trgovčević informs us that the need for an intellectual civil society was already felt in the mid nineteenth century.<sup>508</sup> From 1839 onwards, an organized effort for a planned education abroad was set by the ministry of education<sup>509</sup> and since then "...almost every year, the state has sent a number of state funded grantees to study abroad."<sup>510</sup>

Trgovčević states that the first government grantees that returned from European universities gave their support for the new Law on Education in 1844. They were eager to share the experiences they gained while at western universities. Some of them rose up to the task of writing textbooks for the new education programs from 1844. However, they were met with a serious lack of funds and an undereducated teaching staff that could not follow through with their ambitious plans. In 1855, a new and less ambitious program was adopted, more appropriate for the reality of the situation in Serbia at the time, and was used as a blueprint for twenty years.<sup>511</sup>

The fight for modernity it seems can be followed from the fight for independence from the Ottomans and a modern European nation, to the fight of the grantees with the harsh realities of Serbia at the time. The returnees who were supposed to and eager to plant the ideas of modernity in their home country were met with a still infertile ground for such an ambitious endeavor and would have to settle for less at the time in order to prime the system and wait patiently for a more apt time to plant seeds of modernity again.

However, it is right to say that the program of sending students to foreign universities became a standardized practice and was growing from year to year. Trgovčević provides us with an important piece of information: "between 1882 and 1914, from the 853 grantees sent abroad for studies or specialization... the Ministry of Education received funds for 208 grantees... who later became University professors, high school professors, and it is they who brought new scientific disciplines into the education system of Serbia."<sup>512</sup> While this number is not imposing, it did bring in a wave of intellectuals into the education system.

Trgovčević turns our attention to the intellectuals that were the most influential in Serbia in the second half of the nineteenth century. She divides the intellectuals into three distinct generations. Trgovčević states that although they can be separated into three different eras, there was overlap between them temporally.<sup>513</sup>

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<sup>508</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 33.

<sup>509</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. pp. 33-34.

<sup>510</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 226.

<sup>511</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku". Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 221.

<sup>512</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. "Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku". in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 196.

<sup>513</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 236.

The first generation of intellectuals can be placed in the mid nineteenth century, when there were “virtually no autonomous homegrown intellectuals.”<sup>514</sup> These intellectuals were usually Serbs who were not from Serbia, who were educated predominately in various institutions in Austria-Hungary. Trgovčević alludes to the first influx of modernity, with these educated Serbs being the first professors of the Lyceum in Kragujevac and subsequently in Belgrade. These men in turn taught the first students of the Lyceum.<sup>515</sup> Culturally, this foreign influence could be seen in the press, which followed an Austrian style, in architecture, and urban planning.<sup>516</sup> Politically, the requests of this generation of intellectuals largely revolved around independence. Trgovčević underlines their political and ideological leanings: “strong anti-Ottoman, and at the end of the period a pronounced pan-Slavism.”<sup>517</sup>

The second generation of intellectuals was “the first generation that was born in Serbia and educated abroad.”<sup>518</sup> This generation was active roughly from the mid-nineteenth century to the late 1870s. Trgovčević points out several characteristics that were emblematic for this generation. While there were indeed more and more grantees that were studying at various European Universities, the higher education system was striving towards self-sufficiency and the intelligentsia was able to be educated at home. A notable example of this first homegrown effort was Stojan Novaković.<sup>519</sup> This generation was “a leading cultural factor in society.”<sup>520</sup> This was also the generation that first challenged the patriarchal order of the times with their progressive ideas that were brought home from their studies.<sup>521</sup> Therefore we may look at this generation as the first to bring with them the ideas of modernity with the necessary knowledge and power to implement them into society. This generation is relevant to us because it was, as both the intellectual and political elite, the first to implement Western European institutions into the Serbian socio-political system. However, Trgovčević states that their enthusiasm waned with time and they “became more prudent in their choices and adapted the institutions to domestic circumstances.”<sup>522</sup> With this we can see the first instances of multiple modernities.

According to Trgovčević, the third generation was developing from the 1880s onwards. The primary difference from the other two generations was that this was a generation that largely consisted of homegrown intelligentsia.<sup>523</sup> The characteristic of this generation of intelligentsia was their heterogeneity in several aspects, from ideological and educational – as many foreign and domestic

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<sup>514</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 237.

<sup>515</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 237.

<sup>516</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 238.

<sup>517</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 238.

<sup>518</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 239.

<sup>519</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. pp. 239-240.

<sup>520</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 240.

<sup>521</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 241.

<sup>522</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 241.

<sup>523</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijiski institut. p. 242.

influences were at play – to political, as this was a time when political parties were in full swing.<sup>524</sup> During the time of this generation's activity, a number of social, educational and cultural institutions were formed such as “[t]he Serbian Royal Academy (1886), The Serbian Literary Association (1892), the Natural History Museum of Serbia, and in the beginning of the century the Great School evolved into the University, and professional and artistic associations were created.”<sup>525</sup>

From the presentation of Trgovčević's insight on the three generations we can conclude that the intelligentsia in Serbia was developing from the mid-nineteenth century, that it was growing steadily and that it was evolving with every generation.

In light of this ongoing progress, Trgovčević brings to light the problems that Serbia was facing, namely, a vast unevenness of the education system in Serbia at the turn of the century. It is helpful to look at this excerpt in its entirety:

“Inherited backwardness, a very weak economy and an extremely young population - all this has conditioned that the process of modernization of education in Serbia has been slow. The first impulse of modernization, in the time of the Defenders of the Constitution (legal solutions, development of schools), was premature for the then Serbian society. The real beginning was the seventies, when, legally, socio-economically, and staff-wise some basic conditions were created to start this process. However, in the following decades changes were slow. It was therefore a partial modernization, which paradoxically, ranged from extreme modernity of some sciences at the University to a great level of illiteracy among the population.”<sup>526</sup>

Therefore, as we can see from both the information that was laid out in this part of the Chapter, as well as the assessment given by one of the leading scholars on this subject, we can conclude that there were indeed moves, albeit slow, to move education forward, and that there were tremendous moves in the right direction, particularly in the case of the University of Belgrade.

There were ups and downs, some periods of greater progress and periods of standstill, most of which were dependent on the complex relationship between the elites, or in Trgovčević's own words: “Later waves of school development (1860s and early 1870s) may be associated with the greater influence of educated political elites, while the stagnation of education and even the closure of some schools in the late eighth decade of the 19th century may first be associated with the political circumstances of the time.”<sup>527</sup>

Of the intricate relationship between politics and education in late 19<sup>th</sup> century Serbia, Trgovčević states: “In the case of Serbia there is an apparent dependence of the progress of education on the shift in government... it is apparent that the progress of education was not constant, but depended on its relationship with the governing structure.”<sup>528</sup> Trgovčević emphasizes the importance of the state's role in the implementation of education. It is a pivotal role and clarity of vision on a set

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<sup>524</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. pp. 242-243.

<sup>525</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 243.

<sup>526</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 31.

<sup>527</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Beograd: Istorijski institut. p. 29.

<sup>528</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. pp. 228-229.

national goal for the establishment of education is marked by Trgovčević as integral to modernity: “The relationship of the state towards education is twofold, with its regulations and laws it can make education into a true modernizing factor that will act as a catalyst for general development; contrary to that, by retention of tradition it can be a hindrance to further development”<sup>529</sup> Finally, we may observe that there were difficulties in realizing the clarity of vision concerning education: “national education and national integration is hard to build if it is not completely clear to all citizens what the national goals are.”<sup>530</sup>

However, all of this is not to say that the ideas of modernity were not being implemented in Serbia at the time, nor that Serbia did not achieve a certain level of modernity by the beginning of the twentieth century. Above we have presented that the state had indeed recognized the need for a centralized system of education; that it had established an education network and that it had made measures to create a stable system from elementary to higher education. On this long path to create and self sustain an educational system there were difficulties, some of which could be surmounted, and some issues that proved to be more difficult to tackle.

Trgovčević sheds light on economic difficulties: “The most significant factor of the lateness of modernization in Serbia is the inherited backwardness and slow economic development, due to which society could not keep up with all the changes that education brought and education itself developed slowly and unevenly because it largely depended on the material basis.”<sup>531</sup> Leaving aside this valuable insight into the socio economic aspect of the implementation of modernization, we feel it necessary to underline that we are focusing our research specifically on the ideas of modernity and its implementation rather than the mechanisms of modernization that are mentioned in Trgovčević’s opus. While Trgovčević’s work is essential in providing the necessary information on the socio-political and cultural aspects of Serbian development, we do not intend to make such value-laden judgment on the success of modernization. Our aim is to present traces of modernity in Serbia and it is without doubt that they did emerge and started to grow from the mid-nineteenth century. Also, there is no doubt that modernity was especially being cultivated by a slowly emerging intellectual elite. The intellectual elite, educated both abroad at western universities, as well as in Serbian universities proved precious in planting the seed of modernity in Serbia. In Chapter 6.2. we will further elaborate this elite and their role.

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<sup>529</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 220.

<sup>530</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Srpska država, obrazovanje i neka pitanja nacionalne integracije u XIX veku”. in: Aleksandar KOSTIĆ (ed.). 2015. *Obrazovanje: razvojni potencijal Srbije*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. p. 203.

<sup>531</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije u Srbiji u XIX veku”. Latinka PEROVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 229.

## 6. INTELLECTUAL ELITES AS BEARERS OF MODERNITY IN JAPAN AND SERBIA

In Chapter 5 we have established how both Japan and Serbia's intellectual elites were tied to the West through education. These ties were reflected in the adoption of the Western model of education, the employment of hired foreigners as teachers and experts, and the study of Japanese and Serbian students at Western universities. However, it is important to underline one of the thesis statements that this contact alone was insufficient for the successful implementation of modernity.

As we have established, this contact is of the utmost importance in order for the ideas of modernity to reach new societies. However, it is necessary that these ideas be accepted not only among the intellectual elite, but also among those who are decision makers in these societies. Therefore, our next thesis statement is that the modern intellectual elite must be included into the political discourse in order for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented. Perović asserts that a great importance is placed on the political, economic, military, scientific and artist elites in the process of modernization. Their importance is such that their presence alone signifies a society's modernity.<sup>532</sup>

In order to prove this thesis, it is important to define primarily what we mean by intellectual elite. Also we will elucidate the meaning of the term political elite having in mind its central role in the political discourse.

According to Bottomor "[t]he term *élite* (s) is now generally applied, in fact, to functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society (...)"<sup>533</sup> Perović's definition is in line with Bottomor's: "an elite is considered to be a group of people distinguished in society by knowledge or status."<sup>534</sup>

Bottomor accentuates intellectuals as one of the three elites (besides managers of industry and the high government officials) that are seen as the "vital agents in the creation of new form of society."<sup>535</sup> According to his view, intellectuals are "those who contribute directly to creation, transmission and criticism of cultural products and ideas; they include writers, artists, scientists and technologists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social theorists, political commentators."<sup>536</sup>

Bottomor explains that intellectual elite has two characteristics. The first one is its "direct concern with the culture of a society".<sup>537</sup> The second one is that "it is one of the least homogeneous or cohesive of *élites*, and displays a large diversity of opinion and cultural and political questions."<sup>538</sup>

Finally, Bottomor gives the temporal distinction of the birth of the intellectual elite and ties it directly to the universities of Europe: "The origins of the modern intellectuals have generally been placed in universities of medieval Europe (...). The growth of the universities, associated with the spread of humanistic learning, made possible the formation of an intellectual elite which was not a

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<sup>532</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. "Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države". in: Latinka PEROVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 235. footnotes omitted.

<sup>533</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 7.

<sup>534</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. "Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države". in: Latinka PEROVIĆ, Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ, Marija OBRADOVIĆ (eds.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. p. 235. footnotes omitted.

<sup>535</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 53.

<sup>536</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 53.

<sup>537</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 53.

<sup>538</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 57.

priestly caste, whose members were recruited from diverse social milieux, and which was in some measure detached from the ruling classes and ruling doctrines of feudal society.”<sup>539</sup>

From this excerpt we can see a number of important facts: First, we can denote that the modern intellectuals, one of the most important social strata in the spread of the ideas of modernity, came to existence in the West, in medieval Europe. Second, this social stratum was inextricably linked to the growth of universities. Universities were the bastions of higher learning, and were associated with humanism, liberal thought, enlightenment and the ideas pertaining to modernity. The fact that the university and the intellectual elite were not tied to a priestly caste and that they were independent from religious or ruling influences, at least in theory makes them a vehicle for the ideas of modernity. Moreover, these qualities enable the “exportability” of the ideas of modernity to non-western societies.

After we have presented the theoretical framework for the study of the intellectual elite, it is necessary to explain its relationship with the political elite. Bottomor uses the term political élite to denote “within political class a smaller group, the political élite, or governing élite, which comprises those individuals who actually exercise political power in a society at any given time.”<sup>540</sup> He states that the elite defined in this manner includes “members of the government and of the high administration, military leaders, and, in some cases, politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house and leaders of powerful economic enterprises.”<sup>541</sup>

As for the term political class, Bottomor explains that it includes political élite, but also “‘counter- élites’ comprising of the leaders of political parties which are out of office, and representatives of new social interests or classes such as trade union leaders, as well as group of businessmen, and intellectuals who are active in politics.”<sup>542</sup> This definition shows that the political and intellectual elites are part of the one bigger group (political class), and that is why it is hard to separate them by using solid dividing lines.

For the purposes of this research we will use the term intellectual elite in the following, more narrow, manner: it comprises people who were educated either at domestic or foreign universities. We emphasize this distinction between the domestic and foreign because our research period is focused on the beginnings of the openings of Japan and Serbia towards the West; during this time both countries lacked a developed education system, especially higher education. Therefore, the study at a foreign university had a dual role: on one hand it provided modern education to an individual, on the other when that individual was educated he could disseminate his acquired knowledge for the development of his country’s society. By accepting this new intellectual elite into their ranks, domestic universities or their predecessors have become bastions of modernity.

As for the political elite, by it we mean persons who are in a position of power. It is important to note that the intellectual elite has the predispositions, and sometimes the tendencies to become a political elite. Once the intellectual elite enters the political elite it acquires the moniker political elite, albeit without losing its status as a member of intellectual elite. To make matters simpler, one of the main differences between the intellectual and political elites can be seen in their primary professional endeavors. Namely, a member of the intellectual elite is primarily devoted to his vocation that is located outside the political arena. He may be a lawyer, writer, historian, philosopher, linguist or even physician or mathematician. But, when it comes to the member of the political elite, his primary and usually exclusive vocation is politics.

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<sup>539</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 54.

<sup>540</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 7.

<sup>541</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 7.

<sup>542</sup> Tom BOTTOMOR. 1993. *Élites and society*, Second edition, London and New York: Routledge. p: 8.

This Chapter will be devoted to presentation of emerging intellectual elite in Japan and Serbia from the mid-nineteenth century. We will present the relevant and prominent representatives of the intellectual elite. We will concentrate upon those people who left a mark in the Japanese and Serbian society, especially when it comes to the educational systems of these states. Also, we will present those people who were part of the political elite in order to show whether and how the connections were established between the intellectual and political elite. These connections are important because intellectual elite cannot exert its influence on modernity of a society if it is not recognized in the political discourse.

## 6.1. Intellectual elite in Japan

It is only logical to start the presentation of Japanese intellectual and political elite with the man who was the first Prime Minister of Japan as well as the principal contributor to the Meiji Constitution – Itō Hirobumi.

Itō Hirobumi was a farmer's son. He was adopted by the Ito family and brought under the patronage of "Chōshū leaders like Kido who recognized his ability."<sup>543</sup> Therefore, he became a part of Chōshū leadership group from his early days. He distinguished himself from the other early Meiji leaders through his inclination towards collaboration and compromise and he "probably enjoyed, more than any other person, the trust of the young emperor."<sup>544</sup> He came into the limelight after the death of Ōkubo Toshimichi.

Itō Hirobumi was a member of the so-called Chōshū Five - a group of young Chōshū samurai who were sent to study at the University College London. "The overriding intention of the *Chōshū* was to send young, superior members of the clan to Britain to study modern ideas and technologies in order to apply the same against the *Tokugawa* shogunate, to modernize Japan and to protect the country from foreign aggression."<sup>545</sup> However, this experience not only changed their life but affected the course of Japan: "the scientific and industrial technology, as well as the economic strength, of Western culture exceeded Japanese expectations. The journey abroad convinced 'The *Chōshū* Five' of the necessity of opening Japan to Western knowledge and ideas."<sup>546</sup>

As Itō Hirobumi was one of the central figures of the Chōshū leaders and with his international experience, it does not come as a surprise that he was appointed one of the main members of the Iwakura mission. His knowledge of English was an invaluable asset, especially in giving and responding to speeches."<sup>547</sup> Soon after his return from the Iwakura mission, "he was assigned responsibility for researching forms of government."<sup>548</sup>

As a consequence of the emperor's announcement of the establishment of a parliament, Itō Hirobumi was given a task "to head a commission to study the governmental institutions of other countries" by imperial rescript.<sup>549</sup> "In Europe he was able to consult with Mori Arinori, now minister to London, and Aoki Shūzō, minister to Berlin. His principal investigations were carried on in Germany, where he consulted with the scholar Rudolph von Gneist, and Vienna".<sup>550</sup> Another

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<sup>543</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 389.

<sup>544</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 389.

<sup>545</sup> Hanako MURATA. 2003. "'The Chōshū Five' in Scotland". *History of Photography*, Vol. 27, No. 3. p. 284.

<sup>546</sup> Hanako MURATA. 2003. "'The Chōshū Five' in Scotland". *History of Photography*, Vol. 27, No. 3. p. 285.

<sup>547</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>548</sup> Takii KAZUHIRO. 2007. *Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*. Tokyo: International House of Japan. p. 53.

<sup>549</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>550</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

important member of his commission was a leading German scholar, Herman Roesler. He “had been recruited to come to Japan as adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1878; by 1881 he was first legal adviser to the government, and he earned such trust from the leadership group that from then to 1893, when he left Japan, there were few major decisions on which his advice was not requested.”<sup>551</sup>

Itō Hirobumi was very protective not only of imperial rule but also of his own position in the government. As Jansen points out: “Every move that Itō made upon his return to Japan can be seen as the product of his determination to protect the imperial institution from popular radicalism—and, to be sure, the central role he and his colleagues occupied in the power structure.”<sup>552</sup> On his views on the importance of the imperial house in the political system of Japan Itō Hirobumi states: “In Japan, it is only the imperial house that can become the axis of the state. It is with this point in mind that we have placed so high a value on imperial authority and endeavored to restrict it as little as possible.”<sup>553</sup>

His tendency to accumulate political power was secured when in 1885 he became the first Prime minister of Japan’s modern government. “Around him he collected cabinet ministers evenly divided between Chōshū and Satsuma, with one slot each for Tosa (Tani Kanjō) and the former bakufu official and diplomat Enomoto Takeaki.”<sup>554</sup> It is important to mention that Itō Hirobumi was a long-term member of the Privy Council. Moreover, as explained in the Chapter he was one of the prime contributors to the Meiji Constitutions.<sup>555</sup>

Jansen informs us that “[h]e would serve again and frequently, as prime minister, as designer of the peace after Japan’s victory over China in 1895, as emissary to the courts of Europe (and recipient of an honorary degree from Yale) before losing his life as Resident General in Korea. He probably had the broadest vision of the Meiji leadership group.”<sup>556</sup>

In order to provide a firmer understanding of the relationship of the intellectual and political elites in Japan, it would be wise to turn our attention to the Meirokusha, or the Meiji Six Society. This was a society made up of a broad range of Western-oriented bureaucrat-intellectuals, brought together by the common idea of contributing to the conversation of the future of Japan. Although a short-lived group, it was nevertheless important for the dissemination of Western-oriented ideas in Japan during the 1870s. Meiroku society can be regarded as prime example of the *bunmei kaika* or Civilization and Enlightenment Movement.<sup>557</sup>

As Duke informs us:

“A group of Japanese intellectuals representing the leading western-oriented figures of the time organized the Meirokusha, literally men of the sixth year of the Meiji era, that is, 1873 when the idea first emerged. Although the group disbanded within a relatively short time, the Meirokusha provided a forum for the most

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<sup>551</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 390.

<sup>552</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 391.

<sup>553</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 393.

<sup>554</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 393.

<sup>555</sup> For a more detailed look on the constitution as well as the commentaries by Ito Hirobumi, please consult: Hirobumi ITO. 1906. *Commentaries of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*. Tokyo: Chuo University.

<sup>556</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 395.

<sup>557</sup> David J. HUIISH. 1972. “The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. Vol. 32. p. 208. For more details on the *bunmei kaika* with a special emphasis on its psychological effects, please consult: Michio KITAHARA. 1986. “The Rise Of Four Mottoes In Japan: Before And After The Meiji Restoration”. *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 20. No. 1. pp. 54-64.

outstanding thinkers of the day to formulate, present, and debate their ideas about the future of modern Japan.”<sup>558</sup>

The Meirokusha was founded when Mori Arinori returned from the United States in 1873 and sought out like-minded progressive people who were already active in the intellectual sphere in order to form an association.<sup>559</sup> Pyle provides additional information that deepens the connection of the Meirokusha to the Civilization and Enlightenment movement and its proponents. He writes: “The *bummei kaika* brought a wholesale delivery of the entire Western liberal tradition. The Enlightenment writers associated with the society known as the Meirokusha - Fukuzawa, Nishi, Tsuda, Mori, Kanda, Kato, and others - were among the most self-conscious initial advocates of the cultural revolution that swept over Japanese society in early Meiji.”<sup>560</sup> As an intellectual society they had the opportunity to exchange and broaden their ideas amongst themselves, but they were also publishing their ideas for the broader community by means of their magazine: “Through their magazine, the *Meirokusha Zasshi*, the opinions of the most outstanding figures of the day were made available to the reading public.”<sup>561</sup>

One of the more prominent members of the Meirokusha apart from Mori Arinori was certainly Fukuzawa Yukichi. “Among those Mori contacted was Fukuzawa Yukichi, arguably the most powerful thinker of the moment, who exerted an enormous influence on intellectual thought of early Meiji Japan. His private school, the Keio Gijuku, was already producing graduates who took up teaching positions in all of the leading schools of the day. His books on the West became bestsellers.<sup>562</sup> Moreover, Duke insists that his influence did not stop merely in the intellectual and broader academic circles of Meiji Japan. Duke reminds us that despite his individuality, he remained highly influential in government circles. On this matter Duke further elucidates that “his indirect influence on Ministry of Education officials when they launched the first public school system in 1873 is legendary, sparking rumors that he ran the ministry from his private office on the Keio campus.”<sup>563</sup>

The Meirokusha had other members at its table who were prominent in shaping the first modern education system in Japan. One of the members was Mitsukuri Rinshō: “Others who joined the group, having already made significant contributions to educational modernization, included Mitsukuri Rinshō. He was the prime compiler of the *Gakusei*, and had attained an advanced level of fluency in three western languages unmatched by any other member.”<sup>564</sup> According to Duke, Mitsukuri Rinshō was instrumental in the process of devising the “First National Plan for Education as head of the bureau that wrote it.”<sup>565</sup>

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<sup>558</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 156.

<sup>559</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 157.

<sup>560</sup> Kenneth B. PYLE. “Meiji conservatism” in: Marius B. Jansen. 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 676.

<sup>561</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 156.

<sup>562</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 157.

<sup>563</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 157.

<sup>564</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 157.

<sup>565</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 66.

Another member who was in high government circles and whose role was vital in the implementation of the Gakusei was “Tanaka Fujimaro, head of the Ministry of Education responsible for implementing the Gakusei, joined the Meirokusha upon his return home after nearly two years in America and Europe with the Iwakura Mission.”<sup>566</sup>

This was a group that most definitely wanted to create a new society and wanted to move away from the traditional order. This can be deduced from several facts that we have established, ranging from their individual efforts to the cause of the formation of the Meirokusha in the specific time where its members held progressive values in high regard. However, it should be noted that despite these common values that brought them together there were factions in within the Meirokusha. While the liberal faction was for the emulation of the West, the conservative faction was placing importance on Japanese values. Fukuzawa Yukichi belonged to the liberal faction within the Meirokusha, while Mori Arionri belonged to the conservative faction.<sup>567</sup> Of these distinctions within the group itself and the values that were held and promoted by their respective constituents, Tonsiengsom states: “While liberals emphasized Western values, such as freedom, individualism, independence, and human rights, the conservative group called for traditional values such as loyalty, the imperial line, and faith. They tried to mix traditional values (moral and ethical) with new values (materialism and utilitarianism).”<sup>568</sup>

Ideological and political differences aside, many of the members had a similar background. This excerpt from Duke illustrates these deeply rooted similarities as follows:

“Although membership of the Meirokusha was eclectic in many aspects, it was also in many ways homogenous. All the members originated from the samurai class brought up during the Tokugawa era as warriors educated in Confucian teachings from an early age. At some stage of their education, for a variety of reasons they became interested in western ideas. Nearly all learned one or more western languages. Many of them studied in the West—the United States, England, Holland, France, and Germany. And one, Mori Arinori himself, had served as Japan’s leading diplomat in a western country. They were all among Japan’s most distinguished thinkers of the early Meiji period. Of considerable interest and a sign of the times, most were government officials with the conspicuous exception of Fukuzawa Yukichi.”<sup>569</sup>

The Meirokusha although an integral part of the Civilization and Enlightenment Movement of the 1870s, was short-lived. “The Meirokusha and its journal came to an abrupt end in 1875 after a year in operation. The government had recently placed restrictions on private publications. In view of that, Fukuzawa recommended that the journal be stopped.”<sup>570</sup> Despite its brevity, the Meiji Six Society was a meeting point of some of the more prominent intellectual minds of the time and for that reason it is important to mention, as it paints a broader picture of the values held by the intellectual elite of Japan.

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<sup>566</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 157.

<sup>567</sup> Surangsri TONSIENGSON. 1990. *Western Knowledge and Intellectual Groups in Japan and Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: The Meirokusha and Young Siam*. University of Washington. p. 65.

<sup>568</sup> Surangsri TONSIENGSON. 1990. *Western Knowledge and Intellectual Groups in Japan and Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: The Meirokusha and Young Siam*. University of Washington. p. 70

<sup>569</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 158.

<sup>570</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 158.

We now turn our attention to one of the key figures of education reform in the Meiji Era, Mori Arinori. “As a young Satsuma samurai he was assigned to the study of naval matters and sent to England in 1865... His command of English made him an ideal minister to Washington, where he was also charged with a study of education.”<sup>571</sup> Mori Arinori was the Chargé d’ Affaires of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Washington D. C. at the time of the Iwakura Mission. He was immensely impressed by the reformed American education system, and its primary reformer, Horace Mann. “Mori had devoted much of his time in his Washington tour of duty in the early 1870s to study of the American education system, and took advantage of his time in London to familiarize himself with leading educational authorities in the major states of Western Europe.”<sup>572</sup>

After Arinori was called back to Japan, he became the Minister for Education and became the central figure of the Japanese Education reform. “Mori was appointed minister of education in the first cabinet that Itō Hirobumi organized in 1885. Although he was by no means a clan-centered authoritarian, his brief tenure in that post left Japan with its pre–World War II education system: the lower schools rigidly centralized and emperor- centered, the upper reaches less controlled, focused on scholarly inquiry, and struggling for autonomy.”<sup>573</sup> This fact is relevant from the aspect of our research for several reasons. In having a strong central grip on the elementary school system and putting the emperor as a symbol of national stability and pride, the government creates loyal subjects from young students. As the upper reaches of education become less centralized and more focused on scholarly work, the government ensures that a loyal subject of the state will get the best possible education Japan can offer that will be used in the name of progress of Imperial Japan. Therefore, modernity will invariably be used in the name of a distinct Japanese progress. Gordon explains that Arinori’s “goal was to nurture an elite of patriotic future leaders of the nation. He believed such people needed to learn initiative and responsibility. For this purpose, they had to be given autonomy in their formative years.”<sup>574</sup>

Proof of this “Japanization” of education and the future of Japan can be discovered in Mori’s view and inspiration for graduate schools. “Mori concluded that while in the United States applied science received great attention, higher and theoretical science stemmed from Germany. Within a decade this would be reflected in the structure of Japanese higher education, which, like the new graduate schools in the United States, found its model on the Continent.”<sup>575</sup> From this we can see that Mori was interested in creating a postgraduate education platform that was more heavily influenced by theoretical work, that would bring forth new Japanese thinkers, a homegrown intelligentsia.

Even though he was educated in Western Europe and found inspiration for model of education on the West, Mori Arinori “thought it important for Japan to base institutions and practice on its own tradition.”<sup>576</sup>

Shibata turns our attention to the fact that “What drew the attraction of early Meiji leaders more than advanced technology was ‘social development’ in the West. In his first visit to the USA, Mori Arinori... was greatly inspired by a sense of individualism and social equality held by the

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<sup>571</sup>Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 402.

<sup>572</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 406-407.

<sup>573</sup>Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 402.

<sup>574</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 106.

<sup>575</sup>Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 357-358.

<sup>576</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 407.

American people.”<sup>577</sup> In order to fully grasp Mori’s impression of the United States, especially its education system it would be prudent to present a small segment of his contribution in Charles Lanman’s volume *Japanese in America*.

Mori Arinori acknowledges that the bedrock of education in America was the common school, where every child had a right to free elementary education. The education system was in place from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and it originated in New England.<sup>578</sup> Horace Mann and Henry Barnard further reorganized the school system. Mori provides us with more detail about the reformation of the school system that is aimed at a better education for all; the introduction of standardized methods and teaching equipment; the establishment of teacher schools and libraries etc.<sup>579</sup> It further illustrates common problems in education of the time, such as inexperienced and underqualified teachers and the lack of interest to hold a full time position as a teacher. Mori also noticed the importance of the role that the Bible, and by extent Christianity played in education in the United States.<sup>580</sup> Normal schools were established for the training of teachers to combat the issue of underqualification and understaffing. The impressions of high schools and academies in the United States was that they were varied, in many cases private, and that they served many purposes and had curriculums that the public system did not offer. After high schools and academies, Mori moved on to universities, institutes and colleges. He gave a detailed account of a number of institutions, such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, etc.<sup>581</sup> Mori ends his report on education by underlining the interest from a Japanese perspective on the education of women.<sup>582</sup> The detailed, but concise report on the United States education system gives us a closer look at what the state of education is in one of the wealthiest Western countries. It also gives us the information through the perspective of a Japanese emissary to the United States, and a person that was later responsible for the Japanese educational reform.

Fukuzawa Yukichi was another central figure for the development of Japanese educational system. Even though he was not officer of the Ministry of Education which formulated Gakusei Duke points out that “Fukuzawa’s influence on early modern Japanese education nevertheless was unsurpassed, extending far beyond his private Keio Gijukuschool.”<sup>583</sup> Duke also gives him the title of “a pioneer of modern Japanese education.”<sup>584</sup>

Even though he did not study abroad, Fukuzawa Yukichi was considered a great scholar of all things western. His work as a translator for the bakufu took him to Europe in 1862. He was very diligent in his observations on Europe and upon his return to Japan he made a ten-volume collection on western culture named *Seiyō Jijō - Things Western*. In 1858 he established a School of Western Studies which would in 1890 become Keio-Gijuku University.

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<sup>577</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. “Educational Borrowing in Japan in the Meiji and Post-War Eras”. in: David PHILLIPS, Kimberly OCHS (eds.). 2004. *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford: Symposium Books. p. 147.

<sup>578</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the old American school system, please consult: Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 266-267.

<sup>579</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the school system reorganized by Horace Mann and Henry Barnard, please consult: Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 267-268.

<sup>580</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the importance of the Bible in American schools, please consult: Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 270-271.

<sup>581</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the importance of the Bible in American schools, please consult: Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 276-280-

<sup>582</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 265-281.

<sup>583</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 61. footnotes omitted

<sup>584</sup> Benjamin DUKE. 2009. *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872-1890*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 61. footnotes omitted

Fukuzawa Yukichi very much understood the importance of education for achieving modernity. His knowledge and appreciation for the West cannot be easily overlooked. Neither can his drive for the institution of modern education of Japan. The following excerpt containing Fukuzawa Yukichi's comparison of Japan and the West embodies these two aspects of his intellectual thought:

“If we compare the knowledge of the Japanese and Westerners, in letters, in techniques, in commerce, or in industry, from the smallest to the largest matter . . . there is not one thing in which we excel. . . . Outside of the most stupid person in the world, no one would say that our learning or business is on a par with those of the Western countries. Who would compare our carts with their locomotives, or our swords with their pistols? We speak of the yin and yang and the five elements; they have discovered sixty elements. . . . We think we dwell on an immovable plain; they know that the earth is round and moves. We think that our country is the most sacred, divine land; they travel about the world, opening lands and establishing countries. . . . In Japan's present condition there is nothing in which we may take pride vis-a-vis the West. All that Japan has to be proud of . . . is its scenery.”<sup>585</sup>

This quote should not be misconstrued as belittling Japan. It is more so a constructive criticism given from one of the greatest Japanese connoisseurs of the West and it is given not as a discouragement but as a brave and patriotic motivation to realize the full potential that lies in education. The fact that it is given by Fukuzawa Yukichi who was known as an independent thinker makes this observation that much more important.

For Fukuzawa Yukichi independence was a value held in particularly high regard. This cannot only be seen from his purposeful independence from the government and from the continued operation of his private university, but also from his intellectual thought on independence of the people. As Shibata points out: “Fukuzawa Yukichi... argued that ‘all nations are equal. But when the people of a nation do not have the spirit of individual independence, the corresponding right of national independence cannot be realized.’”<sup>586</sup> Huish writes that according to Fukuzawa Yukichi: “Independence of the people, both as a whole and individually, from the government. For it was only on the basis of this independence of the people that Japan could hope to maintain her independence from the Imperialist West.”<sup>587</sup> This view is even more accentuated in his reserved views towards the Meirokusha, of which he was a member. “His doubts about the Meirokusha were based upon the fact that almost every member was a civil servant.”<sup>588</sup> Therefore, even though he was a part of this group, he continued to nurture his intrinsic independence.

Huish further reminds us that this stance on independence permeated into Fukuzawa Yukichi's life and was instilled as a principle. As a result of this principle, Fukuzawa Yukichi never

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<sup>585</sup> Kenneth B. PYLE. “Meiji conservatism” in: Marius B. Jansen. 1989. *The Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 677. as cited from: Albert M. CRAIG. 1968.

“Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism” in Robert E. WARD (ed.). *Political Development in Modern Japan*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. pp. 120-121.

<sup>586</sup> Masako SHIBATA. 2004. “Educational Borrowing in Japan in the Meiji and Post-War Eras”. in: David PHILLIPS, Kimberly OCHS (eds.). 2004. *Educational Policy Borrowing: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford, UK: Symposium Books. p. 147. footnote omitted.

<sup>587</sup> David J. HUIISH. 1972. “The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. Vol. 32. p. 220.

<sup>588</sup> David J. HUIISH. 1972. “The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. Vol. 32. p. 220.

joined the government. He gave practical reasons that were more than just a practice of principle: “First he feared that the new government was just as anti-foreign as the old; second he feared for his personal safety in the face of persistent anti-foreignism; and third he was absorbed in his own writing and translational work.”<sup>589</sup> Besides, Huish underlines that another “Positive deterrent...was his commitment to Keio, itself by 1870 a flourishing institution where he could feel that he was already performing a socially useful task.”<sup>590</sup>

From these short remarks on Fukuzawa Yukichi’s life we can see that he was truly a great intellectual, a man of principle, respected by and connected to the people in the government, influential among those circles but always free from the chains of power. This short presentation is a good depiction of our thesis statements. It shows that there indeed was contact between Fukuzawa Yukichi as a part of the Japanese intellectual elite and the West. However, that contact alone would remain only a personal sentiment had it not been for his strong connections with the political elite. Through his contacts with people in power his thought penetrated the political discourse and planted the seeds of modernity. What is more important to note from Fukuzawa Yukichi’s life and work is that it is indeed possible to influence the development of a state as an independent intellectual.

After we have established some of the relevant players of the Meiji Period’s intellectual and political elites, we may assume that we have presented the inclusion of the intellectual elite into the political discourse in a satisfactory manner. This inclusion is presented through the examples of the three individuals elaborated above, as well as the Meiroku society. This presentation once again illuminated that the distinction between the political and intellectual elite is often blurred – as in the personal stories provided above these roles often overlap and intertwine. Ito Hirobumi can be seen as the embodiment of the political elite, while Mori Arinori was the bureaucrat-intellectual, therefore a member of both elites in a way. Fukuzawa Yukichi can be considered as a true representation of the intellectual elite in its pure form. Finally, Meiroku society represents amalgamation of intellectual and political elites working together towards a common goal. Another prime example of this amalgam on several plains is the endeavor of great proportions – Iwakura mission. In the following Chapter we will present it in more detail in order to attain a better grasp on the interconnectedness of intellectual elite and the political sphere.

### 6.1.1. The Iwakura mission

Iwakura mission was a diplomatic mission of the newly reestablished Empire of Japan at the outset of the Meiji Era. “The new ‘reformed’ government decided to take up the problem of its relations with the West. Surrounded by many divisive domestic problems, it is amazing that they were able to contemplate sending a major delegation around the world as early as the autumn of 1871.”<sup>591</sup>

The Iwakura Mission bears its name from Prince Iwakura Tomomi, *the udaijin*<sup>592</sup>, who was chosen as the leader of this large diplomatic enterprise.<sup>593</sup> Iwakura took four vice-ambassadors with him for the duration of the year and a half voyage around the world: “Ōkubo Toshimichi; Kido Koin

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<sup>589</sup> David J. HUIISH. 1972. “The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. Vol. 32. p. 221.

<sup>590</sup> David J. HUIISH. 1972. “The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. Vol. 32. p. 221.

<sup>591</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1.

<sup>592</sup> Minister of the Right in the *Daijo-kan*, or the Great Council of State, which was later replaced by the Cabinet.

<sup>593</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1.

(Takayoshi), Ito Hirobumi and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi.”<sup>594</sup> One of the people that is important for the Iwakura mission, although not part of it, as well for as the implementation of the ideas brought by the Iwakura mission was certainly Mori Arinori, whom we have already presented above. He was Ambassador to the United States at the time of the mission and “...he was one of the leading authorities on American affairs at the time”<sup>595</sup>, with “good contacts with the State Department and within Washington society.”<sup>596</sup>

The Iwakura mission was an extremely large diplomatic undertaking with “some fifty emissaries and about sixty *ryugakusei*.”<sup>597</sup> The *ryugakusei*, or exchange students, were students sent abroad in year’s prior and acted as interpreters or the mission wherever the emissaries touched base.<sup>598</sup> The mission consisted of, among others, the most powerful people in the Meiji state who spent a year and a half travelling to various places in Europe and the United States.<sup>599</sup> “This was a master-stroke which for boldness and originality would put most governments to shame. Half the senior leaders of the new administration were sent abroad for an indefinite period which could not in the nature of things be short. In the end it was extended much beyond the original intention to twenty months.”<sup>600</sup> From this information we can deduce the magnitude and the importance of the mission.

Authors covering the topic of this Mission tend to refer to it as a diplomatic mission of great importance; in part because of the prestige that the Great Ambassador commanded. A prince spearheading a diplomatic mission of this magnitude is an extraordinary event in itself. But what is also undoubtedly true is that the political and intellectual power of the mission was just as remarkable.

The objectives of the mission were as follows: “The official objective of the mission was three-fold: primarily to present a credible face to the Western powers following the Restoration and thereby secure recognition; secondly, to investigate the social and economic conditions of the various powers and clarify the basis of their ‘enlightened civilization’; and, finally, to investigate the possibility of renegotiating the unequal trade-treaty provisions existent at the time.”<sup>601</sup>

The mission was planned to visit major and minor powers of the West: The United States, England, The Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and Russia.<sup>602</sup> The Japanese historian and member of the mission entourage Kume Kunitake provided a

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<sup>594</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1.

<sup>595</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 9.

<sup>596</sup> Ian NISH, “Introduction” in: KUME Kunitake, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. xvi.

<sup>597</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1. The list of the members of the Iwakura Mission is available in LANMAN, Charles. *The Japanese In America*. New York. University Publishing Company, 1872, 8-9.

<sup>598</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1.

<sup>599</sup> Andrew GORDON. 2014. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to Present*. – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 73.

<sup>600</sup> Ian NISH. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 1.

<sup>601</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 7. See also: Ian RUXTON. “Britain [2] 17 August- 16 December 1872: The Missions Aims, Objectives and Results” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 35.

<sup>602</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 7.

detailed account of the mission in his work *Beio Kairan Jikki*.<sup>603</sup>

Of the importance of the *Beio Kairan Jikki* and the lessons in it that were vital for Japan, Jansen writes:

“It would be difficult to imagine a more thoughtful and informed discussion of Japan’s present state and future course than that provided by the embassy’s journal. The lessons were clear. Japan had entered a highly competitive world in which victory went to the educated and united. It should choose carefully from among the models before it. Initially American education, British industrialization, French jurisprudence, and German representational institutions held particular promise. It would have to modernize those institutions to establish its qualifications for release from the inequality defined by the unequal treaties, thus postponing immediate gratification for the sake of long-term gain.”<sup>604</sup>

This work acted as one of the bases for the analysis of this endeavor. We will now present features of this mission pertinent to the topic of this work.

The first stop of the mission was San Francisco, California. It is useful to present the introductory speech of Vice-Ambassador Ito in order to better understand the *raison d’être* of the mission’s visit to the United State and the various European nations visited, as well as the deep internal change that Japan was going through. We consider the following speeches as exemplary illustrations of the official aims of both the visitor and the hosts.

At the Grand Hotel in San Francisco on January 23<sup>rd</sup> 1872, at the reception held for the mission, Vice- Ambassador Ito made a speech in which he mentioned, among other things: “Within a year a feudal system, firmly established many centuries ago, has been completely abolished, without firing a gun or shedding a drop of blood. These wonderful results have been accomplished by the united action of a Government and people, now pressing jointly forward in the peaceful paths of progress.”<sup>605</sup>

With this statement, Ito gives a sign that with the reestablishment of Imperial rule, the old ways of the Tokugawa feudal system were behind them and that these revolutionary changes were carried out in a peaceful and civilized manner. He alluded to the fact that the people were supporting the Government, that there was a unified mindset towards the advancements the country has made and was planning to make.

He later continued with: “As Ambassadors and as men, our greatest hope is to return from this mission laden with results—valuable to our beloved country and calculated to advance permanently her material and intellectual condition.”<sup>606</sup>

Ito reaffirmed that Japan is in fact on its way of attaining qualities of the Western nations it is attempting to emulate. Furthermore, this permanent improvement of the material and intellectual condition shows us the influences of modernity in the resolutions of the Japanese government and people- these new values that are adopted by the “men of talent”.

He concluded his speech with: “The red disk in the centre of our national flag shall no longer

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<sup>603</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 8.

<sup>604</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 360.

<sup>605</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. p. 14.

<sup>606</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. p. 14.

appear like a wafer over a sealed empire, but henceforth be in fact what it is designed to be, the noble emblem of the rising sun, moving onward and upward amid the enlightened nations of the world.”<sup>607</sup>

Using this metaphor, Ito gives a multilayered statement about Meiji Japan: that it was experiencing a rising national pride and that it was becoming a new nation state taking its place among other nations on the world scene; that it attained a new resolve that conjoins the old and the new and a connection of tradition and modernity; finally his speech attests to the reaffirmation of Imperial rule in Japan.

On the same evening, a toast/speech was made by the Honorable Charles E. DeLong, American Minister to Japan, who addressed the mission and the guests, and talked about the numerous achievements accomplished by Japan in a short time, including a reform and modernization of the military, of increased trade with the United States and other powers, of the young nobility being educated both home by foreign educators and abroad at universities, and recognizing the Mission as a truly important one.<sup>608</sup> His concluding remark strikes an almost-prophetic note, inviting the very same connection of the past and the future and making a connection between Japan and its modernity-inspired rise to the global arena: “Who of you all, gentlemen, can fail to see in this sight the harbinger of greater events still to follow, that shall place Japan, in a very brief future, in complete alignment with the most advanced nations of the earth? We are proud of the past, proud of the present, and confident of the future”.<sup>609</sup>

These two speeches might seem as nice exchanges of words between host and guest, between a young country searching for recognition and an established nation in the emerging global world, but there is more to these speeches once looked at more closely. There were, by all means, more complex issues at play, and the relationship between the two countries was – at this point – all but equal, especially considering the unequal treaties between Japan and the United States (and other powers). What it does show from a cultural perspective is the resolution of Japan to be set on a modern path, to follow it closely and to become an equal player. In order to achieve this goal Japan decided to take notes from the states it deemed as relevant models. Moreover, in his speech DeLong recognized that Japan had a clear vision and method of execution and that it will be able to quickly grow and take its place among the big players. The use of the words *progress*, *advance* and *enlightenment* in their speeches all point to a clear path of modernity.

After the initial words of praise and the marvel of the beginnings of the mission, the delegation was bound for Washington D.C. “The visitors were to spend over three months there in pursuit of a settlement of the treaties issue, an endeavour that ultimately proved to be futile.”<sup>610</sup> The revision of the treaties was proven to be a failure as the Secretary of State of the United States questioned the authority of the mission to revise the treaties in the name of the emperor and to what extent, and did not wish to start renegotiating at an inopportune moment for the United States. There were many factors that were at play that resulted in the failure of the renegotiation among the aforementioned Swale cites also a cultural barrier and the inexperience of the mission delegates in international affairs as the main hindrances to the success of this endeavor.<sup>611</sup>

After the United States, the mission crossed the Atlantic and continued its route via Great Britain, where the mission had three different aspects of the country to explore: “One was to study

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<sup>607</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. p. 15.

<sup>608</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. pp. 16-17.

<sup>609</sup> Charles LANMAN. 1872. *The Japanese In America*. New York: University Publishing Company. p. 17.

<sup>610</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 7.

<sup>611</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. pp. 12-15.

the law and government, and to examine British political institutions including both Houses of Parliament...The second was to study the economic structure... The third was to examine education in all its aspects".<sup>612</sup> The British were satisfied, while the Japanese left with more wisdom than satisfaction.<sup>613</sup>

Other stays were also important for Japan from diplomatic, economic and military aspects as the mission's aims were to present a credible face to the Western powers in that respect it was successful: in Sweden<sup>614</sup>; the Russians formed positive outlooks on the Japanese<sup>615</sup>, while the Japanese gained a new perspective on the Russians.<sup>616</sup> Both the people and press of France were less astonished by the exotic nature of Japanese visit than other countries were, as "[t]here had been official Bakufu missions in 1862, 1864, 1865, and 1867, as well as visits by groups from Satsuma and Saga and, more recently, officials and private individuals.<sup>617</sup> Although the results regarding the treaty revision were unsatisfactory, "[t]he main significance of the mission, however, has generally been felt to have lain in the general impression of the new Japan which it created, and, above all, in what the ambassadors learned about Western civilization and its applicability to Japan."<sup>618</sup> While the mission had a short stay in Germany, it was one of great importance.<sup>619</sup> The Germans recognized a surprising difference between the Iwakura Mission and the one sent by the Bakufu 11 years prior, from fashion to the resolve of the delegation itself. Both parties were both satisfied with the mission's stay.<sup>620</sup>

In his reports of the Iwakura mission, Kume writes detailed diary-like observations on many aspects of life in the United States, Britain and Continental Europe; the observations of particular importance for this research are the ones regarding education. In his logs, he often gives comprehensive yet compact observations of their visits. During their visit of two schools in San Francisco, Kume observes the schools meticulously, from the classes taught and the number of teachers per student, to the year the schools were constructed and the layout of the buildings, as well as his personal impressions the students' various performances and displays of knowledge left on

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<sup>612</sup> Ian RUXTON. "Britain [2] 17 August- 16 December 1872: The Missions Aims, Objectives and Results" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 35.

<sup>613</sup> Ian RUXTON. "Britain [2] 17 August- 16 December 1872: The Missions Aims, Objectives and Results" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p.43

<sup>614</sup> Bert EDSTRÖM. "Sweden 23–30 April 1873" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 95.

<sup>615</sup> Ian NISH. "Russia<sup>[1]</sup>29 March–15 April 1873" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 85.

<sup>616</sup> "The commissioners who were after all to become the leaders of the new Japan were as a result of their journey able to see Russia in a new perspective. In the east, Russia appeared to the Japanese to be a country which was powerful, arrogant, expansionist and interfering. On her home territory Russia was shown to be backward and unstable with a largely illiterate population and a huge gulf between rich and poor." Ian NISH. "Russia<sup>[1]</sup>29 March–15 April 1873" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 85.

<sup>617</sup> Richard SIMS "France<sup>[1]</sup>16 December 1872–17 February 1873" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. pp.45- 46.

<sup>618</sup> Richard SIMS "France<sup>[1]</sup>16 December 1872–17 February 1873" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 54.

<sup>619</sup> Ulrich WATTENBERG "Germany<sup>[1]</sup>7–28 March, 15–17 April, 1–8 May 1873: An Encounter Between Two Emerging Countries" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 71

<sup>620</sup> Ulrich WATTENBERG "Germany<sup>[1]</sup>7–28 March, 15–17 April, 1–8 May 1873: An Encounter Between Two Emerging Countries" in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 79.

him.<sup>621</sup> He gives us additional information on the school network in the city of San Francisco: “Besides these two schools there were forty elementary schools and two middle schools (one each for boys and girls) in the city of San Francisco. The number of school-children under fifteen years old was 19,885. When you compare this to the total number of boys and girls, it appears that eight out of eleven children attended school.”<sup>622</sup>

Kume speaks of visiting a primary school in London. In it he outlines the classes that the boy and girl, respectively. He takes note of the number of students; the courses and that were being taught. He gives special attention to the practical knowledge instructed to the girls such as weaving, needlework and spinning, and acknowledges the scientific principles being presented through handiwork.<sup>623</sup>

In one instance, in Paris, Kume notices a lack of the proper infrastructure for the education of common people in Paris, citing a French scholar who depicts that if he were to start today it would take him more than eight decades to provide equal educational opportunities for the common people of Paris.<sup>624</sup> This excerpt shows us that during his log, Kume expressed a critical stance towards certain aspects of the Western educational system and noticed negative aspects and logs them as well as the positive ones. There is a consensus in what was wanted, expected, and what the interest of the Mission was. However, it should be reaffirmed here that while this log was an official log of the mission, an individual that has his own views and values wrote it.

As mentioned in the text, the Iwakura Mission had a comparatively short stay in Germany compared to the United States and Britain. However, according to Wattenberg, the *Beio Kairan Jikki* allocates ten chapters of the book to Germany, which is a tremendous amount of space considering that the United States had 20 chapters,<sup>625</sup> when the mission was there for nearly 8 months.<sup>626</sup> The importance is amplified by the notion that Japan had a special interest in Germany, as it was a recently unified country and was judged by some mission members as a preferred model for Japan<sup>627</sup>. As we look into the observation of Prussian education, we should keep in mind this special significance of Germany to Japan at the time:

“The standard of education in Prussia is among the highest in Europe, and it is an area of particular concern for the government. The construction of elementary schools is always paid for with taxes collected from the residents in each town and district. School maintenance is a mandatory responsibility of local officials, and sending their children to school is compulsory for parents. Every year 2 per cent of government income is used for the education of children from poor backgrounds at public expense. One in six of all children of school age in Prussia

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<sup>621</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 19-20.

<sup>622</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 20.

<sup>623</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 132.

<sup>624</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 234.

<sup>625</sup> Ulrich WATTENBERG “Germany<sup>[1]</sup> 7–28 March, 15–17 April, 1–8 May 1873: An Encounter Between Two Emerging Countries” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 71

<sup>626</sup> Alistair SWALE. “America, 15 January- 6 August: The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. pp. 12-15.

<sup>627</sup> Richard SIMS. “France: 16 December 1872–17 February 1873” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 49

regularly attend classes, and it is rare to come across anyone who cannot write.”<sup>628</sup>

Much the same has been said of education in the Scandinavian countries: “Schools and education are advanced in both Sweden and Norway. Even among the peasants who work the land, it is seldom that one encounters a person who cannot read.”<sup>629</sup> After visiting a well-known school in Stockholm, Kume made a more thorough examination of the school’s inner workings, as well as the methods of state financing of the school network.<sup>630</sup>

The meticulousness of these reports and manner in which the mission per se was being executed were both results of careful planning, of clear purpose and an almost scientific approach, as can be seen from the comments and the all-encompassing reports that were tirelessly made.<sup>631</sup>

While it is evident that the connection of the Iwakura Mission to the ideas modernity is undeniable, we should nevertheless comment on some connections. As mentioned earlier, modernity is a broad term sometimes used as an umbrella term to encompass the vast reach of this cultural phenomenon, and other times, authors choose to use other words to describe the effects and clear signs of modernity. A good example of the latter would be the use of the word *enlightenment*. It is helpful to remind the reader that it was established in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 that modernity was in fact a “child of the Enlightenment”. In *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe*, one of the authors Swale clearly indicates that the notion of enlightenment of the primary sources were extremely broad and hard to define in the traditional sense.<sup>632</sup> Swale further assesses that Enlightenment is connected to Christianity and the West, and that the Japanese statesmen in the Iwakura mission were significantly more interested of the benefits of the socio-progressive aspects of said enlightenment, although “[t]hey did not underestimate its function in Western societies in general, but they were also aware of the potential incompatibilities between the Christian doctrines and the march of progress”.<sup>633</sup> He reaffirms his claim and reinforces this definition of enlightenment as a byword for modernity when interpreting the text of *Beio Kairan Jikki*, an official account of the Iwakura diplomatic mission to America and Europe written by Kume Kunitake: “It was an enlightenment of steam locomotives and gas-lit streets. As should become fully apparent to anyone that reads the text of *Beio Kairan Jikki*, the enlightenment that the Japanese subscribed to was very much of this nature”.<sup>634</sup>

As this mission was a monumental undertaking it was natural and logical that, in a mission made up of different individuals over such an extended period of time with so many different countries visited and generally a multitude of moving parts, it would be hard to give a simple answer to the question of whether the mission was a success or not. Ian Nish tries to explain this contradiction

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<sup>628</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 289.

<sup>629</sup> Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 362.

<sup>630</sup> For more comprehensive information on the Stockholm school and by extent education in Sweden as seen by Kume, consult: Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 367-368.

<sup>631</sup> For a detailed account of the daily lives and observations of Kume and the Iwakura Mission during the entirety of the diplomatic endeavor, please consult: Kunitake KUME, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>632</sup> Alistair SWALE. “The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 9.

<sup>633</sup> Alistair SWALE. “The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. pp. 10-11.

<sup>634</sup> Alistair Swale. “The First Stage in the Quest for Enlightenment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library: p. 11.

by laying out a few considerations, such as the strong-mindedness of the mission members and their differences in agenda; the naiveté of the members on the projection of success of renegotiating the treaties prior to their first visit in the United States; due to the secrecy of the mission, there was speculation in Japan and abroad based on misinformation on the accomplishments and intentions of the ambassadors.<sup>635</sup>

From a broader point of view the mission was a success as it was in hindsight characterized by some as “one of the most significant events in the history of Japanese modernization”.<sup>636</sup> And although “[s]ome rated the objective of Treaty Revision more highly than others”<sup>637</sup>, this was not the only objective of the mission. Even if the treaty revision was, from an outsider’s perspective both the most important aspect of the mission and a perceived short-term loss for the Japanese, “it should be pointed out that one of the outcomes of the mission was that Japan saw what steps it had to take in order to request that amendments be made to the inequitable treaties.”<sup>638</sup>

All of these observations were made with a clear intent of compiling and using this information for the betterment of the newly reborn Empire of Japan. “These comparative studies, ranging over the northern hemisphere, were to lead in time to far – reaching constitutional amendments and to the introduction of universal education which was vital to nation-building in Japan.”<sup>639</sup> This work was but the beginning of the changes that would arise from the Iwakura Mission itself. Through the observations and experiences compiled by the Mission throughout the world, ideas of modernity were brought back to Japan that would propel it to the forefront of the global scene. As Jansen observes: “The Charter Oath ended with a pledge to seek wisdom throughout the world in order to strengthen the foundations of the imperial state. Nothing distinguishes the Meiji period more than its disciplined search for models that would be applicable for a Japan in the process of rebuilding its institutions.”<sup>640</sup>

As we can see from the Iwakura mission, this was a practical example in the inclusion of the intellectual elite into the political discourse. From the members of the embassy itself, we are able to see that there was a mix of political and intellectual elites. The connection with *ryugakusei* that were involved in the mission as translators, guides or for other purposes implies that there was a recognition of the embassy leaders of the talent and the resources that were at hand, and from the side of the *ryugakusei*’s side there was excitement and fervor to be a part of a new and exciting era for Japan. The reports that were made and the expertise with which the observations were conducted and signified diligence in planning and despite differences in opinion there was a clarity of vision on the goal at hand by all persons involved in the Iwakura mission. The mission itself was a success because of this clarity of vision and because of this combination of the intellectual and political elites.

## 6.2. Intellectual elite in Serbia

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<sup>635</sup> Ian NISH. “Aftermath and Assessment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 128.

<sup>636</sup> Bert EDSTRÖM. “Sweden 23–30 April 1873” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 87.

<sup>637</sup> Ian NISH. “Aftermath and Assessment” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 128.

<sup>638</sup> Silvana DE MAIO. “Italy 9 May- 3 June 1873” in: NISH, Ian. 1998. *The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment*. Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library. p. 102

<sup>639</sup> Ian NISH. “Introduction” in: KUME Kunitake, Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young. 2009. *Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe 1871–1873*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. xxvii.

<sup>640</sup> Marius B. JANSEN. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 355.

The intellectual elite in Serbia from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was of paramount importance. This was a consequence of the fact that Serbia was a society that lacked distinct interest groups who were integral to the promotion of modernity in Western Europe. These distinct groups were a part of a broader notion of civil society that developed through centuries of gradual social, cultural, industrial and political progress. With the lack of these groups the only way an individual could distinguish himself on the social ladder was through education. As Landes States: "For many, education was the open-sesame to higher status, and this channel was in itself evidence of the more explicit functional requirements of a technologically advanced society".<sup>641</sup> Landes' statement is especially accentuated in the case of Serbia. In such a system, the role of promoting values intrinsic to the modern civil society was relegated to the educated few, the intellectual elite.<sup>642</sup> Therefore, it is especially necessary to emphasize the position of education in regard to both social mobility and political power. This position can be observed through the lens of political parties as the first and most developed institutions of civil society in Serbia.

Political parties epitomize the intricate relationship between the intellectual and political elites in Serbia. Stojanović tells us that this bond between the two elites exists for several reasons. Firstly, Stojanović explains that political parties in Serbia were not the product of a developed and articulated civil society, they were rather a product of "a narrow elite of like-minded individuals, gathered in the capital, educated most often at Western universities."<sup>643</sup> Stojanović informs us that as the part of the most educated among the populace, intellectuals engaged in politics and subsequently lost contact with their primary professions.<sup>644</sup> The second reason for the persevering linkage between the intellectual and political elites lies in the fact that the intellectual elite was often sponsored by the state in providing education abroad. In this way a dependent relationship with the state and therefore with the ruling party was formed.<sup>645</sup>

This dependent relationship greatly influenced the social, cultural and political life of Serbia in the late nineteenth century. The fact that the state had a monopoly on education, which was the only vehicle of social mobility, meant that the state had a monopoly on social mobility.<sup>646</sup> The consequence of this offset balance of power was that the intellectual elite was not independent from the state, as Stojanović remarks.<sup>647</sup> However, the intellectual elite is the one that should be actively involved in the pursuit of more freedoms in the public sphere through promissory notes, and to support the progress of society. However, this is not possible if the intellectual elite is dependent on the state, which it is supposed to keep in check.

This imbalance of power between the intellectual and political elites compelled Stojanović to equate the intellectual and political elites. She further concludes that the intellectual elite not only

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<sup>641</sup> David S. LANDES. 1969. *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. 9-10.

<sup>642</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p. 240.

<sup>643</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p. 240.

<sup>644</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p. 240.

<sup>645</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. pp. 240-241.

<sup>646</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p. 241.

<sup>647</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. p. 241.

lacked the force to move society forward, but was also actively inhibiting Serbia's progress.<sup>648</sup> However, for the purposes of this research it is important to, in fact keep the observation of the two elites as separate entities. Even though there is a significant overlap between the two elites, which according to our thesis statement is necessary, they can and should nevertheless be discerned. In order to succeed in this endeavor, we will frame our research in accordance with the definitions of the intellectual and political elites presented in the introductory part of this Chapter.

We will start by shortly presenting the life and work of Stojan Novaković. He is a prime example of the intellectual elite that was recognized in the political discourse. Novaković was born in Šabac in 1842. Đorđević informs us that after finishing his elementary and high school education in his hometown he went on to study Philosophy and Law at the Belgrade Lyceum.<sup>649</sup> His domestic education puts him at odds with other important actors of his generation but it also signifies the progress of domestic higher education. The Lyceum proved to be a hub for European values that have defined a part of Novaković's political career.<sup>650</sup> He was a true example of a homegrown intellectual.<sup>651</sup>

Two influences were crucial in Novaković's development as an individual, according to Đorđević. The first was his professor, Đuro Daničić, himself a Viennese student and a member of the first generation of the Serbian intellectual elite,<sup>652</sup> who was both an influence and encouragement for Novaković's academic work.<sup>653</sup> The second influence, Đorđević further informs us, came from the values of nationalism and romanticism that were a sign of the times.<sup>654</sup> This fervor was so deep, Đorđević elucidates: "Novaković changed his Christian name Kosta, which in his opinion was not Serbian into Stojan, which was allegedly Serbian".<sup>655</sup> Therefore we may observe Novaković as both devoted to the European ideals he came into contact with through education<sup>656</sup>, and devoted to the romantic national ideals he and his compatriots were driven by in his youth. Throughout his whole life "Novaković was fiercely loyal to his country."<sup>657</sup>

Stojan Novaković was wholly dedicated to his academic work.<sup>658</sup> He was an intellectual in the true sense of the word. During his long and prolific academic career he published "about four hundred scientific papers and announcements, among which were around fifty books."<sup>659</sup> His

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<sup>648</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2008. *Kaldrma i asfalt: Urbanizacija i evropeizacija Beograda 1890-1914*, Beograd: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju. pp. 366-367.

<sup>649</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>650</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>651</sup> Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ. 1976. *Pisci srpske istorije*. Beograd: Prosveta. p. 198.

<sup>652</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*. Istorijski institut, Beograd. p. 240.

<sup>653</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>654</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>655</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>656</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 347.

<sup>657</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 357.

<sup>658</sup> For a more detailed overview of Novaković's academic opus, please consult: Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ. 1976. *Pisci srpske istorije*. Beograd: Prosveta. pp. 189-243.

<sup>659</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 346.

academic work, apart from history encompassed the fields of “literature, philology and political science”.<sup>660</sup>

To elucidate Novaković’s political status Samardžić invokes the words of Pavle Popović: “In his long political career he was minister five times, two times president of the ministry, many times a member of parliament, and spent a number of years at the head of a political party.”<sup>661</sup> Novaković was one of the founders and leaders of the Progressive party.<sup>662</sup> “His political philosophy developed under the influence of the duality of European modernity and domestic traditionalism to which the intellectuals of his time were exposed to.”<sup>663</sup>

Stojan Novaković was Prime Minister two times, once in 1895, and the second time in 1909. As Đorđević notes both his tenures were overshadowed by crises, the first was a financial crisis, and the second was during the Annexation of Bosnia.<sup>664</sup> Moreover, he was a successful diplomat in Constantinople, Paris and St. Petersburg.<sup>665</sup>

From this rich biography, for our research it is important to accentuate that Stojan Novaković was Minister of Education three times: in 1873, 1875, and finally, from 1880 until 1883. Đorđević informs us that his tenure was considered productive: “he compiled and implemented twenty-three laws, wrote twenty-one school curricula, and issued fifty-six decrees and various ordinances and provisions.”<sup>666</sup> It was during his tenure that the Law on Elementary Schools of 1882, the progressive law that prescribed six-year compulsory education for all children in Serbia was adopted.

From this short excerpt we can conclude that even though Novaković was active in political life, he never distanced himself from his true calling, which was academic work. Therefore, he serves as a prime example of the fruitful relationship between the intellectual and political elite. When such an alliance between the two elites is nurtured the intellectual capacities of an individual can be put to use through political channels for the betterment of society. A plastic example of this symbiosis is the Law on Elementary Schools of 1882 during Novaković’s tenure which jumpstarted the influx of modernity through compulsory education.

Another individual that was part of the intellectual elite of the nineteenth century Serbia was Milan Piroćanac. He was born in 1837 in Jagodina. After finishing elementary school in Jagodina, he completed lower high school in Kragujevac and subsequently two years of the Lyceum in Belgrade. He studied Law in Paris, and afterwards went to Germany where he studied the German language. Upon his return to Serbia, Piroćanac stepped into civil service, where he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for seven years, until 1868. After the death of Prince Mihailo, Piroćanac’s career was developing in several directions, from periods in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to positions as judge in Belgrade and Gornji Milanovac, to private practice and judge of the court of cassation.<sup>667</sup> Perović

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<sup>660</sup> Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ. 1976. *Pisci srpske istorije*. Beograd: Prosveta. p. 189.

<sup>661</sup> Pavle POPOVIĆ. “Mladi Novaković”. *Spomenici St. Novakovića*. 1921. Beograd: Srpska Književna Zadruga. pp. 8-9. in: Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ. 1976. *Pisci srpske istorije*. Beograd: Prosveta. p. 189.

<sup>662</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 355.

<sup>663</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 356.

<sup>664</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 356.

<sup>665</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 368.

<sup>666</sup> Dimitrije ĐORĐEVIĆ. 1997. *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije*. Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko- grafički zavod (BIGZ). p. 361.

<sup>667</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 189.

informs us that Milan Piroćanac was “one of the founders of the Serbian Progressive Party and, without any doubt, its ideologue.”<sup>668</sup> However, Perović states that despite his ideological role, he was not the most influential member of the Progressive party.<sup>669</sup>

As we can see from this short introduction into the life of Milan Piroćanac it is evident that he was an extraordinarily able man; his studies show that he was well-traveled; his frequent response to the call of civil service implies that he was harbored patriotic sentiments; his work in private practice implies that he was not tied financially to politics but was financially stable; and his active role in political life and within his party provide us with a picture of a man who was as a firm believer in the ideology he was promoting.

Perović provides further insight into his status: “Together with other educated people of his generation, Piroćanac was inevitably involved in politics... But, unlike most politicians of the time, Milan Piroćanac, Stojan Novaković and Čedomilj Mijatović also had their own professions. They would survive with their work even without political work.”<sup>670</sup> While we are concentrating on Piroćanac as an individual, it is useful to see that he, along with the leaders of the Progressive Party, was in a similar social position. “All three were the first Serbian intellectuals in the modern sense of the word.”<sup>671</sup> This shows us that all three individuals that formed the bulk of the leadership of the Progressives were men of profession first – politicians second. Speaking of Milan Piroćanac as a man of his profession, Perović insists that “[t]his made him independent and gave him a sense of inner freedom. He was already a man of the civilization of money.”<sup>672</sup>

In order to better understand the political ideology, or rather the values that Milan Piroćanac held in high regard, it would be helpful to turn our attention to notes from his personal journal, as presented by Perović:

“The Serbian people have wonderful social and family characteristics, but they, like other Slavs, lack the characteristics of state discipline that give peoples the opportunity to educate and establish their state life. In all poetry for the size of the Serbian state, the Serbian people are not able to find and adopt their own paths that lead to it. Our goal and aspiration is to bring into our people the European spirit that has educated and established so many strong states. With the very qualities that a Serb has today, it is not possible to secure the Serbian state. That is why the Serbian people need to be taught state discipline, it needs to be made so that not only the idea of the Serbian state but also the ways and means by which it can be realized become clear and unwavering.”<sup>673</sup>

We can see from this excerpt that Milan Piroćanac had deeply rooted beliefs in the importance of modern European institutions and a strong sentiment that a Western European system was the right and only model that would prove to be successful for the development of Serbia.

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<sup>668</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 191.

<sup>669</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 191.

<sup>670</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 192.

<sup>671</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 192.

<sup>672</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 196.

<sup>673</sup> Milan PIROĆANAC. *Dnevnik...*, 19. novembar 1882. as cited in: Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 199.

As Milan Piroćanac was a politician and a person who performed a public duty, in order to have a better grasp on his person, it is helpful to observe how he was seen as a public persona. Being that public persona was connected to that of the Progressive Party, it is natural to look at him first as a part of the collective of leaders of the Progressives. Perović distills these views and gives us a succinct picture: “A portrait of the leading people of the Progressive Party; all together, and each one individually. For historians, they were “intellectuals”, “the flower of intelligence”. For contemporaries, well acquainted with Serbia at the end of the 19th century, they were the “elite ... of the people”, whose “image of their people is not very flattering”. In the latter, their political opponents, members of the rival camp, saw both the most important limitation, and the main reason for their failure. They themselves, on the other hand, in their realistic view of the situation in Serbia, found a strong motive for unique efforts in all fields of the young independent state.”<sup>674</sup>

Perović further tells us that although Piroćanac was known being “[u]nrivaled in chamber debates”<sup>675</sup> was not solely tied to the cabinet. He took great pleasure in being among the people, talking, being involved. However, Perović underlines that “he was not a demagogue. He never stimulated the instincts of the masses.”<sup>676</sup>

Milan Piroćanac was the head of government of the Principality of Serbia, and later the Kingdom of Serbia from November of 1880 until October of 1883. Of accomplishments of this government, Perović states the following: “During the government of Milan Piroćanac, laws were passed that enabled the greatest political freedoms that Serbia has ever had. In addition to the laws on freedom of the press, assembly and judicial independence, a number of other laws have been enacted that lay the foundations for a modern state and social institutions.”<sup>677</sup>

However, Perović asserts that one of the questions that Piroćanac was most concentrated towards throughout his whole political career was the creation of a new constitution.<sup>678</sup> One of the primary motives for this push for a new constitution was that Piroćanac’s government, with colleagues in key ministry positions, “needed a legal framework for the all-encompassing reforms”<sup>679</sup> that would bring about major changes to Serbia from the top- down.<sup>680</sup>

As Perović informs us, Piroćanac was a proponent of the representative system, believing that it was the best form of political system to date. As Perović elucidates: “In the representative system, which leads to the training of individuals as a goal of the state, Milan Piroćanac saw the only way for Serbia not to remain a perpetual prisoner of the formula: poverty and low education prevent political freedoms, and political freedoms alone do not contribute to greater prosperity and higher education.”<sup>681</sup> Piroćanac was not only referring to the current state of affairs in which there were rulers who had absolutist tendencies, but rather that this was fertile ground for any form of absolutism,

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<sup>674</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 198. footnotes omitted.

<sup>675</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 196.

<sup>676</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 196.

<sup>677</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Milan Piroćanac – zapadnjak u Srbiji 19. veka” in: Latinka Perović (ed.). 2003. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 19. i 20. veka: 3. uloga elita*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa. p. 26.

<sup>678</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Milan Piroćanac – zapadnjak u Srbiji 19. veka” in: Latinka Perović (ed.). 2003. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 19. i 20. veka: 3. uloga elita*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa. p. 38.

<sup>679</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Milan Piroćanac – zapadnjak u Srbiji 19. veka” in: Latinka Perović (ed.). 2003. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 19. i 20. veka: 3. uloga elita*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa. p. 40.

<sup>680</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. “Milan Piroćanac – zapadnjak u Srbiji 19. veka” in: Latinka Perović (ed.). 2003. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 19. i 20. veka: 3. uloga elita*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa. p. 40.

<sup>681</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 217.

whether it be of the masses or an individual.<sup>682</sup> Perović concludes by stating that “this formula was reinforced by the intelligentsia with the following views: that every nation deserves the power it has; that gradualness is necessary in the development of political institutions; that political institutions “should correspond to the people's spirit and its characteristics”. Milan Piroćanac questioned all these views.”<sup>683</sup>

A bicameral legislature is something that Piroćanac stood for and was most criticized about, according to Perović. With it, she argues, Piroćanac attempted to integrate the intelligentsia into the National Assembly.<sup>684</sup> “Through the electoral census, as well as the bicameral system, Milan Piroćanac sought to make the National Assembly competent to “modernize the state, which was as unpopular as it needed to happen.”<sup>685</sup>

However, King Milan was not interested in the prospect of having a liberal constitution, and there were significant pushbacks in the National Assembly. These events led Piroćanac to realize that he was not to succeed in setting a course for Serbia’s adoption of modernity during his tenure. Perović gives us a closer look at Piroćanac’s reasoning for this sentiment: “[King Milan’s] readiness to suspend the freedoms given to the country by the first progressive government, as well as the gigantic agitation of the radicals in the people and their obstruction of the reforms in the National Assembly, led Milan Piroćanac, already at the end of 1882, to the conviction that his cabinet “completed his role.”<sup>686</sup>

Finally, Piroćanac commented on the failed attempts at achieving his political goals in this journal: “Our work encountered difficulties because hardly anyone in the country wanted to understand the true position of Serbia, because state issues buried the general goal and that political education is still quite weak to achieve a lofty goal.”<sup>687</sup>

After this presentation on Milan Piroćanac we may conclude that this was a man of principle, devoted to European ideals and who was completely independent from the allure of political life. He was an idealist and professional that felt the necessity for a working impartial state system in order for modernity in Serbia to be successful. His aims for constitutional reforms that guaranteed strong political institutions and a bicameral legislature were driven by a pragmatic mind, which sought to find the best and quickest way to achieve the goal of shepherding Serbia closer to Europe.

One may argue that his political ideas left a mark on the political and institutional life in Serbia, such as the 1888 “Radical” Constitution “was, judging by its liberal essence, the closest to the Progressive draft of the highest legal act”.<sup>688</sup> Furthermore, as Popović-Obradović illuminates “[t]he constitution of 1901 was in content closest to Progressive views on the Serbian constitutional issue, i.e. to Piroćanac’s draft of 1883 and Novaković’s similar draft made in 1896.”<sup>689</sup> Even though

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<sup>682</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 217.

<sup>683</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 217. footnote omitted.

<sup>684</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 203.

<sup>685</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 221.

<sup>686</sup> Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. pp. 198-199. footnotes omitted.

<sup>687</sup> Milan PIROĆANAC. *Dnevnik...*, 19. novembar 1882. as cited in: Latinka PEROVIĆ. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. p. 199.

<sup>688</sup> Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ. 2010. *Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije*. Beograd: Čigoja. p.30.

<sup>689</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 133.

these political ideas came from him, being that he was not directly involved in their implementation leaves room for doubt whether these ideas were implemented in the way he envisioned them. With this remark, we may turn to the person who has most definitely left a long-lasting mark in the political arena of Serbia.

Nikola Pašić was born in 1845 in Zaječar, Eastern Serbia. He started studying Technical faculty at the Great School in Belgrade, and in 1868 he transferred to Zürich University where he studied Engineering.<sup>690</sup> He was sent to study abroad as a state funded grantee. It is insightful to illuminate this part of Pašić's life for several reasons. First, it is important to note that by receiving state grant to study abroad Pašić became part of the so-called planned elite.<sup>691</sup> Also, in Zürich he met and formed strong connections with other students from Serbia, among them Svetozar Marković, Pera Todorović,<sup>692</sup> Petar-Pera Velimirović.<sup>693</sup> These men will prove pivotal for his future political life in Serbia. Svetozar Marković was the bearer of the ideas of socialism that were central to Pašić's ideology. Petar-Pera Velimirović, Pera Todorović and Lazar Paču along with Pašić became founders of the Radical Party. Trgovčević cites Pera Todorović and states: "Zürich students created the core of the Radical Party. A quite extensive and interesting study could be written about the influence of Zürich to the fate of Serbia."<sup>694</sup> Trgovčević therefore rightly concludes that one of the characteristics of the first generation of students in Switzerland was their political engagement.<sup>695</sup>

Finally, Zürich was a place where Russian revolutionary emigration was numerous and strong. Therefore, Serbian students were exposed to its revolutionary ideas. Svetozar Marković was already acquainted with Russian socialist ideas, since he studied shortly in Saint Petersburg. In Zürich Marković gathered around him a group of Serbian students who were like-minded. Trgovčević adds that a youth organization "Zadruga" was formed in Zürich under the auspices of Svetozar Marković, and that Nikola Pašić was its organizational secretary.<sup>696</sup> Marković was "guided by the basic idea of by-passing capitalism, and convinced that Slav civilisation rejected the separation of state and society characteristic of the Western nations ... The foundations of this state were to be provided by the patriarchal institutions of the Serbian people, especially the zadruga [extended family with common ownership of land and cattle] and the opština [village community]; and its basic principle of organisation would be self-government."<sup>697</sup>

With these strong experiences and influences from Zürich, Pašić returned to Serbia in 1873. In 1881 he participated in the formation of the People's Radical Party. Its original ideology can be summarized as follows, in line with the learning of Marković:

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<sup>690</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 140, 178.

<sup>691</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 60.

<sup>692</sup> For more details on Pera Todorović please consult: Perović, pp. 162-179.

<sup>693</sup> See Trgovčević's note on how they lived together, or close to each other in Zürich: Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 152.

<sup>694</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 145.

<sup>695</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 142.

<sup>696</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 142.

<sup>697</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRAĐOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 97. For more details on the ideology of Svetozar Marković please consult: PEROVIĆ, Latinka. 2006. *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. pp. 79-126.

‘The Radical Party’ wanted to prevent the people from ‘copying the errors of Western industrial society, wherein a proletariat and immense wealth are being created, seeking instead to build industry on a collective [zadruga] basis.’ It wanted ‘to introduce full self-government ... in place of the bureaucratic order. Instead of capitalist national management ... the establishment of workers’ associations [zadruga].’<sup>698</sup>

Pašić was a strong opponent to King Milan as he saw him as: “as the proponent of western orientation and eo ipso enemy of Slavic civilization, of which he believed Russia to be the cornerstone.”<sup>699</sup> The zenith of this “rivalry” was the Timok rebellion: after the state decided to form a conscript army and to take weapons from the people, members of the Radical Party organized rebellion which was forcefully quelled. Popović-Obradović comments: “The Timok Rebellion, expressing popular resistance to abolition of the popular army, was proof in equal measure of the Radical Party’s enormous political influence and, in view of the efficiency and brutality with which the regime suppressed it, of the strength of the monarchy and the need to seek a compromise with it.”<sup>700</sup>

Pašić managed to escape the arrest and exiled to Bulgaria. There he cemented his ideological views: “the people’s state, created by the people – “the jerkin and the sandal”, the people’s self-government, the people’s party as the representative of the entirety of the nation, Russia as the foreign policy pillar.”<sup>701</sup>

Popović-Obradović gives us a detailed insight into Pašić’s political aim in that period. She states that for him primary goal was a close association with Russia.<sup>702</sup> “To deter Serbia from tying itself to Austria and Germany, and to reorient it towards the Orthodox East, i.e. Russia, was for him an aim to which all else had to be subordinated, even state independence. Serbia refused to be ‘beguiled by the flattering Western culture so full of injustice’” wrote Pašić.<sup>703</sup> According to Popović-Obradović Pašić also wrote: “The Serbian people, in his view, was ‘the most unfortunate in the world’, because the king, whom he called a ‘traitor’ far greater than Vuk Branković, had separated it from the Russians in order ‘to make the country subservient to the Germans’.”<sup>704</sup>

Pašić’s view on the Western institutions is worth quoting in more detail:

“the Radical Party did not wish to see Western institutions in Serbia, because the Serbian people ‘has so many good and fine institutions and customs that need only to be preserved and improved with those wonderful institutions and customs

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<sup>698</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 99.

<sup>699</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 17.

<sup>700</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 109.

<sup>701</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 17.

<sup>702</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 112.

<sup>703</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 112.

<sup>704</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 112 (footnote omitted)

harboured by the Russian people and other Slav tribes, while taking from the West only technical knowledge and science to be used in the Slavo-Serb spirit’.”<sup>705</sup>

This is an interesting statement that falls in line with the trends that were prevalent in the zeitgeist.

There are similarities in the philosophy of the Meiji Period of Japanese Spirit, Western Technology or *wakon yōsai*, with the philosophy of Nikola Pašić who advocated that Serbs should take a similar route of selective implementation of Western technologies and couple them with the Slavic spirit. There is an obvious influence of the other modern idea of that time – the notion of Pan Slavism that Pašić is referring to. The problem with this statement and philosophy is not in its aim, but in the complications in the execution of this philosophy. First, as we have established, by the time political parties played an active role in Serbian society, there was growing heterogeneity within the intellectual elite as a result of a multitude of influences. These influences came mainly from Western Europe as it was primary “educator” of the elite, Pašić included. Second, although patriotism and nationalism could have played a significant role in this philosophy, intellectuals such as Stojan Novaković, although an extreme example, was indeed both a patriot inspired by romantic ideas of nationalism, and who was a home-grown intellectual, opted for a political and cultural matrix of a Western European origin. Finally, in order to realize this philosophy, one needed the strength of the entire population, including and especially the intellectual elite. This takes therefore required certain diplomacy towards differing political and cultural opinion, which Pašić lacked, as will be demonstrated in the following passages.

Pašić returned to Serbia after Milan’s abdication and he concentrated upon strengthening the organization and ideology of the Radical Party, as well as its own position therein.<sup>706</sup> It is important to explain how he saw the Radical Party on one hand and Liberal and progressive on the other:

“According to its own understanding, the People’s Radical Party was the sole representative of the socially and nationally homogenous Serbian people. This by itself determined the attitude of the party towards other political parties. Both the Liberal and the Progressive Party were labelled as enemies of the people, and their potential return to power was perceived as a threat to the constitutional accomplishments.”<sup>707</sup>

An interesting parallel can be drawn on the differences in the political and ideological opinions within the elites in Japan and Serbia. We may harken back to the differing opinions within the Meirokusha. The Meirokusha was taken as a hub of intellectuals and bureaucrat-intellectuals who gathered people with difference in approach. Despite these differences, this society was based on debate and tolerance and was striving towards the same goal. On the other hand, difference of opinion in the public sphere in Serbia was met with disapproval and even violent intolerance.

Despite this sharp negative feeling towards the Progressives, Pašić did not hesitate to form a joint government with them in 1901, known as the “fusion” and to support the adoption of 1901 Constitution, despite the introduction of institutes that were in stark contrast with the Radical’s ideology.<sup>708</sup> Namely, not only that the Constitution introduced the Senate (which was in years prior

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<sup>705</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 112.

<sup>706</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 18, 123.

<sup>707</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 18.

<sup>708</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 132.

totally unacceptable to the Radicals and its' ideology) but Pašić himself was appointed senator.<sup>709</sup> Pašić justified this shift in politics by relying on a specific mission, or “national task”, that he promoted after his return from exile: “the liberation of the Serbs outside Serbia, and all-national unification.”<sup>710</sup>

Namely, Pašić formulated the “national task” in the following manner, as conveyed by Popović-Obradović:

“I have always harboured more intense sentiments for the life and fate of the Serb people outside the borders of the Kingdom of Serbia than those which prompted me to work for popular liberties at home. The national freedom of the whole Serb people was for me a greater and stronger ideal than the civic freedoms of the Serbs in the Kingdom had ever been’: that was how Pašić described his political credo in 1902, when defending himself before the summary court against accusations of ‘cowardice’ and betrayal of the party, and of having given up the party’s programmatic principles by agreeing to ‘fusion’ and the 1901 constitution.”<sup>711</sup>

It is without a doubt that Pašić left a strong mark on the history of Serbia and its political life. He was a true representative of the political elite. Even though he was educated at the Western university, he did not engage in his profession for more than a short period in 1874.<sup>712</sup> However, he was very influential in the politics of Serbia at the crossroads of centuries. When he died “the foreign press wrote about him as the ‘uncrowned king’ of Serbia.”<sup>713</sup>

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<sup>709</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 135.

<sup>710</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. p. 137. For a more detailed presentation on the evolution of Pašić’s political views please consult: Perović, pp. 127-162.

<sup>711</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ. 2013. *The Parliamentary System in Serbia 1903-1914*, Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. pp. 137-138.

<sup>712</sup> Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ. 2003. *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku*, Beograd: Službeni glasnik. p. 178.

<sup>713</sup> Olga POPOVIĆ OBRADOVIĆ. 2008. *Kakva ili kolika država: Ogledi o političkoj i društvenoj istoriji Srbije XIX–XXI veka*. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava. p. 38, footnote omitted

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter 2 we have comprehensively presented the theoretical framework that guided our research. We decided to follow the path of multiple modernities through the study of Japan and Serbia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. We focused on two relevant indicators of modernity – education and the intellectual elite. Through the lenses of modernity, we thoroughly presented relevant occurrences in the social, cultural and political systems of the states.

In Chapter 3 we presented the state of affairs in Japan and Serbia in the immediate time period before the research period. This proved important in order to set the baseline for further research, as the findings in this Chapter showed the starting point of Japan and Serbia in the quest for modernity. Moreover, we tackled the situation in the West, especially in Western Europe in order to present this reference culture.

In Chapter 4 we presented in detail the relevant events that marked the budding influence of modernity in Japan and Serbia. In Japan we explained the Meiji Restoration and its consequences. In Serbia we addressed the moment of recognition of independence and its social and political climate at the time.

After presenting these important facts, in Chapter 5 we could turn our attention to education, as a factor of modernity. We presented the ways in which both Japan and Serbia accepted the Western model of education, created education networks and established higher education institution as primary contributors to the formation of intellectual elites.

In Chapter 6 we shifted our focus to the intellectual elites in Japan and Serbia, with a special emphasis on their relation towards the political elites. Moreover, we have presented biographies of the most relevant individuals for our research. These were prominent actors in the introduction and promotion of the ideas of modernity.

Finally, we can therefore come to our conclusions. In this part of the doctoral dissertation we will structure our final arguments around the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1.

The first general hypothesis of the research was that the acceptance of modernity is not possible without the successful implementation of the Western model of education. This successful implementation entails the creation of a comprehensive system of education – starting from elementary school, through various types of high schools, to institutions of higher education.

In the sphere of elementary schooling, in both Japan and Serbia laws were adopted that contained ordinances for compulsory. Furthermore, through centralized Ministries of Education, a network of schools with standardized curricula was adopted. This contributed to the elevation of literacy rates in both countries. Moreover, it brought about the creation of a national identity, which was another idea inherent to modernity that was to be implemented throughout the education system.

In the sphere of high schools, the consequence pertaining to modernity was reflected in creating a feeder network for the university and state administration. Moreover, specialist secondary education was an importantly stepping-stone in the creation of a vertical school network. This was the case with Normal schools in both Japan and Serbia. These schools educated teachers who in turn educated a new generation of elementary school students. In this way both high schools and specialized secondary education proved to be an important gear in the perpetual mechanism of modernity through education.

Regarding higher education, the aim of the state was to create an intellectual elite. Both Japan and Serbia did this firstly through the planned state sponsorship for the study at foreign, predominantly Western universities. Through this first step, the state was able to create the basis of a self-sustaining higher education system. This was done by accepting the returnees from the foreign

universities and providing that they are included in the further dissemination of values and ideas, most notably modern, gained at these Universities. A special channel for the dissemination of these ideas was the creation of domestic universities.

Domestic universities (and their predecessors) established by the state were proof that the state had an understanding of the need for higher education in order to progress. Returned state grantees that worked at these institutions of higher learning prove this point. Moreover, the intellectuals themselves felt the need to contribute to further dissemination of values and knowledge acquired at foreign universities. Therefore, in some instances they created private Universities. Such was the case of Fukuzawa Yukichi and his Keio University and Ōkuma Shigenobu and his Waseda University in Japan. In Serbia however, the endeavors to spread modernity of the intellectual elite were channeled through the state operated institution of higher learning, such as the University of Belgrade.

The establishment of an elementary and high school network, as well as the establishment of the domestic university resulted in the creation a vertical system of education, which had the capacity to be self-sustaining. It also provided a necessary hub for the creation of a homegrown intelligentsia. Through the prism of education reforms we are able to better understand the lengths to which the governments and the elites in Japan and Serbia were ready to go to in order to position themselves on the international scene. Therefore, we can conclude that in Japan and Serbia education was used as a tool for a cultural and national rebirth. This rebirth was to be achieved through educating the individual. In Duus' words: "The long-run goal was national strength, to be sure, but it was to be achieved only indirectly by developing the character, talents, and minds of the population."<sup>714</sup>

From the general hypothesis we deduced two particular ones. The first particular hypothesis of this doctoral dissertation is that contact between the intellectual elite and the West is a necessary prerequisite, but insufficient by itself for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented.

In the research timeframe, both Japan and Serbia were new players in the international community. Japan was opening after 250 of self-imposed isolation to a completely new emerging global system. Serbia managed to release itself from the firm grip of Ottoman rule and emerged for the first time as an independent nation-state in the modern sense. Having in mind this newly established status of these two societies what followed was a necessary construction of the institution that would make them equal players in the emergent global community. The establishment of these institutions required a specific set of prerequisite that could not be found anywhere else but in the system that both countries were trying to emulate. This brings us to the importance for Japan and Serbia of the West in the cultural, social and political sense.

The West acted as the role model on Japan's and Serbia's path towards their inclusion as equals in the emerging global community and therefore modernity. In order to emulate this role model it was necessary to establish firm connections with the West. One of the ways in which this was achieved was through education. Namely, both states have directed their energies and funds to educate their subjects at Western universities; in that way they would manage to establish firm connections, both personal and institutional but most importantly ideological, with their role models.

In that way students acted as channels of communication between their respective states and the West, its values and ideas. By attending Western universities, the state grantees were consciously or unconsciously susceptible to ideas of modernity. The experience of studying at these foreign Western universities facilitated the creation of a specific cultural and social stratum, the intellectual elite. Upon their return to Japan and Serbia this intellectual elite would become catalyst for the

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<sup>714</sup> Peter DUUS. 1976. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. pp. 89-90.

dissemination modern ideas in their home countries. This dissemination in turn enabled the eventual creation of an indigenous intelligentsia.

Through this newly developed intellectual elite, the seeds of modernity were planted in both the Japanese and Serbian society. However, in order for modernity to reach its full bloom, an impetus from the state was needed. The role of the state has already proven to be instrumental in the very creation of the intellectual elite through its multifaceted sponsorship, reflected in both the planned sending of state grantees to Western universities as well as the creation of the education system crowned with the creation of domestic universities. Therefore, the state needed to recognize its own project, and harvest the benefits of its investment. This entailed the opening of the political discourse for the independent influence of the newly created intellectual elite.

With these findings in mind, we formulated the second particular hypothesis: the modern intellectual elite must be included into the political discourse in order for the ideas of modernity to be successfully implemented.

The intellectual elite in Japan was born out of the middle and lower middle samurai class. Members of the samurai class had a privilege to education in general, as well as education abroad, even before the establishment of the Meiji state. It was precisely this class that has established the modern state of Japan and helped reestablish Imperial rule. Therefore, we can see that the intellectual elite was built into the foundation of the modern Meiji state, and was largely integrated into the political elite. However, it remained independent in its thinking and in its actions towards the progress of the state. In fact, it was the progenitor of many of the ordinances that pushed Japan forward.

The practical joint enterprise between the intellectual and political elite can be seen in the great diplomatic endeavor that was the Iwakura Mission. Iwakura Mission was a practical embodiment of the Fifth Oath that prescribed seeking out knowledge throughout the world. One of the primary endeavors of the Iwakura Mission was indeed to seek out the best social, political, and especially educational institutions throughout the industrialized West. This Mission created tangible contact with the West and brought home best practices in these fields.

The Iwakura mission was a turning point in the early Meiji era and it has influenced the creation of modern Japanese institutions and practices. Its influence can be prescribed to its prestigious members. One of them was Ito Hirobumi. He was a member of the political elite and without a doubt one of the most powerful politicians of his time. Moreover, he was the primary creator of the 1889 Constitution and he was Prime Minister during its drafting.

Another important part of the Iwakura Mission was Mori Arinori. Although not a member of the Iwakura Mission, he was assigned to assist the Mission in the United States. Upon his return to Japan he used his insights and the insights of the Iwakura Mission to influence the development of education in Meiji Japan.

A true representative of the intellectual elite was Fukuzawa Yukichi. As one of the progenitors and main promoters of the Civilization and Enlightenment Movement of the 1870ies his voice was heard in both intellectual and political circles. Moreover, the importance of his role in creating the first private university in Japan cannot be overstated.

Fukuzawa Yukichi acted as part of the wider group of bureaucrat-intellectual gathered around the Meiroku society created by Mori Arinori. This society was instrumental in the dissemination of the ideas and spirit of modernity in the 1870ies in Japan, despite its short life. Meiroku society also stood as a prime example of the ability to work toward a common goal despite differences in opinion of its members.

In Serbia the intellectual elite was recognized in the political discourse. Prime examples are

Stojan Novaković and Milan Piroćanac. They were members of the intellectual elite – Novaković was historian and philologist and Piroćanac was a lawyer –but they also extended their engagement into the political sphere. Novaković was Prime Minister as well as Minister of Education and during his tenure Law on Elementary Schools was promulgated. Piroćanac was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. During his tenure as Prime Minister many progressive laws were promulgated in Serbia. While some of his modern ideas were not implemented in their complete form, it is safe to say that his political ideas of liberalism indeed remained present in the social life of Serbia. Therefore, he succeeded in bringing the breath of modernity to Serbia.

While Novaković and Piroćanac were true intellectuals, meaning that they were professionals first and politicians second, Nikola Pašić was a member of Serbian political elite that through its fierce and persistent political engagement slowly lost connection with his professional work. Namely, it is safe to say that he was the most prominent political persona in the end of 19<sup>th</sup> – beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century Serbia. Pašić was educated at a Western university and was the founder of People’s Radical Party. These were all the traits of modernity that he brought to Serbia. However, through his career he marked as his political aim not to bring Serbia closer to the West, but to unite all Serb people, even outside Serbian state borders. Therefore, through his example we can see that inclusion of intellectuals in the political discourse is not a guarantee of the spur of the ideas of modernity. Having this in mind we formulated the second general hypothesis of the doctoral dissertation.

The second general hypothesis of the doctoral dissertation is that the success of modernization depends on the reasons for the acceptance of modernity. Namely, ideas and values of modernity can be acquired by the individuals and later disseminated through educational and political discourse. However, the reason of the acceptance of these ideas would affect its implementation and success.

In Japan the reasons for the acceptance of modernity lied in Japan’s striving to become equal with Western states and to become a great power. Because of its turbulent opening to the West, Japan needed a strategy in order to properly channel incoming influences from the West. Japan concluded that the best way to achieve this is to enrich their tradition with the western values and to create a new, Japanese modernity.

This “Japanese modernity” can be seen by looking at the establishment of its education system. Japan did embrace Western mechanisms in education, especially in the formative years of the Meiji state. Later on, having established a firm system, they imbued that system with their traditional learning, with the Emperor at the center, as a unifying force.

One important characteristic of the Meiji period was stability. This stability was embodied in the institution of the Emperor and through the implementation of the national polity or *kokutai*. Another factor of stability was the Meiji oligarchy or *genro*. In the newly established structure the Emperor was formally on top, the Meiji oligarchy with the samurai from Chōshū and Satsuma domains below the emperor while exercising executive power, leading the vast new state administration filled with “men of talent”. This structure provided a top-down system that was able to persevere and implement the necessary changes.

This stability enabled Japan to pursue modernity as a goal *per se* which in turn facilitated Japan’s successful blend of its traditional values and the imported ideas of modernity. Japan succeeded in accepting the foreign as its inherent characteristic – the dichotomy between domestic and foreign was abridged by the slogan *wakon yōsai* “Japanese spirit, Western Technology”.

It is important to say that in the case of Serbia there was no guard against foreign influence. Despite being under the Ottoman Empire, Serbia was, geographically and culturally a part of Europe. As we have established, even before Serbia’s independence the intellectual elite have largely

embraced modern European values. Therefore, its' strategy towards the acceptance of new ideas was much more lenient.

An example of this leniency can be seen in the acceptance of modern traits even before Serbia gained independence: from a most liberal Constitution in Europe in 1835 to implementation of progressive Law on Education in 1844. Moreover, connections with the West were constant and important part of Serbia's foreign policy in its' quest for independence, and later in its attempts at protecting its sovereignty. Also, educated Serbs lived outside Serbia in the modern Europe of that time, yet maintained strong connection to both the Serbian state and Serbian culture.

Because of this constant and natural exposure of Serbia to the ideas of modernity Serbia had no need for organized endeavors in order to establish a meeting point with the West, as was the case for Japan, e.g. the Iwakura Mission. Moreover, Serbia lacked the much-needed political stability in both the royal department as well as in the legislative one. Intellectual and political leaders had differing opinions on the manner in which the social and political system should be organized. This immobilized a top-down establishment of the firm institutional framework that would capitalize on a self-perpetuating dissemination and implementation of the values of modernity.

Yes, Serbia was a newly independent state. Yes, it had made several leaps toward modernity that are to be lauded. However, Serbia was a young country, with democracy at its very infancy and fragile state, with institutions yet to be built. What we mean by this is in order for an institution to exist, not as an edifice in its literal form, but in the mind of the people, as a complex system of beliefs, it needs to show perseverance in the face of adversity. It needs to stand the test of time. However, in the beginnings of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Serbia had yet to build such an institution, not only in the minds of intellectuals but to instill it in the national spirit.

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4. **Ауторство – некомерцијално – делити под истим условима.** Дозвољава се умножавање, дистрибуцију и јавно саопштавање дела и прераде, ако се наведе име аутора на начин одређен од стране аутора или даваоца лиценце и ако се прерада дистрибуира под истом или сличном лиценцом. Ова лиценца не дозвољава комерцијалну употребу дела и прерада.
5. **Ауторство – без прерада.** Дозвољава се умножавање, дистрибуцију и јавно саопштавање дела, без промена, преобликовања или употребе дела у свом делу, ако се наведе име аутора на начин одређен од стране аутора или даваоца лиценце. Ова лиценца дозвољава комерцијалну употребу дела.
6. **Ауторство – делити под истим условима.** Дозвољава се умножавање, дистрибуцију и јавно саопштавање дела, и прераде, ако се наведе име аутора на начин одређен од стране аутора или даваоца лиценце и ако се прерада дистрибуира под истом или сличном лиценцом. Ова лиценца дозвољава комерцијалну употребу дела и прерада. Слична је софтверским лиценцама, односно лиценцама отвореног кода.